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September 26, 1986
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Approved For Release 2006/01/03: CIA-RDP90-01137R0 RADIO TV REPORTS, IN 4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 (301) 656-40 PROGRAM NBC Nightly News STATION WRC TV NBC Network September 26, 1986 7:00 PM Washington DC TOM BROKAW: Later today President Reagan gave a pep talk to the United States intelligence community, the people who have been trying to repair the damage from a recent series of American spy cases and defections. To make his case, the President appeared at dedication ceremonies for new facilities of the National Security Agency. That's. America's top secret intelligence gathering agency. And as NBC's Andrea Mitchell reports tonight, the President's appearance was highly unusual, but the White House thought it was necessary in these troubled times. ANDREA MTICHELL: The National Security Agency is so. secret that no one is even supposed to talk about what it does. Over the objection of some intelligence officials, however, the White House turned the dedication of the agency's new headquarters into a full-blown media even to boost morale after a series of spy cases. PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN: Our most sensitive defense secrets and most advanced technology have been stolen, given to our adversaries out of misguided motives or attempts at financial gain. MITCHELL: The intelligence community is still reeling from its losses. Most damaging, Ronald Pelton, who admitted selling secrets to the KGB after working for the NSA for 14 years. Edward Howard, the first CIA defector in 35 years. The Walker family, a spy ring that betrayed secret Navy codes. And the re-defection of KGB operative Vitaly Yurchenko. Amid the fanfare of today's ceremony, some intelligence OFFICES IN: WASHINGTON D.C. ? NEW YORK ? LOS ANGELES ? CHICAGO ? DETROIT ? AND OTHER PRINCIPAL CITIES Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01I37R000100010001-7 Material supplied by Rod o N Reports, Inc. may be used for file and reference purposes oniy. It may not be reproduced. sold or publicly demonstrated or exhibited. Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-011 HARPERS ON PA, April, 1985 TAILORTHE FACTS TINKUD12AXWITH GAD" The spy as techno-bureaucrat By Andrew Cockburn Among the books discussed in this essay: The United States Intelligence Community, by Jeffrey Richelson. 384 pages. Ballinger Publishing. $39.95. The Puzzle Palace: A Report on America's Most Secret Agency, by James Bamford. 465 pages. Houghton Mifflin. $16.95. Secret Contenders: The Myth of Cold War Counterintelligence, by Melvin Beck. 158 pages. Sheridan Square Publications. $14.95. Warriors of the Night: Spies, Soldiers and American Intelligence, by Ernest Volkman. 443 pages. William Morrow. $17.95. % M16: British Secret Intelligence Service Operations 1909-1945, by Nigel West. 266 pages. Random House. 516.95. Enigma: How the German Machine Cipher Was Broken, and How It Was Read lr`? the Allies in World War 11, by Waldyslaw Kozaczuk. 368 pages. University Publications of America. $24. British Intelligence in the Second World War, edited by F. H. Hinsley. 3 vols., 2,120 pages. Cambridge University Press. $126.50. Deadly Deceits: My 25 Years in the CIA, by Ralph W. McGehee. 250 pages. Sheridan Square Publications. $14.95. One of the problems of secret intelligence these days may be that it has only half gone public. Consider last fall's, cu- rious episode of the shipload of MIG fighter planes that wasn't. Briefly, a Soviet cargo ship freighted with MIGs packed in crates was wide- ly reported, in the form of high-level leaks from the Pentagon and the State Department, to be nearing the coast of Nicaragua. How had this alarming situation been discovered? U.S. "in- telligence analysts" poring over satellite photo- graphs had detected crates, of a type previously used for transporting MIGs, piled on the dock in the Black Sea port of Nikolayev near where the aforementioned cargo ship had been moored. Clouds over the port prevented the-an- alysts from actually watching the crates being loaded onto the ship. But when the weather cleared, both crates and ship were gone. Ergo, the MIGs were on the ship. By the time this process of reasoning and de- Andrew Cockburn is the author of The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine. He is writing a book on intelligence analysis. duction had been carefully explained in the newspapers and on television the American pub- lic knew a lot about the significance of packing crates and clouds-and a lot about circumstan- tial evidence. Yet curiously, the Reagan Admin- istration and the intelligence agencies failed to take the matter to its logical conclusion. Hav- ing gone so far, why did they not throw the whole intelligence-gathering process open to the public? The evening news could have dis- played not only the original satellite. pictures of the crates at dockside but also the relevant pages of the "P. I. Key" (photo interpretation key), a standard tool for this kind of analysis. It is a catalogue of illustrations showing what a crated MIG or an intercontinental missile or whatever is likely to look like in a satellite pho- tograph. Viewers could have been treated to a briefing on the relative effect on a ship's water- line of a cargo of planes, helicopters, or trac- tors. Perhaps anchormen could have told those interested where to mail away for defense atta- ch6 reports and significant articles in the Soviet or Nicaraguan press, the perusal of which would Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100010001-7 Ccntir Lied Approved-For-Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01 137R000100 WASHINGTON TIMES 26 March 1986 Right on target Last December, when oil was still $28 a barrel, CIA analysts rendered a secret prediction that the price would fall to $15 or less in 1986. Reason? They said the Saudis would abandon their role as OPEC swing producer and in- crease the amount of oil they pump. The spooks further pre- dicted this would put a big squeeze on Mexico, Nigeria and Venezuela. So now that you're convinced the CIA can actually see through walls, we'll share another classi- fied prediction. For the long term, the CIA says lower prices could raise oil demand, slow down oil and gas development - and has- ten return of a tight market situation. So low prices are seen as a temporary stop on the road back to a tight oil market. Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01I37R000100010001-7 Approved For Release 2bo~/( SIbIi P90-01137R000100 25 March, 1985 Soviets' constant deception on spending for defense confuses Western analysts DEFENSE REPORT /ALBERT WEEKS When Mark Twain complained '1Sefense production according to about the "three kinds of lies - U.S. cost criteria - that is, by lies, damned lies, and statistics," he material inputs, wages, work time, didn't dream that a government rented space, resource allocation, would appear on earth with a policy technology expense, etc- But estab- of active dissimulation and prop- lisping equivalence between the agation of myriads of "damned United States and the Soviet Union lies" The founder of the Soviet is drastically complicated by the state, however, is on record with the fact that the latter can squander statement that "telling the truth is manpower, materials, finances, and a bourgeois prejudice" resources on defense either by sub- Manipulation of statistics and sidizing defense costs from other double accounting have become portions of the budget (in a con- boilerplated Soviet traditions, for cealed way). This obviously throws both domestic and foreign con- off applied Western cost- sumption. Ex-Soviet officials now living in the West have given plenty of evidence of official juggling with figures in order to convey a certain impression. This is one of the reasons that revelations about true official fig- ures is punishable as a capital crime in the Soviet Union under Articles 75 and 76 of the Criminal Code, even where the intent is not "treason" per se. On top of this, Soviet economic reports conceal arms expenditures by distributing them -- unspecifically, of course -- among several ministries whose invest- ment and output plans are known to include large amounts of arms pro- duction. Ferreting them out by remote Western analysis is well nigh impossible. So. it is no wonder that our intel- ligence officials - whether in the CIA or Defense tnte i ence Agency - an our ooiective- min ea scnotars et confused as to just what the Quiets are pro uc- tn es er.a v in t e us - ush area of weaponry. Here Western is ou y curse : The c s buildu secret for ro a anda as because well as for the clear tntelli ence tiara and its fi ures ernerally are He added that Washington u ore of ee in t e potential hi her for Soviet a enditures hoped to damage the Soviet coon enemy in the dark: What he doesn't than those of the CIA, DIA's static amy by forcing a switch from the know will hurt him. t cs are suspect by association and civilian to the military sector but thus undeservin of as much edito- that this would not curtail develop- e i ures su ment. The Financial Times noted Sources of error rid attention is ht Various methods are used to plied by the"c,vilians" at CIA. that even "declared" Soviet attempt to penetrate the statistical What is overlooked here is that tan exnendit res are tin 12 per. Iron Curtain. All of them are sub- the 's record is rater is pent for 1985, or far above the CIA ject to error. One of the most sus- concerns estimates of Sow iet wea - estimates for yearly increases pect techniques is to gauge Soviet ns roduction. timin of their from 1976-82. Approved For Release 2006101/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100010001-7 resear o Soviets see ' to ee tear arms mates. The irn Citation is that other NATO countries. a enta on tnstitu- D A technological breakthroughs, Be that as it may both agencies now report a significant upsurge in Soviet military production in the last 2 years. They both agree that up to 17 percent of the Soviet gross national product goes toward the military. And they agree that the Soviets lead us in 26 of 29 major military-weapons categories. Both agencies know that the Soviets enjoy a 7-to-1 advantage over us in long-range intermediate nuclear arms on the European continent and overwhelming advantages in ICBM megatonnage, percentage of ICBM warheads in protected, land- based silos, ICBM first-strike potential, and several more. Another complicating element Open to doubt is the cheap and manipulated cost of labor in the Soviet Union. Actual Whether the CIA is correct in wage bills, in any case, for either assuming, as one of its officials skilled or unskilled labor hard dif- recently stated that the Soviets ficult to come by. can never a sin resume its military All these unknowns, however, buildup rates of the detente period are crossed to some extent by what before 1976 is o en to serious we know of actual Soviet weapons doubt. For its art the DIA offered production, ostensibly via recon- a tentative comment of " robab] naissance satellite intelligence. We right" to describe th' CIA ro no can also gauge the Soviet state of sis. the art in weapons research and Soviet history, however, tells a development and actual production different story, in peacetime and in by what we read in their technical war. The regime's authoritarian literature. Finally, we have arms ability to pinch its own citizenry in data that the Soviets themselves the name of military defense admit to - for example, SALT arms apparently knows few bounds. For tallies. us to assume otherwise is naive or When all this is put together, dangerous, or both. there are, nevertheless. dive n- Item: According to the Finan- cier in estimates of Soviet arms cial Times of London, Soviet expenditures -- most recent defense expenditures may be between those cam filed byte A sharply rising this year. The news- versus those com i e by the A paper reported that Gen. Petr Gor- When the divergencies occur, it chakov, head of the political is interesting to find that the administration of the rocket all, the New of the York press Times - above gives es forces, "said that defense spending the New -- has been raised because of the Approved For Release 2006/6''~& . D ' ~-01137R00010001000 Nicaraguan war, House panel reports Experts say only U.S. troops cats Knight-Ridder News Service WASHINGTON - U.S. intelli- gence analysts have concluded that only the introduction of U.S. combat troops in Nicaragua could resolve the conflict there, the House Intelligence Committee reported late yesterday. In its report, the committee said the analysis of top intelligence sources shows that it is essentially meaningless to continue aiding the anti-Sandinista "contras." it continues to be the assess- ment of the U.S. intelligence com- munity that only U.S. forces could truly resolve the conflict in Nicara- gua on a military basis," the commit- tee said in a report devoted entirely to President Reagan's request for $100 million in "contra" aid. The Democratic-controlled committee voted a week ago to reject the aid package, which includes 870 million in military assistance and $30 mil- lion in non-lethal aid. The report is believed to mark the first time that an internal U.S. intel- ligence assessment on the use of American military forces in Nicara- gua has been disclosed publicly since the Reagan administration be- gan financing the "contras" in 1982. The intelligence community is made up of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Department's Defense Intelligence Agency, the Na- tional Security Agency and other in- telligence departments and bureaus in the State Department, the FBI and the Department of Energy. Their collective analyses and as- sessments are periodically given to the president and the congressional intelligence oversight committees. In releasing the assessment, the committee said it was not endorsing the use of U.S. military force in Nica- ragua, but only underscoring the fu- tility of aiding the contras. Mr. Reagan and his top advisers have said repeatedly that aiding the rebels may be the only way to pre- vent the use of American forces in Nicaragua. In the report, the com- mittee makes a strong case for U.S. negotiations with Nicaragua rather than the use of American forces.. The committee report also charges that in seeking to aid the contras to pressure the Sandinista regime to open talks with the rebels and make other concessions, the ad- ministration is Ignoring additional intelligence community assessments that such a policy is likely to fail. This approach ignores intelli- gence assessments made since 1983 that the Sandinista government of Nicaragua is unlikely to agree to such negotiations for the simple rea- son that they would threaten the very basic structure by which it con- trols Nicaragua." the document said. The report said that after being briefed by intelligence officers on the White House program, the panel concluded that the rebels could not defeat the Sandinistas even if Con- gress approved the presidential re- quest. Intelligence officers advised the committee In a secret session that reportedly took place March 4 that the purpose of Mr. Reagan's aid re- quest is not to overthrow the Sandi- nistas but to give the "contras" the ability to "exert enough pressure on- ly to force the Nicaraguan govern- ment to negotiate seriously with the Nicaraguan resistance." according to the report. The report was endorsed by all committee Democrats except Repre- sentative Dan Daniel of Virginia, who joined the Republicans in a dis- senting view. "We fully support the president's request for assistance to the Nicara- guan democratic resistance," the dis- senters said. Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100010001-7 STAT Approved For ReleaseL2? 0 CI7 bP90-01I37R000 00010001-7 ARTICLE APPEAL 19 February 1985 ON PAGE .Z - I MI T For Smart Policy, We Neu Centralized Intelligence -,'Jtt ALLAN E. GOODMAN ? Despite the publicity and controversy It is not easy for outsiders to judge the status or udget of various agencies We surrawnding the Reagan Administration's performance of intelligence, and we have also-need a central agency for research. and tzse-af-covert action in Central America and no basis on `which to compute a track analysis, where the best talent can be elsewhere, the President believes that a record. Neither this Administration nor its. deployed to work in as much depth as MAi9X achievement in his first term has predggessors - have provided any public. necessary. These two agencies should been-substantial improvement in .the per- details of successful intelligence opera- replace the Central Intelligence Agency, fpr ante of U.S. intelligence. Congress, tioi~is"`" - the. National Security Agency and the however, disagrees. The Senate and House it is- scarcely reassuring, however, that - other intelligence . organizations lodged ae7,ec` ,"committees overseeing intelligence recent. failures are consistent with patterns, throughout the federal bureaucracy. have-ust released public versions of their , of failure in the past. In fact, the quality of. In the past the intelligence community repoxts =on performance during 1983-84, --,the information that has been provided by has been reorganized in respo:ase to failure. and-the news is not good. the intelligence community has been seri- But none of these reorganizations have X`fie' Senate report concludes that, with ously questioned for some time. There have significantly changed the managerial sys- respect to intelligence analysis and pro- been at least 30 alleged intelligence failures - 'tern or improved the quality ,of analysis. duction,' "analysts are not producing investigated by Congress or the press since ,.The lack of centralized intelligence collec- enough basic data to meet important i 1960, ',and most of them have involved ' 'tion and analysis is the root of the problem. intelligence requirements. Instead, analyt- issues...;and threats of major strategic, If it not addressed now, further disasters ic' efforts seem to emphasize short-term diplomatic or economic importance to the lie ahead. . current' -intelligence products." With re- United States. apea to intelligence collection, the report. There is much that our intelligence Allan E. Goodman. is associate dean of noted-'.'a growing imbalance between col- 'community can do on its own to improve -Georgetown University's School of Foreign lecAozi and analytic capabilities," "persis- , its performance. For example, a central, Service. This is adapted from an article in tent gaps in information on certain subjects community-wide foreign-intelligence data the Winter, 1985, issue of Foreign Policy. of,gwat importance to national security" base should be created to assure that an and the need to "shift away from the analyst working on a specific. problem collection of data that is currently proving would have access to all information to be of diminishing value." collected. It is shocking that, after more The House committee's report found "a than a decade of trying, the intelligence need for improved performance on the part agencies still have not developed such a of-intelligence collectors and analysts," "a capability. In fact, the tendency of each c ear peed for better coordination between agency is to expand its own collection and .the users of intelligence and the providers processing capability and to restrict dis- of intelligence," "that care had to be taken semination of the product. lest analytic thought succumb to pressure These tendencies will never be effec- to support rather than inform policy" and tively~ suppressed as long as the separate the fact that "shortcomings in analysis and agencies are rivals for resources and the collection continue to appear." attention of policy-makers. The United Such shortcomings have led to repeated states is further today from having truly and widespread concern about the accura- centralized intelligence collection or anal- c9-uf-intelligence. Charges of intelligence ysis than it has been since the 1941 attack failure have surfaced over the estimates of on Pearl Harbor. Soviet defense =spending, the accuracy of Reorganizing the way our intelligence ~ arms-control monitoring, the threats services collect, analyze and disseminate against the American Embassy and Marine the. knowledge essential for national barracks in Beirut, the viability of the decision-making should be a high priority Lebanese army, the nature and extent of for the new. Administration. In particular, a the Cuban presence in Grenada and the return to the concept of central intelligence likely outcome of elections in El Salvador, collection and analysis would help improve as well as the activities of that country's the performance of both tasks. Such cen- right-wing death squads. tralization (along with the separation of When Yuri V. Andropov, the Soviet collectors from analysts) would break leader, died last year, intelligence was down agency -erected barriers to the badly apparently slow to pick up the signs that needed sharing of all information. this had happened. And when King Hassan The United States should establish a of Morocco, a major U.S. ally in North central collection agency, able to command Africa. announced that he had proposed and mix human and technical intelligence and entered into a union with Col. Moam- effectively. This mix should be determined mar Kadafi's Libya, intelligence was ; withqut fear of how it will affect the power, caught by surprise. - . ' - `-- Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100010001-7 Approved For Release fb6I t: 1"COO 137RO January 1985 S~imbIin blocks to ma Sy Chartes Waterman Sr ecial to The Christian Science Monitor The United States sports the world's most efficient systems for instant international crisis management: so- phisticated intelligence sensors; instant communications; mobile forces; and innate organizational ability to make an informed, immediate response to many challenges. But the same cannot be said of its long-range planning capacities. Failures over time of US initiatives in Vietnam, Pales- 1MALYS S tine, Lebanon, and potentially, Nicaragua highlight . a seeming obliviousness to longer-range im- plications of its actions. As stated by Robert Hunter of Georgetown's Center for Strategic and International Studies: "Planning has indeed long been the bete noire of US foreign policy -- always recognized as valuable, always attempted, never particularly successful beyond the enunciation of general goals in documents like national security decision directives." The roots of the problem are threefold: a habit of forming most policies only in response to crisis situa- tions; institutional weaknesses; and the unusual influ- ence in a melting pot democracy of erratic domestic po- litical pressures. Al too often a crisis motivates the US to adopt a strat- egy that turns out to have unintended future repercus- sions. The rules of engagement for US forces in Lebanon led, for instance, to an identification of US power with the Christian parties in that country's civil war. Once tentatively chosen, predictions of a strategy's long-term impact by individuals not committed to it is rare or tends to go unheeded. And the entire range of op- tions are evolved as specific solutions for the immediate crisis. Attention to future effects is distinctly secondary. The difficulty is also institutional. Offices charged with long-range planning are often swept up into more re- warding day-today operations or become irrelevant and staffed by officers with little clout. Raze indeed is the bu- reau that can sustain a strategic viewpoint and retain its effectiveness over time. - Strategic thinking and current management rarely mix well. Any worthwhile planning office views the world differently from those charged with day-to-day management. Built-in conflicts over hallowed policies en- sue. Almost always outranked and outmanned, policy planning offices usually lose such conflicts. Yet, decisions made today do form policy. To keep policy planners out of the loop in current activity is to doom them to irrelevance. Thinking ahead is downright risky to one's career if proven wrong. It also is far less rewarded than frenetic involvement in compelling issues of immediate concern. Senior officials don't have to address next year's issues today But they _must address today's issues today. This policy blind spot is paralleled for different rea- sons in the intelligence bureaus. There are, to be sure, es- timates of future trends issued by various agencies sin- gly and collectively. But many officials criticize these docume-its as d un i ai,(,Y-r~rae M the US partures from easily identifiable current trends. Intelligence has been used as a scapegoat for licy f ores based on a tv assessments. Failure to 'predict e aruan revo ution, or instance, was he in art re- s onset a for ineffective po cies in that country: ether Justititied or not, e cum ative effect of sue mger- ointin is to produce very strong, rotective instincts within the career intelligence l e a d e r s h i p - ancy ong- range orecastm oes not flourish in this climate. As Stanford University's He wan, ormer chair- man-of e National me nce Council, has said: Most inteDi ence analyses are conservative. Because of this, they are usually correct. But when wron , the rami- fications are spectacular. Policy office s an inte ence analysts should think through a variety of optional fu- t sh ures to ake them u about td dit wll ,ensasers ase as o ortunities for creative action. The extent to w c oreign polic3making is influ- enced by domestic political considerations is consider- able. The need for an immediate foreign policy "victory it can be compelling indeed. But should this need influence intelligence judgments; it can be dangerous. Perhaps more insidious and common, a politically unpleasant analysis can be simply ignored by policy personnel. Moreover, the interests of ethnic groups may or may not be identical with those of the US generally - al- though they will always sincerely purport to be. Congres- sional responsiveness to Israeli and Greek lobbies exem- plify this. Few other nations are as intensely affected by this phenomenon as the US. And its net impact is to in- ject a "wild card" element into the planning process. - Some observers have suggested an interagency policy planning council as a partial remedy. Dr. Hunter recom- mends a senior planning council, composed of career offi- cials of deputy secretary rank and housed .in the White House. He suggests that officials be immune from termi- nation, transfer, or automatic irrelevancy with each change of administration. This, of course, may be impos- sible in the politically charged atmosphere associated with most presidential changes. - Such an institutional change would work only if top US leaders changed their outlook on the worth of strate- gic planning. Typical comments of those currently in- volved in policy planning offices - "I'm too busy on im- mediate issues to theorize;" "Promotions go to those who run things, not to those who plan" - are symptomatic of the leadership's preoccupations with day to day events. A strong strategic planning organization would quickly arouse opposition. Entrenched interests would feel their policies threatened by the organization's man- date for free-thinking and independent access to senior policymakers. The office could be branded as biased. But many who have long since thrown up their hands at the practicality of effective strategic planning would applaud such an effort. The writer was a government official for two dec- ades before becoming a consultant on international affairs. . u 5 Approve8 #orNe1Wie b0%?b1/03 : CIA-RDP90-01I37R000100010001-7 WALL STREET JOURNAL '~iLL] nF%.Approved For Release 2006/0~',WL A-1l '9O-O1137ROO 100010001-7 w~~~~ uy misnanaimg ms already strained versies. Mr. Casey, in contrast, wanted to Volatile Spy Chief relationship with Congress. mobilize the agency and test the limits of "What Bill did wrong was to let the its congressional mandate- agency get back Into large-scale covert ac- The new director plunged into his job tion, which Isn't covert action at all, but an with boyish enthusiasm-zapping off daily 11 And Budget at CIA, But Not Public Image Stumbling on Covert Action Obscures Higher Quality Of Intelligence Analyses The Nine Mexico Revisions By DAVID IGNATIUS Staff Reporter of Ti WALL. STREET JOURNAL WASHINGTON-Some years ago, Wil- liam Casey wanted to buy a fancy house here that had already been promised to the Japanese embassy. The owner, a genteel society woman, worried about what she would say to the Japanese. "Tell them," Mr. Casey replied, "Re- member Pearl Harbor." The brash Mr. Casey didn't get the house. That anecdote, told by one of Mr. Casey's close friends, illustrates the vola- tile personality of the current director of central intelligence. He is quick-witted and aggressive, but he is also impulsive, with an arrogant streak that often gets him in trouble. As CIA director, Mr. Casey has demon- strated that same mix of good and bad traits, of smart deci- sions and dumb ones. He arrived four years ago hop- ing to restore the agency's morale, budget and public image after a da- maging decade. He has done well on the first two goals, re- viving enthusiasm at the CIA and giving it probably the larg- est proportionate William Casey unofficial form of warfare, argues Sen. suggestions to CIA analysts, touring CIA Daniel P. Moynihan, a former member of stations overseas, and taking a personal the Senate Intelligence Committee and one hand in planning covert-action programs. In his eagerness to revive the agency, re- A leading member of the House Intelli. marked one colleague, Mr. Casey some- gence Committee sums up the balance times acted "like a first-year case offi- sheet this way: "Mr. Casey deserves cer." credit for improving morale at the agency. His greatest successes at the CIA have But, he has focused the agency on the probably been in improving the analytical wrong thing-covert action. And I don't side of the agency, known as the director- have any doubt that the Image of the CIA ate of intelligence. He told one friend in today is as bad as it's been in recent years 1981 that he knew how to produce good in- in Congress, and probably the country," telligence estimates because he had earned a fortune doing the same thing in Irreverent New Yorker his tax guides-taking complex data and Mr. Casey, a New Yorker who is irrev- putting it into concise and readable erent toward official Washington, isn't wild form. about Congress, either. Exasperated by Mr. Casey started by reorganizing the what he viewed as unfair congressional intelligence directorate along mainly geo- criticism, he joked to a friend recently: graphical lines, so that analysts studying "The best thing about Washington is that the Soviet economy and the Soviet leader- It's only an hour from New York." Though ship worked in the same section rather he remains wary of Congress, aides say he than different ones. He increased the quan- now is trying hard to improve relations. tity and, by most accounts, the quality of For all his failings, the cantankerous CIA reports. And he installed Robert Mr. Casey is a colorful personality in a Gates, a widely respected young CIA offi- compulsive reader who races through sev- eral books in an evening. He has an Irish- man's temper, with strong loyalties to his friends and long grudges against his ene- mies. And he is a notorious mumbler, who talks In gruff fragments of sentences that are often unintelligible. "Casey gives the impression, because he mumbles, that he has a messy mind," says former CIA director Richard Helms, "But he doesn't have a messy mind at all. He has a tidy mind. And he has the street smarts of a lot of New Yorkers." OSS and SEC A CIA colleague once described Mr. Casey, only half in jest, as "an American colossus." He is certainly an American success story, a self-made millionaire who Some of the analytical reforms -,were simple. The CIA had never bothered, for example, to keep files of each analyst's work, so it was impossible to assess whether an analyst's predictions tended. over time, to be accurate. Mr. Casey and Mr. Gates started keeping files. The CIA still makes too many mistakes. It correctly forecast some major events in Lebanon, from the Israeli invasion in :952 to Syria's later intransigence, but it failed to provide specific warnings about the bombs that destroyed the American Em- bassy and Marine headquarters in Beirut in 1983. It correctly forecast that Yuri An- dropov would succeed Leonid Brezhnev as Soviet leader, but it failed to predict the later succession of Konstantin Cherrenko. Trying Harder got where he is by hustling, playing poli- Under Mr. Casey and Mr. Gates, ana- tics and taking risks. As a young lawyer, lysts are at least trying harder. The intelli- he joined the wartime Office of Strategic gence community produced 75 interagency Services and ran spies into Europe. Later, estimates in 1983, compared with about 12 he made a fortune as a tax lawyer by pub- in 1980, and the agency embarked on about - lishing books about tax laws. Still later, he 800 long-term research projects, studying was chairman of the Nixon-era Securities everything from likely Soviet weapons in and Exchange Commission. Finally, he the year 2000 to the history of Shiite Islam STAT managed President Reagan's 1980 presi- . in. the 12th century. budget growth of any agency. But he has failed to improve the CIA's image with Congress and the public-and may even have made it worse-largely because of his own mistakes. Mr. Casey slipped on the banana peel of "covert action"--specifically the CIA's "covert" war against the government of Nicaragua. He plunged ahead, despite warnings from his own aides that the pro- gram couldn't be kept secret and would blow up in the CIA's face. When those pre- dential campaign. Mr. Casey brought the same hard- charging, risk-taking style to the CIA, and it caused him problems. The agency, still struggling to recover from the traumas of the 1970s, was in many ways a frightened and self-protective institution when he ar- rived. It wanted public and congressional - Approved For Release 2006/01/03: CIA-RDP90-01137R00 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137FF000100010001-7 ~.?Yt^-!' r_:' WASHINGTON POST Gj, 11 -_r 10 January 1985 Who Should Direct the CIA? John Horton's piece lop-ed, Jan. have managed to behave this way. 2] is a welcome antidote to the Mr. Horton cites one who found self-satisfaction of Bob Gates' Pan- himself considered a "traitor". be- glossian presentation, "Is the CIA's cause of the CIA's gloomy Vietnam Analysis Any Good?" loped, Dec. analyses. Richard Helms (and his 121, on the matter of whether deputy Vernon Walters, Richard policy pressures influence' inteli- Nixon's darling) rejected attempts Bence. estimates. However, as a to make the agency a scapegoat for former CIA analyst with 29 years' Watergate. Stan Turner withstood experience who has served on the pressure from Carter's White National Intelligence Council, I be- House to overstate our abilities to lieve that Mr. Horton's useful sug- monitor SALT II in the ratification gestion of a council of elders to ne- debates. gotiate the clashes between policy This tradition was fractured by and intelligence does not go far the appointment of George Bush. I enough. Something institutional is found Mr. Bush, as did many others also needed. at CIA, to be a first-class director The hard but inescapable fact is who backed up his experts' views that the director of Central Intelli- and made sure they got heard in Bence has to be an independent- high places. But Mr. Bush had been minded cuss who is willing to de- chairman of the Republican National liver straight judgments without Committee, a most partisan job. shrinking from the costs. And they From there it has proven, sadly, but can be severe: anger ' and scorn a short step to Bill. Casey, manager from policy-makers offended by of Reagan's 1980 campaign. uncongenial views, threats of ex- Would it exceed legislative inge- clusion from the "inner circle" and nuity to write. a bill requiring that the seductive argument that, if the director of Central Intelligence one is not a "team player," one be either an intelligence profes- cannot be effective at all. sional or an outsider of proven stat- A good director has to accept ure and political independence? the fact that the job is likely to be JOHN WHITMAN his last appointment. Quite a few Falls Church Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100010001-7 ter , EQ pproved For Release 3 ~(ClINPRq~~7R000 r .. ~.r -69 10 January 1985 Decline in coups around the world is a mixed blessing By Charles Waterman. Special to The Christian Science Monitor Coups, which once were a staple diet for an unstable -third world, are occurring with much less frequency these days. Last year's ouster of Mauritania's military leader was an-exception to the rule. Today, in much of the devel- oping world,. more - sophisticated methods of state control are able to repress dissent and prevent sudden government takeoverss~ more effec- tively than in the past- This is true even though destabi- lizing economic and population trends continue unabated .and, :: in deed, get worse in many areas.