NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER ESTABLISHED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-01137R000100100001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 194
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 19, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 12, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

STATINTL
V
--' -- ------Approved F-or Reie t/07/3T .-CiA-RDP90 3TRaOO1OO'1OD
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON. 0. C. 20505
PUBLIC AFFAIRS
Phone. [phone]
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER ESTABLISHED
The CIA's Directorate of Intelligence and the Office of the
National Intelligence Officers have been merged. to form a new
organization, the National Foreign Assessment Center. The change was
-effective 11 October 1977. Robert R. Bowie, Deputy to the Director of
Central Intelligence (DCI) for.National Intelligence, has been appointed
Director of the Center.-. The Center is located in the CIA Headquarters
building where personnel involved in the merger had worked previously,
i.e., no movement of people has taken place.-.
The merger is designed primarily as a streamlining move, combining
under one person all of the DCI's subordinate elements involved in the
production of finished intelligence. No major internal realignments or
changes in personnel are contemplated. The merger is another step in
implementing the Presidential Directive concerning reorganization of the
Intelligence Community announced on 4 August 1977.
The ational Intelligence Officers have been responsible for the..
production of National Intelligence Estimates for the President and the
National Security Council. These studies provide the best information
and judgment available to the U.S. Government on major trends and events
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DEr E"NS E ! SPACE DAILY
17 AUGUST 1977
CIA TO SEEK OUT STRATEGIC BALANCE CONSULTANTS
CIA director Stansfield Turner says he is planning to create a group of consultants to
work with the agency on assessments of force estimates such as the strategic balance
between the Soviet Union and the United States.
He said the CIA would look at a particular estimate and the agency will call from the
group of consultants "the right mix of people to join in the estimate. "
Turner said the use of the consultants would not be on a full-time basis, but rather
would be used at,the beginning of an exercise, following it through and critiquing as the
CIA proceeded, -
He said he did not think an "ideologically structured" Team A-Team B approach is a
good idea. "I would not reject it entirely, but I think it is something upon which I would
look with suspicion. " The reference was to the controversy that developed over the
"Team B" review of last year's National Intelligence Estimates of Soviet strategic
capabilities.
Turner denied the assertion that, because of the Team B assessment, the "so-called
hard liners won the day and forced the CIA to re-evaluate its opinions about Soviet military
strength. "
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 Lc
AR 27c -? r;,. EAP.L'La
NEW YORK TIMES
e `Man,y'Studies'About the United States
Apparatus End the Same Way: Refarm
it
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ASHINGTGN--When Senate- and House
Committees completed their investiga-
tions of the operations of the intelligence
community last year.. several conclusions
? The intelligence agencies had been allowed to operate
either by the president or by
ient direction
ffi
h
t
,
c
. su
ou
wit
Congress.. -
. 0Their structure and their secrecymadeitnearly impas-
sible to trace responsibility for abuses: As one weary mem-
ber of the Senate Intelligence Committee put it in 1975: "It
'was like the old joke. 'Nobody was driving. We were all
in the back seat.'!' -
? he 55 billion---until recently, S6 billion-Intelligence
apparatus was cumbersome, "redundant!' (in. Governmen-
tese, that means it has .enormous duplication of effort) and
often didn't collect the information the: President needed
to know when he needed to know it.
Last Thursday President Carter took an important step
toward dealing-with some of these questions: He centralized
more administrative power under the director of Central
Intelligence than that official has possessed since the agency
was set up in 1947. _."
In, Washington, centralization or power is no panacea
for abuse. Indeed, the history of the intelligence community
over the last three decades suggests that it was at its
t V worst when it had its greatest power. It was, for instance,
part of the sad chapter of the Chilean- affair-the united
States involvement in the downfall of President Salvador
Allende Gossens-that.a former director. Richard helms,
left President Nixon's office feeling he had "a marshal's
baton under his arm."
ut in Preside art
tion of res onsibilit . Now, presumably, the President can
ring up Adm. Stansfield Turner, his director of Central Intel-
ligence, ask "What's this I hear" about an intelligence.-
i matter and be talking to the man responsible- By the same
token, the two Congressional oversight committees should
be able to get their answers and issue their advice through
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Members of the Senate Intelligence Committee and Ad-
miral Turner both had contemplated an intelligence reorgan-
ization, that would have put even greater power into the,
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M TICLE APPEARED
ON -PA G
THE WA$iITNGTON POST
30 July 1977
A Worthwhile Debate-on Soviet iterations' '
'As a ' fellow. academician.: and- 'cal recent emigre with access to inside in ?
league of.Professor Vladtmi :Petrov,I formation but admittedly, liable to theI
was quite atarmed by the tole and-lr ,_? foibles of insiders, including uneven
plications of-hid letter published Jiiy._- .memory for details and a tendancy, to
22, in which he derides the Outlook ar overrate personality. factors, get secur
titles by Richard-Perle, ProfessorPipes r= y.clearance :before"lie can 'tell-14
and . Boris Rabbot . concerning Soviet story in a newspaper that a fe* days
foreign and military policies and/or later published a -critique by another
the proper American response to them.-. Soviet emigre (Victor Zorza)?, -`c ; "_-
Petrov hopes for "restoring'sanity to-=` Professor Petrov'- seems especially
discussions of such matters, restricting perturbed by The, Posts printing artic
them to?those:who possess both compe- les (in an opinion section, not with
terce and integrity.7i !' .` straight news) that "clash so directly"-=-
Is he in fact suggesting thatThe Post: strange position, indeed, for an acade
in its Outlook section censor important-,: miciau. If for. one, would like to coin
'opinions and viewpoints, which repre- mend The Post and the American sy-
-:sent the inputs into our decision-mak- tem as it is.operatingtoday for the com`
ing? Should Sen. Henry Jackson's aide - paratively intelligent manner in which
Perle. (in spite, of the admitted-CIA- =the: public debate over' Soviet- inter-
underestimation of Soviet military ex- _ tions and capabilities and U.S. strategic
penditures in the 1960s) be denied pub- and foreign policy is being conducted.
lica tion - merely-.. becausel he is - a The American people- in opinion polls
strategic-arms expert .. rather than a have shown- a general- willingness to
`Sovietologist? Will Professor Petrov. spend the necessary money for-an ade-
e~.
"muzzle" thehighly gifted-and produc- .,= quate defense of the U.S. and its alli
tive? "Team B" head, Professor'Pipes,~ All serious positions; as well as Ame .
merely because he has been primarily a can strategic doctrine itself, are geared
historian of pre-Revolutionary Russia? to the preservation and: strengthening
And need Rabbot; a slightly.: `suspect" , -_of :the coexistence we have always-had
with the U.S.S.R.-andthe avoidance of-
--major, armed ' confli'as -well'. as :ilia
>x.
safeguarding- of our civilization dive
the.natureof: politics and people,-how
-..much more "sanity", could one .reason.
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 f ' 1 '?'"_ ~~4 d For Release 2001/07/27 T J~A ~p11a1?7_%0100100
The name of Richard Pipes, Baird professor
of history at Harvard and distinguished Sovie-
tologist, first came to our notice a few months
ago. He and a team of stratrsts studied the
Central Intelligence Agency's yearly evaluation
of Russian strategy and, by all accounts, oun.
it too optimistic.
The considerations that led Professor Pipes
and -"Team B"- to bleak conclusions were then
secret. But in a fascinating article in the July
Commentary ("Why The Soviet Union Thinks It-
Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War") Mr.
Pipes expounds the pessimistic view at length_
His piece has been called "rank hysteria in
scholarly garb by one knowledgable critic. We
did not find it so, but there is room for strenuous
exception. -
Professor Pipes' article is probably more
valuable as 'a glimpse-of the mind-set of those
sometimes called, too simply, "hawks" than as
a convincing -appraisal of. the origins- of Soviet -~
strategic doctrind- But this frame of mind is
worth understanding, because it corrects more
optimistic outlooks and because it is far from
uninfluential in national councils today. -,
.,
To-summarize Professor Pipes' argument is. to
simplify it; but some summary is needed here.
There is, he insists, a drastic difference between
the American and Soviet views of the usefulness
of nuclear war. By his reckoning, the Russian
military dominate Russian strategic planning;
and as professionals, they reject the view that-
thermonuclear weapons have altered warfare
absolutely.-.: _
By contrast, he insists, -American strategic
policy has been deeply- he believes unduly -
shaped- by two forces effectively excluded from-
Soviet planning: scientists and civilian special-.
ists who think the atomic age makes nonsense of
- war considered as `,'a continuation of policy by
other means"; and a succession of civilian de-
fense officials whose paramount concern was
economizing.
He lays- out a stark contrast, then, a contrast
between a rational, bourgeois, commercial soci-
ety (the U.S.) and a peasant society, inured to
-tolerate the loss of human life on a staggering
scale and thus to take a- far more- "realistic
view of the role of violence in history (the U.S,.
Thus whereas we tend to rely on "mutual as_
sured destruction" as a deterrent, the Soviet
Union looks beyond devastating nuclear ex-
to survival, even victory, in nuclear
changes
war. To understand this Soviet outlook, he, argues, we need only read their military manu-
als and examine their writings on military
policy. Obscured though they may be by "Aeso-
-pian" language, and striking the Western
reader as "unadulterated rubbish," these Writ-
ings announce over and over again the Russian
rejection of our notion that nuclear war is too
costly and damaging to be profitable for anyone.
Professor Pipes is a professional student of
Russia, and by reputation a diligent one. Approx.
priately, then, what he says about the Russian -
political and' military structure, and its mental- .
ity, is far from implausible or uninformed.. .
What is far less plausible is his account of the
way American strategic policy is made. It all
seems too simple. A nation that has been for-
some 24 years spending approximately half its
discretionary .-national budget on. defense, and.
the influence of whose "military-industrial com-
plex" one President, himself a distinguished sol-
dier, felt it expedient to warn against, is not
obviously the scientist-and-penny-pinching- -
accountant-ridden society Professor Pipes por-.
trays. -.
More specifically, the Pipes analysis falters in
historical detail --- largely by omission. For in-
stance,- describing the advent of Robert S.:
McNamara as defense secretary (and straining,
=-perliaps to fit. that event into file Iacger argil=
went) Professor - Pipes,writes:,`,`A_ prominent
business executive. specializing: in finance and
accounting, McNamara applied to the perennial
problem of American strategy the method
of cost analysis. Under McNamara the procure-
ment of- weapons," decided on the. basis of-cost
effectiveness, ,came in effect to direct strategy;
rather than the other way around It is at this
point that applied science'-in partnership ,with
budgetaryaccountancy- a partnership which
had-developed U.S. strategic theory - 'also took-.
charge of U.S. defensepolicy:'.~:.=t~:.:.
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President Jimmy Carter's decision to
appos= production of the ;-1 bomber is
shcekin r for two reasons: (l) because
the White House was a;;suria key con-
}ressloTial leade_s only hours before last
Thursday's press conference that the
President had decided to approve p.ro-
duction. of the plane: () because the
presidential decision flies in the face of
a devastating analysis of Soviet mili-
tary doctrine that shows the Soviets are
moving inexorably toward mihitary vic-
tory, not parity, in the Fast-'?ri'est arms
race-
That analysis was prepared by Prof.
Richard Pipes of Harvard. former head
or the school's rCosslan Research C.'en-
tW.:r and one of the ,world', outstanding
authorities on i remlin thinking. fesst
y.Car, the President's Foreign ifltellL-
gence Board asked Dr. Pines to head
up ._-.:ailed ''Tea-rn ' to analvxe
tale :. nniial strategic estimat s; of the
Central Intelligence Agency-
Team B-composed of some of the
most respected academicians and intel-
lictenoe experts in the world-con-
eluded that the CIA had svstematicaiV
underestimated Soviet capabilities, that
the Russians were ideoloeically com-
mitted to victory over the West and that.
their doctrine was designed precisely to
achieve that goal.
Unfortunately, few who have made
this country's rnajor strategic decisions
o'%er the last 15 years have taken the
Russians at their Typical is Paul
Warnke..Carter's. personal choice to
Had the Arms Control and Disarma-
mCrit Agency, who was asked recently
about the Soviet's conviction that they
can fight and win a nuclear war.
"In my view," Warnkc said, "this
kind of thinking is on a 1_ vel of ubstrac-
Lion ;`.hich. is unrealistic. It seems to me
that instead of talking in these terms,
v:hich ,vould indulge what I regard as
thce prim tivc aspects of Soviet nuclear
doctrine, we ought to he trying to edu-
ci,tee them into the real world of strate-
gie 111--clear weapons, which is that ino-
boay could possibly win."
This asst er strA :s Pipes not only as
condescending but as Ally, in
the current CommentaCy, the Harvard
professor asks: "On .';hat (',rounds does
? a 'Yashington awyer, prs ere to
educate the Soviet general stair com-
posed of professional soldiers who 30
years ago defeated the NVehrmacht-
arid, of all things, about the `rtL l.world
c:f _ _;ategic nuclear weapons'-of which
they happen to possess a conwl_-mhly
larger arsenal than we? Why does he
cc;:i ider .here children who C:u~=ht not
to be .indulged'? And why does he
chastises for -\~hat he reg_,,ards as 'prTali-
tive and unrealistic strategic doctrine
not those who hid it, namely the Soviet
rnil!tory, but Americans ',Vila % or'ry
ab.;out it?''
Warnke's bell ---that nuclear war
is unwinr!able, and there ore irrational
---Las shaped American thinking sine.
the mid-1960s when .we unilaterally
frc>,:e our ICBM force at 1154 acid 11
mantled all. our .clauses against enemy
bomibers. CAR defense was all h'ut
ahandoned, as was an ABM system that
scientists said was technologically feasT-
hle
. Z3ut the Soviets paid no :reed to
Oar good intentions. : oey engaged
in a ?;reu tic, rna,ss.lye build-up of
ills;, ntity and quality, soon
outstrip- the United States in areas
where we had long held ovem lTel.m-
Ng soperioridv. But the Warakes
who shaped Arnertean r olicy were
little concerned.
:,: ;s notes:
As was that a5 soon as
t' 1ssirL!ls ielt 'CIT1 elves catial to
the United States is tGrrrli Ol CC1 Cti'i
deterrence they oui_l ;:toO fu_-her de
plloyment5, The tL-anti pace oi' cue So-
viet nuclear buildup ', as e.-rpiained first
on the ground that the Russians had ai
! lot of catching up to do, tf:en that they
had to consider the Chinese threat, and
finally on the grounds that they are in-
herrent1;- a very insecure ;)t:ople and
should be allowed an ed e, in deterrent.
ct~p_ huity."
To Pipes, the West has rna:le a trag.c
mistake in not studying ; oviet military
T ne. C'lotnirlg Could he Al ore Cl -.lr,
alter sacs aaalysi:-, thari toad the. So??
vie?t; , '.lard war----particula,::iv nuclear
war---...a s something that Mn he won. As
tine Soviets p::;clairm,.: `War rrm-,i.ct not
iimn(be] the de eat of t'?- eric-my,
it rritast be his tlestraction. This condi-
_iori has become the basis of Soviet miMi-
tar'i _.rat'egy_" -
The strategic doctrine adopted by
the USSR over the past two decades,
{ Pipes stresses, 'e'lls for a po'dcy- dia-
.~
met.r',c. iy Opposite to that adopted in
the United States by the predorninagt
community Of civilian Strategists.: no
deterrence, but victory, not suf9ci:;ncy
in weapons, but superior ity, riot retalia
tiont, i-,,,it offensive action."
Soviet theorists regard Strtzen'ic nu-
clear forces (organized since 1950 into
a separate arrn, the Sara,,::, Rocket
-r
Forces) to be "the dtci.si ie branch of
the -med services in the sense that the
.ultimate: outcome ofmod::rn war should
he settled by nuclear exc an ges.'
A owards this goal-the: destruction
of the enemy'---the Soviets have been
building a military machine that &:~_irfs
Char of the United States. ti. bile Amer-
ica:n strategists scoff the Soviets'
stockpiling of hue quantities of arrr+s,
r.ew tied old, cailin 4 it a thro?,,.back to
Czarist thinkin U pes rea ;tea:
"It is not, however, as mindless as it
^-'='y =`pir
['or,ilt io'iu;l )OYiCt sCr
i`
C
-
.
2
.
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` -
 NE,1SDA'I
'" "` Hued For Release 2001/07/' JT-ROP O-01137R0001001
By Martin Schram and Jim_?Klurfeld
( rewsday Washington Bureau -
This is the second: of articles an theUSA
intelligence community.::`
Washington_Centrai Intelligence Agency Di-
rector Stansfield Turner has begun working with
-top Carter policy-makers to-bridge, the intelligence
gap and solve- what, he concedes, are "very real"
problems in the way the system 'corks- `, -.' ? -
- "There has been too much emphasis on what I
call intelligence by committee-by consensus,' the
new CIA director said this month in his most exten-
sive-interview since- assuming- office four months
= ago.,' - '. .- :The- system has had too. much-. emphasis
on. having an agreement, so you call:. come up
with a - community. solutiom, -:Ltbjnk I, have'to
bite more bullets, myself,'!--,-,-,. :-~ =L=,.? =mar _ t ,, =
The trim, _-gray-haired , admiral-he =retains his;
-active duty rank-spoke candidly and on-the record
= as;he .acknowledge&criticisns that had.:been-lev-,
,
_. ;;elect, at.the intethgeece community-by a number of - training and ex erience becaase
makers. - -: :- liar with the countries they are in charge 01 assess :
: current' and;fornier: `topp policy-
_ : Those -comments of- dissaWfactton.;r out nevi-in II inor
,
I
ts`bypolicy
m
l
i
d'
lud
7
?
_
co
p
a
Fa
e
Nesdayy inc
-
w -makers that they are'deliiged by raw intelligence l 'Intelligence: Ar'aIysis Needed
:k:that-is poorl7arialyzed-that the- espionage experts -nurser agreed with- complaints of top officials;
what-them-- (such as-Brzezinski that the policy-makers are not
cisio makers
d
h
ll
e
e
. t
often. donote-te
? formatio means and how it map affect present_an l provided with -enough good analysis of the mass of
hard -information that is fed to them by the intelli=
r the first fi3n ' residen t, top `genes community-
now;. fa
pgliCy-makers~_~vill:?begi .telling-.the intelligence-{ t SAnother. problem, he conceded; i 'that the ;oil
;community~a=a regular-basis'-speci.hcally what_--y-makers; are -simply fed- too much in ormation.
