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Approved For Release 2001/12/05 : CIA-RDP90-01I37R000100030001-5 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON. A. C. 20505 PUBLIC AFFAIRS Phone; (703) 351-7676 12 October 1977 NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER ESTABLISHED The CIA's Directorate of Intelligence and the Office of the National Intelligence officers have been merged to form a new organization, the National Foreign Assessment Center. The change was effective 11 October 1977. Robert R. Bowie, Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) for National Intelligence, has been appointed Director of the Center. The Center is located in the CIA Headquarters building where personnel involved in the merger had worked previously, i.e., no movement of people has taken place. The merger is designed primarily as a streamlining move, combining under one person all of the DCI's subordinate elements involved in the production of finished intelligence. No major internal realignments or changes in personnel are contemplated. The merger is another step in implementing the Presidential Directive concerning reorganization of the Intelligence Community announced on 4 August 1977. The National Intelligence Officers have been responsible for the production of National Intelligence Estimates for the President and the National Security Council. These studies provide the best information and judgment available to the U.S. Government on major trends and events Approved For Release 2001/12/05 : CIA-RDP90-01I37R000100030001-5 Approved For Release 2001/12/05 : CIA-RDP90-01I37R000100030001-5 -2- abroad that affect the security and foreign policy of the United States. They are products of the entire Intelligence Community. The Directorate of Intelligence has been responsible for intelligence analysis and production within CIA. In addition to its contributions to National Estimates, it issues a wide variety of periodicals and assessments for the use of policy officers at the national level, ranging from daily current intelligence summaries to in-depth analyses of foreign developments requiring the work of many analysts over months or years. The National Foreign Assessment Center will continue both of these missions. No change is contemplated in the procedures for producing National Estimates or for Community participation in their preparation. Departments and agencies will retain the same voice in reaching the conclusions of these estimates that they have had for the past several years. Their right to dissent from the findings expressed in National Intelligence Estimates remains assured. Approved For Release 2001/12/05 : CIA-RDP90-01I37R000100030001-5 In the CIA1 says Ralnh MoGe you have to do is tell the truth. Ralph McGehee '50 joined the Central struggle was a losing one. Of all the Intelligence Agency in 1952, shortly after countries in the region, today only he was'cut from the Green Bay Packers- Thailand remains allied to, the West_ He's not sure why the CIA approached McGehee thinks he knows why our side him, but during his intelligence training he lost the rest. met so many other pro football dropouts In 1965 McGehee directed an intelli- that he suspects the agency considered gence gathering effort in a province in the National Football League. a prime northeast Thailand where a Communist recruiting ground. insurgency was beginning. After a When the Korean War ended in 1953 detailed, yearlong study, McGehee re- orted that he had found a popular tine l d ' p es an s c McGehee joined the agency operations section as a case officer. Over movement so broad, pervasive and deeply the history of intelligence, and it is the the next two decades he served in the rooted that purely military measures were rock on which Ralph McGehee Philippines, Taiwan, Japan, Thailand and unlikely to defeat it. foundered. Vietnam. He did the routine work of an McGehee submitted his findings to the After he submitted his dissenting intelligence officer: recruiting agents, agency but, -after a brief period of praise report, McGehee's career tool; a nose-. conducting investigations, and maintain- for this work, he ran into an official wall dive. He was shuttled from one low-lev H i d b h ing liaison with the local police and intelligence organizations- _ During that era the CIA's main struggle was against Communist insurgency in Southeast Asia. That e was prom se er. to anot in Washington. - jo His findings, he explains, ran counter promotions but never received them. to the official Washington view that He was frustrated as he watched his Communist insurgency was a form of country wage the wrong kind of war in and orders from outside. McGehee maintains that intelligence pants who were duped or forced into joining guerilla units who took their arms clandestine invasion, and that the Southeast Asia, one he knew was natives involved were unwilling partici- .. doomed to failure. He did what he coul Approved For Release 2001/12/05 CIA-RDP90-01I37R000100030001-1 ? . Approved For Release 2001/12/05 : CIA-R-DP90-01137 February 1982 information often is politicized.. In theory, the agency provides accurate and' unbiased information to the President so- he can make wise decisions regarding national security. In practice, when a President is firmly committed. to a particular policy (such as military victory in Vietnam), the agency shapes i its information to conform to that policy J Bad or. even inconvenient news is unwelcome. That is an abiding theme in Approved For Release 2001/12/05 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000 RICHMOND NEWS--LEADER 26 November 1981 07n. .402% abrua. The advertisement, which appeared Mon- day, said the agency is seeking applican .swith training in computer sciences, economicsen- gineering, foreign area studies, languages, mathematics, photographic interpretations and physical sciences.. McCann said..mast of the jobs,. especially those in the foreigiiassess.- ment, field, require advanced degrees, such as a master's or doctor of philosophy.. - , _ He_ said that radio recruitment advertise ments have been used in Denver; Atlanta and Salt Lake City and that adrtisements have appeared in several national magazines. and professional journals. - Peterson said the CIA never has had prob- lems in filling its job vacancies, even during J he Vietnam war and the Watergate in zestiza- tions, when the agency was the subject of The CIA is "an equal-oppoity,'aa_ tive-action employer," according to its adver tisement Approved For Release 2001/12/05 CIA-RDP90-01137R000100030001-5 By ANDREW ? PETKOFSKY,; The.CiFr, it recruiting employees in .the Richmond area. In a large advertisement that appeared in The News.Leader_this week,: the- government. 