- Ironically, so e s p of a is V this. increased. ability to repress dissent can be beneficial: Economic: . development pro- grams are less frequently disrupted . by abrupt leadership changes'. Most economists agree that a violent coup d'etat can cost a developing country ANALYSIS years- in its development.' process. Foreign investment flows more rap- idly when uncertainty, is. minimized. - ? Policymakers can .generally count on greater continuity in the :-areas for which they. bear responsibil- ity- Intelligence reporting and schol.- arly analysis of :fu trends can also Profit-from a more stable envi- ronment. At the same time, attention.'!', to basic evolutionary-trends becomes':. more critical and their detection more difficult. . .0 Claims that . communist revolu- tions are proving; largely..irreversible must be viewed in the context of, this- trend. The-factis? that most' -govern: ments now have a longer life span .. than a decade ago.. And conservative monarchies'; are` no :longer==;automati- cally considered vulnerable relics ripe for revolt. ' For example, between 1955 and 1969, well over 15 illegal changes of government occurred in eight coun- : tries in the Middle East and North,' Africa. Iraq and : Syria accounted for six of these 'changes. Other countries affected were North and South- Yemen, 'Turkey, Sudan, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya. Egypt had its single successful revolution in 1952.' Between 1970 and 1984, only six illegal government, changes occurred in four Middle East -countries. Four. of these were in the-chronically unstable Yemens, the other' two in Iran and Turkey. Both Egypt and Lebanon expe- rienced presidential assassinations during this period,,' but no change in political complexion of the ruling group. Notably, Syria has been ruled by the same government; since late 1970: With some reshuffling, Iraq has been es- Other areas, such as black Africa, have_experienced.a:': similar lessening in the frequency of violent changes: by - = classic coups d 66L Why has this relative stability, appeared? One answer is obvious..- the turbulence of the post-colonial era-re- quired time to _ . die down. Stable institutions do not emerge overnight. .But other factors exist as well, some of which bring mixed blessings. Regimes of all political stripes are far more conscious of the nature of internal threats to their stability - and the patterns by which they emerge. Intensive security as. sistance programs by Eastern and Western states have=,'. developed third-world expertise in areas such as protec- tion of senior politicians- rapid reaction to threats, and,.-. penetration of potentially hostile groups. The tools of ensuring loyalty have also become more effective and technologically advanced. These include rapid communications, efficient monitoring facilities, propaganda techniques, control of foreign influences, and censorship. In some cases, the ruthlessness with which opposition is suppressed has intensified considerably. Syrian Presi- dent Hafez Assad's 1982 eradication of several thousand Sunni Muslim conservative opponents in Hama, and.! Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's harsh treatment of political adversaries are specific cases in point. While such tactics may -not enhance a regime's popularity or moral standing, they. often. do increase its longevity. If the new situation results. in greater stability over time, this has some positive elements. It could release en- ergies for progress which would otherwise be spent in conspiratorial machinations and their bloody effects. But if the result is ever-increasing repression and sti- fling of these very . energies, the cost of stability will be' high indeed. It will also be illusory, as longer-term pres- sures may merely erupt later in yet more dramatic fash- ion. Iran's example cannot be ignored. The challenge for the West becomes to encourage evo- lutionary change in a world where repression is more ef- fective than it was two decades ago. The writer was_a_government official for two dec- ades before becoming a consultant on international . affairs Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01I37R000100010001-7 1k ' Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-R P90-01137R000100010001-7 FOREIG?N' POLICY Winter 1984-85 DATELINE L AN GLEY: FIXING THE INTELLIGENCE MESS by Allan E. Goodman The recent campaign for the White House marked the third straight presidential election in which the American intelligence communi- ty's performance was a major issue. From ,their memoirs it is clear that Presidents Rich- ard Nixon and Jimmy Carter, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski all left office thinking intelligence had not served them well. Moreover, ever since the debacle in Iran the Senate and Hous? select committees on intelligence have been sharply critical of the substantive briefings they have received from the intelligence agencies. As early as 1981, the Reagan administra- tion's disappointment was underscored by Admiral Bobby Inman, the 'country's most senior and respected career military intelli- gence _officer and deputy director of central intelligence until 1982. Inman told several audiences that the U.S. intelligence communi- ty's performance was at its lowest level since Pearl Harbor. And in the wake of the most recent bombing of the U.S. embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, President Ronald Reagan himself expressed concern about "the near destruction of our intelligence capability," which presi- dential spokesman Larry Speakes blamed on "a decade-long trend of a climate in Congress that resulted in inadequate funding and sup- port for intelligence gathering capabilities." Intelligence and foreign-policy profession- als should take such criticism seriously, de- spite the political circumstances and motives that may have generated it. Many intelligence operatives have left the profession wondering if the community has become too fragmented. ALLAN I- GOODMAN is associate dean of the School of Foreign Service at Georgeto'n University. From 1975 to 1980, he served in several seniorstaffposraons in the Central Intelligence Agency, including presidential briefing coordinator for the director of central intelli- gence. Sophisticated collection technologies have ac- tually impeded the sharing of information. And rival agencies in stiff competition for funding prepare such divergent analyses that the system fails to provide enough accurate, timely, or complete information to policymak- ers. Unfortunately, such- problems have plagued the intelligence community for more than a decade and are so deeply rooted' that only fundamental change in the system will improve performance. The intelligence community comprises the agencies and organizations specifically autho- rized by the National Security Act of 1947 and subsequent executive orders to conduct intelli- gence activities "necessary for the conduct of foreign relations and the protection of the National Security of the United States." The current members of the community all fall within the executive branch and report to the director of central intelligence (DCI), the Na- tional Security Council (NSC), and the presi- dent-in that order. The community includes the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), the military service and special collection offices in the Pentagon, the State Department's Bu- reau of Intelligence and Research, the Trea- sury Department's Office of Intelligence Sup- port, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and a unit of the Department of Energy. The CIA, however, is the only agency controlled direct- ly by the DCI. Intelligence activities revolve around four functions. The first, intelligence gathering, includes human intelligence (HUMINT), pho- tography, and the processing of electronic and communications signals (FLINT and COMINT). The second and third functions involve analyzing information and getting the results to those who need them. The fourth function is covert action. While controversial, it represents only a minor part of intelligence activities and despite controversy and mistakes is generally better managed than either the collection or the analytic functions. Thus a central concern is whether information col- lected in the field is properly analyzed and reaches the right people in a usable form. What policymakers expect and need from LLD Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01I37R000100010001-7 7pproved For Release 2006/01/03: CIA-RDP90-01137R000 U . S . N 1'S & WORLD REPORT 17 December 1984 "Mr. Conservative" Sizes U p Challenges Reagan Faces From trimming the cost of military weapons to getting along with the Soviet Union, one of the Senate's most respected members speaks his mind in a wide-ranging interview. Q You're on the Senate committee that oversees the Central Intelligence Agency. How good is U.S. intelligence? A We have the fourth-best intelligence system in the world-behind Israel, England and Russia. We could do better, and I think in a few years we'll move up to second or third. We've been lucky-most of our CIA directors have been good ones. But I don't think that job should be politically appointed. I want to see the next selection come from men who have been in there 20, 30, 40 years and know their way around. Senator Pat Moynihan and I have a bill that would take that office out of politics. Although Bill Casey is doing a great job, I don't know whom the President would pick as the next director. But it should not be political. _ Interview With Senator Barry Goldwater Barry Goldwater, Repub-? lican of Arizona, has been an, outspoken advocate of conservative principles_ in the. Senate ior.nearly =. 30 years:- As The-GOP presidential candidate-in 1964, he lost-lo Lyndon Johnson. Now 75, he has announced. plans to retire when his current term ends in'two years. Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100010001-7 I ,-- Approved For Release 2006/01/03: CIA-RDP90-01137R0 p T1N.E PPPEARED WASHINGTO!. POST r Cl-~`'~ _ '~ 12 December 1984 Robert M. Gates I Is the CIA's Analysis Any Good? Yes. The Central Intelligence Agency was created to provide comprehensive, all-source collection and analysis of information so that we might prevent strategic surprises like Pearl Harbor and be forewarned of other developments adverse to American interests. Granted, the effort is immense and complex. Recent press accounts prompt some to ask: Is it any good? Is it honest and objective)) There is little question that maintaining the quality of CIA assessments became much more difficult in the late 1960s and the 1970s. Collection capabilities declined. Our analytical effort on the Third World had been significantly reduced by the early 1970s- just when problems there were multiplying. By 1980 the number of analysts working on the Soviet economy (including defense indus- tries) had declined from over 300 to fewer than 50. There was little money for analysts to travel abroad or to meet with nongovern- ment experts at home. Many academics were unwilling to talk to us and share ideas. From 1973 to 1977, moreover, CIA had five differ- ent directors, and from 1975 to January 1982, there were six chiefs of the analysis di- rectorate-the Directorate of Intelligence. Much has changed in the past five years. The resource picture began to improve in 1979, thanks initially to the House and Senate oversight committees. We have since made impressive strides toward rebuilding the corps of analysts. New resources for the en- tire intelligence community have greatly im- proved the collection of information across the board. We have also undertaken sweeping measures to improve the quality of analysis. The directorate of intelligence was reor- ganized in 1981 to bring political, economic and military experts together in regional of- fices. We have dramatically expanded our contacts outside government, drawing on an extraordinary nu.'nber of experts in universi- ties, think tanks and business for information and ideas. We require all CIA analysts to have outside training every two years. CIA has strengthened longer-term analytical research, long put at risk by the pressures of day-to-day reporting. In the first nine months of this year we issued some 700 research studies for nearly every department of government For the first time there are adequate funds for analysts to travel and work overseas as well as to consult with agai -cooperative academic and other experts at home. CIA assessments now are subjected to CIA was created in part to ensure that in- more rigorous internal review than ever be- telligence assessments would be prepared by fore. Every manager at every level reviews . People with no stake in approval of weapons all substantive assessments that come out of programs, defense budgets or particular poli- his organization. We often offer drafts for Gies. Perhaps the strongest cultural trait corn' comment (though not consent) to senior mill- man to all CIA analysts is a very deep sensi- tary commanders, embassies and experts in tivity to the dangers of politicization. Indeed, other agencies. Many of our assessments are sometimes we bend perhaps too far toward an reviewed by nongovernment experts. adversarial relationship with policy-makers to We not only offer our best estimate of what. avoid even the appearance of being suborned. will happen in a given situation but also in- There is no question that policy-makers form our readers of other possible though less have always been intensely interested in the likely outcomes-and the implications of outcome of our assessments, especiafy on each. I cannot say this approach would have contentious issues. If they were not, it would enabled us to predict the fall of the shah in mean we were working on the wrong prob- 1978-79, but I believe that that outcome now lems or were irrelevant. Beyond our natural, would certainly be addressed as a possibility, visceral independence---contrariness, some We are more candid now with our readers would say-a num- about the level of our confidence in our judg-, ber of safeguards exist: ments and the reliability of our sources. We Approval of CIA's assessments also make more of an effort to lay out our evi- rests with intelligence professionals. I dence. Using the example of the fall of the have been with CIA nearly 20 years. I am shah, under present practice we would have the final approving official for all of CIA's acknowledged the paucity of information on daily production of current intelligence that internal Iranian affairs and the self-serving goes to the president and senior government nature of some of our sources. officials. The director of Central Intelligence We now evaluate past CIA assessments and (DCI) first sees it at the same time as the national estimates to see how they have held policy-maker. I also approve all longer-range up over time. The directorate of intelligence assessments. has for the first time its own independent Our assessments go to the two congressional evaluation staff. We voluntarily share these oversight committees. I am confident they evaluations with the House and Senate over- would not hesitate to ad promptly if they de- sight committees. tected a policy slant In addition, both Foreign We organize special task foorces of agency ex- Relations, Armed Services and Appropriations perts and outside specialists to do competitive committees receive a great number of our w analysis and to ensure we are examining all sesmerlts. aspects of key problems. We submit our work A variety of other groups, both independent on important issues, such as the Soviet econ- of CIA (the president's Foreign Intelligence Ad- omy, to panels of outside experts for scrutiny. visory Board), and inside the Agency, also Finally, the skill and dedication of analysts in evaluate CIA assessments and estimates; CIA and elsewhere in the intelligence corn- Directors of CIA have always played an ac- munity are exceptional-perhaps never better. live role in the preparation and approval of While some of the criticism in the press of national estimates, which are produced by the our capabilities and acumen is justified, most entire intelligence community. Similarly, our of it is grossly inaccurate. I urge the reader to directors always have had strong views on the consider the access and motives of sources of major substantive issues we analyze. John criticism-and to be alert to later retractions. McCone, President Kennedy's DCI, believed Meanwhile, I have hundreds of letters, cables the Soviets would send missiles to Cuba in and messages, from the president on down. 1962 long before the intelligence analysts commending our work. Various news organi- agreed. However, national estimates also are rations report that policy-makers and mem- reviewed by the heads of a dozen other intelli- bers of Congress acknowledge that the qual- gence organizations. The estimate that re- ity of assessments has improved markedly. cently was alleged, in the press, to be slanted went through many drafts and even then Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01I37R000100010001-7 Ci;ntlnued Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000 F t ~- n; ,L4.1,L D Cra ~~~ ` 2 WASHINGTON POST 12 December 1984 Out There in Langley WE PUBLISH on the opposite page today a ringing endorsement of the analytical quality and the political integrity of the CIA's intelli- gence assessments. It comes from one who is in a position to know a good deal more about this su- premely important matter than the rest of us-Rob- ert Gates, the civil servant in charge of the process out there in Langley. He declares that the CIA has paid systematic attention to creating intellectual and bureaucratic conditions favorable to good intelligence judgments. The hallmarks of its system, W. Gates says, are rigorous review, an openness to criticism and a devotion to professionalism Except that we still can't really tell whether the CIA is doing it right. Mr. Gates, as a professional skeptic, might be among the first to acknowledge that he has not put before the public the materials for a trustworthy assessment--he is not free to. For that we would have to know many other things about CIA: what questions of analysis or policy it had been asked to address, how it had handled the evidence in different kinds'of cases, what had been done when a hard-charging analyst felt stymied by unworthy obstacles. _ It seems unlikely to us that a simple lack of intel- lectual or physical rezurces would be a major diffi- cutty. now. Raw politicization can perhaps be dealt with. But there is a range of more subtle traps, bu. reaucratic, intellectual and cultural. The question of whether intelligence is designed not just to prevent surprises but also to predict the course of events is a continuing conundrum. Ferreting out or minimiz- ing bias of various kinds is essential, but how do you ensure or maximize insight? Is the team ap- proach institutionalized in the American intelli- gence community conducive to the play of minds- to the play of a single mind-which produces the major breakthroughs in other fields? We do not n.,ean to trivialize Mr. Gates' account, but if we told you that that is the way we write editorials, you would be forgiven if you stopped reading. Still, progress of sorts is visible. For the first three postwar decades in which intelligence was a central preoccupation of national policy, the work was secret and what discussion there was of it took place mostly behind closed doors. In the next dec- ade, the debate went public and focused heavily on clandestine intelligence operations. The main sub- ject, however, has always been intelligence collec- tion and especially analysis, and in recent years enough questions about American performance have been raised to bring this subject to the fore, insid. as well as outside the intelligence cc,ttimuni- ty. Mr. Gates carries forward this essential inquiry. Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01I37R000100010001-7 ARTICLE APPEA roved For Release ~~l83,:RC P90-01137R0001Of ON PAGE 10, Sec. 1 19 November 1984 . PCIA directors Senators Barry Goldwater and Daniel Moy- `nihan, chairman and vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, are pushing leg- -islation to require that all future directors and 'deputy directors of central intelligence be pro- fessional intelligence, officers. Their effort results from the experience... of working with CIA Director William Casey who iad been, campaign manager and a political' !crony of President Reagan and who has run' afoul of Congress for cavalier financial :dealings, the bending of intelligence reports to 'tit the administration party line and the agen- y's. activities in Central America. '=-Because of Mr. Casey's lack of credibility on 'Capitol Hill, senators were able to make the' 17hite House agree to have only professional intelligence officers in the deputy post as long .-as Mr. Casey remains director. Indeed, the Goldwater-Moynihan measure comes too late to do anything about Mr. Casey. Having been confirmed, he can serve as long as the President wishes him to. And it's a bad principle anyway, A President should not be constrained in his choice for. the post by requirements that render it a bureau- cratic civil service job, especially as it deals with the highest levels of national security policy. Under . two professional directors, Richard' Helms and William Colby, the CIA was greatly: plagued by problems. Under a nonprofessional: director, George Bush, its morale and good standing were much restored. Mr. Goldwater and Mr. Moynihan mean well. The post of intelligence director is too important to be handed out to political buddies. But the, place to attend to that is in the confirmation: process. They should take a lesson from the, experience of the FBI, which also suffered from: politicized directorship until Con ess made it ` clear that it would tolerate no such appointment again. _ J Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01I37R000100010001-7 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00 day in areas of upheaval such as Beirut, sources of the past may be of little value Ev fi . en ve years ago, US offi NCE more, in the debate over the security of vials were still in touch with Palestinian and Lebanese of- Americans in Beirut, attention is being focused on Americans they had long known who were willing to talk to this nation's c ' Americans and were close to t f ence geratlaeriqg s-tumbles By David D. Newsom apacnty to collect and use mos o the sources of ~ io- intelligence. lence. Information was exchanged and the security of' Why did we not know in advance of the plans to bomb so Americans Often assured. Most of these urces have lost touch or departed. The task of pen tra.t- the embassy or the marines? Or did we? Did someone in ing the shadowy sources of today the .government have the information and not pass it u s terrorism carries alon ? Was it more risk and is less certain of results, not only for US g passed along and not used? D.d high offi- intelligence officers, but for their contacts as well. Evalu- vials ignore it? ating the result is even more difficult, Americans expect our irate lligence services to know in Even in cases of reliable information coming, for ex- advance of threats to our interests and people.. They are, in fact, putting their trust in a chancy and imperfect pro- ample, through intercepted communications, the mean- cess. Individual mistakes in the gathering and evaluation ing is not always clear. Conversations can be cryptic, of intelligence have undoubtedly been made, yet the real using "double talk" and subject to more than one inter- problems may lie elsewhere: in the sheer volume-of infor- pretation. Information from numerous sources may give mation, the preference for tried and true sources, and the conflicting signals: The intelligence community must de- politics of evaluation. termine the true meaning. Each element may then tend to' At any given time, a huge volume of information is support its own sources and its own view of events. Valu- flowing into Washington from around the world through able time is lost in getting information to the policy maker several channels: the CIA, the State Department, De- through bureaucratic and sometimes political battles fense agencies, the National Security Agency and, where over assessments. involved, the FBI. While every effort is made to alert When information is finally winnowed and conclu- those in crisis areas to relevant intelligence, information sions reached, senior policymakers may not immediately' relating to Beirut, for example, may come from far away, ! accept its validity and act. They may prefer other sources Only a portion of the total information may be available fitting their own view of an issue. Further, the actions . to officials on the spot in time for them to act, ~ dictated by the information may be diplomatically mili- Information coming in to Washington will be orga- tartly, financially, and politically out of the question. nized and considered only in part. Much of it will consist , In the amount of-information received by the US, it is of rumors, reports from unevaluated sources, intercepted :. possible to make a case that almost any. event was fore- seen by someone. That, however, is not the important communications waiting to be processed, and data from - question- What is meaningful complicated electronic and hoto is whether accurate be- P graphic equipment re- mation was sifted, assessed, received in time, and be- quiring-processing, interpretation, and collateral confir- lieved by those with the capacity to act. and whether there: mation. In times of stress, the flow will be supplemented - existed, for them, feasible courses of action. by snippets from those who want to appear informed, The judgment of individuals may occasionally be want to make mischief, are looking for money; or merely rightfully blamed for "intelligence failures." More often, think they know something. Nevertheless, each item' however, the answers he in an inevitably complicated must be looked at and evaluated. system in which chance may play as Items that are cryptic or unclear when first received talent, and judgment. y P y great a role as facts, may have more meaning in hindsight, often leading to. claims that US officials were informed in advance. The David D. Newsom is associate dean and director question arises: Given the lives and interests at stake, ' of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at why not act on every report, of possible attack? To do so Georgetown University. would keep personnel and families in 'a constant state of tension, seriously hampering the working of our embas- sies and, over time, reducing the credibility of the intelli- gence process. The intelligence analyst in Washington tends. to put the greatest credence on known, traditional sources. To- Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01I37R000100010001-7 24 October 1984 J i- ' CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR Apo zova -For-ReteaSe 2006101/03: CIA-RDP90-01137R0 RNOLD BEICHM N he magnification of power and influence of the CIA career bureaucracy, repre- sented by John J . McMahon, the CIA deputy director, over President Reagan's personal appointee, CIA Director William J. Casey, is the untold story of the Rea- gan administration. It is today a matter of legitimate doubt among highly informed observers that even President Reagan's orders to the CIA to undertake. covert oper- ations could prevail over a McMahon veto. To obtain confirmation or denial of the foregoing statements is impossible:- understandably, because the CIA rarely discusses for publication the organization's inner workings. However, persons in a position to know and observe the CIA and who are free of organ- izational inhibitions clearly believe that the CIA career service has achieved a degree of power unpar- alleled in the intelligence agency's 37-year existence. The reason for the disagreement between Mr. Casey and the McMahon career bureaucracy is not that the Reagan-Casey ideas are so off the wall that Mr. McMahon and his aides must rescue CIA pro- fessionalism from the. antics of political appointees. CIA profes- sional judgments have in the past Proven to be misjudgments. CIA analysts, it is now known, have over the years been spectacularly wrong in their underestimates of Soviet WASHINGTON TIMES 11 October 1984 " ? a"rtnaments. expenaitures, 'while outside experts have been correct. The CIA permanent staff has never -had a monopoly on wisdom. The continuing Casey-McMahon disagreement is based on how best to implement Reagan policies via the CIA. The White House endeavor to push the CIA into a 'more activist role via covert-action programs seems thus far to have been frus- trated. For example, following Soviet destruction of the Korean Air Lines passenger 'plane, in September - 1983..Pre.sid.ent Reagan is said to have ordered Mr. Casey to retaliate against the U.S.S.R. by shipping a quantity of surface-to-air missiles to the embattled Afghan mujahideen baitling the then four- year-old Soviet invasion. Mr. McMahon succeeded in preventing execution of the-proposal, arguing that it would be too difficult to accomplish. He may have been right or wrong; whichever it was, Mr. McMahon's view prevailed. Another example: Some 200 Soviet soldiers are known to be either prisoners or deserters in the hands of. Afghan resistance fighters. Mr. Casey proposed, with President Reagan's support, bringing to the United-States about '65 Soviet POWs for a mass-press conference.`' Such a move would have served two purposes: First, it would have relieved the j Afghans of a burden. POWs are generally a problem - what do you do with them? - in a guerrilla war characterized by hit-and-run tac- tics. Second, such a prisoner show with Red - Army, soldiers telling their story to the world media might have been a stunning blow against Soviet imperial interests in Central Asia: Mr. McMahon vetoed the idea and his veto stuck. Again, Mr. McMahon-- might have been right or wrong; whichever it was, his view prevailed. The CIA career bureaucracy opposed from the outset the mining of Nicaragua waters. Whatever plan the McMahon forces finally offered for interdicting military supplies to Nicaragua failed to do the job, so,, as the saying goes in Washington, it was "all onus and no bonus." The congressional uproar as a result of the mining is said to r. c a on s position vis-a-vis Mr. Casey. These are some of the `passages in the continuing battle between the -Casey CIA and the McMahon C]A, with permanent possession of the trophy seemingly in the hands of the CIA professionals, who have also managed to prevent any sig- nificant number of new Casey appointees from entering CIA ranks. In fact, of five Casey execu- tive appointees, only two remain and it is not certain how much influ- ence they have in the organization today. - Whether this situation would change in the event of 'Director Casey's promised reappointment during a possible second Reagan term remains to be seen. ' One of the major reasons for this power accretion to the CIA old-boy network is the formalization of con- gressional oversight of the intelli- gence agency in:t.wo select permanent committees of the Con- gress. Dissenters within the CIA from Reagan-Casey covert action proposals now have a forum where their dissent can be heard and debated inside the committees. Instead of the usual hierarchical arrangements within a government department, there'are now lateral CIA staff connections with Con- gress which has institutionalized its constitutional power to oversee the executive branch. Until the i mid-1970s, congressional oversight of the CIA, was informal. This func- tion was pretty much left in the hands of ranking members of senior congressional committees who, themselves, in the good. old Allen Dulles days, preferred not to probe too deeply into what the CIA was doing. As a result of House and Senate investigations in the aftermath of Watergate, Congress successfully asserted its 'power over the intelligence agency. T here are those, however, who disagree with this analysis. They counter-argue that the problem lies not with the congres- sional committees but with Direc- for -Casey himself: The incumbent has not exercised his own power to the same degree as did Adm. Stan- sfield Turner, President Carter's CIA director, who, as one observer said, "whether you agreed with him - or not, ran the CIA." Watergate, the Nixon resignations and the short-lived Ford adminis- Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01I37R000100010001-7 Gon;inub fl ^!^y4pprovec pqr elease 2006/01/03 CIA-RDP90-011378000100 r-? r' ..'~- -y WASHINGTON POST 7 October 1984 LETTERS TO THE EDITOR Politicization of the CIA Is the CIA being politicized? than -alter an intelligence estimate to Bob Woodward ["Aides Dispute meet Mr, Casey's demand that the esti- CIA's 'Near-Destruction'," Sept. 28] mate support administration policy. quoted CIA Director William J. Casey Sen. Moynihan and Sen. Barry as saying in a letter to Sen. Daniel Pa- Goldwater have joined. forces to intro- .trick Moynihan, "You have my assur- duce legislation that would require ance that I will not .tolerate any at- that future CIA directors and deputy - tempt to politicize the agency or its directors be intelligence professionals: work,' or use the fact of its revitaliza-, This is an excellent move. The. two tion for partisan political purposes." _ senators should go further. They Elsewhere in The Post on Sept. 28, should immediately call in Mr. Casey Joanne Omang ["Analyst Says He Quit and ask him about Mr. Horton's accu- CIA When Casey Altered his Report to sation. We may' find the wrong man Support Policy"] reports that CIA's resigned. highly respected top Latin American CHARLES TABER analyst, John Horton, resigned rather- Chevy Chase Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100010001-7 . Approved For Relg 2 0,, A-fgl9-01 SiR0 4 October 1984 -1 = .ftkks aTi-fl n't Taint the C1, &~s Aumal Amid last week's argument about whether the Central Intelligence Agency had been gutted by the Carter administra- tion, a former CIA intelligence analyst i complained that one of his reports had been doctored to suit the political aims of the agency's present director, William Casey. That's a serious charge, and it merits careful investigation.. The analyst, JohnHorton, resigned last May as a Latin American specialist for the National Intelligence Council, which co- ordinates the drafting of intelligence eval- uations from the.. CIA, FBI, National Security Agency, State Department, De- fense Intelligence Agency and intelligence units of the various armed forces. The council is headed by Casey. Horton, who spent nearly 30 years with the CIA,. had prepared a detailed analysis of conditions inMexico. Casey re- turned it, Horton said, "because he want- ed it to come out a certain way ... . There was constant pressure on me to redo it I refused to do 'it, so he finally had the thing rewritten over my dead body, so to speak." And Horton quit. One speculation was that Casey want- ed the report to provide a more alarmist j view so the White House would lean hard- er on Mexico to bring .its policies on Cen- tral America closer to Washington's. If that was Casey's plan, it apparently didn't work. In any case, tinkering with yse al intelligence committees to examine po- litical influence on intelligence gathering. And Congress should seriously consid? er adopting legislation introduced last week by Sens. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) and Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.). It would require that future CIA directors and deputy directors be chosen from among career civilian or military intelli- gence personnel - thus precluding politi- cal appointments. While that's not a guarantee against politically motivated analyses, it should help reduce the temp- taticn to doctor, data. intelligence analyses for political reasons taints the information that is supposed to form the factual basis for policy decisions. Earlier, another former CIA employee accused Casey of slanting intelligence in- formation to support administration poli- cies in Central America. It's not easy to prove or disprove charges like these because most of the rel- evant information is classified. But the po- tential, damage to this country's security from ineffective or even counterproductive policies adopted on the basis of slanted analyses should persuade the congression- Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01I37R000100010001-7 Y Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00 Gil Pill GZ ~- -r WASHINGTON POST 1 October 1984 Jackson to '. Meet. Contadora Aides By Jay Mathews find a political solution to fighting in W hington 1%3t Staff Writer Nicaragua and El Salvador. LOS.ANGELE'S,?Sept,-30-Jesse Jackson said that in his campaign- ,L,, Jackson .said today he plans to , . ing for Democratic candidates he meet .with ' Latin American leaders plans to make much of alleged,at- in.Panama in two weeks to consider tempts within; the Reagan admin- ,.ways to bring peace to Central istration to slant; CIA reports on _ America. Latin America and its explanations Jackson .told:,' The; Washington ,of the causes-of bombings of U.S. Post before his arrival here that he facilities in Beirut.. . would .attend the Oct. 11. inaugu- :"The doctoring and,, altering. of. ration of new Panamanian President government documents," he . said, Nicolas Ardito-Barletta. While in referring to a former analyst's com- c Panama, he said, he will meet with plaint that his reports on political representatives of the Contadora stability in Mexico were changed by group-Mexico; Venezuela, Colom- higher-ups, "were somewhere be-. bia and Panama-on their efforts to tween perjury and treason." Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100010001-7 APTIV'LE APPEARED Approved For Release 20 ON PAGE 14 - - ~ICIADP90-01137R0 cto er 1 ~+ Don't Blame Me Kitchen Remodelling and Other Excuses . Chicago. WE HAVE just seen why the president's keepers wave oft questions, curtail press sessions and simply refuse to call press conferences. Given a serious mat- ter to talk about, Ronald Reagan will - under questioning - say things silly or false or both. The serious matter was the death of Americans in Lebanon B,y Garry Wills Approved who were under his care and were not protected, despite ample ad- vance warning that they were tar- gets. The president's first remark was to claim that anyone who remodels a kitchen knows it is hard to get the task finished on time. What would we say of his own .Secret Service protectors if they left the president's life exposed, and afterward adopted the kitch- en-remodeling defense? The mere likening of their task to such a ca- sual effort, with its incidental an- noyances, would show they had no worthy conception of their duty. Is the president less duty- bound to protect citizens he has committed to a dangerous situa- tion than are the guards who sur- round him? Other lives become kitchen appliances to a man who had already lost, prior to this last bombing, 276 American lives in combat areas. When does he begin to realize that a battle zone is not a leaking faucet? The president's next comment on the matter. was, even worse. The reporters were sealed off from him, but a college student got to him with a question, and he said that American lives were lost be- cause his predecessors of "recent years" were guilty of "destruction of our intelligence capacity" be- cause they felt that "spying is somthow dishonest." Where does one begin to ana- lyze an assertion so breathtaking- ly false where it is not irrelevant? Don't blame me, the president said; blame the nameless men who betrayed their high trust before I arrived. His aides went drearily about their customary task after he has slipped their controls denying as much as they could of the statement, altering the rest, spreading its meaning, hoping to make it meaningless so no one would notice how McCarthyite the meaning of it is. The argument was irrelevant because Mr. Reagan said it is the job of intelligence "to know in ad- vance what the target might be." Everyone knew who the target was - not might be - in Leba- non. There was no failure of intel- ligence, just repeated failures of protection. No one in authority ever acted on the view that "spying is dis- honest." Some abuses were criti- cized,- though only partly amend- ed, as the result of a Republican administration's study under Ger.: ald Ford. Some reduction of the CIA was made possible - indeed, necessary - by the ending of the Vietnam War. . But the destruction of the CIA is going forward now in- ways that did not occur even under Richard Nixon. Nixon kept demanding from the CIA and FBI intelligence estimates that reflected his views rather than independent observa- tion - for example, that demon- strations in America were being funded from abroad. The agencies resisted that pressure. Mr. Reagan asserts the same thing Nixon did, with no better evidence, and pays no attention to the agencies on this matter. He has Mr. Casey to do that - who has driven out two top analysts al- ready because they would not make their findings reflect a prior policy commitment emanating from the White House. Those are the pressures that undermine the independence, accuracy and ef- ficacy of intelligence units; and they have never been stronger than under a man who, in coward- ly manner, calls his predecessors the betrayers of their trust. E hpPEAREDApproved For Release 20 ftt0 1 1 P90-01137R h YIrI ?AG. Why a CIA Expert Shows Documentary in His Class The CBS documentary that led to Gen. Westmoreland's $120 million libel suit against the TV network is still being rebroadcast-in a Central Intelligence Agency classroom. Although two former CIA directors have criticized the documentary, George Allen, a 20-year veteran of the agency, uses the program to give new intelli- gence analysts in his class what he sees as a lesson in professional integrity. Mr. Allen himself appears in the doc- umentary, supporting its conclusion that military intelligence data were manipu- lated for political purposes. His stu- deats, many of whom were in grade school at the time of the war, usually applaud his performance. Though he still agonizes about his decision to go be- fore the CBS camera, he says his stu- dents seem "grateful I laid it on the line." The CIA acknowledges knowing that Air. Allen shows the documentary in his class, but says it is "used purely as a training device to show one side of a complicated intelligence problem and doesn't represent official advocacy of that version of history." Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100010001-7 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000 i7 ISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR CH R r 1 October 1984 The CIA and Truth N today's world the United States is re- saying the attack was a serious setback j quired to be able to gather intelligence for the US, with a 3-to-1 majority calling 1 swiftly and accurately about the ac- the administration policy in Lebanon a tivities of potentially hostile nations or failure. The administration's loose rhetoric on groups abroad. Yet intelligence-gathering activities the question of embassy security is unfor have.their limitations: Security for US in- tunate. It cannot be permitted to embitter stallations overseas must go well beyond the bipartisan context for intelligence ac- the collection of information. In areas of tivities- gathering, like effective risk, such as Lebanon and other nations Intelligence a in general, in atheyg, requires effective biparti- of the Mideast, adequate security should nforeign support it to have the long-term include properly trained armed guards, such as US marines, and'sturdy gates ar.d backing, and out of government, neces The other barriers capable of keeping bomb- sarifor a good job to ib ofice, must have laden trucks out of embassy grounds. president, the Mideast the general threat to US sound, accurate, and up-to-date informa- facilities and individual Americans is tion is many areas of the globe. learn of both public and self-evident. No intelli- That it is Bence-gathering capacity is necessary to tah co?ntroversyonvolvi cog ac urac of know that. printed reports, the analyst who prepared What is required are much stronger se- P protest after having been William curity measures than had been taken to it resigned in p CIA protect the now-bombed annex to the US told e this repo s , that it provC ided It was Embassy in east Beirut. for the administration's Latin It wunhelpful for the Reagan admire- support rimed stories are istration to insinuate that the responsibil- Ames' the licevi If the evidence reffect wa to re ity for the bombing lay with past, Demo- altered to fit a predetermined conclusion. cratically controlled . Congresses and That is recisel y what the role of intel- dential administrations - with press- athering should not be. Rather, it dential aides evidently pointing to the ligence g Carter administration - on grounds that should produce based. The success al on which they had trimmed the CIA's intelligence- policy art, on the ac- threat activities. The potential of foreign policy depends, in p threat to the embassy annex was well curacy of the intelligence and analyses known; it needed security. not intelligence upon which it is based. gathering. To say the least, it would be exquisitely The American public has already made difficult to base a successful policy on in- up its mind as to responsibility in Leba- formation tailored, for whatever reason, non. A Harris survey taken after the to what someone thinks national leaders bombing found a nearly 4-to-1 majority want to hear. Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01I37R000100010001-7 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-0113 IOW YORK TIMES 30 September 1984 Secret Budgets ec( a Public issue WASHINGTON -The budget for American in- telligence agencies does not usually receive great public attention. Normally watched closely only by a small group of experts, it is reviewed in secret by intelligence committees in the Senate and House, while other lawmakers are permitted to examine the figures in a specially secured room in the Capitol. Last week, the circle of interested parties wi- dened dramatically when President Reagan im- plied in a reply to a question from a student at a political rally that "the near destruction of our intelligence capability" before he took office was partly to blame for the car-bombing of the United States Embassy in Beirut 10 days ago. Democratic leaders accused Mr. Reagan of misrepresenting reductions in intelligence opera- tions during the,1970's and oversimplifying. the reasons for the embassy's vulnerability. Assert-., in- that the President's comment was "person=-.;, ally insulting and too gross in its implications to., ignore," former President Jimmy Carter de- manded an apology from Mr. Reagan and got at least an explanation. The, President telephoned Mr. Carter to say that he had not meant to sug- gest that "you or your Administration was re- sponsible for the decline in intelligence-gathering capability" or for the Beirut bombing. White house spokesman Larry Speakes said Mr. Reagan had been quoted out of context and had been talking about "a decade-long trend and climate in Congress." And Mr. Reagan com- plained to reporters about "the way you distorted my remarks." Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the New York Democrat who is vice chairman of the Sen- ate Select Committee on Intelligence, said that the President's statement "undermines - I am prepared to say betrays -- almost a decade of sustained bipartisan efforts in Congress to recon- struct an intelligence community whose budgets had run dower steadily through the first half of the 1970's and began to rise sharply in the second." The sharp exchange came as Congress was poised to approve a $9 billion intelligence budget for 1935, a 25 percent increase over this year's and twice the amount appropriated only five years ago. Unlike Mr. Reagan's military buildup, the rapid growth of intelligence spending has pro- voked little debate. The only part of the intelli- gence budget that has. been widely discussed is Central Intelligence Agency support for Nicara- guan rebels, which has consumed about $150 mil- lion since 1931, intelligence officials' said. Last week, the Senate, which favors aiding the rebels, and the House, which does not, seemed headed for a fight over the issue as they dealt with the omnibus spending bill. How the C.I.A. interprets also at issue. Intelligence officials said the agen- cy's top Latin America analyst resigned in May after William J. Casey, the Director of Intelli- gence, insisted on revising a report on Mexico so it would support Administration policy. The for- mer analyst, John R. Horton, said, "There is pressure from Casey on subjects that are politi- cally sensitive to jigger estimates." Budgetary Ups and Downs Mr. Horton was the second Latin America ana- ly,t to break publicly with the agency this year while contending that intelligence information had been slanted on orders from Mr. Casey. A C.I.A. spokesman declined to comment on the Horton case but said there are often disagree- ments about "the weight given to various judg- ments and that's the way it should be." There has been wide agreement that the intelli- gence agencies needed strengthening after the cutbacks in the 1970's. During those years, ac- cording to Mr. Casey, the agencies' work force and budgets were cut by 40 percent. With recent budget increases, the employee total has been brought, back to about 100,000. One reason the expansion has re- ceived little notice is that, with a few exceptions, such as the construction of new buildings at the C.I.A. com- plex in northern Virginia and at the National Security Agency headquar- ters at Fort Meade, Md., the money has been spent in secret. The largest intelligence agency, with ; 4 billion to spend and more than '60,000 employees, is the National Se- curity Agency. It is responsible for monitoring worldwide communica- tions, in particular those emanating from the Soviet bloc, and cracking enemy codes. The agency has hired hundreds of additional translators in recent years and acquired a new generation of so- phisticated computers to sort through millions of intercepted mi- crowave and radio messages. . Next largest is the National Recon- naissance Office, an agency in the Pentagon whose existence is not pub- licly discussed, which is responsible for developing and, deploying spy satellites. It spends more than $2.5 billion a year. The agency has a his- tory of huge cost overruns, intelli- gence officials said. It has been the beneficiary of more than one-fourth the overall increase in the intelli- gence budget since 1981, primarily for satellites. Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137F000100010001-7 nunued Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000 N-N YORK TIRES 29 SepteTTber 1984 Senate Panel Is Asked to See If U.S. Reports Were Tailored' Steal W The New York Time WASHINGTON, Sept. Z8 - The Sen- ate minority leader, Robert C. Byrd, asked the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence today to investigate whether the Reagan Administration had trial to tailor intelligence reports to support acMr. Byrd, , West Virginia Demo- crat, said his request was made in re- sponse to reports that the senior Latin' America analyst at the Central Intelli- gence Agency i-esigned in May after William 1. Casey, the Director of Cen- tral Intelligence, insisted that he revise a report on. Mexico to support tration-policy. The C.I.A. declined to comment on the departure of the analyst, Horton. Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100010001-7 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-0113 R000100010001-7 e-nort-Altering at. CIA By Joanne Omang Washington Post Starr Writer Senate Minority Leader Robert C. Byrd (D-W.Va.) yesterday asked the Senate Se- lect Committee on Intelligence to investi- gate charges by a former CIA intelligence analyst that one of his intelligence reports was altered to support Reagan administra- tion policies in Central America. Intelligence committee officials said that the request probably woula be granted and that a hearing could be held as early as next week. The former analyst, John R. Horton, said he would cooperate in any congression- al probe. Byrd said he was "shocked" by published reports of Horton's revelation that he re- signed from the National Intelligence Coun- cil last May after CIA Director William J. Casey rewrote an intelligence evaluation on 'Mexico over Horton's objections. Sources close to Central America policy- making said-yesterday that Casey rewrote Horton's evaluation of Mexico's internal economic and political troubles to suggest thal the problems could endanger the coun- try's political stability, and that U.S. secu- rity interests might be threatened. Such an evaluation "overstated the dan- gers beyond where Horton wanted to go," one source said. Mexican President Miguel de la Madrid visited the United States May 16-18, short- ly after Horton resigned. The rewritten evaluation could have been used by U.S. officials to make de la Madrid more recep- tive to U.S. pressure that he help in oppos- ing leftist-and, in particular, Ni- caraguan-influence in the region, this source said. "The idea was to get de la Madrid to go for a tougher line in Central America be- cause of his own problems," another source said. He denied published reports that Casey had sought to launch a covert action program in Mexico with the aid of Horton's report. Horton refused to discuss the contents of the rewritten report, saying in a telephone interview Thursday that it had nothing to do with Central America. Yesterday he con- firmed that it involved Mexico, noting that the CIA puts Mexico in a category separate WASHINGTON POST 29 September 1984 -%ate Fro e ot. qnaro-,,~es 5-1eeks Se-vii In Byrd's letter to Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.), intelligence committee vice chairman, he said, "If accurate, these reports indicate there has been a shocking misuse of the CIA for political purposes. "If the Congress cannot rely on the un- tarnished accuracy of the CIA's intelligence- reports, then the asserted factual basis for virtually every major foreign policy decision of this administration is brought into ques- tion," the letter said. A spokesman for Moynihan's office said the senator would request an investigation as soon as possible. Committee officials said that such requests nearly always are grant- ed and that the hearing might be held next week. They said Casey and Horton would be called to testify. Reached at his home in Maryland, Horton said, "If they're interested, I'll talk to them." Another intelligence committee official said the' staff had asked the CIA for a writ- ten report on Horton's charges. Horton said that although he supports the administration's overall policy in Central America, he was concerned that debate within the administration on tactical moves in that region is circumscribed by conser- vative ideological considerations. He said all options are not considered, a_nd he ex- pressed concern that the CIA eventually might be blamed "if any cans get hung around anyone's neck" in regard to events in Central America. 477 WILLIAM J. CASEY ... said to have rewritten report from Central America. Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100010001-7 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000 UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL 28 September 1984 CIA HEADS SHOULD BE PROFESSIONALS BY ROBERT SHEPARD WASHINGTON The CIA's top two officials should be career intelligence officers, not political appointees, say leaders of the Senate intelligence committee. A bill requiring the appointment of professionals as CIA director and deputy director was introduced Thursday by Sens. Barry Goldwater, R--Ariz.., intelligence committee chairman, and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, D-N.Y., vice chairman. Moynihan said the agency's mission ''is best carried out by professional intelligence officers.'' The current director, William Casey, served as chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission during the Nixon administration and was President Reagan's campaign manager before being appointed to head the CIA in 1951. In a Senate speech, Moynihan noted that in 1981, Reagan also chose as deputy director ''a person without" visible qualifications, save participation in a presidential campaign,'' referring to Max Hugel, who resigned.the post after two month5. -Later questions arose about Casey's activities before his appointment, 'including those while he served as the manager of a presidential campaign,'' Moynihan said. White House chief of staff James Baker has said Casey gave him briefing papers from President Jimmy Carter's 1980 campaign. Casey has said he does not remember any personal involvement in the case. 'Questions of this sort, however meritorious, detract from the vital duties of the director,'' Moynihan said. Moynihan also cited ''the one great breakdown'' in the intelligence committee's relationship with the CIA when the agency failed to notify the panel about the mining of Nicaraguan harbors earlier this year. Moynihan questioned whether the "misadventure would have happened if a career intelligence professional with strong interest in the long-term welfare of the intelligence community had been serving as director.'' Moynihan said the United States did not have a "career intelligence class'' when the CIA was created in 1947, but now, ''with almost 40 years of experience, there is no longer any need to look outside of our highly qualified pool of career. civilian and military intelligence officers to head the CIA. Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100010001-7 Approved For Release 2006/01/03: CIA-RDP90-01137R0001 {Sti~ WASHINGTON POST 28 September 1984 Aides Dispute CIA's '` `Near-Destruction' D eocra eaga.n , tor Jthce mAt :'.Intelligence -technology. In addition, one t =official said that morale has improved in'the intelligence community under, Reagan and efforts have been made to expand the so- ?_oa1led human intelligence or -information r`obtained from spies. ;.,-r "What he sees as president .and knows about what is going on," this official said, .;';just makes him feel what we're doing now iS much better." ;;. Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.) ;.said yesterday that this does not justify -Reagan's statements because those tech- rnical improvements were set in motion in previous administrations, especially during tiie Carter years. .Moynihan, who. is vide chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and several other intelligence experts yes- terday questioned whether there have been `improvements in intelligence gathered by ".humans. Senior Reagan administration of- ficials still complain privately that that kind % of intelligence is still not very good. , - .Noting that the president's comments ?-about the purported intelligence failure ?Wvere in response to a question about last week's terrorist bombing of the U.S. Em- ' bassy annex in Beirut, Moynihan said, "Get- ting inside a terrorist group is the hardest thing this government can do. It can take years and years!' As further indication'that the intelligence question is becoming a political issue, By Bob Woodward ' - - W-hingwn P08LStarr Writer Past and present CIA officials yesterday sharply disputed Presi- dent Reagan's campaign claim on Wednesday that there was a "near-: destruction of our intelligence ca- - pability" befo:e he took office. Aides to Reagan's CIA director, William J. Casey, said neither bud- get nor personnel. levels were cut unduly during President Jimmy Car- ter's administration. Cuts in .the covert operations branch under Carter's CIA director, Adm. Stansfield Turner, briefly be-' came an'issue when agency old-tim- ers and some others fought them. But officials said yesterday that the cuts were almost exclusively. of. headquarters bureaucrats and that none involved an operative or agent overseas. -A general decision to make some cuts in CIA personnel was made after the Vietnam war in 1976 and early 1977 when George Bush, Reagan's vice president, was CIA director, these officials said. This decision was executed and acceler- ated during the Carter administra- tion. But officials also said that Reagan tee, yesterday introduced legislation that years in office in the intelligence he receives, largely because of im- provement in satellites and other had seen improvement over his 31/2 would require that future CIA directors and Moynihan and Sen. Barry Goldwater :(R- Ariz.), chairman of the intelligence commit- :deputy directors be chosen from among career civilian or military intelligence per- sonnel. The' legislation would prevent political appointments such as those of Bush and Casey, who was Reagan's-1980 presidential campaign chairman. Both Goldwater and Moynihan said their proposal would not ap- ply to Casey, who has been told by Reagan that he is welcome to stay as CIA director if the president is reelected. 'V=uwdLci Sala in an interview two weeks ago that even though he supports Casey and believes he is doing a good job, .he does not feel that someone -from the political ranks should fill the post in the future. Last spring, Goldwater became upset with Casey when he felt that-Casey was not keeping the Senate intelligence committee sufficiently informed about 'CIA support for the :mining of some Nicaraguan harbors. In an April 9 letter, Goldwater told Casey, "it gets down to one, little, simple phrase: I am pissed off!" Two weeks ago, Goldwater said Casey is "a goddamned lovable old bastard who is shrewd and has been fantastically success- ful" in rebuilding the agency. Goldwater said he blames the CIA's -problems more on the congressional investigations of the agency in 1975-76 than on any other single factor, including the Carter administration. Moynihan 'said in an interview yesterday that after eight years on the committee, he and Goldwater "feel there is no place for partisan politics in the intelligence commu- nity ... and the legislation is our statement and judgment of the case.". On Reagan's comments about an alleged intelligence failure in the previous admin- istration, one current intelligence official said, "It's really a bum rap that Turner did something that hurt the agency this way." CIA personnel figures during Turner's ten- ure show that 820 positions were elimi- . nated from-.the operations branch over two years; 17 were fired, another 154 were asked to retire one or two years early, and 649 positions were lost because of attrition. "This was exactly the kind of getting the ' bureaucrats to throw their briefcases in the Potomac that Ronald Reagan advocates," the official said. Several other officials said that the Vietnam war buildup had created a bloated bureaucracy at CIA headquarters and that agents and CIA personnel abroad were being overmanaged. . Con;inUed Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01I37R000100016001-7 Approved For Releas404MSgw~-001137 CIA CASEY BEVERLY HILLS, CA CIA Director William Casey said legislation requiring future agency heads to be career intelligence officers would needlessly tie the president's hands. Casey, who was chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission in the Nixon administration and President Reagan's campaign manager before being appointed to head the CIA in 1981, said the president has the right to appoint whomever he wants. III don't think you tie the president's hands like that,'' Casey told the Los Angeles World Affairs Council Thursday night. ''He has the right and prerogative to appoint whoever he thinks will do the best job.' The bill was introduced in the Senate Thursday. Casey also du:ked a question about the growing controversy over a suggestion by President Reagan that previous administrations' reductions in American intelligence capability left the country's diplomats vulnerable to recent suicide attacks by terrorists. ''As the director of Central Intelligence I try to do everything I can to stay out of controversy,'' Casey said. ''I'm going to pass on that one.'' Casey's speech, entitled ''The Role of Intelligence in Foreign Policy,'' focused on the Soviet Union. He said even if the current ''aging '' Soviet leadership is replaced by younger leaders, he is not optimistic about a thaw in relations. "The need to maintain control doesn't give them many options,'' he said of the Russian leaders. ''I don't have any great hope that (improved relations) will happen.'' Approved For Release 2006/01/03: CIA-RDP90-01I37R000100010001-7 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000 77 r ~ Carl, er By Thomas D. Brandt Congressional Democrats have charac- terized as "unfair and untrue" President Reagan's suggestion that the recent bomb attack on the U.S. Embassy in Beirut was due to Carter administration policies, while the White House said the president's remarks had been distorted. The chairman of the, House Intelligence Committee and the vice chairman of the Sen- ate intelligence panel, both Democrats, yes- terday said that the CIA's post-Vietnam budget decline had actually been reversed by Mr. Carter and anti-terrorism intelli- gence "received higher and higher prior- ities" Mr. Carter, in a rare reaction to a comment by Mr. Reagan, said the president's claim "that his predecessors are responsible for the repeated terrorist bombings of Americans is personally insulting and too gross in its implications to ignore" -In the statement released by his office in Atlanta, Mr. Carter said a series of terrorist bombings directed at Americans in Lebanon WASHINGTON TIMES 28 September 1984 mary at 'ins W louse aides da remarks djsjj honest and let's get rid of our intelligence Sen. Patrick Moynihan, D N.Y., vice agents, and we did that to a large extent." chairman of the Senate intelligence panel, He added, "We're trying to rebuild our intelligence to where you'll find out and know in advance what the target might be and be prepared for it." Yesterday, posing for pictures in the Rose Garden with Presidert Fernando Belaunde Terry of Peru, Mr. Reagan told reporters: "I will answer your questions about the way you have distorted my remarks about the CIA." But he returned to his office with- out answering any questions or explaining what he meant. Some White House aides traveling with Mr. Reagan on Wednesday told reporters the president meant to refer to the Carter administration. But the aides spoke off the record, and Mr. Speakes said yesterday that no one was authorized to say that. Rep. Edward Boland, D-Mass., chairman of the House intelligence panel, outlined the bolstering of intelligence functions approved by Congress during the Carter and Reagan years and said "shortcomings on ter- "has been brought about by the president's rorism ... are shortcomings of this admin- own deeply flawed policy and inadequate istration, which has had four years to solve security precautions in the face of proven any problems:' danger." "What happened during the Carter and The president's press spokesman, Larry Reagan years is that new requirements - Speakes, said Mr. Reagan did not mean to for economic intelligence, drug trafficking blame the Carter administration but a intelligence, terrorist intelligence, third decade-long "climate in Congress that world military intelligence, etcetera - were resulted in inadequate funding and support added. As a result, new personnel and larger for intelligence-gathering capabilities" dur- budgets were requested.... Congress by ing both the Ford and Carter administra- and large supported these requests.' tions. Vice President George Bush, during a "Specifically, human intelligence campaign appearance in Saginaw, Mich., capabilities had been weakened consider- yesterday said that while he believes ably in that decade [the 1970s], partly intelligence-gathering capabilities have because of lack of support, partly because been damaged over the years, he would not of the confidence and trust abroad," Mr? blame the Beirut bombings on the Carter- said the presidents statement "betrays ... almost a decade of sustained bipartisan efforts in the Congress to reconstruct an intelligence community whose budgets had run down steadily through the first half of the 1970s [during the Vietnam wind-down] and began to rise sharply in the second half." Sen. Barry Goldwater, R-Ariz., chairman of the panel, had no comment on the issue, but he did join yesterday with Mr. Moynihan in introducing legislation requiring that the director and deputy director of the CIA be career intelligence officers from the mili- tary or civilian sectors and not political appointees. Mr. Moynihan said the positions are of such critical importance to the nation that the people who fill them should come from professional rather than political ranks so "that their judgments reflect an indepen- dent evaluation of the facts and proposed courses of action" Mr. Moynihan also released a copy of a March 8 letter from CIA director William J. Casey that said: "All of us know that the increase in the personnel and budgetary strength of the agency began in 1979, that it was planned and proposed earlier. . ." Sen. Patrick Leahy, D-Vt., another mem- ber of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said on the CBS "Morning News" yesterday that Mr. Reagan's charge is "an outrageous distortion of the facts" "The biggest initial increase in the intel- ligence budget came during the Carter years;' Mr. Leahy said. "The Reagan budget is basically a continuation of what President Carter started, so ... it's hard to tell any difference between the two. They've both had bipartisan support:' Speakes told reporters in an exhaustive Mondale administration. According to preliminary State Depart- question-and-answer session about Mr. Rea- Mr. Bush, a former director of the CIA, ment findings on last week's bombing of the gan's remark. told reporters he believes the president was U.S. Embassy in Beirut, the principle weak- The controversy was triggered Wednes- referring to budget cuts and congressional ness at the facility was that the terrorists day when Mr. Reagan, replying to a question hearings that "blew the cover" of some for- struck before all security measures had at Bowling Green University in Ohio about ei gn sources. been completed. whether embassy security around the world ,It's difficult to build up sources if they would have to be beefed up after last week's believe their cover is going to be blown in bombing, said: public," Mr- Bush said. But he added that the. ' "The real protection and where we re feel- U.S. has the best intelligence system in the ing the effects today of the near destruction world and that it is virtually impossible to President Reagan received the initial report yesterday from Ambassador Robert Oakley, director of the State Department's office to combat terrorism. of our intelligence capability in recent years fend against fanatic terrorists. According to a White House spokesman, -- before we came here --- the effort that i Mr. Oakley told the president that moving somehow to say, well, spA1 rsgyfWlfiwdll7el`pase 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R01 1?O O1?t 7ations to new quarters in the east Beirut annex was safer" than retainine the entire staff in west Beirut. Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000 fi!'iCi-t AFFAZARE9 USA TODAY 28 September 1984 ? The chairman and vice chairman of-'Ihe-Senate- Intelligence Committee introduced a bill requiring future directors and deputy directors of the CIA to be career intelligence officers. The current director, William Casey, was chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission in the Nixon administration and was President Reagan's campaign manager before being appointed to head the CIA in 1981. The mission of the CIA is best carried out by professional intelligence officers," said Sen. Daniel Moyni- han, D-N.Y., who introduced the bill along with committee Chairman. Barry Goldwater, R-Ariz Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01I37R000100010001-7 ARTICLE APPA?ff ved For Relea>0g/jA-RDP90-01137R0001 ON PAGE - 5 16 May 3.964 . LS- Helms Is Reportedly R y in The letter, shown to the two Senate' Moynihan today pm ` a single. TOLCHIN leaders an Monday, is in the commit y rm for a ~ or of Central t ' - WASHINGTON, May 15-The chair- man and vice chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence have rebuked Senator Jesse Helms for.dis- closing secret committee information in violation of the rules of the Senate, according to two committee members and sources closeto the committee. The rebuke was made in an "Eyes Only" letter to the Senate majority and minority leaders, they said. The letter was handwritten and hand delivered by Senators Barry Goldwater, Republican of Arizona and chairman of the intelli- gence committee, and Senator Daniel ee a sae. It was described as reflect- ing the unanimous view of committee members that the Senate rules had been broken by Mr. Helms. yr. Mr. Helms was specifi Intelligence and a year teethe Deput'Di- ecTDF. now serve at the pleasure of ident. hir_ Homan sm3'his p os l ivP a _w enhance the independence of the Director andeT~isure thaw tus judg- eets reflect not the palicyprefer- ence an predt~ections the incum- "~en~Pi esiderit but an independent uatian of tbe'ffTCts'" :ter to senators Howard H. Biker Je Republican of Tennessee and'the ma- jority leader, and Robert C. Byrd, -Democrat of West Virginia and the mi- nority leader.. ?' This is the first time they've ever sent a letter to the leadership stating that a senator had broken the rules," a York and the committee's vice chair- What Helms Charged - man- The rebuke was reiterated in con- Mr. Helms ed last week thal versations between the committee ;the C.IA- had used several covert de- leaders and the Senate leaders. vices to aid Mr. Duarte 's election cam- The letter asked the two leaders to %o at expense a f his voponent. remind the senators that disclosure of bertod'Aubuisson, a right-winecan- fi~ secret committee information was a W.idate r- 1 *eed- to thhe Sal- jest to disciplinary action. Violations of Senate rules can be punished by repri. mand, censure or even explusion. The two leaders complied and sent letters to the senators reminding them of their obligation not to reveal information from the intelligence committee. Hers Does Not Comment Called Mr. Duarte a Socialist and said Mr.- d'Aubuisson's views were consis- tent with those of the Republican Party in the United States. The charges .an- gered both the Administration, which denied them, and members of the Sen- ate intelligence committee. Mr. Helms charged that the agency had provided "comprehensive across- k There was no immediate discussion the-board- $e~,,, including money ~detary, Barbara His press bor precinct organizers, radio and tele- retary, Barbara a Lukens, was asked vision advertisements and computer for comment by the Senator, ah1 d she1 voter registration. Others on Capitol said she would relay the request to Mr. Hill added that the agency had brought 'Helms. But neither she nor the Senator ;.had any comment, in Latin and European journalists for a The rebuke and letter were prom ted b r. e s east week that ;the nt to enc Fred aided the cam ai of Josa e e rvadnr's runoff presidential election Ithis month a two ce tt campaign of disinformation villifying Mr. d'Aubuisson. They said the agency channeled more than $860,000 to Mr. Duarte's party and more than $37,000 to the conservative National Concilia- tiaa Party, which also opposed Mr. d'Aubuisson. ee Pam hers said. In the Senate, all 100 members have access to information gathered by the Senate intelligence committee. In the House, access of the 435 members is based on relevance to a member's work and the need to know. I In a related developments Mr. Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100010001-7 ARTICLE App ved For Releas ,0O t1 0DO9ECIA-RDP90-011371 ON PAGE - 'Z- 16 May 198+ boss o Cob' , Br MILES LATHEM Bureau Chief 1 WASHINGTON - ! Sen. Daniel P_ Moynihan an- t nounced -plans yester- day to alter dramati- cally the status of the the CIArchief by turning the. sensitive job Into a professional position rather than a ;political presidential appoint- ~-mcnt. CIA directors are mem- bers of the Presid?nt's Cabinet. Jloynihan, who is vice chairman of. the Sen- ate Intelligence Com- mittee, said he plans to introduce a bill later this week that would establish a single, fixed 10-year term for the director. The New York Demo- crat said the bill would be patterned after the FBI charter. The FBI director serves a sin- gle, fixed 10-year term. !'This provision would I enhance the director's independence;' Moyni- han said last night. Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100010001-7 P AND OREGONIAN (OR) Approved For Release 20$wi /Qp~ :Iql RDP90-0113 +1, ale to world class stature. It is a `V`?` s leaders have driven e P gracefully. position they are not likely to relinquish The people of a country form the other foundation on aV JACK STEPHENSON u,,,;rh a nation's capability is built. This inTollovanaott has i THE TOUGHEST intelligence question of them all is sheer numbers, but aiso ulu milieu oiform ofsgo the ernment to understand how this cultural l relign eally id e r 1 relations, education, language, intent - or, put another way, what is the other s and military structure of a nation. At his best, an analyst up to? In today's world of instant communication and hair- and military if he were a member t the society he is studying. trigger answer response, the superpowers must know the cultural foundation, consider exact answer to this question or they greatly increase the To illustrate the role of this Iranian debacle. The U.S. government misinterpreted the danger t themselves and, indeed, the entire world. the phe For example, the Russians currently are assessing the strength of the Islamic religous fervor that led to the uav-. intentions the United States has for the Pershing 2 missiles al in Tehran. ? that are being deployed in Europe. Will they accept at face Americans wanted to believe the shah buccessf lhishad value what the U.S. negotiating team tells them? Considering Westernized the citizens of his country by using O But he deeper Wealth to buy the trappings of a Western democracy. their well-known xenophobia, it would be foolish to assume he The Russians will in ]2 as a was unable to purchase the heart and soul ofta a m to thee his people. These two vital features belonged meaning ethey will. T weapon nejmullahs T contrary. n.o ma matter how holw see much the the Pe United d 2 States a claims to th first-strike who were led by the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The final Thus their KGB, n no doubt, has been assigned the embarrassment was the seizure of the U.S. Embassy along task of finding out the true intentions, over and above the with the Americans who were unable to escape. The cost to officially sated position, of the'Reagan administration with President Jimmy Carter and his administration for failing to regard to these missiles. That begins with an examination of understand the culture - and, therefore, the intentions - of the missile's capabilities. exceedingly great. The United States, on the other hand, is faced with a Iran was To help eeevent-such disasters, exhaustive intelligence this potential threat one leg of h trentyears, dnation relies on , needs to be collected. Analysts must know the agricultural industrial and strengths and weaknesses of the country in for its nuclear r deterrence. In r recen the Russians launched a deep-diving, high-speed submarine known in the question. The transportation and communication networks submarine? Is it need to be determined as well as the scientific and technical sub the Alta. a threat Whet to o are the Russian strategically intentions important Trident rq base that supports the infrastructure. Finally, military capa-do? As What a can it s s bilities and deployments must be established. As these two examples suggest, the first step in assessing U.S. intelligence services use the highly capable combinand . intent is the determination of a nation s capabilities. No lion of overhead reconnaissance, intercept sites, aircraft a matter what a country's intentions might be, if it does not other technical devices to gather ream upon ream of Pic- have the requisite capability to carry them out, these inters- Lures, recordings and other forms of data. On top of these, tiers are meaningless. analysts stack information from open sources such as books, Capabilities rest on two foundations cul. magazines, newspapers and maps plus radio and tele~dsion . The tural. The he natural foundation is is that given the the country by the he signals from the foreign Broadcast Information ing a Service with raw overflow luck the draw during the and and evolution of off' information to feed the i able y rmill. water, soil oil and other natural l resources United States has a veritable granary It includes i at, along with climate. For a nation with aspirations, these Analysts massage this information to extract all sorts of basics ae set the d Saa lemu for m how mfou it can itself with things. They can measure objects for size; they can count numbers; they can note changes from one time period to te T area in favorable climatic zone. Natural s u a vast land area in a favorable climatic zone. Natural resources are also can determine precise geographical lions, tell something about the state of readiness of military natureul, the in s d t is rinit and agriculture even make estimates of the capabilities of weap- destined the United this nation es as t olbe squandered a a suprerpwer. is as if next. forces and They I on t, the thiSs troubled Middle East for its too natural large ors and production rates of factories and farms. Defining resources In becoming and relied great, de ends on imports for its weapon capabilities becomes even more precise when one a portion e its oil. It incrturingly p has access to the actual hardware, such as Soviet equipment r however, remains strong and lured by the Israelis during their several wan. mineral ion needs. Its agriculture, is relatively immune to the vagaries of the weather because captured of the country's location. The Soviet Union also is blessed with a vast land area and plentiful natural resources. But nature did not smile so kindly on the Soviets. Their agriculture is more subject to the ravages of the weather; many of its natural resources are found in areas that are difficult to work. It has been a struggle for Russia to become a superpower, but now its Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100010001-7 Approved For Rele se 1~ 0 ~?gj : CIA 90 01137R000100 c The N.atiohal Security Council and the Making of American Middle East Policy by common response of human na- Les Jank.a resigned as Deputy White by the President. Lure is to react to bad news by The "workhorses" of this model sys- r House Press Secretor} for Foreign Af- terii.are a number of re anal and func- blaming the messenger. Similar- fairs on October 18, 1983. Educated ?1 ly, critics of particular foreign policies at the Universin? of -MMIS tional interdepartmental groups (ICs) sometimes point to the decision making Redlands and The chaired by departmental officers at the process as a root cause of policy failures Johns Ho kins Uni- Assistant Secretary level. After the IGs p or defeats of preferred options. Given versiry he has have collected and analyzed the avail- ,the continuing. high levels of concern served in the US In able data relevant to a policy problem and developed a full range of responses, being expressed about the Reagan Ad- formation Agency , ministration's policies in the Middle asAssisranr Dean of their work is reviewed by one of four East, even in the pages of this journal, an the School of Ad- Senior Interdepartmental Groups examination of the structure and pro- vanced Ir,ternation- (SIGs), generally chaired at the Deputy cesses of decision n;.:king in the present al Studies at Johns Hopkins, as senior Secretary or Under Secretary level, but Administration appears timely. staff member of the National Security not infrequently by a Secretary or Agen- After all, in his State of the Union Council under Henry Kissinger, as cy Chief. Currently, there are four func- address on January 25th, President Rea- Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense tioning SIGs: Foreign Policy, Defense gan told the nation, "We are malting for Near Eastern Affairs, and as an Policy, Intelligence Policy, and Interna- progress in Lebanon" and "The United independent consultant and frequent tional Economic Policy. A fifth special- States is safer, stronger, and more secure lecturer on Middle Eastern affairs ized SIG reviews arras control policies in 1984 than before." A curious listener and negotiating strategies. Not all of the might wonder just how the Administra- of George Shultz helped calm the pro- IGs and SIGs meet with eoual regulari- tion developed policies that produced cess, but William Clark and Robert ty, nor are they equally well led or influ- ? such surprising and welcome results. McFarlane, while moving to strengthen ential in the policy-making constellation. Under the American Constitution, the the staff of the National Security Coun- In addition to these regular interde- question of who makes foreign policy cil, gave little attention to constructing partmenta] committees, there is also an decisions, if not perfectly clear, is rein- and extending a more coherent pattern NSC "Special Situation Group," chaired tively simple: the President. Congress of decision-making throughout the rya- by the Vice President, which exists pri- may occasionally temper, restrain, dis- tional security bureaucracy. ! manly to deal with crisis management tort, or derail a President's preferences, To a large degree, both Allen and situations. Under this crisis rubric, there but the ultimate focus of authority is ark continued the 'Kissinger/Brze -also exists at the sub--cabinet level a presidential and the implementation of zinski tern, whereby the incumbent "Crisis Pre-Planning Group." Usually policy is clearly lodged in the Executive Assistant to the President for National chaired by a senior NSC Deputy, this Branch. The question of how a President Security Affairs preferred to concentrate group is convened to consider the first shapes his administration's national se- ~hethe. a } cv foreigr ]jCy advisor warnings and indications of an impend- curity priorities and enforces the implc- rather than being the manager of a much ing crisis and to thereby energize the mentation of those policies is somewhat broader national security process incor- I entire NSC system in preparation for more difficult to answer. ratin defense. intelligence. and inter- higher-level meetings if events require. The actual structure and functioning national economic 22liciesinio a coher- After the SIGs have completed their of any administration's policy-making n whol e.. senior-level reviews. (often lower-order structure is going to reflect to a large With regard to the Middle East, the policy issues and interagency disputes degree the managerial style of the in- Reagan Administration initially gave the are resolved at the SIG level), national cumbent President. The basic structural ? region a low priority and, with the ex- security policy options and recommen- elements of Executive Branch foreign ception of the struggle with Congress dations are referred to the full National policy management have been in place over the sale of AWACS to Saudi Ara- Security Council for discussion and reso- since the National Security Council was bia, contented itself with rhetorical ref- lution in front of the President, who created in 194-7. The current pattern of crences to the sanctity of the Camp Da- chairs the Council. In addition to the interdepartmental coordination, reflect- vid process and the need for a "strategic usual statutory members and advisors of ing the inherent rivalries and complex- consensus" against perceived growing the NSC and the appropriate sub-cabinet ities of divided national security author- Soviet adventurism in the region. Only and staff officials, other regular attend- ity and responsibility, dates to the early after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in ees of NSC meetings have included such Nixon/Kissinger years. Nevertheless, June 1982 and the departure of Haig, members of the top White House Staff as the Reagan Administration has taken a]- did the Administration, under Shultz's James Baker, Edwin Meese, and Mi- most three years to develop a coherent leadership, produce the comprehensive chae] Deaver. UN Permanent Represen- and relatively smooth-running policy Middle East peace initiative promulgat- tative Jeanne Kirkpatrick may some. formulation mechanism. ed in President Reagan's speech on Sep- times attend. - Nineteen eighty-one was virtually a tember 1, 1982. Under this "ideal" model NSC sys- year lost in the development of a coher- Under the "ideal" mode] for national tem, the policy planning process begins ent Executive Branch approach to na- security policy formulation in the Rea- with a presidential National Security tional security issues- While Alexander gan Administration, as that model had Study Directive (NSSD), drafted by the Haig. attempted to "in-vicar-ate" his evolved by the end of 1983, an extensive NS.C. staff, directing the appropriate State Department's role. Richard Allen structure of interagency working groups SIG/1G to answer certain questions and fai)cd to M=ild a National Security Colin- and review' committees develops Execu- develop a full set of agency recommen- ci] staff capable of ex.endine.ftrm presi- ti'e Branch policies and f,~=ulaies op- : gntinu d mil ccntto7 o\er the rivalry-ridden tiers .or discussion b: hr .u11 N: i^aal. ~,~r ::r c! airs corral. Tie appointment .Sec*it~ Council and ul:i rate e. :sior. Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100010001-7 Approved. For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90=01137 ARTICLE APPE~.PD ON PAGE C ^ ~ _... WASHINGTON TIMES 8 December 1983 The terrorist bombing of the U.S. Marine headquarters in Beirut and the unexpect- edly large Cuban presence that American forces found in Gre- i nada have raised major questions about the performance of-our intel- ligence agencies. The intelligence questions, according to Reagan administra- tion officials and members of Con-' gress, revolve around two immediate concerns: whether bet-. ter intelligence information might have helped prevent the attack on the Marines in Beirut on Oct..23 and whether the American troops that invaded Grenada two days later were sufficiently informed about the strength of Cuban forces on the island. The officials said that fundamen- tal questions also had been raised about the mission and methods of the nation's intelligence agencies, including the issue of whether U.S. spying had become too dependent on sophisticated electronic surveil- lance equipment instead of human agents. Military officers who com- manded the invasion of Grenada complain about an intelligence vacuum that they say left assault forces unprepared for the stiff resistance they encountered from Cuban troops. In Lebanon, U.S. officials report that intelligence tended to lack the specific information that would enable the authorities to block assassination plots or other terror- ist activities. Three days before a terrorist drove the truck filled with tons of explosives into the Marine headquarters in Beirut, killing 240 American servicemen, the Central intelligence Agency reported that a pro-Iranian Moslem splinter group appeared to be planning an attack against the Marines. The report was widely distributed among senior government officials, including Marine leaders. Defenders of the CIA cite the report as evidence that the agency provided at least some warning .before .the bombing, even if it did not give the time, target or type of attack. Gen. Paul X. Kelley, the Marine commandant, disputed that ALLAN BRO WNFELD suggestion, telling members of the House Armed Services Committee that no one had given the Marines the kind of detailed intelligence they needed to prevent a. suicide ..bombing attack. "I'm not talking about those broad, vague, .general statements that they hide behind;' Gen. Kelley said, in an apparent reference to the Oct. 20 intelligence report. "I'm talking about specificity, about a truck." Gen. Kelley, of course, protests a bit too much. "Did he want the license plate number as well?" one ' intelligence official asked. Rather than denying any responsibility for lax .security, Gen. Kelley would have done well to remain silent until a thorough investigation had been conducted. If the security was indeed thorough, why was it that a host of new .security precautions were implemented the day after the bombing? With regard to Grenada, Defense Department officials said they were. s`pr riled by both the number of Cuban- combat forces and the extent of Soviet and Cuban influ- . ence on the island. Intelligence officials acknowledged. that detailed information on both sub- jects was unavailable, but said that planning for the invasion had . moved so rapidly that there was little time to prepare the tactical intelligence normally required for -a military assault. They also said that the military services, not the CIA, were responsible for the col- lection of tactical intelligence. Administration officials say the CIA had little information about political developments in Grenada. As.a result, they said, Washington was caught by- -surprise when Prime Minister Maurice Bishop i was ousted in the October coup In both Grenada and Lebanon, intelligence officials said, the infor- mation that was lacking was of the kind best obtained by human agents rather than satellites, recon- naisance aircraft or other elec- tronic equipment. It was, we must remember, during the Carter directorship of Stanstield 'llirner, that many of our most experienced agents were released from service. _"Human agents," the Carter admin istration told us, were no longer necessary in the new technological age..Now we?can see bow wrong that assessment was. In Grenada, the CIA had no per- manent presence and the State Department maintained no perma- nent diplomatic presence. As a result, the United States had few reliable sources of information. The U.S. intelligence capability has been permitted to decline dra- matically. In 1981, an analysis of the intelligence-gathering role of the - CIA :concluded that, The American intelligence community has routinely failed to predict major political and.military devel- opments before such developments become irreversible and before they become blatantly obvious, even to the general public." What the report called "massive and virtually inexplicable intelli- gence failures that occurred dur- ing the last 15 years" include failure to predict the massive Soviet buildup of nuclear missiles; failure to predict the major improvements in accuracy of Soviet ICBMs in the late 1970s; con- sistent gross misstatement of Soviet global objectives; general failure to explain the characteris- tics of Soviet conventional weapons .systems and vessels, for example, the Soviet T-64 and T-72 tanks and the new Russian guided-missile cruisers; and the entire situation in Iran. , One serious defect in U.S. intelli- gence, critics charge, is the lack of competitive analysis and any pro- cess for quality review. Former Defense Intelligence Agency Director Daniel Graham has .pro- posed that analysis and estimates should be carried out by competing intelligence bureaucracies with each having equal access to the president and the chief intelligence officer of the.United States, who would-no longer be the director of the CIA. administration -- and the CIA Approved For Release 2006/01/03: CIA-RDP90-01I37R000100010001'-7 d a 1137R000 RADtOe VIe 'INC 4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 656-4068 FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF PROGRAM The Fred Fiske Show STATION WAMU-FM NPR Network DATE December 7, 1983 8:00 P.M. CITY Washington, D.C. Dale Van Atta Interview FRED FISKE: interesting article in the current issue of The-Washingtonian, "God and Man at the CIA." And we're very pleased to have you back at our micro- phones, Dale. I - DALE VAN ATTA: Thank you, Fred. It's good to be back. FISKE: The question that you explore in this piece is how the CIA reconciles lying or murder or otherwise moral devia- tions from accepted practice with religion, and apparently suc- cessfully. What got you interested in this? What raised the ques- tion in your mind?- VAN ATTA: Well, I've been covering the CIA for several years, Fred. And it was raised in my mind because I am, myself, religious; and it happened that I knew several people who were in the agency who were of the same religion. And it started me thinking about how they could deal with the kinds of things that were appropriate at the CIA or were done at the CIA years ago. Andt he more I pursued it, the more.people that I asked, it turn- ed out over the last two or three years that I asked every CIA person I. ever came in contact with. I would always discuss one story and then just say, you know, "How do you deal with the ethical questions?" So it slowly developed and .1 built anecdotes and other things, and finally wrote the article. FISKE: Had it occurred to these. otherwise religious people -- I understand from your article, and I would have sus- pected it in.any case, that the large majority of people who OFFICES IN: WASAIplpFO FO1 RISFMX2006/m(TAMP iQ-RDPd` 37140 0b100c 7 OTHER PRINCIPAL CITIES f, C e c! 5i1ppl,e by Rodio IV Reports, IN:, rtioy be used for be ono reference purposes only, n my nc .be retYoouced. sold or publicly oerr nSTrOfed or exnibned. ARTICLE APPEAREDOpi roved For Release 20g0g 4ji, : 1 0-011 of", MGF. JS Casey's smart (and rich), but does he run a if TINKER, TINKER, TINKI BY MORTON KoNDRAcKI I U KITED STATES intelligence apparently had an idea that the so-called Party of God, an Iranian- connected, Syrian-protected Shiite Moslem group that car- bombed the U.S. Embassy in Beirut last April, was plan- ning an attack on U.S. Marines. But U.S. intelligence did not have agents inside the group and therefore could not warn with precision that it was planning the truck- bombing that killed more than 230 Marines on October 23. U.S. intelligence knew, too, that Cuba and the Soviet Union were militarizing Grenada, but again the United States had no in- telligence agents on the island and underestimat- ed Cuban troop strength. The U.S. had not pene- trated Maurice Bishop's New Jewel Movement, and did not know that Bishop's colleagues were planning to oust and kill him. And when Prime Minister Eugenia Charles of Dominica reported to the White House press on October 25 that "we noted with great interest the movements between Soviet Embassies and known activists" prior to Bishop's assassination, it also was news to White House policymakers- On the other hand, the faded in the stretcl bet money, I'd say across the board." Casey's prescier lance, is likely to bE ing to well-informm more disturbing rf tell the President I dropov had pushe Central Intelligence Agency did predict correctly that the Soviet Union would not invade Poland in 1981, but would crack down through Polish authorities instead. Using its superb technical capabilities, U.S. intelligence was able to develop a precise analysis of how Korean Air Lines' Flight 007 was tracked by the Soviet Union, lost, found again, and shot down. And, several months before Leonid Brezhnev's death, the director of Central Intelligence, Wil- liam Casey, reported to President Reagan that Brezhnev likely would not be succeeded by a collective leadership, as agency analysts had concluded. "Chernenko peaked too soon," Casey wrote Reagan in a memo. "Kirilenko tier was xuanappea oy the Red Brigades in Italy, the C.I.A. dug hard to discover who had him and where; but U.S. offi- cials say that in general, journalists like Claire Sterling have put togeth- er a better picture of in- ternational terrorist net- works than the C.I.A. When Turkish gunman Mohammed Ali Agca shot the Pope, they say, the President found out more about Soviet and Bulgarian involvement from Reader's Digest than from U.S. intelligence. The C.I.A. can't know everything, but the Republican Party correctly declared in its 1980 election platform that "the United States requires a realistic assessment of the threats it faces" and "must have the best intelligence capa- bility in the world." The platform said, "Republicans pledge this for the United States." Three years into this Republican Administration, the United States certainly has a better intelligence capability than it did in 1980-it could hardly fail in that-but overall it is still far from the best in the world. Can William J. Casey make it so? Well,. he gets credit for trying-even from.his adversaries---but there's reason to doubt that he can. LOATEVVED Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01I37R000100010001-7 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137 -CHRISTIAN SCIENCE ?IGNITOR 25 November 1983 g to decipher X10 w . own in Soviet According to these experts, this Soviet .der fense .spending, which chanp` began m the mid-1970s?has -sev- eral caus Th es: e Sov>ets ore to call ving Into more techno aes g-' Y phist;rted systems that present design and development problems cost overruns, and higher, per- unit costs (sound familiar?); they. are holding to SALT and-other-agreements that limitprod n of missiles,- submarines, and ballistic mime defenses;$ad:;tb,ey have bad economic problems thatlpted the deliv of"saiae - - Tbe.wup;lies?to-weapa~s~ders.'~- bo ime;for~the CTA as that -$e i` now rate of 7n=-1 c-'~e se `:i around 2 ' tiles. The"D Yom` measured in %. M IA, on the-other hand h u intelligence analysts say Russians ?inning-into delays, cost overruns t mys e Should , be 6 to 7 pemeat: The differ6ce3sim wh er to count inflsitinn in # Q.. _-L Ti- - ut wr --..~w?-^.R.-rL ..VfN{p~ _ 1 rceut? - w } p s i ataVuut.Z Pentagon intelligence officials say its "very x'ou're an anal st at w=* t m hard to say-What inflation is in an economy bass- Y Central In that is 1 Ae aCiGi i2r(~1"S Or the telligence Agency cally 8 bmter-eoonomy," andtherefore discount it. Pentagon and have the followingas- What they both agree on is that "nobody sat back s', unent: The Soviet union has many more fighter-air. and said, Lets beat our swords into to craft. than the- United States, but "US pilots fly more DD_ one senior," ph':" es nteDigence ph=sL+catedPlanes and SO official puff -it.. Measured :4nra- Set percent more fl tiles, spends 25 perms, hoz,e-the.* combat skills. Which country. timeto moreon~ 43F.-theso mflitarY procurement than the US. Measured intime of >var?..How should these facts affect speno:,ng? -- =- - ?. - - _ - __ . US defense dollars, the figure jumps'to 45 percent, en you spend a Taese are file kinds of quBoris y :that endless! the United States quarter to aimost trots half again US in~ spends,-you can-put a lot of new staff and ine~7 b1 ti P s The3'-are }~~ghly subjectiv e in the field--without having any gmwth in our y poll cal. Yet they are-crucial todecisimes'~ spending' said one inte ' ce" y 'in -'4'a ~'Aiagton that will affect , _ n "Thisisma coin- sources and could determine itsy ??u are- R try with 50,000 tanks and they're still ' producing 2,800-a:- According to recently declassified ~,-~:-, _,;_-~? = Year The US builds 700 to 800 new tanks a year. -- utaof Soviet niates, the Soviet Union over the past. emw ha ~: defense increases severaln ears he -A U .??-ume 2wspeao- ing. In the procurement of new weapons, the growth rate has dropped to about zero. Pentagon cn this to prove their critics have seized point that administration plans to "real-m A-nerica" are too grand. proponents of a-stron- . ger defense emphasize the half full part of the intelli- gence glass: that the Soviet Union, despite an apparent siowdovrn, silt produces a lot more weaponry than the I.S. And. as usual, the experts who gather and analyze such caught in the middle. , , . " . y -- - -- -- , - -_ ~ L",_ %-CLM. YYnen ]L" i kept happening, they realized they had a longer trend, i Why did it take so long to figure this out? "This is the kind of question that hurts," said one Senior intelligence officiaL "We think we're riglt out there on the frontier of getting a glimpse into this dosed society. But it takes a long time for us to accumulate the evidence to make these judgments, and the ?u trail by several Years.... do 3' ? Don't quote me, but were no b tter at r di ti h p e n c ng t n .some of xh eir technical problems than we am- .debates, " grumbles one ese I. budget frustrated senior mtelli- predicting our awn. . ace official. ""We habitually, - aale.trying to explain these things.'! wrapped ar'?und .the ,.low h ie to say, what will follow.- . ~ " - . _ you - a fore~cast, rve got to get the chicken In. recent conversation with reporters s 2n. bones out and look at the rie?aric and defense matters, intelligence agency officials expl ned I an "`The"mostimportantthui '~3'tb g.1. said _ the recent reports on Soviet economic choices g is going to be s- - the Bred fns military spending d,of= they e."" ...