`}:they expect them to provide =in military; political ".frorn: "tlie; various' sources ire the intelligence -ct?t-.
,and economic analysis; .
'The-decision-makers have been toopreoccupied~ ? ? There'is,too.m.ucli-information and they:
to give [the- intelligence community] the- attention,": I t't:=iise it-that is a very real problem;"- Turner
Turneaid _ -; We rare now actively en ed.i IlI. had a complete throttle on all of the 1
with the President and` top people ?:-_ =.r in sorting- information going around tows. from intelligence
`butthi priorities-tharivill be ordered-ore me ta,8a--"; [agencies]--I could-prevent some of that.[But]_todo,
obviously'-could
He said he had begun_settingup a procedure in des- sa_?wauId- be -dangerous in that -I
Secretary of State `~ ve;my: b and- could leave something out- So-
Carter
d
th
P
e
ent
'
r
y
cuss:ons
,Cyrus Vance, ,Defense-Secretary-.-Harold Brown; =a. riskyoutake in order.to-hordermultiplicityaf4
National . ecnr]tg:AdviserZbignieW-Brzezinski ands ='sources.-: ->-"-
Chiefs adaed:~"I is~ cin orturiate=that. one> of the
-Geiv'George Brvrrn; ch rnnaii.o tie;Joint ~Y' r.... He
';ol Staff; in Washington is Who Has the Latest Intel
Turner spokecw ile:sitting,atthehead`of along;; _ ligence.e -knd'=that puts'too much emphasis on cur:
";nark mahogany ri~afereace~:tablecdiis seventh- re v -irtelligenc~ : The problem is as soon- as
ltooi_ =CIA _ o ce the hJend _blondWood-paneling:: `` something= happens,' somebody rung in, and says;:.
.
; :Jones; did yoir:3zear what has happened? Hot
and an ,exp2usi era-1I: b? ~viricdn~vs.riooldng~the.l `11ir
` ciodlands:of I iigley,`: 'a=_ Ii the vs d raugfrig_ =:~ off_ thel press; rave intelligence-bas ,just arrived!'
-~ ~: ?}.tG = -- NAVY TIMES
4 JULY 1977
.SECURITYAF AIRS
By Lt. Gen. IRA C. FAKER
USAF (set.)
LATELY, most of the heads of the
principal intelligence agencies have
-been placed under Navy leadership. The
Central Intelligence Agency, National
Security Agency and Defense Mapping
Agency (which provides cartography and
geodesy essential to global targeting) all
now have admirals as their directors.
Also, congressional committees now are
talking about an intelligence reorganiza-
tion, including an "Intelligence Czar."
It is unwise, in fact dangerous, to permit
the Navy, or any other service or agency,
to dominate the intelligence community. It
would be equally unwise to put all
intelligence under Army or Air Force
domination.
It is understandable that President
Carter would turn to a Naval Academy
classmate, Adm. Stanfield Turner, to head
the CIA. After all, it has been the weak
link in the intelligence community during
the past decade. In the National Intelli-
gence Estimates, subsequent events have
proven the CIA's estimates on Russian
,military strength to have-been too low.
The CIA has admitted this and has
upgraded its estimates on Soviet military
capability. During this period, the
estimates of the Defense Intelligence
Agency, and of the intelligence sections of
the armed services, have proven much
more accurate.
But now to put the intelligence agencies
of the military services under Navy
leadership, in addition to the CIA, may let
the pendulum swing too far. It creates the
possibility for a dominant authority - a
President, a- Secretary of State or a
Secretary of Defense to say, as in the past,
"This is my decision, now give me an
intelligence estimate to support it."
This concern was intensified recently
it when it was reported that President
Carter was justified in.:reducing- U.S.
ground forces in Korea because he had
consulted Russia and Red China and each
had assured him that they would not
encourage or support North Korea's- Kim
it-Sung in any offensive adventures:.:
Do we not remember that Dr." Henry Kissinger, President- Nixon's principal
national security assistant, was assured
by the Reds at the Paris Peace negotia-
tions that North Vietnam would not attack
South Vietnam after U.S. forces were -
removed?
Do we not know that North Vietnam
was, at that very time, secretly moving
supplies and troops into forward positions
from which it launched such an attack
immediately after U.S. troops were
withdrawn?
As a matter of fact, each time we have
been caught by surprise, as in the 1973
Arab attack on Israel, one agency - or in
that case an individual, Dr. Kissinger -
was dominating the intelligence communi-
ty.
The lesson from all this is to make sure
that all segments of the intelligence
community are free, and in fact encour-
aged, to submit their views on the
National Intelligence Estimates. It is upon
the validity of those estimates that the
President must rely to make fundamental
decisions on such critical matters as.
defense budgets, arms sales and arms
limitations agreements.
Dissent in the intelligence community
must be encouraged, not suppressed. Any dissenting views also must be available to
the Congress and our people. The wisdom
of this policy was demonstrated in the
recent case of the "beam weapon"
controversy, as it was in divulging the
massive Russian civil defense effort,
President Carter, I understand, wisely"
has assured the Congress that no interna-
tional commitments will be kept secret
from that body.
i . Y i copyrigh! 1977, W gngeces Tinss
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 -Approved For-Release -209.1tOT/27-:'-C1A-RDP9O O1'i3-7R0001
. NEW YORK TIMES
-25 June 1977
Report on S6viet n ear $t
Scys P1 GSCP'v 1~mphas=es
- - :: By DREW M DDLETON
The Soviet Union's staategci nuclear -On what grounds, Dr. Pipes asks, does
doctrine seeks --rictory, not deterrence, su- "a Washington lawyer presume to 'edu-
periority in weapons rather than surfi- cate the Soviet general staff" about stra-
ciency, and of,asive, perhaps pre-emp tegic nuclear weapons "of which they
Live, op ass rather than retaliation ; - happen to possess a considerably larger
according to D . Richard Pins of Harvard ors' al than we?" -
Forei,0 Tr teIiigence Advisory Board,
. Dr. Piers, in an article in the mage
Commentary, asserts that the American
negotiators in the strategic arms limita-
tion talks mis3 the point as long as they
Concentrate on cumbers of nuclear weap-
ons. - - - ? t. -- - - -
T h e e former head of Harvard's Russian
Research Center Dr. Pipes is highly criti-
cal of the prevalent United States . doc-
trine that contends that. a nuclear war
viould be so -destructive that it would
leave no winner. Soviet doctrine, he
argues, emphasizes winning a nuclear
war and the destruction of American soil-.
ety. =
-'The art-cle is expected to revive't e
debate with tine American intelligence
community over Soviet strategic capabil-
ities and Latentoes. The debate began
early this year when Dr. Pipes'- "ream
B'Itermed the Russian nuclear position
- ,'hzd report-3 it - I
Alternative to C.I.A. Study
--T eam 'B v.-as appointed in 1976 by
President Gerald Rr Ford's Foreign. Intelli-
gence Advisory Board to prepare an alter-
native estimate of Scrriet strategic objec-
tives to that produced by the C.LA. .
The United States strategic doctrine, as
summarized by Dr. Pipes, is based pri-
m arily on the concept that a full-scale
nuclear war is not a rational policy be-
cause there would be no winter in such a
war. If the Soviet Union laimehed a sur-
prise attack, Anlariea would emerge from
if f with suf 1Cttr-t forces to devastate Rtrs-
sia in a retaliatory attack. -
"Surh? an attack would destroy all of
the Soviet Union's major.cities and kill
millions, ' Because of this retaliatory
-'thre'at, Ame: cad strategists feel.-that a
Soviet first stri,ce is-higirly unlikely.
finally. American strategists and Corr
gressional sources believe that snraning-
ful defenses against s nuclear attack are
impossible to ti't. d. and -psychologically
counterproductive.
'.The- American conclusion based on 'all
these factor is that nuclear superiority
is.mesningless, - _-
Ciiticel of Waroke Comment
Dr. Pipes is scathingly critical of Paul
Warnke, President Carter's chief disarm-
athent negotiator, for his comment that,
on' the f prig ritive aspects" of Soviet doc-
aught tQ - -_~yi g t,o xg
t em. into
therm nto file reel ultra L~
clear - weapons, which is -that nobody
r id tHwSihly win-" ;
.Sovre doctrine, he writes, "emphatical
ly:asserts that while nuclear war would
indeed prove extremely destructive to
both parties its outcome would not be
mutual suicide; the country better pre-
pared for it and in possession of a superi-
cr strategy would win and emerge avi-
able society.'. :. __.
The Russian stxate?ic :'octrine, accord-
ing to Dr Pipes, contains five related
elements. _ . - . . . ,
These are: pre-empticn rr first strike,
ruanit-avn -ewe iority --t -rips, -cu-ter-
force t`rve'4n`,- c-nvhnned arms open;-
wons nrna defence- -
%T'h e Rr_t a..+ r-1
lion is tr c?d ; -ekc'o re-- -Ys st trim
attack on the T,'i ? - in 19' 1 aY:'_:-
"npoint is
emphasized more cxisistent-
ly" by Soviet strategists "than the need
never to allow themselves to be caught
in a surrrrise attach"
This military memory and -the'speed
of modern- weapons--a missile can go
from the United States to the Soviet
Union in 30 mimrtes-are considerations
that call for a pre-empti ve -strike, espe-
cially v x-e once-the missiles'baveIeft
their silos, bomber- ,are airborn end sub-
marines, at sea "a carm'ter attack is great-
. ? ? _. .
ly reduced in? effectiveness."
There is no indication, he continues,
that the Russians share the American
view that the number of nuclear weapons
does not matter oncen certain quantity
has been attained::. - -'-?_ -- . .:: - -
Soviet strategists believe that the tilti-
mate outcome of a nuclear war will be,
decided in the first hours but they also ?
believe that a nuclear war will last for
months or longer, if the destruction of
the enemy is to be achieved, Consequent-_
Iy, a-large.arsenal-of nuclear deliveryq' .
systems maybe of ;'critical in portaace.'
Attack Against U,S. Mls,ues
'Coirnterforce targeting by the Soviet
Union is the strategy of attacking United
States missile launchers and command
and communications systems. = -
"The central idea of the U.S. strategy
of deterrence holds that.should the Soviet
Union -d-axe to launch' a surprise first
strike at the United States, the latter
would use it ? surviving missiles to lay
waste Soviet cities," the analyst reports.
Marshal Andrei A. Grechko, the 'late
1 Soviet Defense Minister explained Soviet
strategy in an article published -in ?1971
and citied by Dr.-Pipes. In it, the Marshal
se,,i S ll /&7/a1tihTAA-It {dRQQ&1 U7tPd
enemy's nuclear attach large groupsings
Prolonged War of At_' it_on -.
Combined-arms operations. occupy an
important place in Soviet nuclear stra'e r
because of the Soviet emphasis not only
an an enemy's defeat but on his des'ruc-
tion in the sense that he is incapable
of offering further resistance.
Consequently, Dr.' Pipes says, the R"us-
s?ans have prepared for "the follocr uD
phase" of a nuclear war which "mav en-
tail a prolonged war of a`trition' -
Soviet writings on strategy, the author
declares, reject "unegt*_vcczlly" reliance
on one strategy and stress that a nuclear
war will require the employment of all
. Fundamental Differences on Defense -
Nothing .illustrates, better the funda-
mental difference between American and
Soviet strategic doctrines than their ap-
proach to defense-
The Russians, Dr. Pipes notes, agreed
to certain "imprecisely defined limita-
tions" on anti-batastic missiles in the first?
1 agreement on arms limitations but "then
proceeded to build a tight ring of anti-air-
craft defenses around the country. while
also developing a serious program of civil
The relevance of the Russian ciYrl de-
fense program to negotiations on nuclear
rams 1-mitaticns has been the subject of
heated centroversey in American defense
rircles. Last month a congressional com-
mittee decided that civil defense was not
an ion-,ortant elemen?. Eerier Mai_ Can.
l'rorge Xeegan, then head of Air Force
I-'elligence, had contended that 1t'was
pct only important b'rt vital to an under-
of the R- -si-n .r-retail rategic
r'a'tter ahert Sari;
 ~;.
-.
f ;.
i' ?_
 Approved For Release 2001/07/27 IArf;2 90-01137R00010
WASHINGTON POST
Rowland &a' ns and Robert Novak 10 JUNE 1977
The Sc~ttli~g ~fPFIAB:
An Intelligent Move?
Whatever the ultimate cost of the un-
noticed burial of the President's For-
eign Intelligence Advisory Board, the
short-run effect is to silence the most
important intelligence sounding board
-other than U.S. intelligence agencies
themselves-for every President since
Dwight Eisenhower.
The most persuasive agent on Presi-
dent Carter last month in recommend-
ing the death of the board was Adm.
Stansfield Turner, the new Director of
Central Intelligence. But Central Intel-
ligence directors have never particu-
larly liked the advisory board with its
high-powered membership drawn from
former government officials and the
loftiest niches of American science and
business. To them, it represented a
threat as a competitor for the Presi-
dent's ear and a source of intelligence
inspiratior-
PFL4B, for one notable example, en-
gineered the intelligence breakthrough
by the CL-1 that led to spy-in-the-sky re-
connaissance. That might have been
delayed for years without hard pres-
sure from PFIAB and Edwin H. Land,
Polaroid chairman and a PFIAB mem-
ber since 19-31.
The risks inherent in killing PFIAB
are manifold. It was PFIAB that per-
suaded former President Ford and ex-
CIA Director George Bush to engage an -
outside team of hard-line experts to de-,
bate CIA's estimate of Soviet intentions
and capabilities last summer.
Those experts, called "Team B," pro-
duced much harsher estimates than the
'CIA's "Team A" of experts. The result:
a much harder-nosed "national esti-
mate" regarded by experts as far more
realistic than estimates by the CIA act-
ing alone.
? An invitation to -retired Gen.
George Keegan, former Air Force intel-
ligence chief, early this year to lecture,
at the Air University at Maxwell Air
Force Base was withdrawn. The only
explanation:, The Pentagon and/or
White House did not want Keegan to be:
sponsored by the government in view
of his well-known alarm over Soviet in-,
tentions. ? - - - - - -
? Concern within the Defense Intelli- -
gence Agency that the Carter admin-
istration-and Turner-may be plot- :
The point man in. exposing the CIA's flag enhancement of -CL at the ex-'
experts to such formidable competition . Pease of DIA. - 1
was Leo Cherne, the board's last chair- That makes the ., demise of PFL4B
man (a post previously held by Dr. ? more mystifying is that two authors of
James Killian, Clark M. Clifford and the Senate Intelligence Committee's final
Gen. Maxwell Taylor since Eisenhower
report on ""the President's office" last
established PFIAB in 1956). _
The scuttling of PFIAB is clearly tied year, David Aaron and Rick Inderi`urth,
said the board had been r useful," partly. t
to the fear of similar outside competi- I' because "its advice. and. recommenda=
tion for the intelligence bureaucracy, tions have been for the President. As'
-plus a desire to centralize control over
all intelligence within the CIA and the
National Security Council staff inside
the White House.:,
The ?'explanation for this, a view
such, the executive nature of this rela-_
tionship should be maintained:' - '-;
Aaron is now deputy to national secuu --
widely held by skeptical outside ex- f '. They headed Jimmy Carter's transition.
Agency for up to $7,500 to help finance-
a Harvard-MiT conference on basic
had an informal ' agreement from the
perts on Soviet weapons and geopoliti- team on intelligence, proposing to abol-
cal planning, is the bureaucracy's -zeal ish PFIAB despite what they wrote -in
to screen out points of view that chat- that report only months earlier: _
lenge the prevailing administration 1 One conclusion from this is that the
line. Consider the following incidents: - incoming administration was planning I
? Dr. - Richard Pipes,, the Harvard-: to centralize long before it took dffice, ,
Russian scholar who played a key role' ; a possibility duly reflected by Aaron
in "Team B" last summer, believed he and Inderfurth. Their report sat on tbe_,
Soviet strategic doctrine. But ACDA.
now under controversial director Paul
Warnke, informed Pipes last month it,
could not help fund the project (even
has no idea whether Moscow seeks mill- 7
tary superiority-over the U.S. or simply
equality). ;s a- -
Approved For Release. 2001/07/27: CIA-RDP90-0I137R000100100
rity adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski; Inder-=
furth is Brzezinski's special assistant-`:
President's desk until early May when,i
pressed by Turner, - Carter delivered .
the coup de grace to PFIAB-a blow to.
challenges 'from outside the bureaus
racy that have proved invaluable -to i .
U.S. intelligence in the past-
 Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00010
RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.
4435 WISCONSIN AVENUE, N.;N., WASHINGTON. D.C. 20016 244-3540
PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
STATION
Spectrum WTOP Radio
CBS Network
DATE June 4, 1977 10:55 A.M. CITY_
SUBJECT
U.S. Intelligence
$15.00 STATINTL
Washington, D.C.
ANNOUNCER: This is "Spectrum,'' on the CBS Radio Net-
work, personal opinion on_issues of public interest from six
different viewpoints.
Now-one of those perspectives.
f.
M. STANTON EVANS: I'm M. Stanton Evans.
U.S. intelligence agencies have engaged in a massive
cover-up of Soviet intentions and behavior to preserve the
fragile image of detente, so at least says Major General George
Keegan, Jr., recently retired after twenty-seven years in the
U.S. Air Force, and five years of service as Air Force Chief.
of Intelligence.
Keegan recently told a Washington audience a hair-.
raising tale of data suppressed by higher-ups and intelligence
estimates concocted for the purpose of keeping detente alive.
Keegan charged, for instance, that the CIA had doct~
ored translation of Soviet documents to obscure the real in-
tentions of the enemy, an.d that only through independent chan-
nels was an accurate reading of the Soviet position obtained..
He also noted that since the early 1960's, the
United States has had access to the papers of Oleg Konskovsky,
a high official of the Soviet government, proving the aggressive
nature of the Kremlin's policies. Not once in all this period,
Keegan asserted, did U.S. intelligence estimates reflect the
contents of the Konkovsky papers.