'agency said it is "looking for. inen and women . who want a career with a challenge, and rewards to match.: The advertisement said-the available jobs require advanced. education,. "intelligence, skill, initiative..: a willingness to take charge (and) the ability. to piece together information -from many sources... " But the ad did not ay precisely what the jobs are: - CIA spokesman Dale L Peterson said today that the CIA is looking..fgr "operations offi- .cers" to gather information abroad. "We don't use the word agent," he. said. Another agency spokesman, John McCann, chief of the Washington area recruitment of- fice, said "scientific types' and people to work .in the National Foreign Assessment Center in Washington: also. are being sought The CIA has.been advertising for job appli- cants in variousp of the country for about = two years;:Peterson said, becau the end of the'; tite~iraditianal . `source of recruits He said .the?jobs require persons wha have; had advanced _edecation` but also have been- through a "rnatnring expenence'_of working,:: -l especiallyr overseas:- whila_ the . dra f twas effect, largemunbers of?yonng persvnsserved in the military;rmatnred,-.and. then went to college..The CIA then would recruit an college campuses;axioong studs who had service. in the military'_ "The people ar ioger'availible on the campuses,-.' Peterson-said:. -. He said the has torecruit people! who have. bad advanced .training in science, foreign languages,.raathematics, engineering and other technical fieldsand have been work- ing for at.least_ a couple of years. To reach those people, the CIA must advertise, he said. ! McCann said a similar recuiting advertise- ment that appeared in The News Leader in } August 1980 produced about 125 applications. He said 15 or 20 of those applications were I chosen for- interviews. As- for the :number hired, McCann said-that information is not the sort the CIA gig out,. 5~_ ! .. :.. , :. _ proved For Release 2001/12/05 : CIA-RDP90-01137 0 PAC: -1 I;Ap~ NAT..T iAL J^UC:AL 21 November 1981 Reagan's Effort to B.,.'esha May Revive Debate over Agt The President is about to sign an executive order on the Cly delicate question of how to balance national security wil BY DOM. BONAFEDE CIA" will be like the old CIA, which in a D-N torrent of headlines in the 1970s was nent he Reagan Administration, intent on exposed for illegally spying on American sent revitalizing the U.S. intelligence ap- citizens, exhibiting a cavalier disregard that paratus, is seeking to assure . that the for civil liberties, participating or conspir- cone changes conform to President Reagan's ing in overseas assassination attempts and tiviti goals---to combat international terrorism masterminding a host of bizarre, costly by and other perils to national security. and embarrassing James Bond-like plots- pout After several false starts, Reagan will Adm_ Bobby R. Inman, the deputy A shortly disclose the revisions in a new CIA director, publicly declared in March men executive order-the third . presidential that while the reins on the agency may be Pres directive governing intelligence activities eased, the scope of the proposed changes their tram J_ Casey, director of the Central should Reagan persist in "unleashing" issut T trative and organizational measures to tainly would be to revive the highly Hot: aegis. the intelligence community in a free Inte pushing legislation to exempt the CIA The President has already been put on The from Freedom of Information Act stria notice by the intelligence oversight com- Lou tures and is supporting a bill that would mittees in the House and Senate that the tion prohibit unauthorized disclosure of infor- overwhelming majority of their members ordt mation identifying U.S. intelligence oper- are opposed to any proposals that would met atives. - allow the CIA to conduct covert domestic aga: Each of these steps is part of a con- operations. C certed effort to strengthen the nation's On Oct. 30, the Senate Select Commit- atio intelligence machinery in keeping with tee on Intelligence, headed by Barry Hot Reagan's hardline defense posture and Goldwater, R-Ariz., sent its recornmen- witl his political ideology. dations on the .proposed executive order mat Reagan's new executive order, cover- to : Richard V- Allen, assistant to the on t ing the CIA and a galaxy of sister. President for national security affairs. a cc intelligence agencies, could nonetheless Allen and an assistant, Donald Gregg, p provoke an intense national -debate over director of the National Security Coun- met the delicate balance between individual tit's intelligence cluster, are handling the hea__..o rights and national security. Two earlier issue for the White House. Although the mittee on Constitutional Rights. Rodino draft proposals. leaked to the press by committee's report is confidential, it is and Don Edwards, D-Calif., the subcom antagonists, were purportedly designed to known that the members, in a bipartisan mittee chairman. contend that the execu- expand the CIA's jurisdiction to include agreement, dissented from proposals that tive order falls within their purview be- domestic counterintelligence, lawfully would permit the CIA to engage in cause it would diminish the authority of the province of the Federal Bureau of domestic operations and offered several the Attorney. General and the FBI in Investigation- modifications. An addendum attached to domestic intelligence matters. Both the That raised the specter of surreptitious the report included the views, mainly in Justice Department and the FBI come entries, nail openings, electronic surveil- opposition to particular provisions of the under the committees jurisdiction. lance and infiltration1 pVb l pRelm it 4tt42fdbDf Cl3fAl lPtSI ~~P113 b~,bl1l` how far the and even legitimate business organiza- members. order goes, wards said. "We're trying Lions. It has triggered fears that the "new On the same day. Edward P. Boland, to let the American people and the media Approved For Release 2001/12/05 