- - t,: . cinaang insight into how such things are deter- Most recent tTS me why the internal f debate among CIA and_,DIA (De ease '''~.a not relligence Agency anal sts.h theologcel,-and what ) Y ere'is ?sltnast ~... t _ significance it.has "for US defense ,. , -_ . - gets all tvristed arou d i Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100010001--7 WASHINGTON POST 23 November 1983 `Knockdown of a Soviet Buildup' Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00010 Usually when' CIA analysis is reported `inaccurately, we-must suffer in silence. However, in the case of Stephen S. Rosenfeld's Nov. 18 column, "Knock- down of a Soviet Buildup," because we prepared an unclassified version of our work on trends in Soviet defense spend- ing for the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress, I am able to put in proper perspective Mr. Rosenfeld's ac- count of our analysis. He suggests that our analysis of the Soviet defense effort portrays "a steady Soviet performance at a relatively low level" and that the Soviets used detente give themselves something of a breather." A balanced examination of our testimony conveys no such message. We stated explicitly to the committee that "our latest comparisons of U.S. and Soviet defense programs show that, de- spite somewhat slower growth in recent year, the costs of Soviet defense activi- ties still exceed those of the United States by a large margin. In 1981 the dollar costs of Soviet defense activities were 45 percent greater than U.S. out- lays; procurement costs alone were also 45 percent larger." Moreover, the com- mittee was reminded that the Soviet de- fense effort still is running between 13 and 14 percent of GNP-that is, over twice the percentage of GNP devoted to defense spending in the United States. We also stressed to the committee that "trends in Soviet military spending are not a sufficient basis to form judgments about Soviet military capabilities, which are a complex function of weapons stocks, doctrine; training, generalship and other factors important in a potential conflict The cost estimates are best used to iden- tify-shifts in-priorities and trends in re- source commitments to military pro- grams over` an extended period of time. ),Moreover; the spending estimates do not give an appreciation of the large stocks of strategic and conventional weapon sys- tems already deployed. Indeed, current levels of spending are so high that despite the procurement plateau noted, the Soviet forces have received since 1975 about 2,000 ICBMs and SLBMs, over 5,000 tactical combat and interceptor air- craft, 15,000 tanks and substantial num- bers of major surface combatants, SSBNs, and attack submarines." Finally, it is worth pointing out that Soviet efforts . to develop advanced weapon systems continue in the '8! k at least at the rapid pace of the previous two decades. Among these are fighter and airborne control aircraft, ballistic and cruise missiles, space systems and submarines. The new systems cover the full range of technologically advanced weaponry the Soviets will need to mod- ernize all major forces. In sum, Mr. Rosenfeld's description of our analysis does not provide a balanced account of our testimony to the JEC. Our costing of the Soviet defense effort is very complex and susceptible to mis- representation and misuse. Those who oversimplify or cite out of context our work in this important area do not con- tribute to needed public understanding of these issues. They also do an injustice to the professional, independent analysts in all of the agencies of the intelligence community working to broaden our knowledge and understanding of the Soviet defense effort. GEORGE V. LAUDER Thrector, Public Aft&$ Ounce cennai.tntelligenee Agency Washington Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100010001-7 Approved For Release 2006/01/03: CIA-RDP90-01137R ~t 1^ 1 r- r n 7.! r? .-w : r' L!r.^ ) ^? F', ?=ugust ~~5~ OPINION -AND-COPS Momentum under fire: MEN+ARY By David D.Newsom Policies become vested interests of those who create them and pursue them. It be- As the Central American issue is once Comes Personally risky to.suggest to a presi- more illustratin, no dent, in midstream. that a policy needs to be g grea force in reexamined. Those who maybe.tempted.are governmental life than the xnomea entu.tmof a .,deterred by the prospects-of eing labeler.; policy under fire - particulariy-vne:in which ??vac~llatin wear,? ,hr a Presioentis personally "indecisive.. g,''_?? involved-"=:.U, ? In the Case of Central America, ;tbe.policy consistent. - The problem is aggravated by the incteass- undoubtediv flows tram - the conviction `of President ing incidence of leaks. Leaks that reveal tiivi- Reagan and several . of .,those slops over bow to .pursue - d policies are less around him. Their reaction to criticism; bow-bow toly than those that reveals-: ever. is-much less to reconsider .their- policy amaging Po than to defend and explain it- They are pushed fundamental debate over the correctness -of in this by their parallel belief that the prob- the policies and the. premises that underlie munition-xo le^; is pat one of substance but of .a lack-of them. They .give Few olio -spa-- public comprehension. Their task is helped outside, partisan opponents. P immeasurably by cer-ain basic pressures and lei are written today ? in the govern kept inhibitions in bureaucratic and. political life. without consciousness-of the .problem -of- y- unauthorized disclosure. be recent accounts of a memorandum - the li - c o prepared for a National Security Council meeting on Central America on June 8 appear to illustrate the point. .- - - . There has been broad public skepticism about the administration's view of the conflict and the resultant policies, opposition to fund- ing in the Congress. and the quiet detachment at most of our allies..13ut the memorandum, as reported, gives no suggestion of a review of the basic premises of the policy. he Defense Department is said to be sug- gesung a pullout but only to avoid a policy This could be less a genuine option u-ia 2 pion- to force support fo- the defense positio_ tnat a greater zni aw- effort is -rep uL ed . Tne policy memorandum appears to ac- cept without challenge the premise that the issue . is fundamentally one of blocking Cuban/So,~-iet efforts and that these efforts are basically the root cause of the troubles in the area. The thrust of the paper.: is bow: so p,L~sue cu--rent policies with greater. success. There is no apparent hint that the lack of sup- port for the policies may be due to the.prem- ises of the policies themselves. The history of US foreign relations during the years of our active postwar engagement is studded with similar examples of the unwill- ingness of an administration to look candidly a: the premises of policies in trouble. Vietnam and our dependence on Iran are two cases in point- .. P Then there is the team aspe opponent be a political appointee. that per- . son's pronounced opposition to a policy prem- ise can bring charges of taiiure to support7be- team;.-the results can -':be ostracism --or- dismissal - - ~.._.. _ . The;. career ' officia) -wbo ? is -sufficiently 'placed'.to question policy is-even more-ulner able. -Charges may include the fact that the official -is a - "boidover." disloyal to the present administration, that be or she is unsympathetic to a new and ^'tougber" ar- proach. Exclusion from any meaningful role in the process can ouickly follow. The process of assessment itself inhibits reconsideration. Wile it would be unfair to suggest that participating intelligence agen- cies tailor-thei-l assessment of a situation to 't the Policv. it is only human that, in a bureauc- racy - including that of foreign policy and. intelligence - agency representatives will have their "turf" in mind. intelligence agen- cies may tend to paint the picture darker than others in order to be *'protecte against suo- den changes, De ense agencies may ten to - highlight the ultimate need for rnilitary force. The National Security Council input will al- -most certainly reflect a consciousness of the president's political needs. The State Depart-' ment will hesitate over conclusions that mav have serious foreign policy implications- Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100010001-7 iCLE Approved For Release $AQ61 M3TRDP90-01137R0001 on PAGE 5 August 1983 Intra-AgencyRifts Laid to Thcarguan 101 L partial ortial ade of Nicaragua, has covert said no thought is being given to send- guar Q ing American forces into combat in suppo) region. . anythi But the Nicaraguan operation has guan By PHILIP TAUBMAN also created several rifts within the . Reaga spedHILI NvwYork7 ma agency. One, expected by many, is fendec. WASHINGTON, Aug. 4 - United between the operations directorate, its go States covert operations inNicara United which handles the collection of intelli- shipm rkn covert -gua have proved to be a mixed blessing ge? " and g runs divisi~ which , ens-` o Nicr'i miring and m __ r____ ___ ____--- --r__-?_-- -- _ . __- anagiing 1000 Nicara- President' -:and other policymakers. ' say may.harnper the .C.LA.-s ability g s - ' The intelligence division, filled with. to attract young talent a- profession -dominated by the ;scholars and researchers, .= looks ?at by an internal rivalry aver r r resources- often oueis tedious work of collecting and. -covert operations the?sameway a col- Under the stewardship of Mr. Casey, analyzing information, the operations .iege faculty views the varsitylootball the agency'!!s:budget has been growing in Central America have given intelii- team: -with - a. mixture. of suspicion,- - nearly 2S .percent a -years not taking genre officials a chance to plan mill-condescension and contem : inflation into account, nmakfiWit tihe.: tary strikes, -coordinate -airlifts -of,; supplies, createa sophisticated field - ? "I3re :.operations staff, -not surpris- -of the fastest-growing agencies in the municeate s and, .field may, Is primarily populated -by- ~ Government. soportan , servea the front line of. tion-oriented people, .cloak-and-dag- . As covert -activities have grown, imm President Rhry on line . o'f ger .specialists who fancy a Bolme 'more and more money has been re. Reagan's po sian deduction over a computer print- quired to pay for them. Intelligence America out any day. Traditionally, the opera- .officials have asked But the Nicaraguan operation,. lions staff, particulary those devoted million to -finance the Nicaraguan aguan to managing covert activities -as op- operation in the fiscal year that be- es; paramilitary effort mounted by posed to the clandestine collection of gins in October. That is money that the C.IA since the Vietnam War, intelligence, view the intelligence many in the agency think should go to has, according to agency officials, division about the way a varsity foot- . other objectives, such as the improve- produced divisions within the agency `ball team views the faculty: with a " meat of intelligence reports that are significant and growing. mixture of suspicion, condescension- The problem is that covert activi- No Comment From Casey ties, which often involve propaganda and contempt. But there are other, less predict- campaigns, secret donations to pro- These traditional strains have been able tensions. Mr. Casey, who has American politics] parties or at- exacerbated by the 'large covert taken a keen personal interest in the tempts to overthrow a hostile govern- operation in Nicaragua, according to Nicaraguan operation, has reportedly meat, tend to produce divisions -agency employees. Many in the Intel- i bypassed some of his senior aides in within the C.I.A. In addition, they ligence division contend that the running it. Agecy officials report that dominate the public image of the Nicaraguan venom, as a highly vis- ? he has often dealt -directly with the agency, often unfavorably; create ible and widely criticized operation, head of-Central American operations, frictions with Congress and inject in~ has once again thrown the C.I.A. into sometimes' leaving the chief of the telligence officials into command . controversy. Only recently, they say, operations. directorate, John - Stein, roles that can conflict with the obliga- the agency pulled out of the decline and other top aides out of the deci- sion of producing neutral intelligence that started in the mid-1970's with dis- lion-making process. A spokesman repo. closures about intelligence abuses, in- for the agency, Dale Peterson, said A Natural Split eluding the attempted assassination Mr. Casey, would not comment on the. of foreign leaders, illegal spying on reports. ' The Nicaraguan campaign has -American citizens and drug testing an Mr. Stein is not known among placed the proponents of covert ac- unwitting human subjects. -- ? - agency employees as an enthusiastic tion, including William J. Casey, the It hurt, these employees say, to see advocate of covert operations and Director of Central Intelligence, at the C.I.A,'a activities debated for was reportedly am the fulcrum of American foreign poli- officials who raised among before cy. Some Defense Department offs- weeks in Congress, culminating in the- r. Casey noted recently that, with the vote by the House last month to end.,'.. Ty recently decided to expand" the Nicaraguan operation. These offi operations in Nicaragua, -Mr. Casey .vials feared it would escalate -the is directing more troops in combat combat and could bring Cuban forces' than the Army, Navy, Air Force and more directly combined. No ? regular y into the fighting. Like most agency officials,, Mr. Stein was American forces are currently - en- not available for comment. Mr. P&: gaged in combat -anywhere in "the terson said Mr. Casey-would not com- worid. And Mr. Reagan, despite plans ment on this matter either. for extensive military maneuvers .in Central America and the Caribbean, r. , including preparations for a posssible . L'j' 1 - Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100010001-7 Approved For Release gpWQi/0A~-~_%& RDP90-0113 31 .July. 1983 -'- -r r -k-7^ rD foreign Kissinger: OIL By By Robert Bendiner Henry A. Kissinger has probably exercised greater power than any U.S. secretary of state, Having served under Presidents Nixon and Ford, the elder statesman is returning to government service. President Reagan has named Kissinger chairman of a bipartisan commission aimed at seeking support for the administration's policies in Central America. In this exclusive interview, Kissinger offers' opinions on subjects ranging from the role of the CIA in Latin America to the secret of diplomacy. The interview was conducted short- ly -before Kissinger's appointment to the com- mission on Central America. Bendiner: Traditionally, historically, foreign policy has been made by. the president and his secretary of state. But now we have a National Security Council and a CIA and a Defense Depart- ment, as well as the Senate and even to -some extent the House of Representatives, all taking a very active hand in the process. Are there too many cooks for the good of the broth? Kissinger: Let's make a distinction between the management of foreign policy in the executive branch and the management of foreign policy as between the executive and legislative branches. With respect to the executive branch it is impossi- end result was that the negotiations' stopped en- tirely, and to this day the Cyprus -situation is totally stalemated.. Now I can't prove,that those negotiations in 1974 would have succeeded, but with every passing month the position of those who occupied the territory became more firmly established. Q : What do ? you see as the proper role for some of the agencies that were not created for the purpose of making policy like the1'CIA? A; I don't want the CIA to be involved in policy- making at .all. The CIA should be confined to making factual analyses-of political situations and. to. giving. its, views about the likely nonsequences of proposed courses of 'action. Now that second - role is admittedly ?close to the area : of ' poli- cymaking, but I am extremely - distrustful of getting the CIA involved in the policy process as a. -chief player, because there is the great 'danger: that Intelligence Will then tend to follow policy -rather than guide it-with objective information. I would think a major effort has to be made to keep Intelligence and policymaking as far apart as possible. Q: Would you say that that has been achieved? is that the relationship between the CIA and the [State] 'Department? A. No, I'm afraid it's gone the other way. I ..shudder every time I see a CIA report published in order to support a policy. because that really means there is a subconscious pressure on the :agency -to write reports that fit in with official ;preconceptions. Furthermore, no CIA report, should ever-be declassified for any purpose until maybe 10 years after the event. The CIA analysts should write their reports for the president of the United States, and the presi- dent should never use them in a public forum to support his position. He might use their informa- tion but he should not identify it as coming from the CIA. Q: Could you say whether this is the tack that you took with regard to the CIA? Say, in Latin America? A. More or less. You know, when the CIA tells you that the consequence of a communist govern- ment in Chile will .be to upset the political equili- brium in neighboring countries, this is an implicit policy recommendation. That cannot be helped. But as a general proposition, I think separation of policymaking and Intelligence is the tack that I i took. If I did take another one from time to time, it was wrong. Q: Is open diplomacy possible, and if.not, how 'far, can secrecy be named in a democratic state? At -I don't believe the question permits a clear- cut answer. In a democracy the results of negotia- tions obviously have to be made available to the public. Except in the rarest of cases, secret agreements will .not stand the test of crisis if the public has 'not been informed about them. So, clearly, the results of negotiations should be public. The process- by which these results are achieved generally should have a private phase .and then it may have a public phase. I believe 'that it is terribly important in a negotiation for one's interlocutor to understand - one's real purpose.- In fact, -that is infinitely more ble today for any one man or one department to I encompass all the disciplines and interests that have to be reflected in foreign policy. Inevitably, a president has to consider many aspects -of a problem and also take into account advisers who reflect still other aspects that have not occurred to him. This process contains a twofold danger. First, in order to settle a problem, the president may accept the least common denominator by way of bureaucratic compromise. Secondly, each issue ' tends to be dealt with on its individual merits. There is not necessarily among the various ' contenders for presidential attention a representa- tive speaking for the most important of all aspects of foreign policy: the relationship of various measures to each other over an extended period of time. A sense of nuance and of strategy is very difficult to develop in the modern government. As between the Congress and the executive branch, there is no doubt, in my mind at least, that the Congress is asserting an excessive influ-. ence over the day-to-day tactical management of foreign policy. Q: Are you thinking of things like Congress' refusal to appropriate money for some. Central' American states unless they improve their human rights record? A: I don't want to go into which specific decisions would fall into this category, but I can mention one from the period I was in .office-just to take the discussion away from immediate controversies. We were attempting to negotiate an agreement between Greece and Turkey on Cyprus. The Congress, in the middle of the negoti- ations, voted an embargo on arms to Turkey. The Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01I37R000100010001-7 ARTICLE A RED. ^`? Approved For Release 200 9/ 'LQ 6 JP- P90-01I37R00 OIL PArE/ Jul\' 1983 r Reagan. - In fact. they .said, W. Reagan's key reason -for deploying the -U;. Washington - A flurry of hints forces was the U.S. perception that that Cuba ?aad the Soviet 'Union -were Cuba and the Soviet Union were plan- preparing to expand their military ntn to significantly increase :-their role in Nicara led President Rea- ry roles in Nicaragua. ganto -increase the U.S- military State Department sources said I Presence in 'Central America, accord- U.S. ambassadors in Latin America ing to Pentagon and National'Securi- have been instructed to tell "trusted" 'tv Council officials. leaders in the region that Mr. Reagan "All -our indications were that has fresb'intelligence data Vsuggestirig m- -Cuba. and _the -.Soviet Union.:?:were'I - tensification. preparing major military doves in . The. Cuban moves 'are be : described as Nicaragua,and 'so we had 'to move, too," one NSC, official said yesterday.. - "Our move was a preemptive strike, :so to :speak," said a Pentagon amounting to:a direct challenge to vital U.S.. inter- ests and national 'security, -said the, sources, who- official who, like other sources knowl- Cuban and Soviet buildups in Central America be- the situation, -agreed edgeable to about tali; on condition that be remain anonymous. Administration officials conceded, however, that there has been no hard evidence that -Cuba is mobilizing troops or warplanes to intervene in - 'Central America. Congressional critics suggested yesterday that U.S. intelligence ana- lvsts may have misread the evidence; under pressure to supply proof for ls'..r. Reagan's hard-line stance on the region. The Reagan administration sur- prised the American public and ang- ered critics Monday when it an- nounced that it would dispatch 19 ITS: warships, including two aircraft. car riers, and 3,000 .to 4,000 ground troops.:: -to Central America for maueuv f that-swill last six months.. Mr. Reagan described the, ?deplow :menns Tuesday. as "routine r-k cises," but senior adnninistration?offl=:'- dais privately -said they were meant , to -show support or U.S. allies .in the 'region; step =up _'U.S. pressures.: on Nic.aragua's'Sandinista..rvlers-to.mod- - -erate their Marxist stance; and prove to U.S.-foes that-=Mr. Reagan -can pct - decisively in .'Central America; de- spite congressional -opposition to.. his policies. = '. Pentagon, Mate Department'and NSC officials-interviewed this week said that while these factors explain ,what Mr. Reagan wants the maneu- vers to accomplish, they do not 'e-- plain his decision to order the exer- cises-. NSC and Pentagon officials said .hints of the gan flowing into U.S. intelligence agencies 10 to 15 weeks ago... Officials said alarm bells .began ringing at CIA headquarters in Langley, Va., in May when photo- graphs taken by an SR-71, a high-flying spy air- craft, showed about 400 Cuban marines practicing "sophisticated amphibious landings" on beaches near the Cuban port of Mariel,.25 miles west of Havana. ? ' - The CIA's chief aerial photography analyst, .John Hughes, concluded the Cubans were practic- ing an invasion of a foreign country, not a defense of their own beaches, the officials said. Administration officials said they first inter- preted the Cuban maneuvers as preparation for an invasion of some small Caribbean nation. Now, however. they believe the Cubans may have been practicing for landings in Nicaragua, and perhaps even Honduras. a staunch U.S. ally. About the same time, the officials said, Mr. Hughes reported that four Soviet merchant ships had been photographed._ unloading military equip- ment at Nicaragua's Pacific port of Corinto. The administration was further "jolted," the of- ficials said, when the National Intelligence Dailii (NM), a CIA journal distributed to senior policy- makers, reported June 1 that Cuban army Gen. Ar- naldo Ochoa Sanchez had been in Nicaragua since early May. The NID report said General Ocboa:had been in- strumental in negotiating, organizing and leading the .deployment of Cuban troops to Angola in 1976 and to Ethiopia in 1977, totaling about 42,000 sol- diers. Nm's June 1 report said the Soviet-trained Gen- eral Ochoa apparently was in Nicaragua to com- pile a report for Fidel Castro on whether it would be feasible to send Cuban troops to Nicaragua. Approved For Release 2006/01/03: CIA-RDP90-01137R00O0176To001-7 ARTICLE APPEARED Approved For Release V 1137RO ON PAGE .3 SUMMER 1983 Angelo Codevilla is a professional staff member with the Senate Intelligence Committee. Previously, he was a foreign service officer and a fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford Univegsiry. Dr. Codevilla has written widely on European politics and in the field of intelligence and military policy. ArVe4o C lL By focusing so exclusively o rules and standards of operations, the intelligence debate of the mid-1970s did answer the fundamental question of what the United States expects of its intellige services or what they are to accomplish in order to meet challenges of the 1980s. The Substance and the Rules Since the early 1970s, this country's intel- ligence agencies have been asking, "What does the country expect of us?" That ques- tion had not arisen in the postwar period be- cause the American political system had left the agencies to the total discretion of those appointed to lead them. In the early 1970s, factional conflict among those leaders spilled over into a national debate about what America's practitioners of intelligence ought to have foremost in. mind. That debate con- tinues. Recently, Admiral Stansfield Turner, President Carer's Director of Central Intelli- gence, and his former special assistant, George Thibault, published an attempt both to answer that question and to indict the Rea- gan administration's handling of intelli- gence. The author's answer seems to be that the American people expect their intelligence agencies to be as innocuous as possible. They charge that the Reagan administration. is undermining the agencies by loosening too many restrictions. The authors thus contend that for our civil liberties' sake, and for th1: sake of the agencies' own standing in the country, the agencies ought to concentrate on formulating for themselves the right kinds of rules and restrictions. However. bne would not suspect from Turner and Thibault's arti- cle,,,that the rules by which intelligence offi- cers live ought to flow from the intelligence profession's substantive requirements. Nevertheless, in intelligence as in other areas of government, the American people rightly want their employees to accomplish the functions for which they are paid. This author will argue that Stansfield Turner is Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01I37R000100010001-7 Approved For Release 2006/01/03: CIA-RDP90-01137R0 the) eft of exploding cigars or embarrass .sure on the.lefi-wing tegtme stausncs-ao.glonfy.themselYes, ragua tagency's anonymous people usually;l him by infiltrating a depilatory that As a former foreign correspondent, played It cool:' lZeand end World War IL That of dollars and growing yearly. zrge enongh_ There is, some analysts believe, a By that time the idea had become .. And as talk of fighting and winning a whole technological momentum (which limited nuclear war is bandied about and author- `.let's get it over with,,, says Kstia- former government official and Washington while US-Soviet differences kowsky. "Drop the bomb, scare the hell John Newhouse calls "technology creep") that proceeds apart from poli- der. And that's exactly what happened" ed States and Europe about nuclear war tics, apart from diplomacy, apart from Atomic bombs leveled Hiroshima has reached unprecedented levels. the military needs of the moment and Nagasaki three days apart in Au- "Technology has a life of its own," ry S Truman, told his sdentists to pro- So the weapons keep coming, j teed with a hydrogen bomb; odds were '~~'er or not there is a pressing znli- the Soviets would soon have their own tary need. for them. The Soviet missile binge in the early 1960s was attributed anyway- "Truman didn't think the bomb was to Kremlin humiliation at the hands of worth much," recalls Harvard govern- went professor Richard Neustadt. who gust and got the Japanese to surrender. r The United States began working on . Hyland says. "Something is funded- It Kisdakowsky wrote his surnmary report an atomic weapon in 1942 and tested it moves along. It's funded again. It moves and left for Harvard and its laboratmier, in July, 1945. But Washington knew the even further." - Now, 37 years later, he says that secret wouldn't keep. The Soviets had And the forces that keep it moving the nuclear stockpiles cad scenarios are been working on an atomic bomb since are a loosely related pack of research "unbelievable," that most of his surviv- 1942, at first in a ham-handed way; scientists, the Pentagon and its compet- ing colleagues are appalled by what has when they tested one in 1949 it came ing services, defense contractors and grown Out of a rudimentary atomic de- several years earlier than expected.. high-technology firms and a range of vice. That was one reason why President politicians with a claim to expertise The late J. Robert Oppenheimer, Franklin D. Roosevelt's successor, Har- about US-Soviet tensions. who led the Manhattan Project, foresaw a day when a nuclear-armed Soviet Union and United States would be like two scorpions in a bottle, each capable of lohng the other but only at the risk of its own Life. out of the Japs and get them to surren- fester, public concern in both the unit- RA Approved For Release 2006/01/03: CIA-RDP90-01137R DIC TV REPORTS, r .. S, 2Oc' ; 65& O6 PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF PROGRAM Communique 1)4 ~ ,r November 1, 1982 4:30 P.M. STATh CTY V $UJECT Recent Developments in the Spy Business SANFORD UNGAR: From National Public Radio in .Washington, I'm Sanford Ungar, and this is Communique. In the old days, during World War II and beyond, the movies set the tone for real-life international intrigue. The good guys were easy to tell apart from the bad. Espionage was conducted, for the most part, by agents in trench coats who dashed through the wet, dark streets of Vienna, Berlin and Geneva, making dead drops, foiling their adversaries with microdots and an occasional poisoned dart. There's still some of that, of course. But today's intelligence world is one of satellites, computers, listening posts, and other high technology. On this edition of Communique, a glimpse of that world, and the question: How effective and how secure is Western intelligence? However streamlined the intelligence business has become, it still involves spies. ANNOUNCER: The news at 5:45 with Michael Nicholson. MICHAEL NICHOLSON: The Attorney General, Sir Michael Havers, has declined to answer questions in the Commons about the alleged spy scandal at the Government Communications Headquarters at Cheltenham. He said the matter was sub judice. An American newspaper has claimed the Russians-were able to get hold oof.... Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100010001-7 STAT Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100010001-7 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100010001-7 STAT pproved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R ARTICLE A.PF'Z.A} ON PAGE THE BALTIMORE SUN 8 October 1982 Intelligence and Policy The Pressure To Reinforce Instead of Inform There is a saying in the U.S. intelligence community that "If you want it real bad you get it real bad' =if senior officials insist on evidence to bolster a policy, or if they press .too hard for a quick estimate, the result is .bound to be faulted. Concern that this was happening in Cen- tral America prompted a 23-page staff re- --port by the Subcommittee on oversight and Evaluation of the House Permanent Select :Committee on Intelligence. Excerpts from that just-published report follow: The briefing stated that "lots of ships have been traced" from the Soviet Union, through various other countries, and on to .Nicaragua, but when the committee asked how many ships had been traced along this route and when, the written response indicat-, ed that intelligence could show only a very. few examples. Another statement was that, "You don't plan an operation like what is be- ing run-in El Salvador if you haven't gone to somebody's command and general staff col- lege.". Subcommittee staff understood this stateent to mean that the insurgency was commanded by graduates of schools bein g G'" comparable to the U.S. ArmyCommand and d General Staff. College-presumably in the The intelligence community has devoted effort to identifying support to Soviet Union or bloc countries. The commit tee asked about the evidence, and the written the Salvadoran insurgents from other coun- response explained the comment as "a figure tries.. Information on arms trafficking was of speech meant simply to emphasize the growing when, in September, 1980, President greater sophistication and training of the Sal- Carter's certification that Nicaragua was not vadoran insurgents compared to the Sandie- aiding the insurgents focused major attention istas at the time that they overthrew Somo- on the subject. In late 1980, documents were captured from the guerrillas which showed za. A slide titled "Guerrilla Financing (Non- that a substantial amount of arms and other Arms)" indicated that Salvadoran guerrillas supplies had been obtained from Communist were receiving money in addition to weapons, countries. They showed Cuba, with Nicara- showing 'a total of some $17 million annually. than participation, to be heavily involved in This resulted from an extrapolation which, as the coordination, control and movement of outlined by the briefer, seemed particularly the material In early 1982, Secretary [of State Alexan= tenuous. It was based on a single piece of evi- der] Haig asserted that the Salvadoran insur- Bence indicating the monthly budget for the commander of one faction on one front. The gency was controlled by non-Salvadorans. A extrapolation would have required that figure major intelligence briefing, based primarily to be representative of the budgets of the on an analysis of sensitive intelligence, was other four factions, and all five factions to be provided by the intelligence community to equally active on each of the five fronts. In a select audiences in the Congress and execu question for the record, the committee asked tive branch. This committee received that briefing on March 4.... about these assumptions. In its response, the The briefing was based on a skillful and intelligence community said it was unable to professional examination of data obtained comment on whether the original monthly figure was representative, and instead ex- pressive various sources. The analysis was im- plained that the bottom line of $17 million pressive and of definite value to policymak- which appeared in the briefing slide was "not era. Yet the presentation was flawed by sev- an estimate," " but was intended only to iridi- eral instances of overstatement and overint- scafe that "relatively large sums of currency" - erpretation_ Clearly these inaccuracies were were going to the guerrillas. of little intrinsic importance. However, they Slightly inaccurate or misleading state- detracted somewhat from the credibility of ments such as these are not likely to misin- -the presentation. form anyone seriously, although the pattern It is recognized that the give and take of reduce- confidence in the intelligence an oral presentation requires spontaneity, can product. Of greater concern is that these er- which can occasion inadvertent inaccuracies. rpm in presentation may suggest an underly- The staff would not normally concern itself ing unevenness, presentation an excessive zeal in em- with such instances. However, the formality phasizing certain points. This should be of this presentation with its 47 viewgraphs, avoided throughout the intelligence process the fact that it [the staff] had been briefed because of the inherent danger that it might several times pre%lously, and the senior posi revent the broader dimensions of a given tion of the plq jpi yy p ~ X 06/01/03 : CI41,9OlOl1di~7ii@W*610~44f lcq these on a level comparable to a written analysis. points, from being fully considered.... r r STAT _._....._.._.APproved.- Fix Rel e.2Q.0-610 i1.0...