A f N= Fc '4'Q~ se'2~~ 1 $ CIA -011 T 6T01 a01'8I86(N1q PRINCIPAL CITIES
Material supplied by RadO 1V Reports. Inc. may be used for file and reteranee purposes only. it may not be reproduced. sold or publicly demonstrated or exhibited.
 raFor Release 2001/07/27: C
.Il1NE 1977
Arms Coalition
A group called the
Committee on the Pres-
ent Danger constituted
itself last .,Year to
awaken us to the
"present danger." The
names of its 141
founding board mem-
bers provide a good
cross section of the
personalities and
interests in the AC (as
well as a couple of
surprises)-Saul
Bellow, William Colby,
John Connally, Lane
Kirkland (secretary-
treasurer of the
AFL-CIO). Clare
Boothe Luce, Norman
Podhoretz (editor of
Commentary). David
Packard (head of
Hewlett-Packard), Can.
Matthew Ridgway
(Ret.), Eugene
Rostow, Dean Rusk,
Gen. Maxwell Taylor
(Het.), Edward Teller,
Adm. Elmo Zumwalt
(Ret.). The chairman
of its policy studies is
Paul Nitze, who has
been involved in almost
every major effort to
jump up the defense
budget since 1949. The
committee has
consciously modeled
itself on groups of
distinguished laity that
campaigned before
World War II for
preparedness and, af-
ter, for the Marshall
Plan. It describes the
"present danger" as
follows: `The principal
threat to our nation,
to world peace, and the
cause of human
freedom is the Soviet
drive for dominance
based upon an
unparalleled military
bApprov
THE ARMS ZEALOTS
Those who would expand "defense capability" are prepared to sell Alnerica short
by Daniel Yergin - -
S HAS BECOME customary when an old
administration departs and a new one
marches in, we' are in the midst of a
loud and passionate debate about
arms. Some of the relevant questions have be-
come familiar over more than three decades of
such debates. Are the Russians getting ahead
of us? Are they actively seeking world domina-
tion? Should we spend more money on arms?
Should we rush headlong into new military
technologies? Some of the questions are more
recent, the result of nuclear parity between the
two superpowers and halting steps toward arms
control. Is there or is there not a new Soviet
military buildup? Is real and secure arms limi-
tation possible with the Russians? Or are they
taking advantage of such agreements to achieve
nuclear superiority? While the debate is easi-
ly fogged in by the special codes used by those
who talk about arms (MX, MIRV, PGM) the
issues are clear-budgets, jobs, prestige, weap-
ons systems, the structure of Soviet-American
relations, the next spiral in the arms race, and
that most basic of all matters-survival.
The argument in Washington and through-
out the nation is between two "parties." On
one side is the arms lobby or what might be
called the arms coalition (hereafter to be abbre-
viated as the AC). Its members are those peo-
ple, both inside the government (particularly
in the Defense Department and the Congress)
and outside, who believe that the Soviet Union
is an ever-expanding menace. They believe
that we are still living in the Cold War, a con-
frontation emanating from, as they see it, the
predatory character of the Soviet Union.
On the other side is the arms-control lobby.
between the SovietUnion andtheUnited States
in avoiding conflict, particularly nuclear wear,
outweighs their differences, and makes arms
control not only possible but necessary..
It seems clear to me that these days the pub-
lic argument is going in favor of the AC- The
Carter Administration has already found itself
hampered in its efforts to work out furtberpro-
posals for the strategic-arras-limitation talks`
Before negotiating with the Russians it must
negotiate with the AC, and that does not leave
much roonl for flexibility_Meanwhile,the prop-
aganda campaign of the AC is growing. For
instance, an organization called the American
Security Council has produced a film dwelling
on Soviet strength, The Price of Peace and
Freedom,. which has been on television sta-
tions around the country 225 times- Another
1,250 prints have been dispatched throughout
the land. The Emergency Coalition Against
Unilateral Disarmament got forty Senators,
to vote against Carter's nomination of Paul
Warnke for arms-control negotiator.
At the same time, various versions, of in-
telligence reports, meant to strike fear into the
national heart, regularly find their way into
the press. Generals retire from. active- duty to-
carry their message to a wider public. The
Central Intelligence Agency, usually thought
to be beset by critics from the Left, is one of
the agencies that does not have a direct vested
interest in an expanding defense budget, and
its analyses of Soviet strength have, until re-
cently, been the most balanced. But the CIA
has been subjected to. a powerful assault from
the Right, in the course of which it has virtu-
ally been charged with purveying Soviet prop-
It&me b rs believe that the common interest aganda.
d For'Felease 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP90-011378000100100001-7
 Approved For Release 2001A7S(iGOV" 1?OS'-01137R0001
30 MAY 1977
Rowland Evans and Robert Novak
The CIA's Admiral
Caustic corridor gossip criticizing
CIA Director Stansfield Turner for
signing even routine memoranda as
"Admiral" finally wrought a change:
He no longer signs that way.
Unfortunately, the. change is only.
cosmetic. Turner, one of the Navy's
brightest stars who was shanghaied by
President Carter to run the belea-
guered Central Intelligence Agency,
perceives his CIA job as a way-station to.
greater military glory.
Both friends and. npn friends of the
brainy, barrel-chested admiral are con-
vinced that Turner got a deal from.
Jimmy Carter. He- is believed to have
told his former Annapolis classmate: I
don't want the CIA- job; I want to be
Chief of Naval Operations or chairman-
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But Carter, .
smarting from the collapse of his first
CIA choice of lawyer-politician Ted So-
-over the long run, is back in the hands
of a short-term caretaker.
The real interests of this nation's in-
telligence community, costing billions
of dollars every year, were sacrificed to
the needs of the man in the White
House to quickly name a widely ac-
ceptable director after the Sorensen
fiasco. President Ford also sacrificed
CIA interests when he named George
Bush CIA director, knowing Republi-
can politician Bush would last in that.
job no longer than the Republican who
appointed him. But there was a difference- Bush re-
nounced all political aspirations--for-
1977 (perhaps costing him the vice-pres-
"idential nomination).:.Turner.'_:__re
nounced nothing. -
,
,
rensen,would not take no for an answer. from the White House in the Executive
So, the President gave Turner the job Office Building. That guarantees him
without requiring him to resign his access to the Oval Office. Indeed, the
naval commission, with the implict un- President now seems more impressed
derstanding of a future high-level Pen- by what he hears from Turner than by
tagon post. Once again. the weakened his daily briefings from Zbigniew Brze-,
CIA, badly needing a strong director zinski, his national security adviser.
Moreover. he has flaunted his real
loyalties by isolating himself in his new
inner office, located not 'at CIA's
headquarters but across=
Langley
Va.
Turner's supporters vigorously deny
that he is all that scarce at CIA head.
quarters: They claim Turner spends 70..
per cent of his time there, only 0 per
cent next to the Oval Office. Turner de-
fenders also point to Senate legislation
to establish a "Director of National In-
telligence," a post that Turner, or a suc-
ces4or, would occupy in the-office of
the President. That would leave special,
deputies running the CIA and other in-
telligence units. -- - . - . '
Even if true, however, this does not
answer the stockpile of. complaints
about Turner. He has removed himself
from regular contact with his own offi ..
cers in the CIA; surrounded himself
with at first four, now nine, top inner-
office Navy aides; insisted on a military 1
ritual before seeing CIA officers (re-
quiring a precise memo explaining why
the admiral should be bothered, plus a
24-hour wait). -
Though trivial in. itself, some critics
feel that most symptomatic of his lack
of interest in the CIA's well-being was his his decision -to- put his son, Navy Lt.]
with the conduct of a former CIA chief.
whose son had a summer clerk's job at
CIA but was sent packing the, day his
father took the oath of office. The con-
trast does not help sagging morale.
Beyond morale is the vital matter of
building back this nation's intelligence
system during rising competition from
the Soviet Union.- To convince the CIA
that he can be the architect for rebuild-
ing, Turner must change the CIA's per-
ception of him as a transient--a tempo-
rary custodian whose purpose is to
avoid .mistakes that might deflect him
from the . Joint Chiefs of Staff. -- - -
That. is by. no. means impossible. If,
however, Turner's conduct in the future
continues as it has in the past three
months, further decline in the chief US.
intelligence bulwark is assured. -
That spells danger for an organiza-
tion that has been horsewhipped in one
kangaroo- court after another-gener-
ally for following direct orders from
Presidents of the United States. The
horsewhipping from the outside has
eased a little, but Turner has not yet
started the rehabilitation. -
ClVfl.F1e14Entarprix;In .
Geoffrey Turner, on the CIA payroll.
The job is "junior assistant" in the Of-
Approved For Release~2 b1' 7t22 :n~.i q idi"7 2000100100001-7
 ~?1;T ved For Release 2001/07/ ?7- fDt?-9P-(l tj7, OO1?j0Q1, Kl 7
2 -ay 1777
Concept of a Charged-particle beano v:eapon is ha,ed on the design oa negative hydrogen beam that is accelerated and r:c-?atralized by
pass-ng throe ri ii charge exchange coil. In this ballistic rnisr e defense concept, the Collimated ci,argn_par!iCTe. b^_%in, is drrec1~ 1
r1
Li?ryt.1 f:
re r~fs
t t
USSR developing cliarged-particle device aimed at missile
by \lar,h.i . E file S. lei Arrrv (icn,r
defense, exploring highenergy lasers as satellite killer
? I'. I _ 13,:,,;4tiiv. `.u,ec tE'c 1 \~O 51:._..
By Clararce A. Robinson. Jr. ? ,,u:r1 i,i rt,iti,rn,ih!c t.+r tE_i'r ,ircu :r b::r:r+
we:r; ,;r 11, c,tr:nrrr [:_ ~. R It\I c.anc~a,.
\\.t?hin tr:a -So ic_ [ n dc'.elep r e a clr:rrget1-p:u'tiele be ar odic. desittned to \l:r;- L?: ! I.artit.4i.\ rmd ia,liu;r us a nt.r:
icct;t`,^ 1_. _ ntcre? '::ircniri Old suhatt;:rind-Eaunc.hcd b:i.ii,I;: ntksila nt~r:c, r terra ucap mz:tplnc~::hon tt,r tli -C exp,rr
u?:::hea being conLiue cd at :t facility in .et Central .\si:t. l+cEie.c-
in; h}. polo: c'cri'i,_a;itrr. by a le.t:a
[1, ilk,
-icCt of un and er: ittccrti ,cctr{ it
c :t ri u1i tCr tilnttts there- The E.:ti:\I ,' f I \V of 1. S. p:n ?i i
, . , I {
r:-;,::rinn~_-? to t 1trdroacn Block (,d7 defense ;t:";sort system earl\ under . S \ir sprns: ni.hip tit:rt Ilie Sovicr
I'"uc?ridc erier~'~ '::,_r ci'. :ad fc,r :. uarrl!tr c;rlellite uillt sc:rnnin r;:eliatinn had achieved ice'd' of siCCC in each Of
s:tt,-i!ia: cr role_ i-?. S_ W, rc'::Is have uctcctr>r; and inlra:,d sensors h;ls been st:,?rn arlna~: of Li~.h-t:ncr~~ nccr-
c,-inut: the term d:rcct ,l doer c \cc::l:-ns used to determine that sin seven occ.isions sar'v to develop a beam
in rcfcrr to L+a'lt heart v.c: i t,nti and since November. 1`J`,. ;est. that inn he n Si ifts in pnsitir+n bt :r nun_thcr ~+l
hi' t-e tcre ? 1 t:c; :- related to develo :r.cat of a charged- c.. peritrcrtl high duce'=), .ph\:ieists? ,c E,
.te i; on fo- ErarIiclc beam de,-ice h-i`,. been carricri out earlier discounted the So i,a c:rpabililc to
cues ,rnc i,.Yc , ca :tt ,,:ttic p - ; r t he rn A f:cilitj at Scnt p::L:li ns.: t. de'elo{ p l:i, tcchn,,:o.". for _t charged-
_; rrt;?_ie, i
?-
sIce'l of t-=ht ??+!ticit c,,ult'- be directed n Ground te:tin g c' a small hydrogen p:rr'ticlc bc:rin device. There is it
tram u:.end-`-eased inn ;;, ,cc it, Iluoride hi h doer ,' !. and dctcction of grr:dt?ir:g atlnt:,sioil th.tt thc? I. 55k r-
int::rc,p; _.:-A nct:[r::lii ree!':.rc ,elrelC>- prtpar.:tit,rrs to I:rur.cn thin device on board i:rv"l'CLE In a proer.ur, that e'.~ttid prne'u.u
vein: to U_ S_ ai'i ia!>, Rn:h the a ;pacccr,^.fl. Sonic I.. S ?Ilici::l; believe suet, a ?.te:r110rt_
I 1511 the U- S ri?r ::r, i!:'.csliCating the test of the anti s cEi:t !a;: r tn:r) be ? Recent revehitiurts bv tiac;rt { hrsie:.1
tE:c c.ta_. f'. of ~?'. 3:in elaar ed p:'.rtiele related to recent Soviet activities till a I Co ?ref Ruda! :n iluricti? :, tour 1:!,',
eara d,.i._ ?r ;t i,, irit,rc,pt manner', Salvut :p. ce ?-.:t: ut. u:ntn:e t,f U_S_ Fasten Ldl.,r:tlr,ric; ti? ?t
r?,i;,ile - .:..;a:: c- fill; rte;hnu n -.rest of a n,'-v. ar iti.r c p,acrful Ilse I SSR can e.'nuer[ electron hero
4.. rid : .,?:.'t t r, t : h r prop:!f-:;tin fu;i,tn-puts d rtt:tf:ae !tvdr,+d? ii;inric: cn- enerF.v tO a+r=ti,resv lrr.i,, :ohIe rnatcri:t!
t fc+:- a C11:11-al- release r.t_rinrrnn tn.k+n ceer.?v, \IUCII N:
. :;trnr,?, -.
. rOt;Lit I. i~ L~ t t, -?; 1 hcr~_. crator to 1 ttv tic
R e.iu +f c< t .der;v u?itltin the particle beam system in k.'r;akh- the data .:utlincd by R nhr;.t,: durjrtg hi,
1 . S. the der;rils Stan near the Caspi:a:r Sca. the experi- chit it) the Lawrence {.ict rnr.,rr I :rbt
t 5:,.ie- c.'irceted-c cr : vve;;f ,nts hive pent took place late !:in'. re:ir in an under- tor% ha, ;rriGc h?rt Inh,icd tali ;ccrct he
n.,t b e :r?-:d- :t r.:i':_i :e to tie_' ground ch.unhcr in ac area of nsutural s;:lt the I)cfen,e Dept. and !he I?.ncr_ %
u: at the \..::itm::l See l r n,'il. dont Iorntntiuits i n t i r o cteseri near Armin l~c,C:rrch tract l)c~cin~r:,,nt .\dmirti,;r.t-
Rce r o v e p~;"~,d 01107P7;r4 C #;FAR+1 30-Q110 7R00011Q01ROWQ1K?t .,ve .r cl:t_ to I S .Cr,nt,.t-
t,` I'. S_ :t Ic,ti dirt'~t c;?tntrty ,,:rrnir, satellite ct;nt;'::ti nt'cr the Indian th,rt the 1 SSR i; Far.rherd of [ht.( S it
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ti re nearir; - r? ttr:v; e 10,1.11 111 cc;in. cttn r, !I: t! Grsr?rt by uterti,rl canlirt,u,er.t
vvcap,,ns
 Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CI ~0-01137R000100100001-7
"The global military situation that will confront Jimmy Carter as he takes
office January 20 differs significantly fram that faced by any of his predeces-
sors since 1945. The difference arises from the growth of Soviet military
strength and the relative decline of American power over the past 10 years.
The New York Times, January 4, 1977
By Charles DeVore
S INCE 1945, the United States and the Soviet Union
have become the world's top military superpowers.
Which, if either, has superior military strength is the
subject of a continuing debate among military and civil-
ian defense analysts. .
That debate intensified in 1977, partly, perhaps, be-
cause of a new administration, headed by a President
who has been outspoken in his views on arms reduction
and in eventual "elimination of nuclear weapons from
the earth," and because the first strategic arms agree-
men&--SALT I-expires this October. President Car-
ter's views are certain to be reflected in the actions of
I his administration, with emphasis on defense spending
and arms control.
National Intelligence Estimate 40
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
BASELINE FORCES BUDGET TRENDS
ITOA -- $ BILLIONS)
1 tie defense budget a President submits to Congress 0 L ' ' -- ' -L
1964 1966 1969 1970 1972 1974 1976
is guided by the general conclusions in what is called the FISCAL YEARS
IY L1111:1'1 11.1`11. IW 1N 11111... 1'/"1 1.?\1.\ II.,-. 5l)V111'' lirts
National I
t
lli
E
i
l
n
e
gence
st
mate, an ana
ysis of the stra-
tegic capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union.
"Intentions" are what you want to do; "capabilities"
are what you can do with what you have available. The source: Department of Defense
DOD Budget trend has been downward for nearly a decade in
United States prepares and publishes estimates of So- real (constant dollar) terms, turned the corner in FY'76, made
viet military capabilities; Soviet intentions are more dif- more substantial gains in FY '77, and kept moving in the pro-
ficult to assess, because the Soviet Union is a closed posed FY '78 budget and its revisions. (Baseline forces ex-
society. As A i6 I1ecUft4iFf11e ,20g(A7J*7 tsqA-R[3 @s(ID'4QWIRt%04H60'1ft@0 1a7and foreign military assis-
tance.) wrapped i assis-
tance.) It still remains 35-40 per cent below the estimated
r in a my " stery shrouded in an enig gma." Soviet defense budget, which has shown a consistent increase
This year's National. Intelligence Estimate, orat least of about 3 per cent annually.
 Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100100001-7
t R TICLE A pP%,U 'EL)
0,N1 P.4GE _,1--
THE NE14 REPUBLIC
23 April 1977
Even among the national security relics, Robert Bowie is a vintage antique.
'ep yA ties air e for ever
by Roger Morris
Even among the cold war and Vietnam relics who adorn
the national security officialdom of the new ad-
ministration, he is clearly the vintage antique. In his
well preserved record hover ghosts we have forgotten
without even trying. Not Dean Rusk or Walt Rostov,
but even more venerable spirits of empire: John Foster
Dulles and John J. McCloy and the phantom MLF
flotilla with its multinational NATO crew and a nuclear
warhead for every member nation.