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100 ARTICL P .u L1 ON PAGE THE WASHIUIGTONIA5 NOVE+IBE2 1981 By Donald Lambro ?' Best Spies William J. Casey: The CIA director has overcome an inauspicious start. The in- telligence community didn't like his ap- pointment, because he had no experience in modem clandestine work. Casey named a crony, businessman Max Hugel, as director of covert operations; Kugel was implicated in allegations of stock ma- nipulation and abruptly left the CIA. Nevertheless, Casey has shown the same skill in running the CIA that he displayed as Ronald Reagan's campaign manager and, before that, as chairman of the Securities and Exchange Com- mission. He inherited an agency weak- ened and demoralized by his predeces- sor, Admiral Stansfield Turner, and he has improved both its performance and morale. "Morale is certainly higher at the agency than ever before," says an agency source. "Casey has been making the right moves. He's getting us back on track-" John McMahon: Unlike Casey's own appointment, his choice of IVIcMahorr to run the CIA's National Foreign Assess- ment Center was applauded. A career agent, McMahon is one of the most highly regarded senior officials within the CIA_ He spearheaded a CIA expose of the Soviet Union's worldwide disinforma- tion and forgery activities- Casey was alarmed by apparent weak- nesses of the agency's analytical output, and told McMahon to shape up the di- vision quickly so government policy- makers would get accurate insight and analysis on a broad range of strategic issues. Intelligence sources credit' McMahon with instituting changes long overdue. "We can already see an irn-. provement," one reports. Approved For Release 2001/12/05 : CIA-RDP90-01I37R000100030001-5. Approved For Release 2001/12/05: CIA-RDP90-011 ARTICLE APPEARED ON YALE `~ THE PUBLIC HISTORIAN n-f.- 1 901 r The mstorian as Fore Policy Analyst: Th Challenge of the Q. PROFESSIONAL msxoaLAn s and the institutions of Amen policy have been engaged in increasingly fruitful relal years since World War 71. rust as individuals like Geoa and Herbert Feis have. linked the worlds of diplomacy and his- torical research, so the profession has established, `institutional beachheads"x in the historical offices of the Department of State, the military services, and in smaller numbers, the Departments of Defense and Energy. In these offices historians working as his- torians have applied rigorous scholarly standards in editing pri- mary sources, most notably the Foreign Relations of the United ? This paper is a revised version of a talk presented at the?anniial meeting of the Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association, University of Southern California, August 1980. This material has been reviewed by the Central Intelligence Agency to assist the author, in eliminating classified information. However, that review constitutes neither CIA authentication of material presented as factual nor a CIA endorsement of the author's views or those ascribed by the author to. others (including current or former officials of any nation). L The concept is taken from Otis L. Graham., Jr., "Historians and the `World of (Off-Campus) Power," The .c Lbiic Historian, Volume I, Number 2 (Winter 1979), 34. 15 ?1983. by the Regents of the University of California 0272-3433/81/010015+11$00-50 Approved For Release 2001/12/05: CIA-RDP90-01I37R000100030001-5 ARTICLE !FFEFA roved For Release 2001/12/05: CIA-RDP96-0113fM6610003 ON PnGE PHI iiELPHIA xN zJI-RER 5 October 1981 1 f are economic woes coming for ;,,da ledA_ ;s- mss[ year, more than 120,000 Cu= IVASHLNGTN A CIA 'anal sC . bans fled to the. United States: in a y boatliftsanctioned:by Castro.- ."' bays serious economic problems. and; "Castro- would-probably: prefer to Internal 1?discresidentontent may prompt negotiate'a long-term, orderly depar- ..Fidel Castro to- tune for- some One-to- two million encourage a new, large-scale exodus Cubans on the periphery of the?revo- ? pf- The refugees forecast wa is count=y. lution, -but he is not above threaten- was in.a compendium .. lug a new large-scale exodus to hattons eleasedester~n hemisphere achieve his goal," Swanson said. "In yesterday by the : addition, growing numbers of Cu- jCommittecongressional . Joint Economic bans could take it upon themselves to Analyst Russell- Swanson ? of-' the leave illegally and thus escalate bi- CI .,. ....,:... -. ssessment-. _ lateral tensions.' , A's National Foreign: A _: ._ ;Center wrote` that in coming years Swanson said Cuba's:, economie `the Castro `governmentr_faces.-its slowdown was ' reflected" in? the most serious, economic, challen a growth rate of -its national budget; ;since the transition from capitalism which dropped from about' 10 per to socialism in theearly 1960x." -= .:, ..Cent a year between- .tote mi4.1960s Despite. improvements in -areas and mid-1970s to k:3 tperce - 'otin1980. Swanson said tha led- ving Mal-' .such such as. health and education;' Cu gr ; have: experiences a decline arse and despair have e led- to- serious- ince-the- mi 1960x-in_'per-' capita.' declines in- labor prSlowdovitp ,supplies of clothing and key staples through deliberate work slowdowns and such as sugar, rice; beef and coffee,: black market absenteeism. v the a d: other e, end, the. housing--shortage has-gone black activities and other- from bad to worse; Swanson said.. ? economic crimes have been increas- "Reolutionary fervor among both ing" the young and the old is on the wane Although the 'e'conomic situation because of continuing consumer is not an immediate threat to the austerity," Swanson said. "At the Political security of the Castro gov_i same time, the prospects for dynamic ernment," he said, it is likely to lead economic development are Politi cato "major systemic economic at least the next decade." : ( changes,"- which would amount to' Facing such deep-rooted economic I, abandoning certain fundamental! problems, he wrote, "Havana could Marxist tenets. again,,seek to defuse internal discon. Swanson's portrayal.of the Cuban tent `through-large-scale emigration economy. contrasted sharply ciaa atactic employed"successfully on recent assessment by Cuban offaficials, three previous Occasions in the past who argued that the economy has enjoyed substantial growth despite' the. U.S.. trade embargo and. would become even. stronger in the next - five