-.C1A-RDP-9II-Q1-x.3.7 tEAFXD ON P GE Sir r CHICAGO TRIBU14B 3 October 1982 le.decHne'of u.S.Jnte When you think about the capabilities this I we began asking if it is cost effective. In 1964 country ought to have in the intelligence Vietnam came along, and a decision was arena,'. you need to think in three areas. Foreign intelligence, knowing things about other countries, whether their military capabilities, political events, economic events, ecology, or .transportation systems everything one might need to I encyclopedias that had to be updated by know: a classified Encyclopedia Britannica. printing, by typing every year before compu The second area is counterintelligence, tern had come along. whether other intelligence agencies are try- ing to find out about this country, about The decision was made to divert those secrets we believe we should protect. I people from the study of less essential count- h t il d h th k d on t e a e em wor e ave And finally, the most controversial area: I ries and to covert action using mechanisms beyond nor- .; information for fighting a tactical war in mal diplomacy but short of the formal de- South Vietnam. In 1967 a new problem oc- clared use of military force to try to bring cured with the balance of payments. The ld reduce A-4- u H u about actions or change actions in other question was. ow- co yo countries. can presence abroad? In the 1950s when we embarked on a great in 1969, it became a Vietnamazation, reduc- period of building, money and people were ? ing the entire size of the national security available if you had a good idea about how structure. By 1971, new opportunities came you might do a better job of foreign intelli- along. Technology had led 'us to the stage gence, or counterintelligence or of covert that we could do with satellites all kinds of action. things we earlier envisioned doing only with The covert action syndrome came out of manned aircraft. But but they cost huge the experience with OSS in World War II and sums of money. So a decision was made to . there was great enthusiasm in 1953 when the reduce manpower in order to buy the tech- Shah of Iran was restored to his throne. In nology. 1954 whpin Arbenz in Guatemala Was removed That's not entirely a bad story because the from governing, that covert action was a very fundamental ability to vertify treaties and to useful tool for the government to have. provide for indications and warnings against surprise attack in this day of inter The 1950s were times for investment in continental weapons systems was in fact bol- technology and the arrival of the U-2. For the stered by that investment. But our ability to first time we obtained the ability by photog- follow and understand what was going on in raphy to understand what was going on in a the bulk of the rest of the world in any kind closed society. We had both the understand- of depth was given up. Then in 1974 came the ing to avoid the prospect of surprise attack disclosures of abuses, some imagined, but but also the possibility to be able to verify some real about trampling on the rights of treaties. We could move into arms control American citizens. arrangements where we could not get per Suddenly with hindsight one recognized mission to do on-site inspection. that the great builders in the 1940s who really began from trying to intercept, break and read the codes of other countries. In World War I, the U.S. moved to have an intelligence capability that covered all those disciplines. In fact, the very best communica- tions intelligence capability belonged to the State Department. ' After World War I, the U.S. went back to the usual mode of trying to disestablish that capability. But the State Department for a decade kept a very good capability in com- munications intelligence until 1929 when a new secretary of State came along, took a look and said, "Gentlemen don't read other gentlemen's mail," and disestablished. it. BUT IT really was the galvanizing experi- ence of World War II that changed this country's whole approach toward intelligence organizations and what we might need. For the first time, this country had to deal with problems on a global basis, whether it was planning an amphibious operation or target- ing factories in Germany for bombing or trying to understand simply the climatology of places in the world where we were going to store supplies. . Out of that experience, the leadership of this country was determined that we would not again be so'totally taken by surprise, not just by Pearl Harbor, but by knowing so little about the problems we would have to deal with. The National Security Act of 1947 not only set up a Defense Department, it pro- vided 1'or a director of central intelligence and a deputy who were to look after the needs of an entire intelligence community to be created and also to manage a central intelligence agency. The other intelligence agencies were created by executive order over the next four who observe and report information. A great deal of that is available in the open press, by contact, by discussion. Somebody with a lan- guage ability can go out to the bazaar or the mosque and come back and give some sense of the feeling of the people. And sometimes human intelligence is clandestine, when it is necessary to hire agents to steal secrets that -other governments wish to maintain. The second area, imagery-taking pictures-has been around for a long time. But the advent of the U-2, the SR-71 and satellites revolutionized that. And in fact that entranced a lot of people who felt it was going to answer all the needs of the world. And the third area, signals intelligence, By Bobby Inman WHEN YOU think about the intelligence business of this country, there are normally three disciplines: human intelligence, imagery, and signals intelligence. By human intelligence, we mean people In 1961 we came to a new era, an era of cost effectiveness. It swept over the Defense Department, and since most of the intelli- gence budget is buried there, we were quick- ly caught up. If there was ever a profession that was likely not to be cost effective, at least next to research, was that of the field of intelligence. You never knew when you might need to know some information, but if you started asking if it was cost effective to collect information on the transportation sys- tems, or communications systems of various countries, it was pretty easy to conclude that you might not need it, and therefore it was not cost effective. I MARK the begin of the decline of U.S. intelligence communication capabilities to. 1964. Indeed, from 1946 forward we had asked what might this country need to know. In 1961 made to pay for the cost of war out of capital investment. And so instead of maintaining that encyclopedic data base on what hap- pened in the outside world, the decision was wanted to give this country a peacetime intelligence capability second to none had failed to reflect on the standards by which the operatives would be held accountable. There were no guidelines. And we lurched-as this country has a great ability to do-into a period of inquisition, congres- sional investigations. They made great head- lines and for about -18 months no one was very interested in looking back and asking about the effect of those years of diversion and in reduction of people and assets in the intelligence community. Adm. Bobby Inman is the former directo+ of the National Security Agency and was tin deputy director of the Central Intefligenci Agency until he resigned last spring. Thi; growth for this co;~int in y:e top an " T rqe~+i g of scientists at the Ferm intelligence capabil }~ OVe ease 2006/01/03: CIA-RDP90-01137R00010l i rol dcceterator Laboratory in west sub urban Botot'ia Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100 ARTICLE APPEARED ON PAGE Q ishire, England? A sprawling network of listening posts, satellites, computers and antennas Unveiling the Secret NSA .. udging by the sheer size of his operation, America's most important intelligence officer is an Air Fo=e lieutenant general named Lincoln Faurer, the director of the National Security Agency. It is Faurer's NSA-not the CIA-which owns and oper- ates the bulk of U.S. intelligence-collection systems: everything from "aquacade" satel- lites in orbit 22,000 miles above the Indian Ocean to massive "antenna farms" cached in the West Virginia hUh. The global com- munications the NSA intercepts and de- codes give the government its single most important source of intelligence. NEws- WEEK has learned, for example, that during the Falklands war, the NSA broke the Ar- gentinecode-allowing crucial information to be passed to the British about the disposi- tion ofArgentine forces. For all its influence, NSA remains the least known of the intelligence agencies. For most Americans, the National Security Agency does not exist--or is fuzzily con- fused with the National Security Council. That is exactly the way NSA wants it, since success in eavesdropping depends on the target's naive belief that no one is listening. But that is about to change with the publica- tion this month ofa new book, "The Puzzle Palace," by Massachusetts lawyer James Bamford-* Bamford, 35, unveils in eye- 'glazing detail the organization and installa- tions of "America's most secret agency"--a worldwide network of satellites, listening posts, computers and antennas that can, Knowledgeable sources say Bamford's tome is chockablock with errors that will no doubt allow NSA to denounce it as "grossly distorted" or "wildly exaggerated." But Bamford has nevertheless painted a fasci- nating picture of the massive agency that commands the largest share of the secret U.S. intelligence budget, will soon have more floor space at its Fort Meade, Md., headquarters complex than any U.S. agen- A new book tells how America's largest and most clandestine intelligence agency spies on the world. cy save the Pentagon, and churns out 40 tons of classified documents a day. Although be doesn't mention it in his book, Bamford once worked as a clerk for the naval security group, which operates many of NSA's listening posts, and also served as an informant for the Senate Intel- ligence Committee during its investigation of eavesdropping on Americans. He insists that nothing in his book came from his own association with NSA and that none of it is classified. But the government belatedly has reclassified some of the information and the cannot reclassify documents, but a new ex ecutive order, which took effect Aug. 1, claims the government can do just that. Th debate is not an -idle one. The maximum penalty for publishing classified informa-11 tion about communications intelligence is a I $10,000 fine and 10 years in prison. Careless: Classified or not, Bamford found much of his information gathering, dust on library shelves. As he tells it, his first break came when he was going through papers at the George C. Marshall Research Foundation in Lexington, Va., and came across a copy of an unclassified NSA news- letter for "NSA employees and their fam- ilies." Bamford successfully argued. that if NSA relatives could read the newsletters, so could he-"I'm as good as somebody's cousin," lie says-and the agency allowed him to pore through more than 6,000 pages of newsletters dating back to 1952. Al- though sensitive information had sup- posedly been deleted, the censors had been careless. Names that were blacked out in headlines appeared unmasked in the body of the story and bits of seemingly harmless information led him to major discoveries. An obituary of one NSA employee, for instance, noted that he had once been sta- tioned in Yakima, Wash.-alerting Bam- ford to the existence of an NSA listening complex tucked away in the vastness of an Army firing range. When his relations with NSA eventually soured, Bamford turned to other sources. He scoured more govern- ment archives and talked to several former NSA officials, including former director Lt_ Gen. Marshall Carter. Bamford implies, horrl$ppuokiedaFEpmvR leasgi20D6 OrltOSit I Mv i219i)a6t l S7R0 0##1100fhk-getails for the first time international telex, telegram and telephone "not to publish or communicate the infor- the physical layout and organization of the conversation. - - mation," which it says was mistakenly re- massive NSA complex at Fort Meade. The Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00 PORTLAND OREGONIAN 2 August 1982 Intelligence analysis [ibie, not for. fainthearted ._ 'u. By JACK STEPHENSON PREDICTING the future is the life- sons, some for believed good intentions, that claimed oil production in Russia blood of an intelligence agency. The vi- others for more base motives. would rise until 1985, level off until the tal fluid takes.the form of intelligence How accurate have these estimates 1990s and then rise again. estimates. Although the real-life James into the future been? What grade should As we' stand today, almost awash Bonds and the modern-day Mata Haris the analysts receive on their report with oil, many may be confused over i receive the glamour and the notoriety, it cards? Let's look at one example that what to believe about the future of So- is the intelligence estimators who deter- came into the public domain. viet oil. The majority seems to favor the mine the real value of an intelligence At an April 1977 press conference, new CIA estimate. organization to its government. President Carter cited a classified Cen- As noted, written predictions are not Peering into the future is great fun, tral Intelligence Agency estimate on for,the faint of heart nor .are they sure for, after all, we do spend the rest of world oil supplies that predicted severe things. Yet they are vitally important. -- o u lives there. But committing what shortages by 1985. In particular, ' the . Perhaps more disturbing than the we see to written predictions and then Russian oil industry was estimated to be cloudy view of the future is the tenden-' standing by them is not for the faint- in trouble, with production peaking as cy of the present administration to be-' hearted. How does an intelligence ana- early as 1978 and Russia becoming a net come more secretive The closing cif' lyst sort from the subtle, shifting shades oil importer by 1985. The furor over the several federal statistical offices'is and of. gray to form a vision of the future? president's comment caused the ad- example. Public debate based on avail Analysts arrive at the best estimates the ministration to declassify and release able information was good far the CIA` old-fashioned way; they earn them within three days the_ClAeport Criti- forecast on oil. It should--be cantinuedy through research. cism of the report was instantaneous. whenever possible: The grist for the analyst's mill takes The next month the gloomy CIA es- There must always be secret esti.; many forms. There is a massive amount timate was reinforced by a report enti- - mates, especially those that are either, of open literature that forms the base of tled, "Energy: Global Prospects for tactical in nature or contain informaon any estimate. But piled onto it are the that would identify sources. But on the. more esoteric and potentially more in- . . strategic scale, topics such as energy sightful sources: defector reports; pho- In mJopi IIQI t resources, crop. estimates, economic" tographs from on the land, from in the conditions, socio-political issues and air and beyond into space; communica- even military force levels would benefit lion intercepts; and even environmental 1985-2000." This study was done by 35 from criticism by knowledgeable. dti pollution. Add to this the gleanings business, government and academic zees from the espionage network -reports leaders from 15 non-communist coun- Somewhere within the intelligence from agents-in-place and purloined doc- tries. It stated that world oil shortages community there must have been an., uments and hardware - and the ana- could begin as early as 1981. analyst who perceived the potential.for, . lyst has the ingredients to make an esti- The CIA was still standing by its conflict over the Falkland Wands be forecast in August 1979. CIA Director tweed Great Britain and ArgeutbL.But! But there is no precise recipe for this Stansfield Turner continued the warn- what analyst would have been listened -process. The analyst applies his or her ing during congressional testimony in to on that issue when-Israel was with- special knowledge and insights devel- April 1980, predicting a vicious struggle drawing from the-Sinai and at the same oped over the years. What degree of over the remaining oil supplies. time attacking terrorists. in Lebanon, validity can be assigned to the various But by mid-1981, the CIA had -re- the Soviets were embroiled fn Afghani- reports? How reliable are the sources? vised its estimate because Soviet oil pro- stan, Poland was suffering, Central Is the evidence -conflicting or support- duction, which had been predicted to America was in foment' and the entire ing? What shrewd questions can be peak in 1978, had instead continued to world was speculating on who. would raised that, might give a better inter- climb. The new forecast stated that pro- succeed Soviet President Leonid I. pretation of the information? duction would continue at current levels Brexhnev? The analyst will surely subject first- for one or two years and then begin to And that the problem - identify- draft estimates to the critical eve of decline. One of the CIA's severe oil crit- ofessional colleagues. Outside exerts ics, Professor Marshall Goldman of ing those who do, indeed, see clearly may be called in. Finally, the analyst Wellesley-College, then said he agreed and accurately into the future- A hall- must defend the vision of the future with the CIA. mark of the American scientific re- before a panel of other experts often Another oil expert, Arthur Meyer- search effort has been its openness and subjection to review. If it is correct that including representatives from the van- hoff, writing in the November-Decem- the - best intelligence estimates are ous intelligence-related agencies in the ber 1981 issue of American Scientist, earned by careful research, then as. government. declared that the CIA was more nearly much as possible should be open to re-' The official estimates that result correct than any agency except for the view by an informed audience. Our offi- from this process range from the highly Soviet Ministry of Oil Industry, which cial forecasters might end up with bet classified to those available to the pub- had predicted a turndown in oil produc- ter report cards. - lic. Classified estimates are sometimes lion, possibly by 1982. - edited so that they too can become-pub- The Defense Intelligence Agency, Jack Stephenson is a resident of St lic property. In other instances, re orts however, has a different crystal ball. In [lens a.,d a former analrsr for the are leaked to tlPPMMeWr nil, W0as0e 1ffi3, ,~lZats~~9 1aX67 Approved For Release 2006/01/03: CIA-RDP90-01137R00 NEWSDAY (NY) 18 July 1982 Costs Difficult to Newsday Washington Bureau Washington - Trying to estimate just how much the Soviet Union actually spends on defense is one of the most com- plex and controversial issues in the de- fense debate. The Central Intelligence Agency says that since 1970 the Soviets have been outspending the United States by more than 50 per cent a year. That estimate has become a key point for many who argue that the United States must dra- matically increase its defense spending. But some say the CIA figures exaggerate Soviet defense spending, and others say they are actually too low. A recent study by the Carnegie En- dowment for International Peace con- eluded that there are two major iiicultiet in trying to assess Soviet de- fense spending and comparing it to U.S. spending: finding out what resources, and how much money, the Soviets are actually putting into the military, and accurately comparing the true value of resources devoted to defense in societies and economic systems as different as the United States and the USSR The Soviet Union, of course, does not publish its military budget in the accu- racy or detail required of the Pentagon. Most analysts agree that the public Sovi- et figures are no more than propaganda designed to give a very low defense spending estimate. A major part of the CIA effort goes to determining just what the Soviets are producing. The second problem - comparing rel- ative costs - is even more difficult. The CIA has attempted to compile the ruble costs of Soviet products and then to in- terpolate the costs of those products into dollars. But there are inherent difficul- ties. For instance, Soviet manpower costs are considerably less than those in the U.S. military. Taking the much larg. er Soviet Army and calculating what it would cost the United States to maintain it in dollars produces a higher figure be- cause U.S. manpower costs are higher. Trying to estimate the cost of producing technology is equally difficult. The CIA relies on the U.S. defense in- dustry to help it estimate the costs of pro- ducing Soviet weapons. A company like Grumman mist be asked how much it would cost to manufacture and assemble the components of Soviet aircraR But the agency must make some arbitrary ad. justments to compensate for obvious cost differences. For instance, the agency nays that expensive Soviet manufacturing practices, such as hand wiring , must be excluded from the estimate. One critic, Franklyn-D. Holzman, pro- fessor of eainomics at Tufts University, claims that the CIA overestimates the dollar costs of both Soviet manpower and equipment. He also . claims that the CIA estimates do not sufficiently compensate for the higher level of education and training of the average American soldier compared to the Soviet soldier. And, be says, there is a systematic overestima? tion of the quality of Soviet weapons that leads to an overvaluation of their worth. "It is a serious disservice to our policy- makers and the public to have the na- tional security debates use the CIA dollar comparison, particularly as they are presently calculated," writes Holz- man. He suggests that the CIA could present a more accurate picture of de- fense spending if it published figures that showed the ruble value of the U.S. defense effort as well as the dollar value of the Soviet defense effort. But other critics of the CIA defense estimate may it underestimates Soviet defense spending. William T. Lee, a for. mer CIA analyst, argues that the agen- cy's approach is not valid and should rely more on published Soviet data on indus- trial output, and the costs of labor, cap- ital and materials. Lee argues that the CIA relies too much on defense firms in making the cost estimates. The Carnegie report concludes that there are "serious problems" in making the cost comparisons. It says, "Spending comparison are of limited value, these limitations have been overlooked in the political debate, and a more realistic sseemeat of the Soviet-American mili- tary balance must focus on other aonsid- erationa." -Jim Khzrfeld Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01I37R000100010001-7 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137F 000100010001-7 WALL STREET JOURNAL ARTIci AMU= 16 JULY 1982 ON PAGE when he arrived. Part of the f Casey's Shadows: r-t problem said' has been thane day briefing procedure was simp]y money: In the seven rials f or tight years prior to the last year cf the merely get a- pack N -officials don't age A Greater Emphasis Carter administration, the agency had sent y g over by the o agency. I written Instead mat they e bear "lost 50% of its people and 40 of its fund- _ ~ fig.,, a presentation from a briefing officer. He On CIA Analysts The problem wasn't just money. though.,., then reports back to headquarters on what types of questions the officials asked and if The program. "wasn't timely," said Mr. ` there might be a need for more of certain In the huge marble entrance hall of the C " " ' aney, and it wasn t relevant. For iris= Central Intelligence Agency outside Wash- stance, I asked for an estimate on the-Cu- :, ington, one wall bears the words, "And Ye bans and their;aetivities. I got, it after-two- Shall Know the Truth and the Tnrth Shall months-and."it neglected to 'mention Make You Free." The wall :opposite is in- (uba:s :relationship with the Soviet.thikm 1: scribed: with stars. "In Honor of Those sent iIt back: and it -took another while. -I Members of the CIA Who Gave Their Lives asked bow long It had been In the works. It In the Service of Their Country." Below the turned out that it was. begun in dune. of. stars, a glass display case holds a book In 1980 It had gone through ?seven dratts=' which each star is followed by the name of and the first one was the best." the slain CIA member it stands for. Some Moreover, the estimates were too nar-. of the stars have only blank spaces beside row in scope: ?y were doing these esti-` them, to, mark the -names-that wiil-riever, mates on a country-by-country busts:. They, be revealed. t ? f would do one-on Nicaragua, Booduras. El., This dual commitment: to secrecy and,ode.was Iookingat there I to knowledge, is the hallmark -of-,a govern-_. gional _ Interplay'.among these eoi itrr merit. intelligence -agency. Most of our at- And no nne was concentrating on the eco- tention to the CIA in the past decade has . ;. nomic component of these situations. In 2(l. been concentrated on the secrecy part. But CIA Director William Casey, in a recent in. terview. wanted mainly to talk about what he was doing about the less glamorous and' more important matter of bow the agency , analyzes and reports Information. ..t He did say that the CIA was now active again- 14- clandestine. - activities... post-Watergate style. "There's a lot of talk about my being-trigger-happy, " Mr: Casey. 'defended himself, ''but lots of the. little countries of the world are under pressuu'e" by Suzanne Garment from Soviet-backed -forces. "We've gotten out of the business of security assistance, but we're doing lots for them in fields like communications. . "For Instance, we helped in the El Sal- vador election. In Honduras, we put people through school and gave them instruments that can detect how much metal a truck is carrying. Some countries we help just with photographic information, or sensors, or training for anti-terrorist forces. It's all done with local people and just a handful of officers." - But just as important was what was happening to. intelligence analysis. The es- timates program-the process by which Capital Chronicle kinds of information- - These changes in the way the CIA han- .. dies Intelligence are all of a piece. Tbey are designed to make disputes in the Intel- ligence community more visible. produce . . ' information on the politicians' timetable, reorganize the analysts to make their prod- uct, conform more closely to decision mak- ers needs and tighten the day-today can-., nection between high government officials .I and the agency. If they work, they. will - make the CIA more relevant. They will also make theagency-,more political. by, forcing analysts to attune themselves more closely to the.srhedulesand agendas of the; ,politicians who are "their. customers,`. ? : Mr- Casey's strategy is guaranteed to provoke redsWce. but its "political" na ture is precisely what makes It Prombft. A .all: it=Is hard 4o Vve .a years; we-bad put=baty Svc estimates 'o6,_1 makeragood answer imless are T the Soviet economy:.. ' y ai .. : . .....: I ' ing to find out what his a '? - _~. ~~ ~',~" "We've got the estimating process streamlined," Mr..,.Casey said. Instead'of j. -the compromising and papering-over,ofdlf;,j levels , of the bureaucracy when as - estf mate tva s prepared. "we ..>raw- have the. chiefs of 'all the agerici s eampkgbw the telligence community-..making. the .deV.? .stone.'.'. The issues;- as:?one aide to .Mr:?` Casey.put"It; are drawnmore clearly unuder. the -neon systeril: rbe'y'are made clearer; -`,still by Mr. Casey's certainty that"I'm`ttie' one respons1ble'fiir Ibe estimate. a,~ =f f' giving. a. `tour ,refiectiari `of alternative Mr. Casey has also made some motor, changes in the way the, agency; does tti short-term analysis. Tie's taken the people, in the analytic sections--who used to be dl- vided up into categories like scientific a[- fairs, societal affairs and strategic af- fairs-and put them into new -sections or- ganized along geographic lines. That way, be said, they have a better chance of pro:. ducting Information. that is: immediately: useful to policymakers, He has also estab- lished new analysis centers on two topic of current interest, technology transfer and "insureency and instability." the intelligence community, within the CIA j and elsewhere, produges e p~~ru v~a o Orr of analysis-had b lease 2006/01/03: CIA-RDP90-01 I37R000100010001-7 THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR pproved For Refifte,s 2806/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00 By William V. Kennedy that for a democratic society to pursue such jealously controlled by thef secretary of de= activities short of a state of war is to risk cor- Tense and their respective chiefs. - Whether or not -Adm. , Bobby Inman re- ruption of its own free institutions. It -is no The DIA's satellites and reconnaissance :signed as deputy director-of the US Central accident that former CIA operatives involved aircraft can take pictures of literally any-.1 ',,'Intelligence Agency.-_as a "utter- of princi- in the Watergate conspiracy came from the thing on earth The NSA can eavesdrop on] i ple," what is now known of some of the dis- covert action staff. most of the' world's electronic communica t putes that marked--his teniire.make .it. plain Therewas some justification for keeping a tions. , The ? CIA's' counterintelligence staff " that America's troubles with'intelligence are Jsinall "OSS" in the Defense Departinentas a .': abroad and the FBI at home can track down farfrom planning -staff only, but the .beginning of the '-'enemy spies (as well as keep a jealous watch: Of most immediate concern is an effort by f Cold War led to the surreptitious insertion of on each other).-,. National Security, council staff'members, re-.:_-. the Jeftover'OSS covert action staff into the --- What- the US cannot do --With anyconsis ,portedly resisted .by Admiral Inman,:-to ere- -.then newly created- CIA:-In- that hothouse, of:: .tency is make sense Out of what it all means.,, ate?Big Brother -right=on`-schedule for 1984:;' secrecy .the covert action. "camel"-grew,to ,In part this is due to the crowding out of the. This was to have been a--super" counterintel- 'such proportions that, as the Church,cominit assessment function of the CIA_'ay the sawn ligence? agency that would have combined the tee found, it came to dominate the agency.':"` terintelligence and covert action activists.-It - Federal Bureau of Investigation and the coun- = "Counterintelligence," - as the term im- -has ignored centuries- of British experience terintelligence staff of the CIA with a comput . -plies, is essentially, a negative function:It and current practice that show competent in, erizeddata bank, thereby creating"thepoten- seeks to block foreign espionage but in the.. telligence assessments to be the. product..of tial forintrusion into--every household in the `process it can produce some useful informa individuals, not of committees.?America's na coon 'tiara: Thus the principal contribution of= the tional assessment -system is. based on one' try-- :: P p as if -the -investi(gati.ons of the mid- =?''CIA 'counterintelligence staff ' has been" to suffocating comrpittee of another all 1970s ;, =with their disclosures of drug expert-": identifyand "turn" Soviet agents abroad into the-way from the regional directorates of. the ments on: unsuspecting Americans, .collusion :. sources forUS intelligence: >= "' _=' ? ?: CIA and DIA to the National Security Council:. with the Mafia in -assassination plots, and ,an _' _" r Like ?a police vice squad; however;; coun=.:' That problem is compounded by the prac unrelieved series of national disasters and hu- terintelligencestaffs run - a constant risk - of Lice of recruiting-analysts direct from the col miliations bred of misguided "covert action," being corrupted by the very -practices they lege campus on promises of good pay and life- never had occurred. are supposed to be fighting. -Pressure from . rime job security. Anyone who thinks people What the reemergence of the monstrous the CIA counterintelligence staff for an inter- ' such as that are going to take risks -- the es= ?j counterintelligence idea tells us is that the nal US control system more '`efficient"than `"'sense of competent intelligence assessment basic Raw revealed by the Church committee that of the Soviet KGB has waxed and Waned -= plainly never has worked for the .US gov- _ in the Senate and other congressional investi ' for years and apparently has:: surfaced once ernment, Interestingly enough Israeli intelli- gators has not been corrected. In short; de-again in`the form of he National Security'f-' Bence experienced its first major failure, in spite the, expenditure of literally hundreds of Council `Big Brother"-concept.:.. ! . the 1973 October war, after it adopted the CIA,. j billions of dollars during the past 30 years the "Intelligence," as such, tends to be-the-,' practicelof using. advanced ? degrees rather -United States does not have. a reliable intelli- = first victim of such: an"approach, primarily than performance as its?primary staffing and - ,Bence service. because the patient gathering, sifting and as- promotion criteria, ,M: -_- .. What it does have is a set of competing in=.-\~, sessment of information "-the essence of true. Ray S. Cline,- formerly of CIA- and now of telligence bureaucracies. In terms of the na intelligence,- seems much too?dull`for the the Georgetown Center- for- Strategic. Studies.- ture of the activities an wbich they' are I en- American psyche- It is more exciting to be a - has proposed that the CIA approach to intelli- gaged, the most questionable are the covert "doer" chasing after foreign spies or consort- - gence be discarded in favor- of an institute -action and counterintelligence staffs of the' ing with the Mafia to poison Mr. Castro's that would devote itself to producing true in-. CIA'' soup. ' ? : r:;:= telligence, largely in the open and without the. `Covert action''_as_currently established Also indicative of -the- American prefer- excess baggage of covert action. V e.would do In the CIA has nothing: remotely .to- do with ; .? ence for "hands-on" technology rather than well to look into that idea. at least as a start..,; intelligence,-understood any way you choose, philosophy" (defined as any sort of abstract-,?' to read the word. It is a form of warfare first.: Lion) is the superb technical collection system.:.: institutionalized. in the World'War II office of -built up, in. the Defense Intelligence Agency ; :-`._ : William V Kennedyls a military.jour r_ Strategic Services involving sabotage; exeCu- and the National Security Agency (NSA). Al-_,11' -Faust who has served as an intelligence; tion--of opposition`"lead-ezs and psychological _.`though nominally-coordinated by the Director officerin the Strategic AirCorztnand and warfare.` of Central Intelligence these are,. in fact, for 14 years as a member of the US Army 1 r i c it should Have been obvious from the start quasi-independent, ?agencies~ "tightly. and .'' War College _.~...xr".r_,?~_~s~.~szove.:that. -government sources believe was prompted by.a?.dispute over plans for:.domestic.. intelligence activi- ties. s_r ...~ - - The CIA. yesterday,. sent:-congressional. committees-.a:-message: saying. President Reagan "regretted,,-that Adm. Inmanis re-, signing. from- the aegency;and retiring.,frrom the Navy.,,The.:mssage said, Adm:; Inman [ was quitting to "enter the private sector." White .House officials insisted that- Adm. Inman, who is highly regarded-'In Congress and the U.S. intelligence community, had in- tended to.quirafter the-Reaggan administra- tion had been in office about IS months. But congressional aides and other officials say his departure seemed to be prompted by a disagreement with other administration offi- cials over how to conduct counterintelli- gence operations in the U.S. The sources said-Adm. Inmamobjected to a new directive the White House approved on counterintelligence operations. He report- edly felt the new procedures allowed intelli- gence agencies. to get too heavily involved in spying activities:=in the U.S. Also, sources said, he: was miffed.