Across nearly 30 years in the pattern of a classic in-
and-outer of the foreign policy establishment, Robert
Bowie is in Washington again. This time he will be CIA
Deputy Director for National Intelligence, principally
in charge of the "national intelligence estimate," a
bureaucratic weapon that can be used so effectively
against makers of policy on subjects as various as arms
control, defense budgets and covert intervention. Once
more, by clubby connection, perhaps in part by default,
in any case by a stunning lack of originality and insight,
the Carter regime has chosen what the Wa?hinton Post's
William Greider has aptly called "the painful past."
His countenance has changed remarkably little
through the lengthening files of official photographs.
The shock of wavy hair has gone a distinguished white
but it is still atop the same doughy, slightly florid face.
In 1968, when Bowie was counselor of the State
Department, an admiring reporter described him in his
seventh floor Foggy Bottom office as "gazing on the
world out of wise pixie eyes." And his world at least has
usually been congenial and uncomplicated, though
seldom a matter of pixies or wisdom.
Carrying a patrician Maryland name, he went
through Princeton while the rest of the country was in
the depths of the Depression, and graduated from
Harvard Law in 1934. There followed eight years in his
own Baltimore law firm, brief tenure as an Assistant
Attorney General of Maryland, and then wartime
service in the Army, including staff work with the
occupation government in Germany. When Bowie left
the Army in 1946, he was a lieutenant colonel with a
legion of merit and, more important, profitable
contacts among the establishment civilians and
gentlemen officers who would graduate from the
occupation to inherit most of America's postwar
foreign policy.
He began teaching at Harvard Law School in 1946,
and in 1950 was back in Germany as general counsel to
the US High Commissioner in Bonn. Three years later
he was appointed by John Foster Dulles as the State
Department's director of policy planning in the first
Eisenhower administration. Then 44, Bowie suffered
from foreign policy credentials that were scanty at best,
but enjoyed patronage of senior figures like McCloy
and others that was impeccable. So from 1953 to 1957,
by several accounts, he became one of Dulles's closest
and most trusted aides. He is credited by some with
earnest efforts to educate the "old man" on strategic
policy. This education proceeded at an unavoidably
otI 1?u~,
Approved For Release. 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100100001-7
 Approved For Release 2001/07/27: CIA-RDP90-01137R000100
RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.
4435 WISCONSIN AVENUE, N.W
"Who's Ahead: The Debate WTOP TV
Over Defense" CBS Network
April 20, 1977 10:12 PM
Washington, D.C.
CHARLES COLLINGWOOD: Not since the coldest days of the
Cold War has there been so great a debate about growing Soviet
military strength as there is today. Listen: 4
MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE I believe the United States
today is in a position of very serious strategic disadvantage.
THOMAS REED: I think the Russians are going for a
tactical and a strategic superiority by the early '80s if they
possibly can.
SENATOR FRANK CHURCH: I don't know what strategic superi-
ority means. The term implies that whoever possesses it has some
advantage, some added rseasure of security. But that can't be
true when both sides have already developed arsenals capable of
utterly destroying the other. .
ANNOUNCER: This is a CBS News Special Report, "Who`s
Ahead: The Debate over Defense," with CBS News correspondent
Charles Collingwood.
COLLINGWOOD: As we have heard tonight, the number one
concern of President Carter in domestic policy is energy- And as
we shall hear in this hour, the President's number one concern in
foreign and military policy is also energy, in its most fearsome
form, the nuclear bomb and the way to control it and its carriers.
Both priorities are in for a very hard time.
When Secretary of State Vance first tried out the Presi-
dent s proposal for a substantial cut in nuclear weapons on the
OFFICES IN: NEW YORK ? LOS ANGELES ? CHICAGO ? DETROIT ? AND OTHER PRINCIPAL CITIES
Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100100001-7
Material supplied by Radio TV Reports. Ine- may be used for file and reference rurposes only. it may not be rop,,dosed. sold. cr pub+CIy deinoTStm or exhgx i.
 (b
Approved For Release 2001 /07/2r13UIKR 1y1 R00010010
12 APRIL 1977
,rA
I;ti i:eves Leech
Of Or vi'as:ar:pfor' huretxr - -
\VAs',fI\GTON-- The other day a reporter called a senior
CIA official at the Agency's splendidly isolated headquarters
in. Langlley, Va-, and ruined his day with an offhand remark:
"I hear you're being
fired.-
.. ,it could be," the CIA
man said calmly, "but
nobody has told me yet".
He isn't going to be fired --- far from it ---- but the thought
of quitting has crossed his mind more than once during the.
last few years.- Arid his reaction to the reporter's fishing
excedtion %vas- more or less typical of_ the wary attitude
of a goad many career-intelligence officers.. Battered and
bruise-t by congressional investigations, newspaper exposes,:
wholesale revelations of CIA misdeeds and blamed for
everything in the boo'., with the possible exception of lousy-
v either, they wonder what's going to happen next.
do one can be sure. But what is happening right now to
the CIA and the. rest of the U.S. intell.iserce community is
Ac Sta:sfield Turner, the ne.7 director, of central in-
A bras`;, crisp Chicago-born on:tirna Rhodes Scholar who
was picked for the job by a U.S. Naval Academy classmate
r amed Jimmy Carter, Turner promises to be the hest thing
that has Happened. to the CIA since the invention of the
electronic bug.
AS A MILITARY r,IAN he commands the respect of -mili-
tarw professionals (SO per cent of all intelligence funds come
cut of the Defense Department budget). As an intellectual,
he commands the respect of academics. And, most impor-
tant, of all, he has the respect and the ear of the President.
Despite these admirable credentials, the admiral is not
critics In CIA corridors. Some career-officers
complain that he has surrounded himself with a screen of
U
k.tr Y1Li
Continued from Page 1
four years, three of them
varying ideas on how the z
ONE OF TIME MORE J1
or nothing to criticize in
Tu :per's predecessor, Get
changes during his first
has," the CIA man obser+
Because Bush was a hi
man; CIA officers shuddered at tue tnoudnL,ic Y,UW- r-..
size the agency. As they later confessed, they were dead
wrong. Bush was not only good for the agency, in their vie,v,- --
but trey would have liked to see him stay on.
Suspicions of "Navy coup" were aroused when Turner.-,!-
sac.:?d his public affairs officer, a former Unitei states
Information Agency ratan, and brought in a retired Navy
captain to tame his place. But Turner has promised more, -
not less, press access to CIA affairs -- within the-limits of
national security. - ?
Turner's most v; idely applauded appointment was that of
Harvard Prof. Robert R. Bo lie, 67, a mail with wide ex-
patience in and outside oroveniment, as deputy director for
national intelligence. Bowie will be responsible for CIA-in-
telil encc estimates, the agency's most prestigious product.
"The intelligence estimate," said one CIA veteran, "is the
ultimate refinement of all the intelligence we have from
available sources. It is the basis of presidential decisions.
Its importance cannot be overestimated"
The estimates have come under attack in recent years,
_especially on issues of Soviet military capabilities and in-
tentions. The agency's board of estimates was scrapped four
Turner's disarming reply-to.-this is that he landed runu:iug-
and needed some of his own crew. The "screen," as one ?;
n?v:s magazine described it, consists of four navy men, and
one of them is leaving soon. . -
- The admiral's naval shakedown approach to his new job
has nettled some professionals, one of whom grumbled:' "lie
wants to reorganize things. I Wish to hall they'd just leave
me alone so I could do my job.'-'
. "It's the same with every new director," said a 25-year
CIA veteran. "He comes in and discovers the wheel. Let me
tell you something: It's still round."
Perhaps that is The real source of some of the testiness of
the CIA professionals. The CIA has had four directors in
-pznel0
A
proved For Release 20!-R1000100100001-7
p
'1 av'7 Office of lnforma yon
years ago and. replaced with 10 -
intelligence officers directly re-
sponsible to the director for variotts
areas and subjects. Bowie's-appoint- - -
..ment? promises. ta.restore to the -
estimates what Ray S. Cline; a for-
rier deputy CIA director, called "an
independent aid objective scholarly
"I took this job because I Feel
.;strongly about the ? estimate :f"unc-, .
:'tion;".said Boivie, founder cf liar-:
yard's -Center for -International -
Affairs and a former member of tlie'
State Department's policy planing: .
-board. "The estimate has been tar-
- nished, and I would like to restore
l 1 continue:
 Approved For'Release200"1/07/
WASHINGTON, APRIL 1977
7 YT
ST'tRA TEG C BA LIAN
E I o _V
D, us'eu, I'D PERCEPTI-01 S
intelligence estimates-It is hard to imagine a step that
the new Administration could take that would do-
more to improve foreign and defense policies than to
restore rigor and objectivity to the intelligence
estimative process.
At our press luncheon, General Keegan talked
from notes. We offered him the same opportunity a
Congressman enjoys of reviewing and amending his
statements for the record. What is presented below is
his amended text. Editor
Today, I speak as a private citizen -- expressing my own
personal views regarding the Soviet threat and the evolving
world power balance.
It is difficult for a member of the military establishment
- and especially for one who has served in military -
intelligence as long as I have - to retire and render public
judgment about the adequacy of the Establishment's
perceptions of our most serious national security problems.
What has troubled me most has been the wisdom of
suggesting to the free world that its defenses are not nearly
as effective as might otherwise have been thought. Such a
suggestion runs counter to conventional wisdom and to
accepted points of view. It upsets the diplomats and
challenges the assumptions upon which they have based
many of their foreign security policy initiatives. And most
of all, such a suggestion can have important negative
psychological feedbacks in the critical area of morale -
especially where NATO's defense is concerned.
Rest assured that these matters weigh heavily on my
mind. However, after many years of devoting my
is his primary message. professional career to the study of the Soviet Union and the
General Keegan makes a specific recommendation evolving threat, it has become necessary for me to speak
on howA$ pV4E FAt RNW&*201 'ZdA-RDP?J' t VM-h6f $ff~ -nwhile there is still lead
This is the first
sixteen page
Washington Report. We
are publishing this
double-size issue
because the material is
of vital importance.
On March 11, Maj.
Gen. George Keegan,
former chief of U.S. Air
Force Intelligence and
currently Executive
?3:
"t 1 X
Maj. Gen. George Keegan
Vice President of the United States Strategic
Institute, spoke to nearly eighty of Washington's top
newsmen at one of ASCs press luncheons. His
remarks were the basis for major stories in both the
Washington Post and Star, as well as for AP and UPI
stories that covered the country. The- prestigious
Aviation Week magazine devoted nine full pages to
his talk in its issue of March 28th-
General Keegan presented a withering
condemnation of those in the intelligence community
involved with making estimates and analyses of Soviet
military R & D, production, and plans for aggression.
Of itself, General Keegan's explanation of what has
gone wrong in the intelligence community is of vital
importance.
. But General Keegan's remarks go well beyond that
point. They provide insight into the weaknesses of
U.S. foreign and defense policy. Policy rests upon
intelligence. There is no way our national policies can
be right if our intelligence estimates are wrong. That
 Approved
Tupolev Backfire B supersonic bomber takes off from a Soviet airfield with Its variable-sweep wings in the extended position. Twin-engine
aircraft is capable of Mach 2.2 at 40,000 ft., and has a subsonic unrefueled range of 5,500 naut. mi., also at that altitude. Weapons include
AS-4 and AS-6 air-to-surface missiles, as well as gravity bombs. Note aerial refueling probe in nose.
Intelligence Analysis
New Assessment Put on soviet Threat
(it is very seldom that a bona fide, long-term
member of the U. S. intelligence community
speaks candidly in public about what goes on
in the super-secret recesses of the national
intelligence estimating process. Maj. Gen.
George J. Keegan. Jr.. recently retired as
chief of Air Force intelligence and a 20 year
veteran of varied top-level military intelli-
gence posts, recently spoke to a group of
Washington newsmen under the auspices of
the 'American S v Council to provide
such a viewpoint. His remarks are published
here in full because they deserve close study
by everyone concerned about the future secur-
ity of this nation and the peace of the
world.-R. B_ H,)
Today I speak as a private citizen
expressing my own personal views regard-
ing the Soviet threat and the evolving
world power balance. It is a very difficult
thing for a member of the military estab-
lishment to serve that establishment for
better than 30 years, to work in harness
with it to weigh what has transpired on his
watch and, upon retirement, render public
judgment about the adequacy of the
Establishment's perceptions of our most
serious national security problems., What
has troubled me most has been the wisdom
of suggesting to the Free World that its
differences are not nearly as effective as
might otherwise have been thought.
For in so asserting, one runs the risk of
all of the negative, psychological feedback
on morale, etc., and invites the risk of
rather negative impingements on the
foreign security policy arena. I want to
assure you that those matters weigh very
heavily on my mind. .
But in the last five years, in watching
anyone labeled "worst-case scenario advo-
cate," who suggested even the most
modest real case, I realize that what I
have been living as a member of the
intelligence community was a part in a
Charles Dickens novel. The shocking fact
about our intelligence community, with its
thousands of able, competent and dedi-
cated people, is that for 25 years, it has
consistently underestimated. What the
press has heard,' in contrast, is a vast
mythology about overestimation -citing
bomber gaps, missile gaps, ovetkill, with
,very few people ever devoting any time to
addressing the realities.
A little over a year ago, Dr. Albert
Wohlstetter made one of the most impor-
tant contributions to understanding the
strategic balance ever published:
"Legends of the Arms Race," issued as a
special report by the United States Stra-
tegic Institute. And he undertook what
very few before him seem willing to do. He
checked the record and documented the
past decade's intelligence-projections of
.future Soviet strategic force strength. And
then for each successive year after the
estimate had been issued, he most care-
fully and rigorously researched the avail-
able evidence on the forces that the
Soviets had developed and deployed. His
principal source was the Defense secre-
tary's annual posture statement to the
Congress. He found that without a single
exception, the United States had consis-
tently underestimated the development
and deployment of Soviet strategic forces.
He found, secondly, that in a substantial
number of the cases-better than 75%-
the actual Soviet deployments had ex-
ceeded the high estimates.
Such a condition has, in fact, existed for
the past 25 years of my direct participa-
tion in the national estimative process.
There is no way that I can describe to you,
and have you believe me, what has gone on
in the business of perceiving the threat,
s ethnology, March 28. 1977
38 Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP90-01137 ?d 1`69d ~ d0~~ce t-
 STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/07/27 CIA-RDP90-01137R0001
S 4100 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 141rra?c1 2 ; 1077
their -own; while at the same time they are defense effort. The cops and robbers tale This holds true, however, Only when poll-
denied the' primary human characteristic of of how they were foiled is in Air. Alsop's best tical leadership respects.-the inctepenAnce of.
responsibility. The rich are, regarded as hay- vein. While I am unable to recognize my the intelligence. function, retrains. from
ing a will of their own. but as being vii- former colleagues in this melodrama, the pressures to obtain. agreeable findings, and
lainous. Poverty is seen as a condition caused style of attack on anonymous analysts who also from urgings to - "get on the team--
by external forces, while prosperity, is viewed are unable to defend themselves is only too Unfortuna.tely,;these conditions-have not in-
as -the result of conduct, although repre, familiar, variably.obtpined. during the commotions of
hensible conduct. The poor are considered In 1973 ,sir. Alsop found CIA analyst's guilty the last decade or so.
passive but virtuous, the rich as active but of what he called "marked historical bias-" There' is likely always .. to be tension. be-
wicked. Bureaucrats and social reformers- Reasons giveli were that they were playing tween some politicians and '-Journalists" on.
and at times also academics, artists, media down the likelihood of Soviet attack on China the one hand, and CIA analysts and F oreign
sorts, and entertainers-are distinct cate- and "had always been broadly gloomy about Service professionals on the other. The latter
gories who seem to get the best of both the Vietnam war." Time and events make It are disagreeable because they seem to harp
worlds: they may be prosperous anti yet re- appear that the Was Mr. Alsop perceived de- on complexities and uncertainties in world
aln virtue. - rived from their . disagreement with him affairs; worse, they may even define. the
rather than from their, own lack of ob- Soviet threat in other, than a one-dimen-.
U.S. 11V`f F.T.7 7GENCE jec?ivity. sionar wry- Almost invitably, they arouse
His latest article also revives charges suspicion among self-styled "tough" people.
Mr. STEVENSON, Mr. President, the made in 1973 that an unnamed senior for whom a more simplistic, version of reality
security of intelligence-ia one of the most analyst was responsible for tendentious er- is obvious.
difficult questions with which the Execu- rars on Hungary in 1956, Cuba in 1462, and Thus it will never be easy to carryout CIA's
tive, the Director of Central Intelligence , Czechoslovakia in 1968_ Mr. Alsop is given to analytical mission, and certainly not in a
and the Congress are astral E dicta and mostly disdains an accounting of ? period when the national security consensus
wrestling. 4 y his evidence;. whether "solaces" or his own is fractured and' when the decline of civility
- important is the quality and objectivity ? formidable powers of invention misled him snakes attacks on personal Integrity and half-
of intelligence. Unfortunately,. all these it is impassible to say. But people who could baked ideological innuendo the norm in
requirements--,security, quality, and ob' testify to the falsity of these charges were public debate. Still,-I remain confident that
jectivity--have often been damaged in never consulted by him. Being a knowl- my former -colleagues will do their jobs
recent. years, by selective and self-serving edgeable source and an interested party; I honestly it given half a chance.
accounts of sensitive intelligence matters tried to discuss the matter with him myself. . Perhaps the new director will see that they
leaked to the press, always by persons The distinguished "reporter" hung up the get it. All he has to do is to insist on high
phone. standards of competence and objectivity and.
unknown. Mr, Alsop did get one. thing right. in his no less important; 'to -support, and 'defend
Recently we have seen the intelligence 1973 articles. lie-wrote that the role of CIA those who may be threatened when they try
process politicized by garbled press ac- analysts "is most unlikely to have escaped to meet such standards.