years. Approved For Release 2001/12/05 : CIA-RDP9O-01137ROO0100030001-5 ed For 2/05 . emA-RE)PS0110 1191? - NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMEI Last spring I notified Herb Hetu that Lafayette College wanted to do an article on me and my employment at CIA in their Alumni Quarterly. The article has been published, and I think you ought to have'a copy of it in case you get any questions. I doubt very much that you will. DD/NFAC -'T1C, ,p i H. elease 2001/ 5y:C@4 bPg0-01137R000100 27 SEPITMBERi 1981 25X1A Reflections, on Kremlinolog- Y BYDAVID BINDER 5peaal tOT' N WYOTk Trmes ALEXANDRIA, Va., Sept. 26 ti It may be only a footnote in the world of real estate, but a report that the entire Soviet analysis division of the Central Intelligence Agency was moving from C.I.A. headquarters up the road about 10 miles to Vienna, Va., stirred a wave of reminiscence in Marion G. Shaw, who formerly headed the agency's Soviet in- terrialpolitics branch.. She will not comment on the move from headquarters in Langley, Va., which apparently is a purely adminis- trative housekeeping matter. But she recalled that in the old days at the agen- cy, before the advent of The Computer, she and her fellow analysts 'kept their: arcana about the Kremlin officialdom:,' on 3-by-5-inch file cards- In those days: the C.I.A. was housed in wartime bar- racks buildings north of the Lincoln Me. morial, near the present day Kennedy Cente - r . One day in the late 1950's there was a flood warning along the Potomac and all the C.I.A. officers were ordered to evacuate with what they could carry to higher ground. Miss Shaw, an analyst who kept her Kremlin file cards in old shoe boxes, caused "great guffaws" that day among her colleagues by. emerging with her arms full of her oblong cardboard boxes, looking like she was about to deal with a picky cus- tomer in a fancy bootery. An admiring fellow Kremlinologist at the State De. partment, Paul K Cook, says fondly, ` Marion kept the best shoe boxes in town-" - A Return to Back Rooms Twenty years ago, at the height of the cold war, hers was a vaunted craft. Now, with easier access to the Soviet Union and somewhat more informaticm -appearing in the Soviet press, the art of 'Kremlinology, like that of clock repair- ing in a throwaway society, has retired mote as the czar's palace fortress for I -'A 1 h w ich it is named. A Vassar graduate who had studied ~e briefly foandhad served r State De- partmert, Miss Shaw joined,t'he C.T.A. in 1950 and was immediiately assi ned t g o Soviet?Internal Politics, a.k.a. Kremli- nrem"I felt at home," she recalled, nology- The term was already in wide ivrth a twinkle in her light blue eyes. Did use in intelligence circles when she it changeher mind? "No." started, but did not appear in print until Since,early 1979, when she retired, about ].9M. Her first boss, a World War 'I Miss Shaw has experienced fits of pa;: 11 intelligence hero, described World War sionate nostalgia, when one or another nologyas"the last ero horizon," change occurs in the Kremlin. "I die "He showed me the intellectual fasci. overthat, she said. _It was like reading a totally spellbind- s new clue.-- . 'Signs and Symbols' Pondere d In those early days, she said, the scar- city of information about the men inside the Kremlin was such that Western stu- dents of-Soviet politics were largely re- __"I could do it, but I was never a classi- political system became more open Among the newer instruments were the study of what she calls "old boy net- works" of party officials who were con- temporaries in the same region, the cor- Wat would affect the careers of officials;: trictmirtay~r~ anders.~~V - -, Sbae Box s Help Predictlans. - - munity, that Dmitri S. Polyansky, then.: considered a possible successor to Khru- h s chev, way alydybeingdowngraded. C LA. _-a_ u,e' mss'. in 1973 that President. f.,4.I care desperately about whatlilid, Jo= That same year, her 23d on the job, the agency discovered that Mi 'Sh ss aw . had never set foot in the Soviet !Union,'. Approved For Release 2001/12/05: CIA-RDP90-0 floe o tr ist-- a venture not entirely without peril since "they knew who I was" -and see Novels of le Came "It's not the leaving but the not know- ing. But I'm cut off because it's classi- fied " In retirement she has found time to read, among other things, the spy novels of John le Carre, whom she admires as a great astronomer of Bureaucracy Soviet and American. "I learned about Soviet bureaucratic- I politics by watching C.I.A. bureaucratic .I politics," she said, and then emitted a raucous laugh before adding, "alloca_ trans of money power of a i , ppo ntment and the threat of removal." of a retired, g woman hard-drinkin that type - I knew several of them,,, she said. Now Miss Shaw is applying the?skills h d l s e eve oped over 30. year to her. own family history, rooted in Colonial times around Charlottesville, Va. One anger - tor,-Martin Luther Smith, a Civil war general out of West Point who fo';ght with the South, fascinates her, since he f came from New York. She is fillinh oe boxes again. g. 1/ Approved For Release 2001/12/05 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00010 ARTICLE APPEARED THE NEW YORK TIMES ON PAGE 2 21 September 1981 WWAS INGT TAL K P,E'4 UNOL.OGISTS are trying. not to read too much into the : . fact -that- their own- section. of-,; overt Soviet inte 1igence analysis is being.moved off the grounds of tine Central Intelligwce Agency s main of fice campus in.tbe Virginia suburb-of:; Langley. A plot of sorts -a blueprint for additional office space -- is the mundane reason gvea fo'r the move to'. another C.LA. site in the Virginia bed- - room community of Vienna- Some of the more irrepressible analysts ` are=-' wondering whether the change-was dictated by Williaml. Casey, the new C.I.A. director and an old hand in the- busitmss- One profeseic ial says the Sovietseo- lion relates crucially to the other intel- -, ligence unitsr like the shaker to: the :cocktail, with various specialists wan- dering down the Langley halls-for:'!, casual business chats with the Moscow chaps. "I can think of a lot of others who aught to be defenestrated first,"'.; said the analyst, reluctant to go out, into the cold of crosstown traffic..