- because the, White House didn't- allow, him a greater voice in :,shaping the intelligence procedures. ? Last year;->'Adm. -Inman battled with White House officials over the wording of a broader executive order governing all Intel- ligence activities,;.gompia1nmg that It would allow-the CIA to conduct-operations against s U.S. citizens'.-The order was held up for months. and .eventuallyi was modified. to overcome most of his objections. =: . The departure of Adm..Inman insure to create problems for . the administration - in - ' Congress. Many influential lawmakers hold him, in higher esteem than they do CIA:?Di- rector William Casey, and they hoped Aft.-- Inman eventually would move to the CIA's top Position. .Y:= Some of the congressional clamoring for bur. Casey's,-resignation:during a. Senate in- vestigation finances: .:last,:: year stemmed from a desire for, Aft. Inman to move up. Lawmakers have contended that they get a clearer picture of CIA activities from Adm. Inman than from ''Mr. Casey: Administration aides said they hadn't yet begun' to consider a replacement for Adm. Inrnan.He-plans to remain in his post until a ;successor. is named,- probably early this summer, administration officials said. r' -?; , -:'Despite the congressional. suspicions of, a high-level.- ? disagreement,=. 'administration aides- contended that there weren't any bu- t- reaucratic battles that led to Adm. Inman's resignation. They noted:-that he had. been tempted to-take a job`in-business&last year and1-had to be persuaded to- Me-.t the-, CIA post in'the first-place: ...- At`that'time, Adm. Inman complained that he could make far more money: by ac- cepting lucrative private-sector jobs than be could by remaining in -government service. To persuade him to take the CIA job, Presi- dent Reagan agreed to promote him to full admiral from 'rear admiral,.making him the first naval intelligence specialist to reach Before taking the CIA job,. Adm. Inman had been director of the National Security Agency, a secretive Pentagon organization that monitors radio and satellite commnni- cations;: earlier, he was. director of naval confided to associates that he found it diffi- cult td serve- as No. 2 man after directing the NSA.- Some intelligence- officials specu- lated -earlier that Adm. Inman might -look for another job if it seemed that Mr. Casey- wasn't stepping aside soon.:.: Adm. Inman has been handling much of the day-to-day operations of the CIA, intelli- gence officials said- Mr.-Casey has focused 'more ?on:'coordinating_- the--activities of the- CIA--and =other U.S intelligence~:organiza-= tions`and has.devoted.a great deal of time td- his duties as`a?member of-the- Cabinet. Past CI-AI, directors'baven,t ben `_Cabinet `mem- bers..:', Adm. Inman has been stressing that the CIA neeth its --y-"`m -mart and focus - more On international ecOnom-c issues rather than merely political and .,,il,t is a y began compilieg forec is ,of lo a co - g The administration is likely ' to look for a- f . 1.r o ficer to`take Adm. Inmar.'s placer Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01I37R000100010001-7 Approved For Release 2006/01/03: CIA-RDP90-01137R00010 GTi in F ro the Cold Long Out of Fashion, Spy Agencies Now Get Priority in Washington Administration -Adds Agents And Analysts, Pays Heed To Once-Ignored.-Nations But Is It, Politicizing CIA? By GEe. .D F. SEIB StaffRepor!ero,r THHE WAU. STREET JouRiA1. WASHINGTON-Radio listeners in At- lanta may have been startled recently to. hear a mellifluous voice saying, "We're the Central Intelligence Agency. looking for very special people to train for a career with us." The announcer explained that if listeners could "make on-the-spot decisions, have ini- tiative and self-reliance, are willing to live abroad,". they could qualify for a job. The ad closed with these instructions: "Get in -touch if you believe you are special enough for with the Central Intelligence .,. Agency." That ad and a-similar one. run iri Salt Lake City represent the CIA's first effort to recruit new employes with broadcast.adver- tising. And the. Atlanta experiment, in par- ticular, was a big hit. "It - absolutely swamped us with responses," a CIA official . The commercials- are just one sign that the Reagan administration has begun trying to make good -on its promise to rebuild America's intelligence system. Both in radio and newspaper ads, the CIA is recruiting full-time analysts for duty either at its head- quarters near here or at posts abroad. Over- all, the administration has begun quietly in- creasing the intelligence system's secret budget by roughly the same rate as the Pen- tagon's 18% rise for fiscal 1983. Meanwhile. the CIA is assembling a five-year' master plan for beefing up the intelligence'commu- pity, which many in. Congress now agree was worn thin by - sttaffing and budget re- straints during the 1960s and 1970s. . THE WALL STREET JOURNAL 5 March 1982 Emphasis on People The Reagan administration's plans will make some broad changes in the way the U.S. intelligence system does its work in the 1980s, The emphasis will be on adding ana- lysts and clandestine agents, after the re- cent heavy dependence on spy gadgetry for budgetary reasons. Many of the new people will be used to build-up the CIA's knowledge about developing. countries:: that promise to be the world hot spots in the 1980s. ?'R there is a broad, general underlying approach, it says you have to devote a lot of time and at- tentidif' to understanding in depth. countries that haven't been centers of attention in the 1970s,:'?.. a. senior U.S. intelligence official . -says. At this,. point Congress and the public' seem willing to support the administration's plans. But some lawmakers sound a, warn- ing. They say the new congressional consen- sus for rebuilding intelligence could be 'threatened by what some consider. another trend: the Reagan administration's inclina- tion to "politicize" the intelligence corn to fit its policies. - Some lawmakers think politics, rather than a desire for-objective intelligence, lies behind the appointment of some intelligence officials. And they charge that some recent CIA work has been tailored to fit adminis- tration views.. Democratic Sen Paul Tson- gas-of Massachusetts recently stormed out of a closed-door briefing' on Central Amer- ica, charging that the session had turned -into a political harangue rather than a pres- entation of intelligence information.' . The meeting etas given by Constantine Menges, a conservative Latin American ex- pert hired by the Reagan administration as the CIA's national intelligence officer for Latin .America. Afterward, ,.Sen. Tsongas and two. other. Derrlocratic Senators sent a, .letter to CIA -Director William Casey com- plaining that the meeting "bordered on pot-1 .icy prescription rather than a straightfor-,i ward analysis of available intelligence,) Some Senators suspected that, tine CIA's analyses of the administration's proposal to, sell Awacs radar planes to Saudi Arabia were shaded to push the sale. Likewise, they objected when Mr. Casey ordered CIA ana-1 lysts to rewrite a report. on. terrorism to in- clude more emphasis on the- Soviet role in international terrorism. ' "It goes back to, the whole question of whether we're going -to, have, an -agency giv- ing what we' need-unvarnished, unencum- bered, straight facts," says Democratic Sen. Joseph Eiden of Delaware, a member of the Senate. intelligence Committee. Conseil For n bon's bi . around li the 197 Langley the pill agency but als lesser i Both intellige mid-1970s, he says, 'almost one-third of the personnel devoted to intelligence in the 1960s had been lopped off. Ray Cline, a former high CIA official, adds that from 1970 to 1971 U.S- spending on intelligence increased little if any. As a re- sult, he says, inflation cut the real invest- ment in intelligence by 33% to 501io.. - - . Some of the reduction resulted from the end of the Vietnam war, which had required an intelligence buildup. But other factors were at work; too. Revelations of abuses by the CIA undercut congressional support for intelligence spending. Also; the intelligence agencies were hurt?by the government-wide' slashing of overseas personnel- irr the early ,'1970s in an attempt to stem the flow'of ~dof- Jars out of the U.S. Both Democrats and Republicans nowij find large-. gaps??in the nation's intelligence capabilitie::" Tbe,U-S_ intelligence system isn't able: to deal with multip] e.crises, as we have experienced recently;'without diverting'; resources from other high-priority mis- sions," the Senate Intelligence Committee: said in a recent report. "Moreover;` in many areas of the Third World,-coverage-by thel U.S. intelligence system is either marginal' or nonexistent." The CIA has suffered a "brain drain ,o1., top analysts, Seri; Biden says. Its language abilities have declined; during the upheaval-, in Iran, a community-wide search turned upl billy two Farsi-speaking employes. who could be put to work analyzing events there, a for- mer official says. And because few new agents have been joining up, some two- thirds of the higher-ups in the CIA's clandes-; tine services are technically eligible for re-1 tirement because they are more. than 50' years old. ?:-- One area in the U.S` Intelligence system'rerhains-;unparalleled is in spy tech. nology. Foi'example;.the U:S: has satellites! with cameras that can spot cars and trucks moving down roads; and it has spy planes with cameras that can easily distinguish ob- jects less than a-yard in diameter. Under, the ? Reagan - administration' -plans, this electronic wizardry will be devel- , oped .further. But the initial emphasis will Approved For Release. 20.06/01/03.:. CIA-RDP90-01137ROm'De1OO04t60intelligence. program isa trying to wean itself off the pattern of heavyl investment, in technical -resources -'and; tleni . gration of - other' intelligence~tnarr Approved For Release 2006/01/03 CIA-RDP90-01I37R000100010001 KANSAS CITY STAR (MO) 14 January 1982 athe s peec ing from-the agency's abuses rank Snepp had just got- agency . back on its feet. Mr ten off the telephone with" Sneop said, by be eiirg up the _ 91 the Central .intelligence ..":`.`dirty tricks'.' department. . .Agency that wants him to re throwing a shroud a' se+cr-cy move; two 'sections-' from `a --over the. agency; and sec speech he will give tonight at cooperation. from increasingly Mid-Americai Nazarene Col- conservative-congressional- 4?i ? :- . . r = steadily sincethe CU began to`, He will speak. at 7:30 p:m:in . , -rebound from humiliating con :'Room 200 at the college:. Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100010001-7 Approved For Release 2006/01/03: CIA-RDP90-01137R BALTIMORE EVENING SUN 31 DECEMBER 1981 Cord Meyer UjA aqe1JL,.--. called -'right wl,ng'Jor forms, Doherty asserts. - tractors on the Senate committee staff, and E1.Salvador against Sen. Helms efforts to re- i . hardest evidence. Some of these analysts have verse- American policy. "He saved the re- secretly aligned themselves with Menges' de- As a consultant to the Defense Department Casey faces a serious problem of internal dim WASHInrrTON during the Carter administration Menges was cipline within the agencyy n l th i i t i ti th th Th e extent-:- e Polish cr s J roves at a s me e first to rc:eive clear ~dj[{Vll'~ IN er AINCIENT were IES ba, tyrants frustrated t of Castro's guerrilla threat but he saw the an= we need more intelligence analysts with anger Here in in the habit of, orda ordering severe {~swer in strengthening the democratic center, Merges' breadth of view and willingness to h n e rs who. roug . g punishment against messe them bad news. In Washington last week, a modern version= of this barbaric practice was directed agates"asst- .a--CLA analyst by some Democrats, who- ob- j`cted to his secret testimony before a Senate' suacommittee regarding Castro's plans to con- tr of Central America. - _ ? - g . credibility and force the resignation of the re- - live observers who have seen the classified :fish them. cently appointed national intelligence officer text of his Senate testimony do not believe he for Latin America, Constantine Menges, a con exaggerated Castro's role'as main supplier of fidential letter from three Democratic sena- -arms and trained guerrillas to the insurgen- - tors to CIA Director William Casey was Gies in Central America. - = leaked to the Associated Press by anonymous With more experience in testifying before sources. ported by the AP, the senators -- Paul Congress, Menges will learn to avoid expres- As re ('_liass.), Claiborne Pell (R.I.) and _ signs of personal .opinion, and CIA Director Christopher Dodd (Conn.) -charged in their Casey in replying to the Senators has made. letter that Menges in briefing the subcommit -clear his determination to keep him in his job.' tee was guilty of "selective use of informs- = The main reason for,the campaign against lion," had "seriously violated the agency's :Menses is his refreshing insistence inn telling long~hershed principles of objectivity' and i the America story in of a Castro's coherent and intervention inCentral so undermined his own credibility as to "call = convincing manner, into question his future effectiveness." that almost forces his listeners to face up to the policy implications of what they are bear- l e . - While the three senators denied any ro ' -- : publicizing their private advice to Casey, one mg : of them made their purpose clear by stating, "Guys like Menges should be tucked away where they can do less harm." The anonymous leakers described Menges- :-to the press as "a conservative theoretician' and the approval of his testimony by Sen_ - Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) was cited as proof of his - right-wing extremism. An article by Menges . in a recent issue of Commentary was cited out of context to drive the point home. - Even hardened veterans of Washington's For those who still persist in believing that political infighting have been shocked by this Castro is no real threat, that the guerrillas are, guerrilla warfare against Menges' reputation democratic reformers and the right-wing mili- and credibility- Those who know him well like Lary are the main danger; Menges powerful -{ Fiiliam Dohertp, the head of the AFL-CIO's presentation is bad news, and they are deter- agency for- helping non-Communist labor. mired to get rid of the messenger. -. = -:I unions in- Latin America, are incredulous; During most of the Carter administration, the implication of right-wing extremism:- policy was based on the optimistic assumption According to Doherty, Menges has consist- - that the Sandinistas and other guerrilla groups ently had "a centrist voice of moderation" on could be weaned away from their Marxist"con- -~ .Central American issues and played a decisive v fictions. - - role on Reagan's transition team in fighting Intelligence analysts learned to play it safe ,for retention of far-reaching land reforms in by avoiding predictions and reporting only the ' not in bolstering right-wing dictatorships. risk his reputation on anticipating the, future. His Commentary article is basically a plea - As a Reagan official has admitted, "the signs to democratic socialists to avoid forming?pop- were all there" of the impending internal mili-- ular fronts with the communists in view of the - tary coup in Poland but no one-questioned the tragic outcome of such alliances in the past. -, prevailing consensus that the real danger was If Menges' record is one- of defending the : a massive Russian invasion. democratic center against the extremes of In this New Year, we will urgently need how is one to explain the : messen both left and right eirs who dare tell us the truth about , g In an unprecedented attempt to destro p y the sudden assault launched against him? Objec- the dan We should reward, not pun- ers ahead Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01.137R000100010001-7 Approved For Release 2006/01/03: CIA-RDP90-01137RQ A TICLE APrEARED 0?, PAGE THE WASHINGTON POST 29 November 1981 The CIA': S Real S"ns Jack Anderson For all its "destabilization" efforts, "di5infor- ? "Consistent gross misstatement of Soviet mation" programs and cloak-and-dagger activi- global objectives; ties, the CIA's real function is supposed to be ? "General failure to explain the characteris= j expert, objective analysis of world events. tics of Soviet conventional weapons systems i Yet not a single piece of pending legislation and vessels, for example, the Soviet T-64 and intended to "unleash" the CIA would have any T-72 tanks and the-new Russian guided missile significant effect on the agency's ability to per- cruisers; form its prime function. Consistent miscalculation regarding the By demanding punishment for anyone who effect of and general apology for massive tech names its agents, seeking authority to spy on nology transfer from the `Vest to the East; Americans and claiming exemption from the _ Freedom of Information Act, the CIA is deliber- Apparent internal failure of countarintel-: ately throwing up a smokescreen to hide its fail-hgence generally," and, of course, ures at intelligence-gathering. - r The entire situation in Iran. A point to keep in mind is that a decade ago, This indictment would be merely embarrass---' the CIA was doing most. of what it is asking ing if it were only a matter of professional per Congress for authority to do now. But the ille- formance that had no bearing on national se- gal James Bond operations did not improve the curity. But . the top-secret analysis estimates quality of the CIA's intelligence - that, of the fast-approaching 10-year period 1 That's what should be the subject of the- de-.' when "The U.S. ICBM force will be totally vul- q bate on Capitol Hill-the quality of the CIA's nerable to a Soviet missile attack, at.Ieast five intelligence, not the side issues and' irrelevan- years can-be attributed to miscalculation, en- Gies that are getting all the attention. gendered by erroneous intelligence produced by. A devastati th CIA" ' ng assessment of the CIA e r s pe. formance has been under review by White Having listed the ' symptoms theli , anayss House aides. The top-secret analysis has .been- proceed to' diagnose the cause of our intelli- I examined by my associate Dale Van Atta. Bence system's sickness: Mind you, the appraisal was not the work of There is "n thi th e o ng at r motelybl resemes the CIA's usual liberal critics It was prepared competitive analysis, nor is.there any. process ji by professionals for the, most conservative ad- for quality review," the report-explains, adding: ministration in half a century. "These deficiencies exist notwithstanding ben- _ Here is its truly appalling conclusion: ..,, . eral recognition by all governments that aom= i "The American intelligence community, petitive analysis is essential :t4: accuracy-. and, chiefly the CIA,. has routinely failed to predict _ that quality review is the best method of, weed- major political and military developments be- ing out.-those incapable of or deliberately.prone, fore such developments become irreversible and toward drawing incorrect assessments." before they become blatantly obvious,, even to In fact, the analysis says, there "appears to' the general public-" b What the report called 'massive and-.virtu.;' ally inexplicable intelligence failures that-have occurred during the last 15 years" include the following: ? "Abjecct failure to ? predict the massive Soviet buildup" of nuclear missiles; . = - .. ? " jtiholesale failure to understand the characterisstics of Soviet missiles under develop- .. e almost a-direct relationship between dMid] of failure- to .predict .accurately military political developments-ancl career success,':Iri, other words, it's the bumblers who get promot- ed. There. is no real review of .intelligence estia mates several years later, when-their accuracy.: or inaccuracy would be obvious, and the ana-': lysts explain why: "Doing so would embarrass I the CIA and would show a pattern of career a& vancementby those who av th g e e worstassess= 1 .. merits in accuracy of Soviet ICBMs in the late ments." 199 0s; C1981,1Vn1tedFeaWre"kate. ? "Failure to predict the major improve- Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01I37R000100010001-7. - Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137 ARTICLE APPEARED ON FACE enough of a bureaucratic infighter to have survived so far. A top-secret analysis, originally prepared for the new administra- tion's CIA transition team, is being restudied now at the White House- It lays the problem out bluntly. The report warned that it was inevitable President Reagan and his advisers would be "told repeatedly by virtually everyone in policy po- sitions at the agency that the CIA is , o offensive. It. is trying to persuade a highly professional, nonpolitical Congress that it should he allowed to -agency that produces `objective' in- invade the FBI's turf and conduct telligence." The analysis comments domestic,,- operations..-One of . the witheringly: "Those assertions are things that got the spooks in trouble arrant nonsense." in the first place. Claiming strict objectivity and What's more, the CIA is demand- - piously wrapping themselves in the ing that it be exempted from most flag are merely the automatic defen- rovisions of the Freedom of Infor- sive "cover" adopted by the CIA elite p mation Act, thus assuring that fu-' to protect their weak flank: the lack ture misbehavior would he harder to of Civil Service job security. The detect. Clearly, the old-boy network - CIA director can fire anyone he - at the CIA pines for the "rogue el-' chooses, and this has always spooked ephant" days when it could literally the old-boy network., get away- with murder, and relishes : "For that reason," the analysis ex- the prospect early return to plains, "the CIA self-image-and its that halcyon James Bond era. projection to any incoming direc- The Reagan administration, like tor-is part of' an elaborate self- others before it, tried to bring the defense mechanism developed over spy agency under control, and soon the years as an artificial protective felt the power OF the-CIA's elite. The device in lieu of the normal protec- rank outsider appointed, to head co- tions of career. Civil Service status. vert operations, Max Hugel, was "In part out of a mutual drive for soon -forced out after mysteriously individual and corporate self- 1, t red e'iar es of questionable preservation, the CIA has become an ra g reaucracy of the Central Intelligerce Agency-for self-preservation-must create and constantly reinforce its elitist image and status as 'untouch- able' to insure self-perpetuation." orc es business dealings.-k similar "desta- elitist. organization which engenders bilizing" campaign has been directed incredible loyalty, among its staff at Director William J. Casey, who is,- and.retired personnel..:.. The bu-.- Approved. For Release 2006/01/03: CIA-RDP90-0-1I37R0001. 00010001-7. THE WASHINGTON POST 18 November 1981 CIA Seeking Early Return IQ `Bond',.Days After an all-too-brief period of hunkering down, when exposure of its illegal activities shocked the na= the CIA is once more ? on the, n ti Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00 ARTICLE APPEARED ON PAGE-I__. bal By Leonard Downie Jr-. : 3J Ikng'An Pest Forelio &r'e. LONDON,. Nov. 17Washington publisher Anthony Stout,. backed by a -group of large European financial s,-plans to start a world- institution, wide intelligence service for business and government that ' claims it will. rival the abilities of the' Central In-.: telligence Agency. Stout, chairman of Government- Research Corp., which owns Nation- .a I Journal, is expected-to announce formation of the new compa~- ny-International Reporting - and-..I Information Systemst a news conference here next week. IRIS will be-based in. Crystal City.-- A-spokesman acknowledged that one reason the firm will be: located in Crystal. City is that the, computer that forms the core of the new op- eration will have the.=.advantage of First Amendment protection of in- formation-gathering. in the United. States and the absence of laws reg- ulating computer intelligence . Sys- terns. . The ? new firm has hired former British prime minister. Edward Heath at a reported salary of $100, 000 to head an "international advi:_ sory council" intended. to assure cli- ents of the integrity and accuracy oft the service. Heath, who will be work-] ing part time while remat -..a member of the British parliament,I also is being asked to select directors', "of public prominence" to oversee, .IRIS subsidiaries : -in the.- -Llnitedl States, Western Europe, the diddle East, Asia,.Africa and Latin Amer-{ ica, according to a prospectus for investors circulated by'the London- merchant banking firm.- of Henry i Ansbacher..... Approved a IRIS is be to built around a pow- j erful computer, the operation of - which is-being modeled on the one. used by the CIA in Langley, cess information'. it gathers from around the world, according to IRIS .representatives here. They said the IRIS system, designed by a former CIA. .consultant and "benefitting from the things the CIA has learned in pioneering this technology,' would offer clients CIA-like analyses and "scenarios" of political and economic risks that insurance 'companies, hanks; other businesses and govern- ments might encounter- in various parts of the world. - The privately circulated prospec- tus reportedly claims that the IRIS. service. using 96 "correspondents? - based: throughout the, world and 33 analysts working under, a former State Department official in Crystal -..City, will surpass the CIA in scope and accuracy of its forecasts. The prospectus reportedly indicates that IRIS was conceived by its organizers partly -because of the - shortcomings of CIA forecasts for countries such - as Iran during the rule of the late shah. IRIS also intends to monitor television ? and radio broadcasts,- -newspapers, periodicals and govern- ment and business reports' world- wide,--IRIS representative Maurice Coiton:said here. The organizers' references -to the -CIA and.-the secrecy that has shrouded the venture so far have caused it to be referred to in spec- ulative press reports here as a "pri- vate spy agency," with Heath cast in the role of "the super-computerized version of James Bond's boss 'M'. " Staffers of National Journal, a pe--l riodical that reports in detail on gov- { ernment and politics, also said ' they knew little about their new sibling, . although it already has opened of- staff of about 20 in Crys- ith fi a ces w For Rele .61flwb:.. C:IA=RVPSO=Q 137R THE WASHINGTON POST 18 November 1981 The Crystal City office, contacted- . by telephone today, said Stout was traveling abroad and could not be .reached. Heath's office here said he also, was traveling and unavailable for--comment today. Both men are scheduled to appear - at next week's heavily publicized press conference. `Colton said, "There will be noth- ing clandestine about IRIS. It will be, gathering only open information,: available to the public and people like journalists; just. as the 'M does in much of its work." Be said IRI correspondents would work like jour _'. nalists, pursuing local `inedia an interviewing officials; . politicians, business executives and others. "The difference with IRIS will be its computer capacity," Colton said. c Instead of being limited by space like -a newspaper or existing news letter information services with which IRIS will - be- .competing, he said' it will be able to present an ,al- most limitless amount of informs- tion on any desired subject to clients, paying about $20,000 to $200,000 for a terminal connected-to the IRIS computer in Crystal.City- "It will be electronic and instan- taneous,-which nobody else is who is- taneous, .offering the same service," Colton said. -IRIS is incorporated"in Holland, -with its initial multimillion-dollar capital supplied mostly by a handful of large financial institutions in Brit- =ain, Holland. and other. European countries. But Colton said the names of the investors and financial figures would not be made public until next week. ~:.. -He-said. IRIS-would own the com- puter program and distribution ser vice, but that it had. contracted the .running of the 'compute and data analysis;.,to -a;_new:.: firm, started by -Stout -called'`GRC"Intemational; iilary-of Governmen Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00010 ARTICLE A PEAEE]3 ON ?AGE _a ., THE WASHITTGTO:IIAEI NOVE? BER 1981 By Donald Lambro Best Spies William J. Casey: The CIA director has overcome an inauspicious start. The in- telligence community didn't like his ap- pointment, because he had no experience in modern clandestine work. Casey named a crony, businessman Max Hugel, as director of covert operations; Hugel was implicated in allegations of stock ma- nipulation and. abruptly left the CIA. Nevertheless, Casey has shown the same skill in running the CIA that he displayed as Ronald Reagan's campaign manager and, before that, as chairman of the Securities and Exchange Com- .mission. He inherited an agency weak- ened and demoralized by his predeces- sor, Admiral Stansfield Turner, and he has improved both its performance and morale. "Morale is certainly higher at the agency than ever before," says an agency source. "Casey has been making the right moves. He's getting us back on track." John McMahon: Unlike Casey's ovin appointment, his choice of McMahon to run the CIA's National Foreign Assess- ment Center was applauded. A career agent, McMahon is one of the most highly regarded senior officials within the CIA. He spearheaded a CIA expose of the Soviet Union's worldwide disinforma- tion and forgery activities. Casey was alarmed by apparent weak- nesses of the agency's analytical output, and told McMahon to shape up the di- vision quickly so government policy- makers would get accurate insight and analysis on a broad range of strategic issues. Intelligence sources credit' McMahon with instituting changes long overdue.-"We can already see an irri- provement," one reports. Approved For Release 2006/01/03 CIA-RDP90-01I37R000100010001-7 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00010001000 LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH 26 October 1981 NAY JOIN WORLD SPY' AGE CY Daily.T.elebraph Reporter jR- HEATH, the farmer Prime - 'Minister,-:.Js ,refusing to comtieat: -fin. reports-that beds to. take. up-.a ?50,000-ye -iab~as- head ? of-? a - worldwide private intelligence?agefl .- =The-'agency is? being set. up liy a Dutch-based company, "Iris. the-international Renoi:ing:and information- System. ?. Holdings, as; a rival ,to -political and. econ- omit : information - gathering State bodies, such. as, the CIA. It is . understood that Mr Heath is about to sign a con- tract. to be chairman of-the supervisory board of Iris. = His initial task will be to find diree- tors "of public prominence".to, .head six subsidiary cocnpaeiea around the world- One of his principal' targets is thought to be Xr Robert McNamara, former president of -the Wor'ld' Bank and, a former American Defence Secretary. Failure of C I A 'AT The businessmen behind Iris are convinced that there, will be an extensive and lucrative- 'demand from countries, and companies for. such a service, particularly in the wake of the CIA's failure- to detect any, significant cause for concern before. the revolution in Iran. Iris plans to employ experi- enced-, field. agents and to monitor every publication .and broadcast in the world for stor- age and analysis on computers- in America... -As befits the nature of such an enterprise, no one was giv-. ing .very much away yesterday- 1Ir-Reath is- staying in New , York with friends and has told aides that he has no comment to make on the report. A spokesman for him said yesterday that Air_. Heath had no plans- to - retire from - active politics. and. it is- understood. the. Iris position was. never contemplated. as a-.. fulltime appointment.... .- . Approved For Release 2006/01./03: CIA-RDP90-01137R000100010001-7 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R0001000 1I:.DIO TV REPORTS, INC. 4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEW CHASE, MARYLAND 20015 656-4068 ABC World News Tonight October 16, 1981 7:00 PM sranON WJLA TV ABC Network Intelligence on Egypt's Stability , Washington, DC CARL BERNS.TEIN: ABC News has learned that US intel- ligence officials-have concluded that disaffection in the Egyptian military was and continues to be far more pervasive than previously believed by the United States or Egypt. Moreover, the Egyptian government's stability from Islamic fundamentalists reached deep into'alrnost every element of the country's society. These are the central conclusions of a highly secret study, described in detail to ABC News, that is being conducted by the combined agencies of the American intelligence community. The study tentatively concludes that the assassination of Presi- dent Anwar Sadat was neither planned nor sponsored by Libya or any other positive news in a generally bleak assessment. According to these working on the report, it also contains these conclusions:- There was a critical failure of American intelligence to perceive the depth and intensity of threats to Sadat's rule, a failure similar to that which- occurred in Iran before the Shah's fall. Given the breakdown of Egyptian security during the assassination, it appears likely that the plot extended beyond the four men taken into custody. The Egyptian authorities that a small, extremist Moslem sect was primarily responsible was probably correct. Already, this intelligence assessment is becoming the basis of American policy and of advice to President Sadat's suc- cesor, HohsnroVed or ;easlbl80M 1/~~!c1 ~?0id-Ol 37kb~@f0)b0l(ffl;.fiance to Egypt 8 deal w~ any ex erns reats., but it will fall Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-0113 A:,axCLE APPEARED ON PAGE - THE PUBLIC HISTORIAN Winter 1981 't'he Hitorian as Fo Policy analyst: The Challenge of the CIA- Sm1R BENSON PROFESSIONAL HISToRrAitis and the institutions of Ameri policy have been engaged in increasingly fruitful relai years since NVorld War II. Just as individuals like Geo: - and Herbert Feis have linked the worlds of diplomacy and his- torical research, - so the profession has established. "institutional beachheads"' in the historical offices of the Department of State, the military services, and in smaller numbers, the Departments of Defense and Energy. In these offices historians working as his- torians have applied, rigorous scholarly standards in editing pri- mary sources, most notably the Foreign Relations of the United ? This paper is a revised version of a tall- presented at the-annual meeting of the Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association, University of Southern California, August 1980. This material has been renewed by the Central Intelligence Agency to assist the author in eliminating dassified information. However, that review constitutes neither CIA authentication of material presented as factual nor a CIA endorsement of the author's views or those ascribed by the author to. others (including- current or former officials of any nation)- L The concept is taken from Otis L. Graham, Jr., "Historians and the l'orld of (off -campus) Power," The .Public Historian, Volume I, Number 2 (Winter 1979), 34. 15 Q 1981 by the Regents of the University of California 0272-3433/8I/0100I5-;-11$00.50 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-l DP90-01I37R000100010001-7 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000 RICHMOND TIMES--DISPATCH 9 September 1981 TBetter htelligthice--. It is-. essential,' in the: kind of: USSR would experience a major world we. live in today, for Ameri- oil crisis within a decade, (2) pre-- ca to have, a. : powerful . military dictions that the Shah of Iran I force. It is also,. essential: that the would remain in power through- nation have: the-ability: to know? the. 1980s, and (3) the contention -what's going on -in othercountries, , that the Soviets would not invade _ .particularly in-those that are our:..