Counts of the "B team" exercise, in which President Nixon's sharp eye" and that James
outside experts were commissioned to Schlesinger, the incoming director, was a POLITICAL PRISONERS IN:INDI-I
evaluate the national intelligence esti- "new broom" who would have "the Presi-
mates concerning Soviet strategic capa- dent's backing and encouragement" in Mr. ?TRURMOND: Mr. President, a.
bilities and intentions. And, still more re- "sweeping clean." The unnamed senior recent article appeared in the Washing-
ailalyst was soon to depart.'' CIA's esti-
cently, the - distinguished columnist mators would be glad to settle for forecasts ton Star which reported that an esti?-
Joseph Alsop has returned to one of his that turn out as well as that one did. mated 30,00.0 persons are being held as
favorite subjects, berating the acuity and , Mr. Alsop's. explanation for the "extreme political prisoners in jails throughout the
objectivity of -CIA's analysts and esti-? ideological slants" of CIA analysts is that . country of India_ : ?
mnators, in so doing luridly painting they "belong, broadly speaking, to the Amer- It was' also reported that these pri-
someone's account of CIA analytical in- ican professoriate." This is odd because the sorters intend to ' go- on a hunger strike
trigue in allegedly suppressing uncon- only actual professor ever to serve as direr- in the near future to protest this de-
genial new intelligence. CIA's analyses tor was Mr. Schlesinger, and. he obviously tention in a supposedly free and inde-
and estimates have in general enjoyed a had his "slants" right. What is also td is Pendent nation.
good reputation for wisdom and objet- that many .professors, and especially those In this era. when the term "human
tlVity. who would have to be judged ideologically
. o
unsound by Mr- Aesop's lights, w n't come rights" has . beCOI11E a. watchword, ..I
With regard to these questions I com- within shouting distance of CIA any more. believe that it- is incumbent,
upon
mend-to-my colleagues the thoughtful True, many professors have served as con- Americans to question, the policies of
"Reply to Mr. Alsop" which Mr. John sultants over the years, but anyone who any nation which espouses the same
Huizenga? former Chairman of CIA's heard their noisy debates on the relevant fundamental freedom as America, yet
Board of National Estimates,. has con- issues could hardly believe that they had a imprisons a large number of its- citizens
tributed to the Washington Post. What- uniform, let alone a nefarious, ideological for exercising these freedoms.
inlluence-
ever the case.-with respect to the partic- It Is that Mr. Alsop him . ' puzzling While many are quick to condemn the
ular estimative questions he and Mr. self the instrument of renewed wed to Makes CIA internal actions of some nations, they
Alsop are debating, Mr. Huizeriga per- analysts a at t this his s tiofme, The alleged eged t e on CIA A simultaneously overlook, and completely
time. a useful' service in reminding us tiousness and "unresponsiveness" of their disregard, the recent - occurrences in
of the need for objective, nonideological work was supposed to have been corrected India, Which I believe to be incompatible
analysis which can stand "the test of years ago, in particular by William Colby's . with the fundamental ideals of freedom
events and makes a contribution to poi- abolition of the Board of National Estimates seeking people everywhere...
icy" and for political leadership which and by steps he took to give .military agen- Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
refrains fpressuring the intelligence ties tional a larger role in the production of Iia- sent that the United Press Internationa:
anal sus from o obtain intelligence.' It is possible that Mr.
Y agreeable findings." Alsop and his informants believe that CIA article which appeared in the-March 9
-N-Tr- President, I ask unanimous con- analysts have been too stubborn in defense of 1977, issue of the Washington Star bf
sent that Mr. Hilizenga's excellent arti- their independence despite efforts to get printed in the RECORD. ' -' -
Cle be printed in the Ytrcoso, them to see the light, as for example in the .. There being no objection; the articli
There being no objection, the article recent Team A/Team B episode. It is also was ordered to be printed in the RECO!Z
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, possible that Mr. Alsop believes that a new : as follows:
as follows: director at CIA needs to be alerted promptly 30,000 YN INDIA'S JAILS PLAN' A $VI5GER Sfl%xi{I
to the unwholesome elements he will find in
A Reel Y ro rile.. Atsop his own house. . NEW riELHI (UPI)=An estimated 30,001
On March 7 The Post carried an article by Of course,, analytical,/estimative work in political prisoners still ' in jail in India de.
Joseph Alsop, titled "A Cautionary Tale," in CIA has not always avoided error, and no- spite relaxation of Prime. Slinister Indira
which, he worried a theme that has preoc- body assigns analysts there a purity of heart Gaudiii's'etate.of emergency. have vowed tt
cupied him before: that CIA analysts and others lack. But it is a fact that the mission, go on hunger strike. next week to protes
estimators have shown a persistent bias, structure, and traditions of the agency were theirdetentioii... - -
which has led them, wilfully and against. all designed to promote objectivity. No analyst A spokesman for the opposition Janata
the evidence, to minimize the Soviet threat who shows persistent ideological bias, of any (People's) party 'said yesterday that the
to the.Unlted States, sort, . will go far in that environment. The prisoners made the decision in meetings. ii
This time Mr. Alsop's somewhat fever- career payoff normally derives from penetrat- jails last Week_
Ish "journalism" unmasks analysts who con- log analytical writing that stands the test Jayaprakash Narayan, who hay emerge,
trived to understate the real scale of Soviet of events and makes a contribution to policy, as a leader of the opposition challenge t,
Approved For Release 2001/07/27 CIA-RDP90-01137R000100100001-7
 Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100100001
A12Trc,LE 4P~~F~UEP
ONPAG3~
BY Henry S. Bradsher
r,s!lia~c~n Star staff 'Vritsr
DesDire years of careful study by
At eriCan scientists. Cie U.S-
i :__. zee:ce community is unable to
THE WAS11INGTON4 STAR (GREEN LINE)
23 March 1977
i .:J is ~ 1J ~ca, a
T1 r!~
HE HAS FOR SO LONG been a
lone voice within the secrecy of the
intelligence community warning o
Soviet military developments and
,
d'-fide if t e Soviet Union is close to ti-- since going oublic. has made such
building a .vori;able aeatn ray
,veapon -- one that could drastically
alter the Soviet-American military
balance.
The former head of U.S. Air Force
Intelligence says the Soviets are test-
ing the new weapon and might soon
be ready to use it. But most scientists
are skeptical that the Soviets have
made such progress on the frontier of
high-energy physics.
Potentially threatening Soviet ad-
vances in the field are "a theory that
can't be disproved.-"but'so far it's
only a theory," according to one
solace who - rechecked the latest
thinkin in the intelligence com-.
r_iunity before commenting. .
Such comments nettle Maj. Gen.
George J. Keegan Jr... Since he re-
tir-ed .lag. 1 from heading Air Force
Intelligence; Keegan has publicly
warned that the Soviets might be-
able by- 1380 to neutralize U.S. nu-
clear deterrent power by destroying
missiles with the new weapon.
sweeping predictions of doom that he
now finds it difficult to get a serious
hearing. -
According .to, and' 'authoritative
source, the CIA"for years was in-
clined to look for, 'reasons to refute
the warnings coming out of Keegan's
Air Force work rather than give
them a fair hearing. Yet, with the
faith of a true believer, Keegan re-
cites the times he was finally proven
right, and informed observers con-
cede- that he sometimes has been
first to detect- important new intelli-
gence developments. -
The "death ray"- weapon would
train a charged-particle beam on an
object in order to destroy it.
An atom is a miniature solar sys-
tem of particles. Electrons wheel like
planets around a sun-like nucleus
which is composed of protons -- each
weighing some 2,000 times as much
as an electron - and neutrons.
Scientists who split atoms with.,
high-energy particle accelerators -
under experimental conditions know'
KEEGAN INSISTS the intelligence that it -is also possible to make a
data is clear enough to show that a brick explode by pumping enough
atomic particles into it
"Peo
le are
massive Soviet scientific effort over
some 20 years has now come close to
a usable weapon. He argues that
American scientists are too blind to)
concede that the Soviets might have,
made technological advances which
have eluded this country. . -
if Keegan is right, a major danger
could face the United States_ The
achieve gent of a workable Soviet de- -
t"erase against missiles while this
country has nothing to :stop Soviet
missiles would leave the United
States vulnerable to blackmail or de-
structi gin. "
But, despite the potentially catas-
trophic implications of what Keegan
says, his warning has received little
public attention. The government has
not commented on it because there
has been no demand for public
surance that Keegan is wrong and :
the danger which he sees does not:
loom in the future.
.
p
continually reinventing the wheel by
suggesting that that kind of thing can
be turned into a weapon," says a sen-
ior scientific adviser to the govern-
ment who is connected with a West
Coast laboratory.
g
LIKE FOCUSING abeam of light
on an object to illuminate it, a parti-
Perhaps the
energy on some- p
U.S. developme
cie beam can focus beams has been
thing. When a charge is put on parti-
by jolting them with 5
Iles of atoms, scientific comm
the govern
million volts of electricity in the aged make weapons.
example cited by one scientist, the
large-scale' fund
resulting beam can carry enough
effort to solve
energy to destroy.
doned when the
The use of laser beams of high new scientific
intensity light to carry energy and
destroy objects has been studied
according to a
extensively- Some "death ray" uses
munity expert
reas-
are already being
ogy,
lasers cannot deliver enough energy
quickly
enough to destroy heavy ob-
jects in tiny fractions of seconds,
The reason seems to be that Kee- which might be all the time it is
gan is a controv ,f r vttlRt!ea?Psi ItO1 s .~1ABq~0ZM1l'87R000100100001-7
statements tend t dit~ alit c ear war ea
Charged particle beams can
deliver far more enerf;y more
quickly, and therefore are more
effective weapons - if they can be
made to work. The United States has
conducted research on them without
developing a workable weapon. -? . - . ,~
The largest effort, .Project Seesaw
of the Defense Department's Ad-
vanced =
Research Projects' Agency,
was abandoned about four years ago.
after runninu into a blind .alley- The
Army and & Air Force still have
small, separate research programs
under way with tight funding and low
priorities. The military project man-
agers get nervous when -a reporter
asks about them.
ACCORDING TO ONE source, See--';
saw tried to use beams of electrons
and failed, but . the Soviet!;- have
worked with, protons. Electrons are
too light to carry much--impact, a
scientist explains, but , protons from
the nuclei of atoms are heavy enough
however. One is focusing a beam
tightly, since protons tend to repel
each other and scatter.because they
all have the same positive electrical
charge- They also have trouble get-.~
tin.- through the atmosphere; in ef-
fect having to split atoms along their
path.
Another problem is locking a beam
onto a small, rapidly moving target
while it is dozens or hundreds of
miles away. The technology being de-
veloped for laser weapons is also ap-
plicable to tar
eting charged-particle
main problem. in the
nt of charged-particle
the skepticism of the
unity. It has discour-
ment from providing
ing in a determined
the problems and
Seesaw was aban-
confidence to pursue
approaches declined,
n intelligence com-
on weapons technol-
ontrtue
 pr ,pp "ved For Release 2001/07/Z7A I 9~ 137R00010
r PAGE ~ 19 MARCH 1.977
John liia,.enba
guilty of what he called "marked histor-
ical bias-" Reasons given were that they
were playing down the likelihood of So-
viet attack on China and "had always
been broadly gloomy about the Vietnam
war." Time and events make it appear
sponsiveness" of their worts was sup- able findings, and also from urgings to
posed to have been corrected years ago, "get on the team.". Unfortunately, these.
i
in particular by William Colbys abol
- conditions have not invariably obtained
flog of the Board of National Estimates during the commotion of the last des-
and by -steps he took to give military ade or so.:...:..
agencies a larger role in the production There is likely always to beten~ivn
of national.. intelligence. It is possible. . between some politicians and "journal- .
that Mir:. Alsop and his informants be-- ists" on the one hand, and CIA analys s`
lieve that. CIA analysts have been. too., and Foreign Service professionals ort:
stubborn in defense of their indepen the other. The latter are disagreeable
dente despite efforts to get them to see
because they seem to harp on complexi-
the light, as foF example in the.recent,
'ties and uncertainties in world affairs;
Team A/Team B episode. It is also possi- - worse, they may even define. the Soviet
ble that: Mr. Alsop believes..that a -new: threat in other than a one-dimensional
-way. Almost inevitably, they arouse sus'
picion among self.styled' "tough" people
for whom a' more simplistic version of
reality is obvious:,
Thus it will never be easy to carry out-
CLa's -analytical mission, and certainly
- not in a period when the national secur-.
ity- consensus is. fractured and when the-
decline of civility makes attacks on per-=
sonal integrity and' half-baked ideologi-
cal innuendo the norm in public debate-_
Still, I remain.confident that .my former
colleagues will do their jobs honestly. if
given half a chance--,--,
Perhaps the new director will see that t
they get it. All he has to do is to insist ort
high standards of- competence and ob-
- jectivity and. no less important, to sup-
port and defend those who may be
threatened when they try to meet. such
that the bias Mr. Alsop perceived de-1
from their disagreement with him
rather than from their own lack of oh-
jectivity_
His latest article also revives charges
made in 1973 that an unnamed senior
analyst was responsible for tendentious
errors on Hungary. in 1956, Cuba in 1962,
and Czechoslovakia in 1968. Mr. Alsop is
given to dicta and mostly disdains an ac-
counting of ..his evidence; 'whether
"sources-or his own formidable powers
of invention- misled him it is impossible
to say.-But people who could testify to
.the falsity of these charges were never
consulted by him. Being a knowledgea-
ble source and an interested party;' I
tried to discuss the matter with him my-
self. The distinguished "reporter" hung
up the phone.
Mr. Alsop did get one thing right in
his 1973 articles. He wrote that the role
of CIA analysts "is most unlikely to have
escaped President Nixon's sharp eye"
and that James Schlesinger, the incom-
ing director, was a "new broom" who
would have "the President's backing
and. encouragement" in "sweeping,
clean:' The unnamed senior analyst wasi
"soon to depart." CIA's estimators would
be glad to settle for forecasts that turn
out as well as that one did.
Mr. Alsop's explanation for the "ex-
treme ideological slants" of CIA analysts
Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100100001-7
on March 7 The Post carried an arti-'
cle by Joseph Alsop, titled "A Caution-
ary 'lale," in which he worried a theme
that has preoccupied him before: that
CIA analysts and estimators have shown
a persistent bias, which has, led them,
wilfully and against all the evidence, to
niinitnize the Soviet threat to the United
States.
This time Mr, Alsop's somewhat fever-
ish "journalism" unmasks analysts who
contrived to understate the real scale of
A n eply to Mr., Aiso-D~l
MIr. Alsop's best vein.. While I am unable ? they had a uniform, let alone a nefar- stands the test of events and makes a
to recognize my former colleagues ii ii ideological influence. contribution to policy-
' this melodrama, the style of attack on - It is puzzling that 'Ir. Alsop makes This holds true,: however, only when ..
anonymous analysts'who are unable tot himself the instrument of renewed at- -political leadership respects the intle-:
defend themselves is only too familiar- =tack on CIA analysts at this time. The al--. pendence of the intelligence function.
ter- ,t..__ !_.._~ l Y? -....1....4... ~ _?---._" _,__ .._ 7 5. ~..
is that they "belong. broadly speaking, ? director at CL\ needs to be alerter.
to the American.p?rofessoriate. This is promptly to the unwholesome elements
odd because the only actual professor he will find in his own house-
ever to serve as director was Mr. Schley Of course, anal tical/estirtativ~ worn
in?er. and he ob : iot:sly had his "slants". in CLA has not always avoided error. }
right. What is also odd is that many pin and nobody assigns analysts there a pur-
fessors, and especially those who would ity of heart others lack. But it is a fact
have to be judged ideologically ursot:n`i that the mission, structure, and tradi- '
by Mr. Alsop's lights, won't come withirt lions of the agency were designed to
shouting distance of CIA any more.. promote objectivity. No' analyst who .
True, many professors have :served as' shows persistentideological bias, of anc-'1
consultants over the years, but anyone - sort, will ;o far in that environment.
who heard their noisy debates on the
The career payoff normally derives
.- hers tale of how they were foiled is in relevant issues could hardly' believe that
from penetrating analytical writing that -
 Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00010010000
I r'anh: CtIUi Ctt WASHINGTON POST 14 1 -
Which SecrSc'?TLTL
'Secrets. Can anyone keep a secret? Sen. Church (D-Idaho) was chairman of
In the aftermath of The Washington Post's
disclosure that the CIA for 20 years had been theSenate Select CommitteeonInteRigenec-
secretly paying King Hussein of Jordan sums
adding up to milBons of dollars, that 'vas the United States to ensure its sovereignty and, un-
question that Newsweek featured in its discus- til recently, its economic viability. It intelli-
sion of the Hussein affair. President Carter's re- gence collection was the objective, as claimed,
action was, first, constructive-to stop the pay- it was in the king's own interest to share intelli-
ments; second; defensive-to assert that there gence with the United States, and he should
was nothing improper or illegal about them; not have had to be paid for it. If, on the other
and third-regressive, to reduce the number of hand, Hussein used the money for his personal
people in the executive branch with access to needs, then the purpose as well as .he means..
information about covert operations and to chosen was clearly improper- Nevertheless, the
suggest that a joint congressional committee on disclosure seems not to have harmed the king;
intelligence be formed to reduce access in Con- the facts of geography and geopolitics appear
gross to such information. Adze. Stanfield to be working to fortify his position.
Turner, the C.Lk director, volunteered that he Why then the draconian response? Perhaps
Wright support criminal penalties for uttauthor- it reflects only the Inexperience of a new ad-
ized disclosure and publication of national se- ministration abruptly confronted with the
crets, a position seemingly endorsed by several basic contradiction of official secrecy in an
members of the Senate Intelligence Committee. open society. If so, It is best that it happened
Finally, the Secretary of State sought ti detect Early, before knee jerk reactions l er_oen
a distinction between our payments to Hussein ,rusted habit. The dynamic of an open society,
and the Korean CIA's alleged financing of U-S. iy definition, works in favor of disclosure- A
politicalfigures. determined free press probes relentlessly to
-I suggest that the wrong question is being uncover dubious practices and, in the after-'
asked and the wrong remedies are being pro- math of Watergate, the automatic invocation of
posed.'i'he right question is not wheti er any- national security no longer suffices to hide
one can keep a secret but, rather, what are the dirty linen.
secrets that ought to be kept? -- This is also a society in which all kinds of ape-
I suspect that if we examine this question we clad interests-in and out of government-
.would find that, with very few exceptions, se- compete for resources and influence. They will
crets that ought to be kept are being kept. For #,go public" with information whenever. it
example, with the single exception of the book
by Phillip Agee, a CIA defector who left the
United States, there has been little or no disclo-
sure of CIA sources or methods; or of the confi-
dentiality of sensitive. negotiations, such as pre-
ceded the partial test ban treaty, SALT I. and
the release of the Pueblo crew. The practices
that have been revealed are mainly those that
should never have been approved or under-
taken the CL .'s secret war in Laos, the subver:
sign of a freely elected government in Chile,
the prolonged and illegal mail openings in the
United States, and the Conspiracy to murder
foreign leaders, to name a few.