-?': Approved For Release 2001/12/05 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100030001-5 Approved For Release 2001/12/05 : CIA-RDP90-01137Ff@00100030001-5 25X1A ICLE -APP ' ' D NEW YORK TIMES h1, C.LA. Says Terrorism Is on Rise, With 760 Acts Counted Last Year WASHINGTON, June .16. (UPI) - A new report by the Central . Intelligence Agency says that the number of terrorist activities around the world have risen dramatically and that American busi- nessmen and diplomats- are the terror- - ists'favorite targets. The 22-page. report, prepared, by the agency's Nationai:Foreign .Assessment Center and made public yesterday, said that 6,714 international terrorist acts had been counted from 1968 through 1984, in- cluding 780 last year. Since-a new system. of counting was used, the agency said, a comparison with,the numbers in a sirrii- Iar report last-year would: not-be accu- rate. ;;;..., American citizens, especallybusiness- -targets of terrorist attackE;?'the a_qlficy said, citing six, Americana killed ' ' 1- Philippines, and. one in the-Israeli piedWestBank: .'? =4w;. The next- "most-vicitmized national- sties" were listed as Russians, Turks, Ira- qis, French, Iranians and Israelis. Approved For Release 2001/12/05 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100030001-5 Approved For Release 2001/12/05 : CIA-RDP9O-01137 OFFICE OF POLICY AND PLANNING This week I have made two organizational changes which will bear importantly on the improvement of national estimates, on the administration of CIA and on our relationships with the media, Congress and other elements-of the government. THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL (NIC) For intelligence to play its crucial role as policy is formulated, our work must be relevant to the issues at hand and it must be timely. There have been shortcomings for some time in this relating of intelligence efforts and. activities to the policy process. Moreover, the process of preparing national intelligence estimates has become slow, cumbersome and inconsistent with providing the policymaker with a timely, crisp forecast that incorporates clearly defined alternative views- - - To correct this situation, I am restructuring the role of the National Intelligence Officers (NIOs) and the procedures for having the Na- tional Foreign Intelligence Board and its members make their in- puts to national estimates. The MOs, constituting jointly the Na- tional Intelligence Council, henceforth will report' directly to the DCI and DDCI. The Chairman, of the NIC will function as chief of staff -in directing and coordinating the work of the NIOs. The NIOs will continue to be the DCI s principal representatives in policy forums, and will continue to support the DCI in his role as member of the the NSC and the DDCI as Intelligence Community repre- sentative to the Senior. Interdepartmental Groups (SIGs)-working through the Director of NFAC for analytical support and assistance. The National Foreign Assessment Center (NFAC) will continue to be the, analytical arm of CIA and the DCI and carry primary responsibility for the production of finished foreign intelligence. I have decided that organizational changes are needed to improve Agency-wide administration and to shift direction in certain areas now that the difficulties of the past decade are behind us. These changes will reduce staff positions and return a number of intel- ligence officers to the collection and production of intelligence. I am establishing the Office of Policy and Punning to ensure that plans and policies submitted for DCI/DDCI consideration are consistent with Agency-wide objectives and priorities and that they are reviewed in the context of overall Agency needs. The Office will further develop and coordinate CIA's long-range planning ef- fort, review materials submitted to the DCI/DDCI that concern Agency administration, personnel, analytical operations and exter- nal affairs policies, and coordinate preparation of briefing papers for the DCI and DUCT for MSC and SIG meetings as well as meet- ings with heads of other agencies. The Office of Policy and Plan- ning also will centralize in the immediate office of the DCI/DDCI responsibility for all external affairs, including interdepartmental relations, liaison with the Congress and public affairs. With respect to external affairs, the Office of Legislative Counsel and the Office of Public Affairs were created at a time when the Agency was still encountering considerable criticism in the media ,,and in the Congress and when it was important to expend consider- able effort to explain the Agency= s mission; to justify our activities and to defend the quality of our work. The magnitude of effort devoted to these purposes has significantly decreased, and I believe the time has come for CIA to return to its more traditional low - 'public .profile and a leaner--but no less effective-presence on Capitol Hill. Our emphasis from now on should he to maintain and Approved For Release-2001/12/05 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100030001-5 Approved For Release 2001/12/05: CIA-RDP90-01137R .4p X7D IGLE .iPP ONP4GE SOVIET.. AID- DISPUTED IN -TERRORISM STUDY A Draft.- C . I.A:::Report, K. ow-Being Reviewed, Finds lnsut fie6 .,. Evidence-of Direct Role By JUDITH MILLER` WASHINGTON, March 2a-A draft re- port produced by the Central Intelligence Agency has concluded that there is insuf= ficient evidence?to substantiate Adminis- tration charges that the Soviet Union' is directly helping to foment international terrorism,- Congressional. and Adminis- tration sources said today: :::.:: ? William J. Casey, :Director of Central Intelligence, has asked his analysts,. the: sources said, to review their conclusions; given the substantial opposition t&the re The draft estimate,. produced C.I:A.'s - National Foreign Assessments Center, has stirred debate within'Admin- istration foreign policy circles, as foreign affairs spokesmen have publicly accused the Soviet Union of training, equipping,- and financing ?. international terrorist groups. ;.;_ _ ~,?: ::::... The review. of the draft=estimate has once again raised questions about the relationship between intelligence offi- cials and policy makers, with some C.I.A.I officials concerned that the agency - is coming under pressure to tailor its analy- sis to fit the. policy views of theAdminis. . tration. -~ _ Charges in Last Administration: similar charges. were made during the .Carter Administration -and resulted in. frequently bitter