- l'hird World countries , such: -as. foes or--, -Po foes: _`~?; f ,Afghavista.n-:._.:_..r~_ti~ Because of abuses, or-alleged Under the Heritage analysts'. abuses, in` U .S, covert operations, proposal, as outlined in the fourda-o Congress in recent. years. has im- lion's -National Security Record, posed'`certain- restrictions- on the- the - commission would function nation's intelligence activities, re- somewhat in the manner of the "B strictions that many conservative team" set. up"by then-CIA'Director members s of Congress believe have George Bush ' during' the Ford 'ad_rgone too"far. Congressional over- ministration; H although it- would sight of covert intelligence-opera-. have more-.- . power. The--B-Tea ' tions has-been broadened. Under that an outside groui the Freedom of Information Act,_ of national. security. experts-ca the intelligence sgrvices are- re- ' :provide, where justified, an alter-, ,quired to reveal some.inforrnation.; "native to :the-'t'ifrrternal, ana the disclosure of .which can - `be"" lyses_ Heritage believes-this ` "corn-' harmful to-.national security?'' petitive> a process' :f n lead to argued. better final conclusions-in the"for But the most serums problem iry!':. n- intelligence field by counter- U.S. intelligence is the 'staggering i_ ing "institutionalized"bias." failures"in-the analyzing of rirtel=, If the CIA. and the independent ligence information,-in the-opinion commission locked horns over an- of national security analysts af,the . issue, the: president would be the- Heritage Foundation; - To over;-. - arbiter- and_ -make,: the final 'de come'this?defect,:the analysts pro-, f sion:it' is reasonable to assume pose the establishment of an inde-- _ ';. that whether there, was or=was not pendent.'corrirriission, "consisting.:":, disagreement on an issue, the in- of veteran.a nalysts'as wellas crit- ". - It%is worth-"noting that the peoples- In any event;confidence in.-theprod'. ?: running the analysis side enjoy wide:_' uct brims-k g.angley:-So:-does confi respect, ' not. least from'. some of those.- dence in aprocesa based on a notion o? who regard Casey as a buccaneer. Onej multiple competing centers of analysis ? of these is his deputy,-,,'Adm. Bobby' those centers being inside the separate Ray Inman, who has won high and un-: govemment'departments and outside hit: usually~'unpatronizing-.civilian-,regard the academia'. business and scientific; for-" his seriousness and `competence.: communities Such competition is tradi - Another is the new chief of estimates;: banal, but it is now Toeing tended with a former:-,Whiz Kid, RAND president.; certainty that:,it is an improvement on, and professor Henry. S. Rowen, a qual the old atyieJ a~;domesticvolence,:'perpetrated`anony "-I .;nouslyby" roues with few or no articulated ?:: goals:: `.=~~rv ;.. . ;.: =;. ' .:;:= ? .. Jay '"Peterzell, a researcher esearcher ,fore:: the intelligence : Watchdog '. group Center* for -National.. Security Studies, points.-out that "Haig - has taken positions because of " ?I ideology that may not be supported by fact: Consequently the terrorism report became I~I the focus of a bureaucratic battle pitting CIA analysts-whose job requires them to make' realistic and. sober assessments of interns- = 'tionalevents--against State Department "cold war ideologues and Reagan appointees at .the top . of the intelligence command :,structure." As a result, the 1980 terrorist study reportedly was redrafted at least three :.times- to beef up the number of terrorist incidents reported: $.Z.:.! Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01I37R000100010001-7 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100010001-7 ALT 1 LE APPEARED ON U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT 29 June 1981 WashingtOn G~IG~o~pQr~ l1 Iembers of Congress----confused over conflicting views of experts on the purpose of the Iraqi nuclear reactor knocked out. by thelsraelis-asked the Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA assessment, delivered in closed-door hearings: The reactor .was all wrong for scientific research, undoubtedly was part of a program meant to pro- duce bombs. ... ... - Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100010001-7 Approved For ReI8"ik_Q(~,i7?;~IIP~QL~1137R000 0001 -0 May 1981 as L; LA J.1 7 ~s IN 1977 the CIA issued a report :which said the soviet Union was facing an energy crisis and would be forced to go into the world market for oil by 1935_ That report became the bass `or -- and the justification of - an American otsess:cn with the --if-rich Persian Gulf region. Nov, the CIA says its earlier repo? wrong and that the Soviet Union will not have to seek oil outside its own borders within the foreseeab!Q fu- ture_ It is a message that, taken in the context of the earlier report, could be the first strand of a new policy that might let the United States adopt a lower profile in the Persian Gulf. The difficulty in assessing any report. or action, of the CIA rests not only in secrecy but in politics. Earlier in the 1970s, when the CIA. admitted it had grossly underestimated Soviet expenditures on armaments, Gen. George Keegan, then-head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, argued that the problem lav in the analy- ses that finally reached the president's desk. Mr. Keegan charged that these analyses had been colored to support ad- ministration policy. Since CIA analyses ,must ce filtered through the ocfitical appointees at top of the agency, mare is probcbiy some dity to Mr_ Keegan's c. - irges. This raises some interesting questions. `1.1hich CIA esiimat-a of Soviet oil ;,roduction is correct? Was the 1977 report used to support a political I -decision to raise this country s- profile in the Per- sian Gull or is the current report designed to al- low the Reagan administration to lower the U.S. profile in the area? if the new report is_a prelude to lowering the U.S. proWe in the Middle East. the world may ;e agile to breathe easier. ? The reai danger to world peace in the mid le East has always been the possibility that the United States and the Soviet Union would be sucked into war by the area's in- soluble conlicts. Putting some ;istarca between that Pcss ~ i; ty would not atr ac:.his count,-i's ac- cess to ci!. The Unites Sates van co business vith Persian Gulf countnes without becomin c a catty to their endless feuxs. In the meantime, the Reagan aOrninistration should .resurrect Mr_ Keecan's suggestion to at an outside panel of independent exoerts be appoint- ed to examine C!A data on critical questions and produce its own independent and public analysis. C!A Director William Casey has already created an internal flap by insisting that one analysis done by his staff be rewritten to reflect the admir,- istrttion t:-a! goals- An independent review may be the only way to ensure that an honest analysis done by the non- pciitical professionals in the CIA survives the trip through the political strata. Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100010001-7 ~~~ A droved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R . i , G-~. 1 z HU:=IA M EVENTS ~~.. 13 June 1981 M t% RR i1 et for some reason the thesis By SFN_ JOHN P. PAST (R.-N.C=) that the Soviets support terrorism in - previous administrations ? had 'a Approximately one week after Ronald Reagan was inaugurated as President of the United . States,. Secretary of State Alexander Haig, in his first press conference on January 28, affirmed that the Soviet Union is, "involved . in conscious- policies which foster, support and expand interria-. tional terrorism." National- Security adviser Richard V. Alien has also stated that there is "ample evidence" -of Soviet support for terrorism. These statements. by high-level. government officials represent perhaps the first time that the United States government has officially accused the Soviet Union of supporting interna- tional terrorism. The evidence for this involvement is not new, however; As long ago-as 1975, Brian Crozier;. director of the Institute for the Study of Conflict in London, testified before the Senate Internal Security subcommittee that the Soviets were deeply involved in the support for and training of terrorist cadres throughout the world., Robert Moss, - lohn-'.Barron;.- _and Miles'Copeland,.to-namebut a. few,, are among-; the many: ratnineiit.::Land respected journalists 'w++'-io:;have -developed compelling evidence iii - the-s, .last 10 years of Soviet involvement over- a lengthy period of time. More recently,;` Samuel T. Francis has summarized and analyzed this evidence in a monograph, entitled The-Soviet Strategyof Terror, published early this--year . by- - the" Heritage Foundation, Herbert Romer, stein, in a monograph-just-published, Soviet Support for International Ter- - rorism, also presents evidence for.-the allegation,, based on . I' 1st primary sources. Finally, Claire Ster-. ling,. an internationally respected -journalist, has recently published The Terror Network I at any puce' and were enthusiastic ce ted b the other responsible.- which shows in massiv pp4'..Qved- For Re e. oR00~d04 it0 200g, ~~7west .The. Kremlin detail the role of the KGB and other often refused to look at the evidence or desires respectability 24 well as the ..I Soviet or Soviet satellite services in the to consider its implications. because . diplomatic and economic benefits ?.' remains controversial. Although '-vested political interest in the-policy-of much of the evidence was available detente,' the U.S. government itself to the mass media throughout the ; refused to deal with what was becoming 19709, there was virtually no a serious threat to national security. discussion of theSovietrolein ma- 'Instead, of recognizing and reapon- jor newspapers in this period. One ding- to the"growing Soviet threat,-:we- reason for this black-out was pure- entered into a decade of withdrawal ly ideological. and restrictions on our own intelligence and and _foreign, policyrx*aking Both liberals as well as some govern- capacities. _ ment officials wished to -promote The Church and Pike?committees in- detente with the. Soviet Union. -A basic,, vestigated our intelligence services and? assumption of detente was that the- created a "black legend" of the CIA'as`, USSR is no longer: a . serious ' c6 robue?ele- hart out of control " in "revolutionary force, . that it has the words ?F-- former -Sen: Frank matured into a "great power" which . Church. The Levi guidelines on has- responsible international com- domestic security investigations-for the rriitments and goals and is no longer FBI, restrictive executive orders for the pursuing the goal of Marxist-CIA andotherpartsoftheintelligence 11 destabilization and revolution. community, the expanded' Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act, Of course, conservatives were all the 'Foreign Intelligence Surveillance along skeptical of detente and of these Act . of. 1978, internal - dissension and claims - for the Soviet Union. Long demoralization in the. intelligence com- ?before the Soviet" invasion of munity itself, andthecollapseofthein- Afghanistan, we were pointing out the temal security apparatus in the. ex- discrepancies between the carefully ?ecutive and legislative branches and at cultivated image of the Soviet Union as many local law .enforcement levels as a "responsible power". in the West and Well-all these undermined our ability the brutal realities of Soviet behavior. even to know about and analyze, let Soviet -assistance to North Viet- alone respond effectively to, the namese aggression in Indochina, the dangers of Soviet military. escalation, escalation of Soviet espionage efforts covert action, espionage, terrorism and against. the United States,. Soviet and propaganda. Cuban militar involvement in Of course, the proponents of detente y southern Africa and, the Horn of. cannot admit that the Soviets support l " Africa, the Soviet .military and naval .terrorism. To. admit this well-, buildup,- reported Soviet violations of documented fact would imply that thel SALT I, and even the repetition of ag- Soviets are actively engaged in pro- gressive themes and slogans by Soviet moting violent revolutionary attacks on leaders-all these were. - ignored or Western society--in other words, that covered up? or explained away by the the Soviet Union is not a "mature" or proponents -of detente, but were con- responsible power eager to become d: emphasized- by an established member of the inter- tinually exposed an =:conservative foreign policy spokesmen. national community. l-Because liberals and the far left ex- - yet it is also true, on one level Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00 &.':T ILLS APP-4AnD cr1 PAGE '" MISREADING INTELLIGENCE FOREIGN POLICY Summer 1981 by L.cs Aspin It is .not enough to cite Winston .Churchill's,.,., epigram that the Soviet Union is a "riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma." The truth is that the United States has not properly focused its intelligence and analysis efforts. Intelligence analysts have.-an aversion to studying Soviet intentions and priorities-and . understandably so. Most of the data on intentions.-documents, speeches, and human intelligence reports-are necessarily soft. Technical collection, however, supplies hard data. The technical profile of a missile in test flight can be clearly inferred from telemetry. But what does a speech by Soviet President Leonid. Brezhnev mean? -Can it be trusted? Why was it delivered? What is the significance of an article in a Soviet military journal? What. if its conclusions are contradicted by another article in another, or even the same, journal? Intelligence analysts like to have 'a high degree of confidence in their findings; tb. y like to maintain credibility within the bureaucracy. They are, therefore, wary of advancing conclu- sions based on other than hard information. For this reason, the intelligence community has focused on Soviet capabilities rather than intentions: The United States can answer de- tailed questions about Soviet technical capabili- ties, e.g., the range, accuracy, and payload of Soviet weapons systems. to nothing is known about what is going on inside Soviet heads. If such a void of knowledge were ever accept--. - able, it certainly is not today. When Soviet forces posed no clear threat to U. S. forces, the United States could live with misestimates of Soviet intentions; in an era when they do pose, such a`threat, it cannot. Only a mixture of hard and -soft intelligence can improve U.S. un . -;:?- ; , .:; ..-:.:: '? ;.; The. review- of the .draft: estimate has once again raised questions. about the relationship between -intelligence`'offi- cials and policy makers. with some C.I.A.I officials concerned that the agency. is coming under pressure to tailor its analy- sis to fit the policy views of the Adminis- tration.V : _ -... ru Charges InLastAdmiia ? Similar charges were made duringthe .Carter Administration -and resulted! in frequently bitter exchanges . between policy makers andinteiligence officials.-..- Bruce C. Clark, who heads the agency's- assessments; or analysis unit, is retiring from the C.I.A. in April, in-what officials said was a personal decision unrelated to the dispute over the intelligence estimate onterrorism;-;::. ,~.t NEW YORK TT ES 29 14ARCH 1931 One official said that a successor hac not been named, but another indicatec that Mr. Clark's successor would be th< The special national intelligence esti said. Secretary of State- Alexander Haig Jr. said on Jan. 28 in his first new -conference.that the Soviet Union, as par of a "conscious policy," undertook th "training, funding and equipping" of it ternational terrorists. :., said that combatting international ten rorism is one of its key, foreign policy of `Ample Evidence' on Soviet Role: commented." . =Other Administration and Congres- sional officials; however, voiced concern! that the. agency was -once again being asked to tailor its views to fit the public! pronouncements.-of senior Administra- tion?officials.. zy ="There would not have been a review if the estimate's conclusions had totally supported . the _ 'Administration's charges," the official-said:- said in an interview with ABC News thi .week that "ample evidence" bad been ac cumulated to demonstrate the Sovie Union's involvement in international ter rorism, Mn Allen also said that the Soviet Union was "probably" -supporting the Palestine Liberation Organization, which be. said must be identified. as a terrorist organization, . through., financial . assist- ance and through support of its "main Finally, Mr. Allen concluded that Is- raeli air raids into southern Lebanon should be generally recognized as a "hot pursuit of a sort and therefore, justified." - Officials said that the draft estimate contained some factual evidence to sup- port charges that the Soviet Union was di- rectly.:. aiding and abetting -terrorist :groups, but that. in, many instances the evidence of such involvement was either murky orhonexistent. - . -- The estimate, which was circulated for comment to the State- Department, Na- .tianal Security Council, Defense Intelli- gence Agency, and the National Security Agency, stirred angry? debate and re-- Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100010001-7 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00010001 L T'r THE WASHINGTON POST o Pnc3 r" 25 March 1981 The spook's lot is not a happy one. He is expected to predict what is going to. happen, and if he doesn't, his job is on the line. Of all the government's intelligence analysts, those who try to figure out what the old men in the Kremlin are So the experts in the CIA, Penta- 0 Andrei Kirilenko is another-rank- gon and State Department stuck to - ing Politburo member,. who has the safe road. They didn't name a known Brezhnev for 30 years. As the single preeminent candidate to fill the Communist Party's organizational sec- 74-year-old Brezhnev's boots, a course retary, he presumably has the support-- that might get them in trouble if they of many party professionals whom he- They are- supposed to' a ve the presi- So Kirilenko is the man? Not nec- ciate Dale V n Atta h 14T a :.. sso y a as may, according to the Kremlinolog- dent reliable .information -when . -. 't U,,...., seen the experts analyses, and herea iota The ahnmt dismissal of his rim- e? tl, R ia leaders A ev e uss n -" d th e White House: which uley have tol which end is up. tege, ?Yakov Ryabov, as- party sacra-;. So it's understandable that our in-- . - - a Konstantin Chemenko is the fa- tary, in early 1979 might, have: been telligence people --in. the CIA,..-'the '- vorite of many Kremlin handicappers. - "an attack onKirilenko's position," Intelligence Agency-tend to take an Chernenko, 69, is an old buddy of. Who then? ` nere undoubtedl are y on-the-one-hand-this, ..:. on-the-other- Brezhnev's, dating to the early '54 many younger men who have become hand-that line-with-their Kremlinolo- when they 'served together in &Iol- increasingly restive at their inability to gical studies-"-" :::, ......,_ . davia .11 . - - - - ~. . . . . ., advance'. themselves because of the community has handled. the Reagan administration's question: - Who `will succeed leader Leonid L Brezhnev? - Our Kremlin watchers hoped that Brezhnev might give them some en- lightenment at the recent Communist Party conference. It would have been unprecedented for him to announce his heir apparent, but they had hopes g g Brezhnev, of course, did not lay Brezhnev's abilit on for "sev- . predictions of Brezhnev's successor. to han g y hands on a successor. In the dog-eat- eral more years." Some analysts figure it's a choice be- dog tradition of the Soviet hierarchy, tween hard-liners and soft-liners in none of the "first among equals" has So Chernenko is the man.., right? the Kremlin Other analysts say this is weakened his position of supremacy Wrong. Except for his close associa- by naming the man he wants to suc- tion with Brezhnev, he has no inde- horsefeathers. ceed him. From Lenin on, they have pendent . power base. "We believe In the end, it : all boils down to been realistic ' enough . to- realize that Chernenko's addition to the Politburo 'Winston Churchill's observation: ,Rus- . succession depends on -:'the political . was designed to enhance Brezhnev's i sia is a riddle wrapped` ina mystery skill of the contenders for. p?_. wer. own power l%ceition, " the CIA said. : inside an enigma."' -~ -._._~F_~._..-,_...._ . --?_ --- - . _....... .. . _.._... ~~r~a-s.-,=_..n ..,. ~ . Kremlin bureaucracy, becoming a full member of the 14-man November 1978. At that point, the CIA learned from a well-placed Soviet spy that "the elevation of Chemenko :to full Politburo status means he is being. groomed by Brezhnev as his, successor." But the spy conditioned Chernenko's rab for the brass rin on gerontocracy," -a State. Department s o'tlysis concludes. "They know that they will rise only in part because of what they know as opposed to'whom they know, for some of the most im- portant Soviet-style political battles are fought on- the patronage front." What all this speculation means for--' the United States is as murky as the Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01I37R000100010001-7 /?s sr:? 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T :? r< r ;r E:r=3is L? ?.j=?L urn s. y=E. ! ~: 8`2 ! ~L; ?T ii ~ M }~~tii ir? i?. fi:?.. i . G i ~ i : ?~ 4 .rr i . I V ? .' L. ',~ ?:Y y:i L. r ! it ri1 xi i a,s3 Simi' is ii 4,-:i 14~ 1'~ --?ii 5 tk???'i6 1~ ! '`? :rii y: is ri i.i r. ?s ir~i5'? i S;~ !?2. SQL tSr iri t 13 t l. ~'... 1' ? t3 r'Ll+~. 2~ Y 2~ r - r f - } 1 ?1 : i !~?: T r - . ? ::'i >K :?? !' r . r. Y r-? r . P. 1 L i ? . ?T : r i"! 'i"' i"? LS ??. +? a?. 1 7 / rs : ; r r r T ? ? . - . i i .?" S T - . ? : 1 1 rn_ i _ L `~( !: r E . i F t, is 1 t. F. r. t :n L? L t: i t r l x i. 1 i. .. L S 4 s.: s 3 u ..lf :!"s.. 3 ?J i ?1 .:{?a L= iji.3 :l .i? .. ?! F L2 Z.: k till. :. f 1 i3 i i?tik L. i21 {3i 7 .. Lft. '. l ; pave 2 Ar RIParO3MIDP9-03~R010 0'00a7 =# r -V 1. L r? `?U"I ie r is . ..y~Y L? ti. nrs?r ~?E.3i rr x Y r r r:. Pr RO-t S- IF 1E IC T S 11 P ', 1! Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R0001 T1TE fIFORMATION SOCIETY VOLU:v1E 1, NUi' ER 1--1931 William E. Colby Reid & Priest I11 119th Street, N.W. - Washington, D.C. Abstract The 1980s will see revolutionary changes in i, gence analysis and assessment, matching the changes in collection in the past few decades. Information management will be improved by technology, analysis techniques will be refined by new disciplines, and intelligence warnings will be more pointed by improved commu- nication modes and by providing them to-a wider public. intelligence in the information age will become a public function, not merely a secret service. The profession and discipline of "intelligence" faces a major turning point in the 1930s- If'successfully navigated, these years will mark the culmination of the growth of a truly American intelligence system, as different from traditional and foreign systems as American society, culture, and government contrast with those abroad. The result can be a remarkable improvement in our nation's ability to analyze, judge, and make decisions about international affairs. For centuries, intelligence was the small, private preserve of mon- archs and generals: Governmental and military espionage ferreted out the secrets of other powers in order to provide its sponsors with advan- tag,, in their dealings. Secret agents intrigued and subverted in order to discredit an opponent or support their adversaries within his own camp. -Me spy was the prototype of this traditional "intelligence" discipline. The first American change in this traditional posture was launched by William J. Donovan in World War II's Office of Strategic Services. I is adventurous character certainly fitted the old tradition and he built America's first worldwide service for espionage and for secret action among guerrillas and liberation movements. But his adventurous spirit was matched by an equally intense intellectual bent. Thus, in his new intelligence organization he assembled a corps of academic experts to "centralize" all the relevant information, that was overtly available as well as that secretly obtained, to analyze it and to come to conclusions about its significance. He gave this corps full status within the organiza- tion and, indeed, praised it first in his final remarks to OSS in October 1945, ahead of his other personnel "in direct contact with the enemy." This "central" contribution was so missed by President Truman when he disbanded OSS that he reestablished the central staff a very few months later in January 1946. While public opinion was transfixed- and continues to this day to be so-on the more-adventurous aspects of intelligence, this central capability grew and became the key feature of I .Approvedf*dell?h&WiY8 o*Mc! Ditbg@ft4(S7R000100010001-7 CQ2 PI Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R0001 ARTICLE APPEARED ON PAGE E. 1 -- Z POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLi= Winter 1980/81 Surprise Despite Warning,: Why Sudden Attacks Succeed RICHARD-K:, BETTS+ . - Most major wars since 1939 have begun with surprise attacks. Hind- sight reveals that the element of surprise in most of these attacks was unwar- ranted; substantial evidence of an impending strike was available to the victims before the fact- The high incidence of surprise is itself surprising.' The- voluminous literature on strategic surprise, however, suffers from three fixa- tions. One is a focus on the problem of warning, and how.t' improve intelli- gence collection, rather than on the more difficult problem of how to improve political response to ample warning indicators. Another is a common view of surprise as an absolute or dichotomous problem rather than as a matter of degree. Third is the prevalent derivation of theories from single cases rather than from comparative studies. This article puts these fixations in perspective. ?INTELUGSNCIi.ANO WAINMG:~THa Rm.ATIVITr-OF S77Rt Warning without response is useless. "Warning" is evidence filtered through perception; "response is action designed to counter an attack (alert, mobiliza- tion, and redeployments to enhance readiness). The linkage between the two is accurate evaluation and sound judgment, the lack of which is the source of most victims' failures to avoid the avoidable. Just as analysts of armsccontrol agree I For eight case stud!--s on which An ands is based see, Richard K. Dem. Surprise and A--freer (Washinston, D.C.: Brookings Institution, forthcoming). chaps- 2 and 3. RICHARD 3LBErrs, research associate at The Brookings Institution, has taught at Harvard, Co- lumbia, and Johns Hopkins Universities, has served on the staffs of the National Security Council and $eaata Sekxtco + acre on Iutd1B . and is author of Soldiers, -Statesmen, and Cold War' Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100010001-7 Surprise Despite Warning: succeed even :xplores the role and doctrinal argues that re- government's :e-ids that major ,.rs.onal decision :,atiug to strong affairs. He con- ;. is bound to re- E~s. the contemporary ?e over the regu- developed reflect dition. ?. ention. in Guate- to that interven- of Pigs fiasco. -sent a major rein- ,)f the Nineteenth demonstrate how through the efforts ortance. Why Sudden Attacks Succeed Most major wars since 1939 have begun with surprise attacks. Hind sight reveals that the element of surprise in most of these attacks was unwar- ilable to the victims ranted; substantial evidence of an impending strike was ava before the fact. The high incidence of surprise is itself surprising. The voluminous literature on strategic surprise, however, suffers from three fixa- a focus on the problem of warning, and how to improve intelli- i O ne s tions. ather than on the more difficult problem of how to improve ti ll on, r ec gence co political response to ample warning indicators. Another is a common view of than as a matter of h er surprise as an absolute or dichotomous problem rat degree. Third is the prevalent derivation of theories from single cases rather than from comparative studies. This article puts-these fixations in perspective.' INTF,LLIGENCE AND WARNING: TBE RELATIVITY OF SURPRISE . . th ut res onse is useless. "Warning" is evidence filtered through - - - warluna wt o p perception;- "response" is action designed to counter an attack (alert, mobiliza- '`_ - TLe U-.1-- 1%.+AWPPn the two is - tlOrl, 411LL LGUChav,7 .......w ... ___'-?--- accurate evaluation and sound judgment, the lack of which is the source of most victims-' failures to avoid the avoidable. Just as analysts of arms-control agree- (Washington, D.C.- Brookings institution, forthcoming). chaps. 2 and 3. RICHARD K. BETTS, research associate at The Brookings Institution, has taught at Harvard, Co- lumbia, and Johns Hopkins Universities, has served on the staffs of the National Security Council and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and is author of Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises. PoliticaISc McQwrte+l-' Volume9S Number4? Winter1990-81 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 CIA-RDP90-01137R000100010001-7 RICHARD K. BETTS Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01I37R000100010001- 1M7_A=APP p AI~'ERICI\N INTELLIGENCE JOURNAL ONP-17 WINTER 1980-81 Captain Robert Bovey US1 Let these examples also- serve to inform the politician of vast projects that the human mind can never penetrate how- ever extensive it may be, because their minute combinations must be developed in order to foresee or regulate events that depend on future contingencies. We can -explain past incidents clearly, for their causes are now discovered, but we always deceive ourselves about the future which is concealed by secondary causes from our rash and prying inspec- tion. That the expectations of politicians should be disappointed is not a phenom- enon peculiar to. the present age. It has been the same during all the ages in which- human ambition gave birth to grand pro%e?ts Frederick, The History of the Seven Years Wa , I, viii-ix..! 1, 369 Frederick the Great of Prussia serves to start us on the first task, defining what good intelligence analysis is not The second task, defining what it is, will be harder- WHAT GOOD INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS IS NOT - Frederick pointed out that good intelligence analysis is not the same as consumer satisfaction. Consumers haven't changed in 200-odd years; they'll never be satisfied. Failures will be heralded and successes taken for granted, the latter because (at least in part) the timely anticipation of events allows a decisive policymaker to preempt them. This is not to argue.for ignoring serious policy- maker critiques of intelligence; it does argue that each critique should be judged on its own merits. Also it argues more generally that a good press will not be ours. Second, good intelligence analysis need not mean good intelligence. Intelligence consists most finely tuned analytic machinery cannot produce useful intelligence. Absent the ability to- provide assessments in forms intelligible and persuasive to the- people who should act, the most perceptive analysis is worthless. In any case,- we will not address here questions of collection and dissemination; in spite of their importance, we will limit ourselves to the middle stage. Third, when our microscope focuses on the middle stage, we find that there are finer grada- tions in tht- process of intelligence analysis itself. We also see that intelligence analysis is a seamless web so that any cut for purposes. of taxonomy does violence to- the whole.. Nonetheless, for our purposes here, it will be useful to cut the web into four, sections that we may call the functions of intelligence and describe by the following catch phrases: Facts and Figures. Who's where? When does how much rain fall? How big is it? How much does it cost? and so forth- - - Reckoning and Reporting. What happened yester- day or did nothing happen? What is the military capability of an assembly of men and equipment? What is the productive capacity of an assembly of men and machines? and so forth. Prediction and Prognosis. What will happen tomar- row or. next year? What are the critical factors influencing developments? What are the key uncertainties? and so.forth. - Watch and Ward. Among all the scenarios that might unfold, which ones are both .sufficiently likely and sufficiently important to the United States to merit special attention? - Each of these functions makes somewhat different demands on the analyst. Here we will concentrate on the demands of the Predictions and Prognosis function and with only peripheral mention of the others. - - Fourth, we will ignore questions of relevance even though it is clear that when all is said and done superb analyses of irrelevant problems are no broadly' of three phases: collection, analysis, and dissemination.. Fob to Vice t l II three s{e'~~ vsV'15 ~ e- RDP90-01137R000100010001 ~- cause failure. Absent the basic information, the - RICHARD K. BETTS Intelligence is more important to the United States than ever before because we can afford ignorance or misjudgment less. The rise of Soviet military power and decline of American economic hegemony have shrunk the margin for error. With the last shreds of detente going up in smoke, the United States could be entering a period where tension is as great as it was in the 1950s and 1960s, but the old cushion of American material predominance is gone. Important as it always was, it is now even more vital that American leaders understand the nature of challenges in the interna- tional arena and know the full implications of their own policy initiatives and i lli gence. nte reactions. Such understanding requires first-class Yet the increased importance of intelligence has not been matched by adequate understanding of its true nature and its proper use to improve government decisions. By and large, intelligence is properly appreciated where it is most successful and least controversial: the collection of raw information. Confusion is greatest where the problems are trickier, impossible to fix by changes in resource allocation. or organiza- tional procedure, and controversy: analytic interpretation and projections of foreign military and political developments. EXPECTATIONS, TYPES, AND TIMING OF INTELLIGENCE olicymakers often complain about failures of the intelligence community to give them information that is timely or relevant to the nature of their responsibilities, but they rarely realize that they themselves are a big part of the problem. Henry Kissinger reportedly said, "I don't know what kind of intelligence I want, but I know it when I get it." And when authorities are more communicative about their needs, intelligence professionals frequently feel they ask the wrong questions. Officials also often prefer to get "hard facts," rather than extensive analytical interpretations, feeling they are better equipped to make their own assessments. In some ways, and at some times, they are better equipped: they usually have more political experience than professional analysts-do, and they know more about high- level activity and day-to-day developments in negotiations both external (with foreign governments) and internal (between various U.S., agencies and committees). As Richard K. Betts is a research associate at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. and is the author of Soldiers, Staresmen, and Cold War Crises (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,.1977). This article is based on testimony before the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs. d