-The Hussein case is a classic illustration of
the confusion that surrounds the issue. If slip-
ping money to King Hussein wasn't "illegal or
improper," as the President maintained after
stopping the payments, why were the pay- -
meats stopped? Why, indeed, did we run the
risk of so'embarrassing a revelation in the first
place? The United States has openly extended,
economic assistance to Jordan for years. If we
had to purchase the king's cooperation to get -
intelli2ence,why put him, on the payroll of the
CIA? Money is fungible: U.S- aid could readily
release Jordanian funds, which the Icing could;
The a rplan
ce
lli
'
.
gen
then use to furnish us inte
ationjust won'twash.
Indeed, the hole operation -won't wash-'
Throughoutth 5jM4 1/07/27: CIA-RDP90-01137R000100100001-7
crisis, Jordan has. basically relied upon the;
 I iTPE WALL ST? E JOURNAL
ON FSG&11 PATCH 1977
p ved For Release 2001/07/27 :. CIADP90-01137ROO0100. 0
l
ntegence: Reates-an .
illiliid
By DANIEL O. GRAHAM
Contrary to conventional wisdnrn, most the nuclear rnreat of the other, reason h%;:t
The recent publicity over the U. S. Intel- of our serious mis-estimates of Soviet mili- prevail.
~
ligence cornmunity's ability to assess So- tary - matter's have failed on the side of un-
In the light of such evidence, it would
Viet Rus.Aa's unprecedented military build- i derestimating them. One notable r,xception be strange indeed for the U.S. intelligence
up is all to the good. National debate over -the so-called "missile gap" estimate fol- community to continue to express doubt
this issue is of critical importance. lowing the trauma of Soviet Sputnik guts that the Soviets are seeking overall milt-
The pity is it is being obscured by irrel- ceases-is tediously cited as proof of the tary superiority. To suggest that CIA ana-
evant and largely uninlirmed assaults on tendency of "hawks" and Pe;ztagcn intelli? lyats would have dismissed all this. evf-
the efforts of the panel of experts. This gence people to exaggerate Soviet arms ef-i dente in order to paint a reassuring plc- '?
panel, called "Team B," was directed by forts. "P.e,neanber the missile gap"' has ture, but for the efforts of Team B, is
the President's Foreign Intelligence Advi- become a comforting slogan for those un- either fantasy or Calumny. -
sory Board to determine why past assess- willing to face unpleasant facts about So- Ironically, the Soviet decisioh-making {
meals of the intelligence community failed vier militar exertions.
to alert the national leadership to imp?r- Actually, mirror our own, even to produc-
tant o lieu military developments. It :vas y' analysts differ --d rather ing an unending stream of disputes within y
widely at that time as to the actual size of
created as an alternative to the re ar the leadership between "hardliners" and
the soviet ICBM force, and the rate at
compilers of the National Intelligence Esti-
mate-9, the so-called Team A_ which the missiles could. be produced and nology of "hawks" and '-doves" is being
I ant directly involved in this matter, as deployed. CIA, the State Department and applied to the Soviets. rt
a member of Team $, and as the only the Air Force arrived at high estimates --
member of the team who must accept But the Army and Navy held that the Sovi- Doves on the wise
much personal criticism of past errors in eta had deployed few, if indeed they had it is being said today that the Soviet
the intelligence estimating process. I have deployed any, ICBMs.- doves are in the ascendancy. Indeed. Col-
been part of that process at the CIA and in Observe that the only intelligence _Chiefs umnist Victor Zorza claimed recently in
who dissented from the high estimates were The. Washington Post that "we are ap-
the Defense Department since the "missile -those of the Army and Navy, those very '.proaching one of those rare moments in
days of the early 19309. Yet while I military analysts we are Constantly being I history when a lucky combination of cir-
welc elcome debate on this whole vital ques-
tion, I think it essential to focus on the real told are prone to exaggeration about such cumstances on both sides of the great di-
problems. matters- vide opens the way to a breakthrough in in
Team B's critique'of late last year has This is all a matter of record. It is also ternational relations." -
been depicted by critics as- a "kangaroo a matter of record that the growth of the prime among the fortuitous circum- -
court" operation forced upon an-unwilling Soviet ICBM force was underestimated for stances cited by Mr. Zorza is that
CIA by a cabal of outside "hardliners." a decade after the "missile gap" by the en- ''Moscow has welcomed most- of Carter's'
his troops in battle. And the outsiders have Pentagon hawks. ter,' He approvingly names Cyrus Vance
been described as devoid Of. Intellectual Over the last year or so,. evidence of the ("whose past pronouncements the Soviet
honesty. Ignored amid these charges are build-up In'Sovlet military capabilities has- press recalls with approval"); Harold
several critically important points: been disturbing enough to cause deep con Brown some of whose recent statements
The A-B exercise was not solely the tern, including among some previous opts- "roust sound like sweet music in the Krem-
work Of-the CIA but of the entire U.S. Intel-- mists, Even before Team B came into exis- lin ears"); Marshall Shulman (who '-has
ligence community, which includes the De- tence the trend in national estimates turned stood up to U.S. hawks through thick and
fence Intelligence Agency, the intelligence unmistakably more somber, as witness thin"); and Paul Warnke ("who has few
.t
establishments within the three military CIA testimony before the Joint Economic equals when it comes to arguing against
services and within State, plus a number of Committee of Congress in June 1976. Several the follies of the arms race') --
-other agencies with intelligence functions, - circumstances contributed to this trend. Mr. Zorza says this "is a team that
Nor was this particular exercise unique For one thing, U.S. hopes that detente gives Moscow's own doves every reason to t
or even exceptional. Indeed, there has been and arms control negotiations would dimin claim, in their continuing debate with
a succession of postwar-precedents, The ish Soviet emphasis on military power- Kremlin hawks, that, the Soviet Union
ought- to lean over backwards to make a
first followed the surprise Soviet A-bomb hopes that were reflected in earlier na
explosion in 1949: another followed the un- tional estimates-have been dashed by the quick SALT deal with Carter." - :. .
anticipated display of- an array. of new So- unprecedented scope and scale of Russia's But much more in keeping with the evi--
viet weapons systems at the-May Day pa- military build-up since the inception of de- '..dente is that throughout detente. the Soviet
rade in Red Square In 1950. tente in May 1912. - I '.Union has at every level conistently pro-
- that year. -Gen. Walter Bedell claimed that each and every Washington
Smith was summoned from his post as For another, we have found that our old concession to Moscow was forced by Rus-
American ambassador- In Moscow to as. assessments of Soviet military spending- sia's growing military might- _
that it represented only some 6% to 8% of Rather than me
some the directorship concession with
p of the CIA.- He was the U.S.S.Et.'s gross national product-were concession,'-Moscow's prescription for con-
charged by. President Truman to get at the way off-base. It is now agreed in Intelli- tinued success is to confront the U.S. with
source of the intelligence failures that re- genre circles that Russia is devoting two to what made it give ground in the
suited in the U.S. being caught unawares- first place. As former Soviet Defense lIi the
three times that much more of
by the Communist attack on South Korea.,' Finally, there has been a new aware- later .Hershel Grechko liked to put it, the
Figuring 4Dtlt the Implications Hess of a large continuing Soviet civil de- greater the combat capability of the Soviet
The Team $ critique was aimed not at fense effort, which was greatly stepped up armed forces and the more powerfully they t
a_ssessin how well our basic level of Intel- after the ABM agreement equipped, peaceful and the accom-
ligence was performed,- but at the reliabil- I panying Strategic Arms Limitation agree- on earth." ity of "estimates." The same has been true ment in Moscow in 1972. `
of ? tae various critiques cited above. - The Lt. Gen. Grahruu (USA. ret.) is prefessi r
fact is that we have done far better collect- Analysts can. -reasonably argue as to i?tr'r,rrrfiu;u,I stndie^.v at the Unia?ersily of
ing and analyzing basic intelligence than how effective this continuing defense effort hlin,ni nnrI terry sr rr ed ns rIirert.,rof thr De-
we have In estimating the meaning and fm- will prove to be, or whether the Soviets can fence Intelligence Agency and deprdtf dire'r'-
plications of available Information. As any achieve their stated goal of losing fewer taro/thcCld- Ali rdifurirrlrrlutedtnfhis sit tA-
number of experienced observers have re- than 10 million people (as opposed to over j< rt npprrrrs hxtrr;t-
marked,'the main intelligence problem is'( 100 million Americans) In a nuclear wars - _ ?
not in finding out' what an adversary is. But the inescapable conclusion that ana-
doing, but in getting agreement as to the . lysts must draw from this huge civil de- _
Implications of what it is-doinr. Tense effort is that it represents an attempt I
Approved For Rel stag d,O Mfof (DWROA19"44 7R000100100001-7
terrent - mutual assured destruction, a
- concept based on the belief that when both'
countries' civilian population Is hostage to
 WALL STREET JOURNAL
roved For Release 2001 /07/27! I UP9 dT137R00010010000
(REVIEW '.'.& QUTLOOK
=Virulent, Vehement;. etc:).. _ .. y
etc.
ge'of
President Carter charged that underestimated the percent,
opponents of Paul Warnke as top the Soviet gross national product .
disarmament negotiator "just do devoted to buying arms. By now ,
not want to see any substantial re- the Soviets have forged ahead of i
duction in atomic weapons." In the 13.S. in a number of crucial'
fact, Senator Henry Jackson, the areas, and more generally are in
spearhead of the opposition, has the region of parity, but the Soviet'
also been the leading advocate of build-up shows no sign of abating.,
proposing to the Soviets actual re- All this is known. The precise
ductions in existing arms.. current balance can be disputed,,
Senator George McGovern said but the direction of the trend can
that criticism of Mr. Warnke's not.: Yet if someone suggests that.
views on - atomic. weapons. is= ac- we have something to, worry'.`
ceptable "only if one loves-:these ? about, and that arms control may;.
.weapons' for? themselves if one ;not:solve all of our.problems,-.he,:
actually prefers - them .,over the ad better be prepared for attacks
homes and schools and transporta- ,,on his. motives
.
? tion systems and medical attention '.This certainly-:was the experi
".The Senator talked of ,"pro- ence: of the members of Team B,
fessional scaremonger's -,Z,and. escribed . alongside;: by General
warned of "psychopaths'-' `in- the - -Daniel ? Graham. Disturbed by the
military services.- He said that in'-- persistently low estimates of So-
taking testi mony from Paul Nitze, -' viet .deployments. the CIA : direc-
one of the nation's most'distin- 'tor-_ set up a special--. team -:.with
guished arms control experts, . a"'' members picked for, impeccable
Senate Committee provided., "a .?- .. reputations and a skeptical-view of.-
..ready, forum and a serious. audi- ...;the Soviets, to insure that-official;'
ence to inflict his paranoia on the' estimates were.-exhaustively de-
_public mind. bated.-When this was revealed,.the -
Meanwhile, columnist - Joseph same columns . cited 'above .were
Kraft was remarking -on the - filled with -words like`-"black-.
crude terror tactics" of "the Sen- mailing," ,.`.`kangaroo court"..-and .-,.
-ate Hawks," whom he labeled "a "worst-case . -assumptions.'' :In
leftover product of the Cold War." such quarters the issue became
:.The New-.York Times was editori- the motives of the participants, not'
ally pondering the "virulence" and. the merits of the views- or the the re-
;And The Washington Post talked deal with in. the case-against Mx
i
'
"bizarre" log
of the opponents
c,,, Warnke. The views he has repeat-..
- d 1 d d- th t "th eeks- ?
an cant u e a e w
= a .reasoned debate '! .:_ ...,,...., ~..,.., ? -W4SI1XA&%,C-..., L44C
, . = , _ _;,.h, ? current . negotiations,: - as V. we
r?, edly expressed over a long period.
long', assault.on Mr.' Warnke -has. y of time-will give pause to anyone. j
zarre and crude?: office: boy;:"or that' in an eventual
remains a question: Which side of .'views -in - recent testimony,.,, that
this debate was it that was, viru- since. the President makes the real
nary- to. ratify, an eventual._treaty;-.',-.with ixguments that Mr. _Warnke
'eient margin for, confirmation but nearby.'`" And. we do`not.think these
'
short of the twoathirds vote neces-; _- reservations--- can-.: be:- dismissed-.
proved by a.vote. of 58-40,- a suffi -: strated neatly in the speech quoted
:
. u.+ nc?.111x"% ulc VIA LA VLIL Vi WAG
.was not the first occasion for the .:.:::y r
k t h
l
n
a
kind of column displayed shave: a e'. vo e e thy' It - puts
y President Carter,. his negotiators
Indeed, such attacks seem -to be a and the Soviets on notice that the-?
hallmark of fl, ur
t t - f
r
e c en s age o
.,-
-Senate will riot automatically - ap--"-
tir}.7f n..atit tn-}ya?f1.e .....efe. o.......e. _ _
~/aM+G ' '' LL NC, 5V
'defense and arms control- debate -_T - IP-V. A-SAL.L
through this often enough, with .40'
It is now universally conceded counted,-;it will. clear the air on
-strategic arms `.treaty the,Soviet may even be possible to observe
Approved For Release 2001/07/27f A W-A1*l OA . 01s les really do exist, without being.
ponce a ha our , rote I ence immediately thrust into a defense,
agencies failed:to:predict.this de- = of your, motives, intellectual-hon-
 Awed For Release 2001/07/27
91p'gfZ000100
TZ77Cr'a p-p
71977
~i1r P, G_L
A Ca'ulionary Tale
The Central Intelligence Agency
s'harpia raised its estimate of what
the Sir et Union was spending on de-
fen>e, a change that can mean, ac-
cording to one's point of r;iew, either
that the Russians have started to ex-
pand their forces. in a terrifying
manner, or that the earlier estimate
was too low.
Nothing. in this city has been more
munity to the episode above ~rnen- outlays- ?A Byzantine system was
tioned. The change of estimate was evolved by the CIA's civilian analysts:
made long prior to the intervention of -and partly accepted, too, by the
the so-called Watch Committee in the,-,, Pentagon's Defense. Intelligence ana-
estimating process- lysts--which was obviously calculated
Furthermore; the official figure on. to produce comfortingly--.low esti-
sponse of the American political com- f acted the estimates of Soviet defense
dead wrong about the Soviet invasion
of Czechoslovakia in 196$.
't'here was nothing evil about these
errors-a_though it was perhaps a bit
odd that the man who committed
them was 'continuously promoted. The
errors simply reflected the view, so
common in the American professo-
by the estimators that the Soviets had j
spent 2a billion rubles on defense that
year.
The emigrant-defector reported, in
stead, that the actual total for Soviet
defense spending in the 1970 budget
he had seen was'no less than 50 billion
riate, that the Soviets at bottom are rubles! -,He.. further,, backed up this
much nicer and a lot less militaristic - highly unsettling report with a wealth
than nasty-minded persons too often of remembered figures from. the var-
believe: - w.ious subordinate parts of the secret
amazing than-the totally blank-re- Inevitably, this view' deeply -'af-__:Sovietbudget.
A d-th
p
y
a
e
iauatJ - - -
It is time; in the first place, because officers.
Mr Alsop spent 40 years as a posit= ~
too-many people have too good rea- = As director of Defense Intelligence;;
scat reporter- General Graham only learned that the
sons for fearing that President Car
'tees nominee for chief disarmamentemigrant-defector had failed a lie-de-
-
negotiator, Paul C. Warnkewill rem- named. Director of..Defense. Intelli tector test when this invaluable wit'
.force a dangerous policy bias in-the--;-:gence in. 1974, when a serious-debate . mess-.was on the' very eve, of being
crucial' estimating' process::. And sec- 'begun: - (- :.shipped .back to Germany In heavy
ondly, it is time because this same bias...-," ::..In 1975,. the American intelligence disgrace' as,. ai probable provocateur.,
has already produced- results which :'''processing centers" in Germany then General .Graham promptly obtained
=look-unpleasantly-like-(but-do not -in picked up a Soviet emigrant-defector the' backing of Secretary of Defense
fact resemblektheugliest kind' of spy who must be nameless. since he would Schlesinger and then: demanded the
- ' - -:=.`- otherwise go in peril. of his life- It is body, as it were, first from Lieutenant.
drama..:. ? `:,.- _ : -'. _ ;.:.