exchanges , between policy makers andintelligence officials. Bruce C_Clark, who heads the agency's, assessments, or analysis unit, is retiring from the C.IA in April, in what officials said was a personal decision unrelated to the dispute over the intelligence estimate onterracism w;:cam: r: rL" W YORK TIMES 29 PARCH 1981 One official said that a successor hat current director of the -agency's opera tions unit, John McMahon. The special national intelligence esti mate on terrorism was begun soon afte' the Administration took office,- official said. Secretary-of State Alexander N Haig Jr. said on Jan. 28 in his first new 'conference, that the Soviet Union, as par of a "conscious policy,". undertook th "training, funding and equipping" of it ternational terrorists., The Administration has subsequentl: said that combatting international ter rorism is one of its key. foreign policy of jectives: 'Ample Evidence' on Soviet Role ::,'In addition, Richard V. Allen, Pres- dent Reagan's national security adviser said in an interview with ABC News thi .week that "ample evidence'''" had been ac cumulated to demonstrate the Sovie Union's involvement in international tei rorism. Mr. Allen also said that the Soviet ?.Union' was "probably".`supporting the Palestine Liberation Organization, which be. said must be identified. as a terrorist organization, through , financial assist- ance and through support of: its "main aims ,t . _ -;a:_ ......*; k.-- Finally,- Allen: concluded that Is- raeli air raids into southern Lebanon should be generally recognized as a "hot pursuit of a sort and therefore, justified." Officials said that the draft estimate contained some factual evidence to sup- port charges that the Soviet Union was di- rectly aiding and abetting terrorist groups, but that. in-many instances the evidence of such involvement was- either murky or nonexistent. - -- .- The estimate, which was circulated fort comment to the State- Department, Na- ..tional Security Council, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency, stirred .angry debate and re- sponse~.. s... _. S; _ commented-" Other:! Administration and Congres- sional officials; however, voiced concerns that the-agency was once again being, asked to tailor its views to fit the public1 rronouncements of senior Administra- ?unofflcials.. "There would not have been a review if the estimate's conclusions had totally supported _ . -. the-. .' Administration's charges," the official said.-. ti tee. 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O Ye~aa of CIA t;iG estimates of Soviet '.'?~L'.7^:11ttia$ _ .1 e,V3 decades of ch:tr7.e, that j-,. e the early I is the CfA. .e yatr1Z- - `t,3 1 L[ ~ J T1~i e'd F-017 .! mi Iter'y Viending, technical c?zau ?:3s a,_d 2a ors, deploy- *n ziz.t. icaay's ffi--st irwta.? . "11 e Security Blanket '? qt = eilec!:' e:plor? onje --i the blunders as aeon by a num ni ~r.erts.nho have analyzed the reppcts dui bctiz R ablican and Democratic Admi ' r ohs. Oco rT I : I T hQ secu- 1 b;zt, k e t Thai f.aH ed .BY W LTLL , ii x PA IE-IL Bul.Ie}in S~.aii Writer WASHINGTON - The U-S. government has wasted billicr'9 of dollars over th past two decades on inaccurate estimates and forecasts of Soviet military spending and cagabiliries, according to present and former (J.S. intelligence and wleieruse officials. Ever since the Soviets encouraged the U.S_ in the late 1951?s to overestimate Soviet deployment and accuracy of intercontinental ball,:--tic niussiles_(IC.6Ms) which led to the famous "missile gap", U.S. Presidpr%3 and Congresses have reached arms limits agreements with the Soviets and have determined U.S. defense invest- ments on the basis of hiaccurate intelligence about gnat the Soviets were spending on defense and whata, they were'planning. to deploy, strategically as well as tactically, The Bulletin has 1?arned. The inaccurate int:?lilgence has-... iii the subject of often heated debate. within. the- intell.igccr'-ce community since the mid-1,56-Ds, wit? some critics claiming they, were forced out of the CiA for q esaio Ting the agency's figures. Recently, mcre ominous gi:.estior, have been raised about p cssi)ale explanations for the errors. Was it simply the result of bureaucratic bungling or stubborness on the. part of t1:r i-evolved, some of the critl,cs- ask.- Or was it the result of Soviet deception possibly including "moles" or Soviet agents in high positions in the U.S_ goverweeut' Whatever the cause, it -is beginning to - dawn on Capitol Hill and tYirougrout the new Adnwrsti=ation that the money. wasted tint the poor estimates may be only the tip of a very unpleasa&it iceberg. Ann even more significsni: ,-livelihood:and: in' some cases even their lives on the linen in providing thformatiom'"`:"i ". 7" e' The? ? CIA's' - personnel 1' director. Fm2m- xanney; said .in an'-affidavit that the campue'contaets`are.neeese sary toproperlY-P" tect national seen., city. He. said.ia many.. fields`- it is; "absolutely. essential that the- agency baM'available-to it the single greatest somrca of: e:pertlae; theAmerican? aca? .deEi comzniuiity:" . - i yr;, C .analysts at4 its. National Pored Asaastraneat Center-.consult,. rly_ wins fhe s. orr:., an,, "tafoxataI and personabasis,often - by -1 ;wh_ th&:mWerstanding that the.contacts will be. confident Janney: said;-: without': specifying- that scholars whose, CIA contact have.: become public were subjected to bar.. 'asmment and ridicule -by students and -other faculty. members... `There -is also evidence ? that. such. -scholars, despite recognized standing in their fields of expertise, have beert ;subjected to professional disabilities, including. denial of tenure and- dis- missed from theirs positions as a result of acknowledging such informal con- sub the CIA," Janney said. The Senate Select Intelligence Comel inittee_ said - in an April 1978 report `that many of the. CIA's contacts with i academicians are not dangerous but' that the "operational use" of academe. class raised serious questions about preserving the integrity of academic institutions. __ _ According to the committee, several hundred American academics, 'In ad.