To mike-.:'hat happened-.: under enough. to say' that thus he ; had been General. Vernon A_lValters, and then
standable it is necessary to say, some- able to be defected from an extremely: from the next man In the CIA pecking..:
thing about- our little understood ... high post in the Soviet central plan-;_;' order, .Deputy Director= for. Intelli
American intelligence community. OOn'.-. ping apparatus, the GOSPLAN ',.gence Edward Proctor . -
the estimating side in brief,.there is a-' '....This ?- emigrant-defector . produced ' At first, Proctor tried Yard to resist
sharp division :between the military an earthquake-like convulsion among-.., turning over the-emigrant-defector to
and civilian analysts._ The Central In- the. analysts and estimators of--the -General. Graham, But there. was no,
telligence,-Agency's analysts' belong, American intelligence ,community.-- remedy under, the established proce-_
broadly- speaking,- to the,--American Somewhat earlier,, he bad had an in- -. dures, so-. the emigrant-defector was
professoriate. Many of them: in fact ;? disputable "need to know,",which-. sent to General Graham's office in the
have the ideological. slants---often in ?caused him to be- shown.the secret, - custody of a CIA operative-This latter,
extreme form-Of any characteristi- line-by-line Soviet' defense budget for . had been surprisingly Instructed not -I
cally liberal American university pro- - 1970. He was heavily guarded when to leave,the emigrant-defector alone
fessor. _ ~.. studying the defense budget, and was with General Graham, and he had to
To give one. example; there is the forbidden to take notes. But by luck, be forcibly prevented from entering
honorable but misguided ? man who he had a near-photographic memory. General Graham's office. - --
rose to the head of the CIA's analyti- Because of his former key position General Graham,-who speaks excel-
cal branch, but ended his career after . in the GGSPLAN, the emigrant-defec- lent Russian, then discovered that the
Dr. James Schlesinger took over the tor was brought to this country for lie-detector test had been Improperly
CIA- He was dead wrong about Hun- .,'.'debriefing" by the CIA. He promptly . administered-to put it almost too po-
g jcome. ? litely. It is not generally known, but
s x/2 h~ ~ r c y 7~w?e~lt~~t1 O y' aph or lie-detector tests cat;
that he wished to stop the U'Z Soviet defense spending .in?the year _ ily be crooked- by. using long,: many-
ditionaluestions
c
hl
d
hi
to per c n n
e
tionalProduct to no less than "13 per -`, grossly unrealistic to some people, in- propaganda-making for U.S. defense
cent' In other words, America's sin- .eluding this reporter, because of the ..? spending.. But the Pentagon was only
gle most important foreign estimate; vast quantities of weapons the Soviets most casually informed about the?cu-
in the whole book -was approximately.. were buying But nothing much was rious. lie-detector ? test that was ab-
doubled,- apparently. - overnight It. is - done about the problem until L-ieuten- ruptly administered to'the Soviet emi-
:therefore high time-to tell the cau- ant, General. ? Daniel Graham wa s grant-defecter by his CIA debrieiers,
pened or perhaps by some of their superior
ha
of what reall
t- t
l
As. the debrtefing- procee e , e
Pentagon was 'informed. under the
usual procedures. Dr. James Schlesin-
ger, by then Secretary of Defense,
.even agreed to defer any revision of
the published intelligence estimates
until after the U.S. defense budget
had passed through Congress that
t" of the Soviet Gross Na- The resulting estimates, looked. summer-for fear of accusations. of
8
y
on
,
g
overflights, which alone revealed the :1970 had beer '6 percent", of Gross clause
 ... ti4 F- ~,~?~ - ~. -:r_.. ~:y. -t:-~a~?~s~-~~:?:~:yL'~T" r's:~'T_`~ze;?';? '~~z',a~e'~
Do We Have to Caen to Live With Amb! u1ty
A thoughtful look at the varied company of scientists, scholars, and lawyers who are
taking over the State and Defense Departments, the National Security Council, and the
Arms Control Agency. They are largely drawn from the implacable opponents of nuclear
strategy and the dovecotes of the Vietnam war.,
by Charles J_ V_ Murphy
lk
fr. ?Murphy was for 34 years a writer and editor of
For-rune magazine. He is a Member of the American
Cause Board of Directors-
There is a disturbing aspect to President Carter's prep-
arations to impart a promised fresh direction to the con-
duct of American defense and strategy, which is only just
beginning to attract the wide public attention that it de-?
serves. It has to do with the public performances and
political philosophies of the people whom he has placed in
command at the State and Defense Departments, the Na-
tional Security Council in the White House's precinct, and
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency-the four
institutions primarily charged, along with the Central
Intelligence Agency, with maintaining the Nation's
security.
For reasons that may in time tell us more about Presi-
dent Carter's own ambitions in the fields of military aitd
foreign policy than he has so far vouchsafed, there is a
notable absence among these personages of the new
faces, innocent of power and private ambition, which
candidate Carter assured us would now be seen in these
high jurisdictions. Instead, save for a slight sprinkling of
scholars, businessmen, and journalists of modest reputa-
tion, the installed magnates have nearly all served in
their present fields as senior or junior lieutenants well
back in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations; and,
by the standards of the Plains, Ga., morality, they have
certainly sinned in the exercise of power and the pursuit
of influence. '
For some of us,with long memories and a certain famil-
iarity with these matters, the group that now presides over
the fields of national policy, where Dr. Kissinger so long
held sway, has the look and bearing of men restored to
authority at least four years, perhaps as much as eight
years, too late. They sound today much as they did when.
they were trying to haul Lyndon Johnson out of the quag-
mire of Vietnam, which is to say out of the world itself
out of the grinding, shifting, remorseless pressures of the
Cold War. They were pathfinders in the search fora way
to an unacknowledged and hoped-for painless retreat from
that war and into a lull we have lately known as detente.
Cyrus Vance, 59, at State and Paul C. Warnke, 57, at
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, lawyers
both, have been in and out of government and politics
most of their lives. Years ago, they cast their lots with the
left-of-center wing of the Democrat Party, and they have
been active iii the politics of arms control.
- Dr. Harold 1. Brown, 49, at Defense, is a nuclear sci-
entist, the first scientist to take the quarterdeck at the
Pentagon- He comes from the presidency of the California
Institute of Technology, where he long has been a rela-
tively silent but senior member in the league of left-wing
scientists and technipols assembled around the Charles
River Basin at Harvard and M.X.T. who keep the Penta-
gon's advanced weapon programs under unremitting at-
tack. No stranger to the Pentagon, he served there eight
years, 1961 through 1968, under Secretary Robert S. Mc-
Namara, first as Director of Research and Engineering,
then as Secretary of the Air Force- -
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, 48, at the National Security
Council, where the President's channels to national se-
curity policies converge, is a left-tilting centrist in foreign
policy who has on occasion styled himself a "dawk."
That suggests either a dove in hawk's plummage or a bird
with the temperament of Ferdinand the Bull. Like Kis-
singer, he is a professor (Columbia University) and a
naturalized citizen (son of a Polish diplomat). His prin-
cipal patron is another Rockefeller (David, the banker)
with an affinity for detente and accommodation.
One is left to wonder: Is the "dawk" about to supplant
Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :. CIA7RDP90-01137R000100100001-7
 NATION
ed For Release 2001/07/27: D)AM Q11. 0001001
ZAVID_ CQTLT aIGHT-& ROBFR"t BORO$AGM~ poration, John W. -Vogt, former-Air Force Gen:.ral; ti.'il
liarrt Van Cleave, wmember- of the SALT delegation, and
Over the last twenty years, Americans have been treated Foy Kohler, former U:S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union -
to an annual performance of Sturm and Drang in advance all known to hold -gloomy views about Sovict designs.
-of Congressional hearings on-the defense budget: A fusil- :,-This outside group; designated Team B, was given access.
lade of press, leaks on some new Soviet menace blends to raw data and told to debate its views with tbe regular
;with the blare of- the brass seeking additional weapons. analysts. In an exchange described as "bloody," the panel
The spectacle.-.has bad so many reruns that many in the apparently - succeeded-- in moving the - accepted analysis-1
legislative.- audience are now - bored with it. -This year, closer to its own- predilections.T cam B was a stacked
C
however, a much more intense and concerted performance jury, chosen j o, deliver a predetermined- verdict. - The.
'
has- captured the attention of legislators and the- national.
,press alike.
- The- primary -theme: is the'---new -, National Intelligence
- - Estimate on Soviet military intentions, first leaked to -The:
New.. York Times during the. slow-news Christmas- holi=
days and picked- up by nearly every print and broadcast
outlet since then. -The estimate-a product -of.what 'is ' .
described as a - `.`furious" debate between regular. intelli-:=
Bence analysts' and a special team, of outside "experts"
gives. a "grim":- portrayal of Soviet- aggressiveness.. But the
NIE is only one of many variations in a well-orchestrated
performance-by -conservatives,.-designed to scare citizens -
:,about Soviet-. intentions. - The --entire movement=-poses . a-
, major polic}- -'challenge to President-;Carter, . one:. which
-will:--tell much; about _the~:futurz:-directions of :this-'ad-
ministration:r
'=-r Annual assessm'e'nt-of Soviet military intentions is-the:
'}task- of analysts within the $10 billion intelligence. appara__
r
tus..Over the years,. the views of, the CIA's analysts have
predominated; with- confiictin views footnoted in:the text;.--
and often- supported in appendixes.. Clearly irritated by the,,.
:-moderate,. unimpassioned findings -of previous analyses;
-President-Ford and CIA Director.: George Bush sought to,
-
influence-.-the: result.. by- appointing - an. outside- team. to
process
gave very- conservative voices official endorsement
to attack intelligence. community analysts.. -_ :- . -:. -....~..:.. ~ z
=-Political leaders have ignored or rebuked disagreeable
intelligence. analysts since at least the time of Xerxes. The,
::-Greeks had to be warned against the folly of killing
messengers. bearing bad news: Modern- practice is some-
what more- subtle.. The Pentagon - Papers demonstrated.
that -the Johnson administration repeatedly ignored CIA--
assessments of the bombing of North Vietnam. Walt Ros-
tow- (like -his Nixon- counterpart, Henry Kissinger) often -
preferred- to, get raw- data directly, the better- to fit them
to his . views.-- Instead of basing. -policy on assessments,
estimates were- created to fit the policy.. The Pipes coin-
mittee-is another; Variation -of- the practice, in tahis case
changing the analysts to get the desired result---that is, an
official finding that the USSR seeks. strate8 c "superiority"_
over.. the United -States.: :
There is much -less to support the- claims of the Pipes
panel than meets-the eye: According to reports, it based
its estimate on -three- primary charges: that the Soviet,
Union is improving its air defenses; that it is proceeding_
with a rnassive:..civilian- defense program, and than it is
provide an "alternative".-view:-:The panel was beaded ' improving the. accuracy of its missiles- The USSR is:
-:, by -.Harvard Prof. - Richard .Pipes- and. included ; retired -
--:Army Lieut. Gen. Daniel Graham, former director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency;:Paul Nitze, former Deputy .
Secretary of Defense; Thomas Wolfe of the Rand Cor-
David Cartright, author of Soldiers in Revolt (Doubleday),
is an associate of The Center-for National Security Studies. ' _
Robert: Borosage, director'of the center and a- practicing
cttorrey,- is co-author of The-- Lawless State (Viking). and
co-editor of ,The CIA File (Gross
mnrr).
improving its capabilities _in each of -these- areas,, but
there is no evidence in the public domain to suggest that _
there has. been a ,new . surge of development, Moreover,
none of these-: steps gives the USSR an edge over the
United States,. or substantially alters- the present relation-
ship between 'the- two powers , For example,. the Soviet
program for low-level air defense may well be a response
to American acquisition' of the F-15 fighter-bomber and.
the likely procurement of the B-I. Low-level air penetra
tion has always, been, an area- of U.S. technological- ad-.
Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP90-01I37R000100100001-7
 +~ A~VJo pr d300~1NJ?7 : CIA-RDP90-01137R0001
~"?~~ f
4435 WISCONSIN AVENUE, N.W., WASHINGTON, D_C. 20016
g
ANNO
with the former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, George
.
knowledge ~s r
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the CIA, the possessor
PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
Agronksy at Large
Interview With George Bush
STATION WETA TV
PBS Network
r'onsky at Large. Tonight, a conversation
UNCER: A
RONSKX: Good evening, In this capital city,
N A
G
MARTI
And that's what makes any man who's the
the ower
In world crises, the Director knows what the President of
sometimes
of an awesome power.
the United States knows, and he knows it as soon as, or
even before the President does,.because that's his job.
G e Bush was :Director of the CIA for a'year until
NnYlnnal committee during Watergate -- served Mr? Nixon oy y
as
January'20th. e pp
-represented the U.S..in Communist China. He served Richard Nixon
first asU.S. Ambassador-, and he was Chairman of the Republican
eorg
a ointed by President Ford after having
.into
from there .than you had anti.cipatea:
did- you find that the world looked likemuctt more aaugt,Luuz, Fiu%.
B us w en YOU took your seat as Director of the CIA,
,
I o
.at the tota ity
more dangerous in some ways than I thought when I went there. On
the other, I think that there are some real opportunities now to
make the world more peaceful...
Martin, but as one looks
t immediately
Pl
H
,
o
:
GEORGE BUS
I do feel that it was -.it's
f the information
and have been concerned about
I am concerned
,
But, yes,
the .-- some of the trouble spots in the world. I'm concerned about
OFFICES IN: NEW YORK ? LOS ANGELES ? CHICAGO ? DETROIT ? AND OTHER PRINCIPAL CITIES
?or~puh~cy Cemonx.atea ? exh~o teA_
QIA 4 4337W0@1MO"
 STATINTL
q/
Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100100
NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
IT FEBRUARY 1977
&V PAGt'
By STAN CASTER
outside ,panel reputedly took` a darker'?.'_~ `_ =^'.'` Tlie United States was ahead is the-
view of Soviet intentions- than the. CIA- number of missile warheads, .-missile .1
itself did.-: ? :: -:-4:= accuracy and the number: of. bombers;
Some academic critics who think the t' he said-while the Soviet. Union led. in
new assessment exaggerates the Soviet missile size and. explosive-power throw
threat; base-- their criticism on the.- weight, 3
participatioci. of the outside experts r `,`I: think= ,that;.we =' are roughly''
HE CAREFUL way that President..,
Carter hedged his remarks about
the = U.S. Soviet strategic .arms
ence- last week indicated that he had
`-rejected the "worst, case". argument of
some experts that the Soviets have."
1
? ready gained military superiority over-
this country. But he was concerne3 that ..
the Soviets soon could be stronger.,than~
we are..
= So are most=if - not all informed =
observers. both ? within the government
and without. - -
Some experts, using the same-basic
intelligence data-.-'. as -=that -given : the
President by the,,-Central Intelligence
Agency, ? believe ? the . Soviet Union
already has - established ' a lead ? in
- virtually every category of. military
Others,- mostly outside government;
think- that,. the Soviets; 'despite. their
breathtaking headlong buildup, still are..
Merely seeking military parity with the
:-United States.H__.
:A thick - CIA .report ?;-captioned,
National . Intelligence"- Estimate 11/8,"
which was. placed before.the President-
during- his first ? days in office,. report=;`
edly: "reflects the, majority assessment:-:
The Soviets are determined to attain
military superior'ity_--over the .United
,.-States, but have not yet done so:
-The Top Secret document is said to,-
take 'a imuch sterner -view of- what::the
Soviets are up to than- that taken by
previous assessments::
It incorporates'. two" independent-
evaluations, one devised by the CIA,
the - other by outside - experts- Both
groups-..worked with 'the- same raw
intelligence data
The conclusion of " the tWo panels ,
was identical: The Soviet Union is seek-
ing arms superiority- What's more,.tbe ;
whom the critics describe as hard-liners;-i - equivalent;' Garter added "even though i
''- '
?
"
predisposed: to
' ; make .- ?
worst=-case_-
.estimates.-
One. of the outsiders, retired l rmy
Lt.-Gen_? Daniel- O. Graham; dismisses--
that allegation:--"Since I had -much to-
do with: the way-. estimates were- made
.in,the past. I was. in fact criticizing
myself,'?- be points out. -Graham is. a -
former head of the Defense Intelligence
Agency. = ..:
"I didn't make. my reputation by -
being an arm waver or a worst-case
estimator," he declares:.::
RAIf Ai SAND another outsider,;
University: of Southern.: Cali
,fornia ?-Prof. William R.- ZTan
Cleave, insist that, the. harsher
assessment':: grew directly' -out, -of, -the
.evidence:.
"There-isn't any doubt that'they'are7
trying=-"there. is a'doubt over whether=
they-can achieve' superiority," is how-,
Graham sees ?it-..::
=.'A third.'_outsider, retired- Air Force .,
?Maj_ Gen. George J.?-Keegan Jr., is-now-
convinced-that the Soviet Union already^
I think we are supezioi r iri- that either
-the. Soviet. Union or. we could destroy
a major part of. the other. nation if a.i
major-attack was"made,.with losses In-,
the neighborhood . of 5o -to -100 million
people.", _ - ? , W - __- .
The threat of . world holocaust,
Carter said, showed.-the need-both_for-
.negotiations with the Soviet- Union to.
reduce the two 'countries' -nuclear
arsenals and maintenance by the United.
States . of "an?.- adequate deterrent
capability"
While - Carter's- remarks. implied
--rejection of the-"worst. case" estimates,
they also appeared to. indicate a deter-:
mination not to let the United States
fall too far behind the Soviets in total,
military-power. - -
HIS IS essentially the conclusion
reached by the previous ' admin
istration:.. Before' leaving office-
witted.: a- record $123 --billion defense
budget for the, next, fiscal year saying
.
has achieved superiority 'by' every'M, '. that ..itwas the :minimum needed to
brake America's fall. and the Soviets'
::criterions used tbQ. measure- strategic.
balance "'-_ - - ,~: _ - _ " =rise ?:_ _ -
=- Despite ?Carter's campaign promise
But- this dread view apparently Was--
to trim $5- billion to $7. billion in waste
rejected by the CIA panels and by Gen, from the Pentagon budget, Joint Chiefs
George S. Brown,-chairman of the-Joint Chairman Brown-. indicated : last week .
Chiefs of Staff.:. In -a -letter' late last ' . that the new administration's cuts may-
-month ,_'to- - Gen.- William Proxmire;- n
j not be too the President 'resident as b
Brown" said -the ' chiefs-"do not agree -He viewed ed th
s being
that- the :Soviet Union has achieved. ,`entirely. .; He's obviously
military superiority' . been_ exposed to facts that' were not
"The Joint. Chiefs of. Staff are, con available to him in the early days ,of
cerned, however, that the recent U.S. the campaign"
and Soviet trends in-military programs Just how grim is the situation? One
i? and civil defense could permit the USSR I Pentagon. analyst who has studied the
,.to attain superiority.-.
.? latest CIA', report 'gave, this: personal
-, view:..