- dition- to providing leads, and, on De. casion, making introductions for intel- ligence purposes, occasianauy write- books and other material to be used for propaganda purposes abroad. yond these, an additional- few score. are usedin an unwitting manner for minor activltie9." - - - ... - ` In suggesting that all contacts with academics be open, the senators said:: `? : _ If the. CIA is to serve, the initel--1 ligence needs of the nation, it must. have unfettered access to the best ad. vice and judgment our universities. can produce. But this advice and eai pertisa' can - and 'should be. opew sought-.and.openly given:" .. __ 25X1 A elease 2001/12/05 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100030001-5 Approved For Release 2001/12/05 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100 IIIIIII'~iani 25X1A Approved For Release 2001/12/05: CIA-RDP90-0113 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT 21 November 1977 =,s-ft h 1 n Sources close to the intelligence chief have been quick to answer these charges. They say that of the 820 jobs being eliminated in the clandestine ser- vice, only 13 are overseas billets. The rest are staff slots at CIA headquarters in Langley, Va. The point is made that the end of the Vietnam War left the clandestine ser- vice enormously bloated, with hundreds of redundant agents recalled from the Far Fast. Furthermore, congressional reaction against covert operations over the past UU Nam, AtCA A DRAMATIC CHANGE in the way America's espionage system oper- ates around the world is being signaled by a purge involving hundreds of clan- destine operators. - What the housecleaning at the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency reflects . is, a. sharp downgrading. of covert actions--- the "dirty tricks" operations that have embroiled the organization in a series of scandals and official investigations over the past three years. Analytical approach. The emphasis now is shifting to intelligence analysis-- political and economic as well as mili- tary. The aim is to insure that the mass of information pouring into the CIA from spies, reconnaissance satellites and open sources reaches the President and other policy makers in a usable form. This marks the end of an era for the Agency-30 years during which the or- ganization was preoccupied with covert actions aimed at overthrowing govern- ments and otherwise influencing politi- cal developments abroad. From 1961 to 1976, roughly 900 major covert operations were carried out--such as the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba and financing of op- position to the Marxist Allende Government in Chile. In addition, there were several thousand smaller projects. -. _ - Significantly, all of the 820 CIA officials on the purge list are officers with the. Deputy Directorate - for Operations--the- so- called dirty-tricks-depart- ment. Approximately 200 have just re- ceived their- walking papers. The _ remainder will be given the choice of retiring or resigning in the months ahead. When the retrenchment is com- pleted, the Deputy Directorate of Oper- ations will be cut by about 15 per cent from a strength of roughly 4t500. . Some officials among the purgees charge that America's espionage oper- ations overseas are being crippled. They allege that the CIA Director, Adm. Stansfield Turner. is obsessed with satel- - - - - - COVERT ACTION Where It Paid Off The large-scale purge of clandestine officers is only one part of a wide-rang- ing program that Turner has instituted to revamp the structure and the prior- ities of the U.S. Intelligence community.. In another move to strengthen the community's analysis role, he has estab- Iran: 1953 . CIA-promoted demonstrations result in overthrow of pro- Communist Mossadagh Government, return of Shah. lished a National Foreign As- sessment Center. It is run by Robert Bowie, a professor at' Harvard and former official of the Department of State. The Center is staffed by 1,200 intelligence analysts from the CIA and a group of high-ranking specialists who, in the past, were responsible for producing national intel. ligence estimates. These studies provide the Presi- dent and other policy mak- ers with the intelligence community's assessment of major trends and events abroad that affect U.S. secu- =- tional Security Agency, which handles electronic intelligence, and the National Reconnaissance Office, which pperates spy satellites. 2 : - The aim is to minimize costly overlap- ping by the various agencies and also to insure that these units actually concen- trate on the information that policy makers need. - _ _? - ..- Taken together, the reorganization -and the purge of specialists in dirty tricks are changing the face of America's Guatemala: 1954 - the criticism of a Senate committee's Leftist Government led report that the CIA for 30.years had by Col. Jacobo Arbenz neglected classical analytical intelli- Guzman is ousted in Bence work because of its preoccupation . armed uprising orga- with covert operations abroad. CIA b y nized covert-ac- - In another move to streamline the tion agents. Col. Carlos entire intelligence tem. Turner has Castillo Armes, left, lead- er of the coup, sets up a? setup a National Intelligence Tasking pro-American regime. Center under the command of Lt. Gen. responsible for assigning tasks to the cies. These include not only the CIA. but ... also the Defense Department, the Na-- Yw w- -..a? , 9~~ r^ i2 nDAn~ I I_~ - spies who can assess yoI-nRel arb~G~mrtrf~s'[`teigmre0aia~7 914ut whether it proves tentions and not just his capabilities. take-over by U. Gen. Mobute Sese Seko. - more effective remains to be seen- Approved FoAWNsb 20OIK12/05PX1A-? 9l9 q 7R0001 31 October 1977 CIA Merges Directorate, Office Washington--Central Intelligence Agency, in another effort to streamline Internal intelligence gathering efforts, has merged the Directorate of Intelligence and the Office Q of the National Intelligence Officers Into a new organization called the National Foreign.. Assessment Center. According to the CIA, the merger Is designed primarily to combine under one person all of the directorate's subordinate elements involved in the production of analyzed Intelligence. Robert R. Bowie, deputy to the director of central Intelligence for national intelligence, has been appointed director of the center. The National Intelligence Officers were responsible for the production of national Intelligence estimates for the President and the National Security Council. Compiled by the entire intelligence community, these studies provide the government with information on major trends and events abroad that affect the security and foreign policy of the U. S., according to the CIA. The Directorate of Intelligence has been : responsible for Intelligence analysis and production within the CIA. - - Under the reorganization, the new center will continue both these functions. In: announcing the move, the CIA noted that no change Is contemplated in the procedures for producing national estimates or for Intelligence community participa--? tlon In their preparation. -~. In a related matter, the CIA also notified aerospace companies dealing with top security matters to tighten procedures concerning the usage and transmission of U. S. top secret codes, according to U. S. officials (s.was7 Oct. 17, p. 20). The new procedure calls for two persons .to be present when codes are being used, instead of one. In addition, movement of U_ S. codes now requires two couriers Instead of one as was previously required. The new code procedures are part of Increased emphasis on Security to prevent leaks and possible dissemination of Information. - - In another internal development, the CIA also recently decided to cut 800 to 820;, persons from its Directorate for Operations, which Is responsible for the agency's ? covert activities. The staff reduction has been under consideration by the CIA since the wind-down in the post-Vietnam War period. The cutback Is being spread over a 26-month period to allow for the impact of retirements and other procedures that would reduce the need for layoffs, according to a CIA official. Approved For Release 2001/1-2/05 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100030001--5 - AVIATION tti'r_EK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY 31 October 1977 Approved For Release 2001/12/05 : CIA-RDP90-01137R0001000 25X1A CIA Merges Directnrnta Offic e Washington-Central Intelligence Agency in a th no er effort to stli i ,reamnenternal r Intelligence gathering efforts, has merged the Directorate of Intelligence and the Office , of the National Intelligence Officers i t n o a new organitilld Assessment Center.zaon cae the National Foreign According to the CIA, the merger Is designed primarily to combine under one person all of the directorate's subordinate elements involved in the production of analyzed Intelligence. Robert R. Bowie, deputy to the director of central intelligence for national IF Intelligence, has been appointed director of the center. - The National intelligence Officers were responsible for the pdti roucon of national intelligence estimates for the President and the National Security Council. Compiled by the entire intelligence community, these studies provide the government with Information on major trends and events abroad that affect the security and foreign policy of the U. S., according to the CIA. The Directorate of Intelligence has been responsible for intelligence analysis and production within the CIA. Under the reorganization, the new center will continue both these functions. 1W announcing the move, the CIA noted that no change is contemplated In the procedures for producing national estimates or for Intelligence community participa?- tlon In their preparation. In a related matter, the CIA also notified aerospace companies dealing with top security matters to tighten procedures concerning the usage and transmission of U. S. top secret codes, according to U. S. officials (Aw&ST Oct. 17, p. 20). The new procedure , calls for two be present when codes are being used, Instead of one. In addition, movement of U.S. codes now requires two couriers instead of one as was.: j, required The new cod . e procedures are patf i r oncreased emphasis on security to prevent leaks and possible dissemination of information. - - In another internal development, the CIA also recently decided to cut 800 to 820:, persons from its Directorate for Operations, which is responsible for the agency's - covert activities. The staff reduction has been under consideration by the CIA since the wind-down In the Post-Vietnam War period. The cutback is being spread over a 26-month period to allow for the impact of retirements and oth er procedures that would reduce the need for layoffs, according to a CIA official. Approved For Release 2001/12/05: CIA-RDP90-01.137RO601600 6001_ 25X1A 18 October 1977 ORGANIZATIONAL MATTERS Two important organizational steps have just been completed in furtherance of the Presidential decisions on the Intelligence Community: (1) On 3 October, Lt. General Frank A. Camm, US Army (Ret.), became the Director of the National Intelligence Tasking Center. General Camm comes to us with a superb record in analytic work, military operations, and engineering, and I am most happy that he is joining the Intelligence Community. His initial work will be to organize the National Intelligence Tasking Center (NITC) established by the Presidential Directive. Organi- zationally, this will have only minor impact on the Agency. In time, the tasking function of the NITC should be beneficial to our Agency collection functions by coordinating them more closely with those of, other agencies. (2) On 11 October, the DDT and the NIO were merged to form a new organization under the DCI, the National Foreign Assessment Center (NFAC). Mr. Bowie will head the new Center and Dr. Stevens will be his deputy. NFAC will receive its support from DDA and other CIA elements. With these changes our organization will look like this: Ap Approved For Release 2001/12/05: CIA-RDP90-01137R00 Director of Central Intelligence/ CIA Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Public Equal General Legislative Inspector Affairs Employment Counsel Counsel General Opportunity Support Deputy Deputy Deputy Deputy to Deputy to Deputy to Director Director Director DCI for DCI for DCI for for for for National Collection Budget and Operations Administration Science and Intelligence/ Tasking/ Evaluation Technology Director, Director, Director, National National budget and Foreign Intelligence evaluation Assessment Tasking Staff Center Center No. 13 ! - S i? i 1T t Approved For Release 2001/12 ti J ~a i~ln: t i. 3?S i?-:jr -~t'L-?r.L+-ti?l?- 1i: .=i?i; rte''! _: w .-L.3 i ^~L. iwi ii ~i.~ tii_ L?~u: L. e.i :~siirr 'irr"j is -- . ~1's?.v? L. i?$ ! ~r?s.? { u - ! ii i./L ! - 0iri i Sir -.1 ~:~r?-~?i -? -rr.- - -~i s! rt?' .i 1 -.+lvi3 L SEL 13i ~ iE~%i5iii >.iV. U L x+18 IF .~ `~ . 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