The Soviets are rapidly closing the
;..
gap, -but they still lag in ' -__ We've had a downward#rencl at the
technological:
-
important areas.". same'..time the Soviets have. been going
- stimate.- up every year. Now, we have turned up,-
After studying the new CIA e
- and discussing it-,with his military- and if we maintain the programs that
Approved For Relea~` v , T, V P9d`- 1t R fl1kQi~ G dO1 d- there is np
- - At? the present time, my judgment .
is that we ?? have'-- superior nuclear.-l - -
 f{. ?P .Ili ,U' l'TV YORK DAILY NEWS
ON PA ue ~ 15 rEBRUARY 1977
Lr .a,ru~ ~-.ax r cx:; _ .: -; = industrial com lez to hog-
f
P tie the Carter -1 the two countries differ gr atlyn when
of rtrs H?'"s wasr""9r?n.9u:aay -administration -into adopting its Neap measured a ~ainst inflation
First of i, series _ _z s{ -ous, priorities."
t
ime ? however; mere, is no -i - defense -spending .:shows- a ? continuous =
HE MNKES-are: high`. in the: de-- -yd-
basic dispute over what the S
o- -bate that ha
1 decline sin
h
e
xili
1968
a
e
-
s
ce
e
n
_I -.
ng as
o
n' nvar-m een ii n Wash -viets.are- doing The raw intelli-.-1 - In sharn- contrast ?: So iet- a:
b
r
t
er wh her t
-
__
LV-U ?. - ..a....... s
..._....._ ...,..."....J g+vnw of o%o a year. .
uuuCaf -
superiority over this country.- graphs, interceptions -.o? ..Soviet -com- - "As- a: -result : of. these divert ng
'' '' "' ? munications,:-- clandestine.: agents and trends
". the rentinu
Are - the Soviets reall
u Port continu
"th
kin
i -
,
y see
es
es
g s
e est
,-_.,- And if-so, how close are they, other sources ? indicates- a broad.Soviet- mated dollar costs- of Soviet defense ex=
pe achieving v buildup in virtually.. all: categories of ceed U.S. defense
it? Conceivably; :national. strate~,- d conventional forces..- outlays by a. widening
survival could hinge on the answers:-_:;:' thou , .` = margin in every year after 1971.", -:
Nhilo._*ha ;~ a;~ though.Defense Secretary Harold W ~. ---- -'-
-- B
C
- -
e
IrA analysis
rown ua~ sWffea at the mlt ~ ;"?"`
-,ore aarmis'.,' _ ., Soviet = i tentions,. there.-.appears to be a s.. - " found that'if
pensions paid
rhetoric it is said that he's- advised-the "
little doubt that Sosciw has been --= en STX- to retired s
r
Presid
i
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ild
e
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en
cemen were
o
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five of the eight B1
gaged" iii 'a-massive buildup of both-can-:" the Pentagon wants to deducted- from both --sides' -
put. in the air
l
d
l
h
Senna
.an
nuc
ear. forces t
at could, this year. ..- budgets;-"the estimated dollar costs of
in time; upset the balance if the=United Here's -how Gen: George 5. Brown, Soviet activities in 1976 exceed: those of
States does nothing to counter it chairman of the Joint. Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. by about. 407x.",
:president Carter's position, on-_the_ assesses the Soviet buildup at the begin According
to one Pentagon analyst,
giant B-I bomber is indicative of= =the ning of -the Carter administration. this frightening trend began "way back
seriousness of the question During his : The Soviets continue an age es >_n 1960"
campaign, Carter-.viewed :the vastly sine program of upgrading their inter- The other major factor In changing
expensive bird as being,."wasteful:. of continental ballistic missile ea.pabili% the intelligence community's perception
taxpayers' dollars" by replacing "older "-systems -with - im of the Soviet threat has been the grow
Now that he is President; the :bet proved missiles. ing- realization of the size. Of the Soviet
ting 5s that Carter .will,go ahead with "The Soviet nuclear. powered bal-l. .:civil defense program.:
S7T 4 billion
ra ._ for- the
?.-t. _ -- r
ro
p
g
new wa
plane.'-:
to grow In sloe and capability United_..States= abandoned :its: civil. de-
Carter -still insists that: he willex- .fense_ program after the abortive effort
Ui1-enem1es:1'to-cut-down dependence.-I 'force-with -production of the-inultipur-I - backyard air-raid shelters. -Not - so
said after his first week in- office -- we -' 0 ``A1sa,-tlie: Soviets .may be develop they were- continuing - toy put -great
" emphasis on civil defense.. but we didn't
don't-knowsyet how-_muck: the. Soviets. ingacapability, to-attack ours
t
llit
a
e
es
-. would.-be- willing to cut back. their-de-. --The numbers--and effectiveness-o#- pay too much attention.until recently::
Tense. capabilities :to-match. Ameizean U.S and Soviet .'strategic and conven tiat fie we ze -took-another look,.. this h
...-._ _ - _ .. - ._- _ - `ac_=_, t-_--- _ - .- - -- - W}tAt mQ inl,nli? : -_-..? -c.~__..- -
With . the. -continuing-.-Soviet-- arise balance=of military power will b;', om national network' of modern
buildup- shelters -#or- both civiliaix!:and-military.
)r clearly in-:mind; ,Carter- -told. pared.in.laterarticles in this series. Eut ,
con ll industr national protection for
dents, :`r the B-1 bomber_is one of. those - contributed even more to the new,
essential industries
e
r
o
item
- w
l
i
- S
w
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along-- ce
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veto -c
sid
etinte
tions thanthe
nth-the Cruise missiles'=and anew kind "ate gap:'. " a =A? network of protected-food and
+, fuel-depots -outside some, urban areas,
of intercontinental ballistic missile' One of these i?shock fa f; r
s
d
bli
ma
e pu
c for no broad system o#.-shelters-for.-the
and achievement,;---,bas been build:. the first- time last October.,-that the
?maze a
and. bleakest estimates -ofthe Kremlin's -spending 11%.'to 13% of - their: gross, ` ss en 1e sSoviet civil de
arms build-lip crash. assessment of the Soviet ?.
. _ " =s ==;_ = =.?~O~elpnd again.
propose yO1A 0 W 'or Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDD9pf' 'I ft 6
WASHINGTON REPORT - 5
 Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100100001-7
One thing necessary to any strategy is that our military
capabilities at a minimum throw up such possibilities for
development that there are obstacles to the Soviets in
continuing their strategy, and I don't think parity is the
answer to that. You are not going to change the Soviet
point of view unless you present them with alternatives
downstream which they cannot surmount, so that they go
back to something like the Khrushchevian heresy of thlIe
mid 60's.
QUESTION: If parity is not the answer, by extension are
you advocating some form of superiority for the United
States?
GRAHAM: The question was: do I advocate superiority for
the U.S.? I say yes.
How The Soviets Measure Superiority 11
QUESTION: There's been some discussion concerning
whether the Soviets are really going for superiority. What
do you believe and why?
VAN CLEAVE: My personal opinion, based upon an
analysis of the capabilities of the Soviet Union, a
comparison of these capabilities with the capabilities of the
U.S., and a comparison of the doctrine, concepts and
objectives of the two is that there is absolutely no question
about the seriousness of the Soviet quest for superiority.
Even more ominous than that is their belief that superiority
should be measured in terms of war-fighting capabilities.
It seems to me that if the Soviet actions and words are
consistent, the person who says they don't mean what they.
are doing and what they are saying has a burden of proof
himself to show that. So my personal opinion is clearly that
they are on a quest for superiority. I think our major issue
here, as I posed at the start, is what does that really mean
what are the implications of it, where is the superiority to
be measured and the like.
GRAHAM: I agree with Dr. Van Cleave that the Soviets are
in. fact, out to achieve superiority.
I will not comment on what's in the National
Intelligence Estimate, but I will say that the arguments
between the people on the inside about whether or not the
Soviets are attempting to achieve superiority have
disappeared. There isn't any doubt now, I don't think, in
the minds of any responsible intelligence analyst that they
are trying. There, still remains an argument as to whether
they will make it. The argument about can they make it is
so dependent upon what do we do that it becomes easily
arguable at this point depending upon what you think the
United States' reaction will be-
"Soviet Superiority Exists Today"
VAN CLEAVE: Let me add something so that I'm not
hedging my own personal beliefs any more than necessary,
on the evaluation of superiority and where it exists today. I
am fully aware of the fact that this is a very complicated
and sometimes intractable question because we all have
different conceptions of what superiority is all about and
what contributes to it.
But if I might. just for the moment confine my remarks
to what we refer to as the strategic nuclear level, that is to,
say the strategic intercontinental attack forces and strategic,
defensive forces, it is my conclusion on the basis of analysis
that I've done, that overall strategic superiority exists toda types of intercontinental attac
for the SovieArpricupdrJ DThRe a Q ~~ (~7 7(r. IA-F 4 '?A%uQtl 7A 9s09ei p
countermeasures, projections show an increasingly large
margin of superiority.
In this regard, let me refer you to the article in the
current issue of Foreign Policy by Paul Nitze on "Deterring
Our Deterrent," where he carries his classic Foreign Affairs
argument a couple of steps further analytically. I've gone
over this analysis in quite a bit of detail to the point that I
am professionally persuaded by it. And according to this
analysis, looking at it either in peace-time comparisons, in
comparisons after an initial optimized Soviet counter-force
attack, or after an exchange including a U.S. counter-force
response, the Soviet superior situation given presently
projected forces is relatively favored even after a
counter-force exchange at the highest level. And this is true
whether you look at it in terms of throw-weight, megatons,
equivalent megatons, or whether you look at it in the more
sophisticated index of equivalent weapons which takes into
account accuracy, target hardness and other things. All the
curves go in that direction. And that's all there is to it.
QUESTION: I wonder if you can explain why China has
suddenly become unmentionable by you analysts. You
remember when McNamara first justified the ABM, he said
well, it's not a good idea, but China is kind of irrational,
and therefore for appearances sake we should build an
ABM. Why couldn't one assume that Russia is likewise
building its civil defense against a Chinese nuclear attack?
Secondly,. is it fair for the Pentagon to compare directly
the Warsaw Pact forces versus NATO forces without
crediting any of those forces to the China front which is
right on the Soviet border?
And thirdly, do you agree with Professor Garwin who
said that if you figure how many rubles the Soviets would
have to spend to buy our own defense establishment that
there might well be a gap in our favor for defense spending?
And lastly, and I think this is more targeted to Van
Cleave, what do you mean you want a better response? Is
the 123 billion dollar new defense budget too low? Do you
want 200 billion? What are you talking about when you say
let's have a better response?
Plenty of Soviet Threat To Go Around
VAN CLEAVE: In the first place the China matter: I don't
think it makes much sense to try and make any comparison
with Mr. McNamara's justification of the early ABM on
Chinese rationale. We all have to recognize that Mr.
McNamara just plain didn't like ABM and therefore wasn't
much interested in a very strong rationale for it at that
particular point in time. So I don't think that has any
relevance today in any context whatsoever.
Is the Soviet Union deploying a civil defense against
China? I don't think it matters against whom they are
building a civil defense. What matters is what it reflects in
terms of their beliefs about limiting damage in the event of
a nuclear war and what its effectiveness might be against a
range of potential American options.
As to the Soviet Union building forces principally for
China, we're very well aware of the forces that the Soviet.
Union designs and deploys against China and we tend to
factor those out. We don't add them into what we think are
Soviet intercontinental forces against the United States. We
thoroughly separate the two whenever they are separable.
At times they are not. But, I'd like to point out to you, the
la-3 the U.S. are not quite
 Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100100001-7
General Daniel 0. Graham called for a "National Strategy."
those that are needed against China against whom medium
range and shorter range systems are all that is necessary.
As to Mr. Garwin's assertion about the Soviets buying
our own defense establishment, I think it's getting to the
point that if we can make a trade with the Soviet Union of
defense establishments, I'd be heartily in favor of it.
Finally, about the $123 billion. I haven't seen or gone
over the full budget for this year. I don't think it makes
much sense to look at some particular aggregate in total and
say, is this a good enough response or isn't it. I don't, think
it is a matter of money really, quite frankly. Particularly
when we are addressing strategic forces and the strategic
balance in the context that I've been using these terms we
have to recognize that strategic forces are cheap. It is a very
very small fraction of the defense budget. You could'ido an
enormous amount by very small additions to that program.
The situation has gotten to the point that even the
Brookings Institute in Setting National Priorities this year,
came to the conclusion that a substantial real increase is
now necessary for at least the next five years. I think these
things can be done by focusing on a strategy, by focusing
on a consistent set of goals for technology, and by taking
more initiative in technology than we have in the past
without a good deal of money- Now the S123 billion may
look awfully big, but two weeks ago the Social Security
Administration announced that social welfare spending
went up 45 billion dollars in the past year, after having
gone up 47 billion the previous year, and is now at a level
of 331 billion dollars per year. Now 1 am not arguing that
one should dispose of these social economic welfare
programs, but I think these types of figures are necessary to
put the defense budget in some perspective.
GRAHAM: I -essentially agree with what Dr. Van Cleave
had to say. If you take the threat to NATO - well if it is
any comfort to say that 50 of the Soviet divisions are
disposed against China, and the Warsaw Pact presents
NATO with a threat of a mere I50 divisions - I don't take
much comfort from that. If the Department of Defense's
posture statement has put all those divisions together and
said they were directed at NATO, of course, that would be
a mistake because there is plenty of Soviet threat to go
around.
With regard to the money thing, 123 billion or so, that's
what worries me about the reaction to the situation that is
facing us strategically: it winds up a question; are you for
123 billion or 150 billion? I'm not for any number like
that, I'm for pulling up our socks, finding out what we are
going to do about this challenge and then see what comes
program that every admiral and general in the Pentagon
thinks is a good idea should be adopted. As a matter of
fact, I think that if we put our minds to it, American
technology can come up with cheaper ways to do the job if
there is some good description of what the job is.
SALT Is A Segment of Soviet Strategy.
QUESTION: Do you see the strategic balance being
affected by a SALT II agreement?
VAN CLEAVE: . don't have any expectations that SALT is
going to accomplish anything to ease one iota the strategic
problems facing the United States today. I can't see that in
the offing. All I have to do is point to a comparison
between those goals and aspirations commonly posed for
SALT in 1968 and 1969 with what's expected by the
administration or by arms control scholars today. Today,
the emphasis isn't on what you can acomplish in SALT so
much as it is how can we hurt ourselves less, by any
particular agreement.
If you look at the SALT agreements proposed for SALT
11 or any prospective agreement after that, they simply
reflect one particular thing and that is that arms limitations
agreements that would restrain planned Soviet programs are
unacceptable to the Soviet Union.
GRAHAM: I agree, I see no indication of any dampening
effect on any Soviet program, as a result of SALT. I think
the real problem with SALT is that SALT agreements and
detente in general in the Soviet view is part of a strategy
that's aimed in the long run in achieving their overall
national goals. For the West, SALT and detente has been
sort of an end in itself and hooked very closely to the
proposition that somehow we could reduce the armaments
load, or the defense problems for our own countries, 'So the
two sides have entered these negotiations with entirely
different sets of motivations.
QUESTION: My question is: to what extent does the
transfer of advanced Western technology make a
contribution to these particular Soviet military efforts?
GRAHAM: Well, on the technology transfer side, I think
that what we have to realize is that much of the technology
that the Soviets lag in are not the theoretical technology
and so forth. Where American genius really overhauls them
is in the engineering and production end of technology. But
when we turn to giving them plants and machinery that'
allows them to go into production on defense and
defense-related materials, I think we make a mistake and I
think we've made some grievous mistakes in the past.
QUESTION: Haven't we lost the political will to resist? The
point being that we will be reducing our defense budget.
And is not this discussion here today inescapably linked to
this political background?
VAN CLEAVE: I think that you've put your finger on a
very important point and that is the question of political
will which is also the question of the ability intellectually
to grasp the situation and the mental toughness to be able
to figure out the responses that are appropriate. That is
purely in the political realm and there are many indications
that the political will has been lacking in the U.S. I don't
think that that lack, however, springs from the public. I am
not a Kissingerian on this at all. I think that with the right
type of national leadership, it would be entirely possible to
have this will spring forth and be manifested.
out of tAJ$pirb t Fof R l sd M'k/l l2Fd-atdMfFDP90-01I37R000100100001-7 * * r .
 ;0 n20 'T.10 27.: 1A-RDP90-01137R000100100001-7
Civil Defense
In the developing debate over civil defense - how much,
if any, is enough? There has come a stark warning of what
could happen to the United States if the Soviet Union
should ever believe it could successfully threaten the U.S.
with surrender or nuclear destruction.
Dr. Eugene P. Wigner of Princeton University, a Nobel
Prize winning physicist, was interviewed for the American
Security Council Education Foundation's new
documentary film, THE PRICE OF PEACE AND
FREEDOM.
DR. WIGNER: "We have no definite plans for
evacuating our cities in response to a Russian evacuation.
We have no - what I call - counter-evacuation plans that
are valid.
"In the present situation, the population loss the
Russian missiles could inflict is about 45 percent. If we had
an evacuation plan, or as I call it, a counter plan, this 4i5
percent would be reduced to about 11 percent at 'la
ridiculously low cost - a couple of dollars per person.
"If we had a good shelter system similar to that which
the Chinese can afford, the loss would be 5'/z percent,
which is quite similar to the 4 percent which we could
Saigon Today
With the terror came hunger, poverty, mass
brainwashing, finally waves of suicide. This is the death of
once free South Vietnam as described by Father Andre
Gelinas, a Canadian Jesuit priest, recently expelled from
Saigon after 19 years of missionary work.
Father Gelinas estimates that between 15,000 and
20,000 Vietnamese have committed suicide rather than live
under Communism - 10,000 in the Saigon area alone in
one month. Back home in Montreal after 15 months in
Saigon under the Communists, Father Gelinas describes
how the new regime has begun remolding the nation:
FATHER ANDRE GELINAS: "All the intellectuals
were ordered to register at the police station, and in
Vietnam anyone who has a high school degree is considered
an intellectual. All the people from 25 to 60 - male - had
to register at the police station and two days later, on the
twelfth of June, they were called for one month of
reeducation. They were imprisoned in the big school and
four days later - on June 16th - there were vast
movements of trucks during the night. People saw convoys
leaving the city for the countryside. And for the next ten
days - from June the 16th to June the 26th - every night
convoys would leave with all these people. About 500,000
people were carried away, and this was nearly two years
ago. And they haven't come back."
Western Technology: Russia's Invisible Ally
Is Western technology helping build Soviet weapons
aimed at us? A leading authority on the subject, Miles
Costick, author of the forthcoming book, U.S. and Soviet
Computer Capabilities, has no doubt.
MILES COSTICK: "The Soviets are making every effort
to close the computer technology gap in the only way
possible for them - to get us to give it to them. During the
last four years, U.S. computer manufacturers have sold to
the Communist governments about $400 million worth of
computers and related equipment.
"The Control Data Corporation has a joint venture with
the Communist government of Romania for production of
peripheral equipment which is one of the weakest links in
the Communist computer technology. In addition, Control
Data has an agreement pending with the U.S.S.R. to
manufacture one hundred megabit disk memory units in
the Soviet Union. It is well known that one of the main
deficiencies of all computers produced in the Soviet bloc is
the memory system. The International Business Machine
Corporation is one of the major suppliers of advanced
computers to Communist governments. Many IBM
computers have been sold from its European branches, and
apparently, in some cases, no export license was obtained.
From its U.S. facilities, IBM has sold to Poland several
computer systems, among others, the largest industrial
computer system in the world, consisting of the
IBM-370/158 with eleven satellite systems, for the
automation of the Kama River truck plant which, among
other things, will mass produce tanks."
BROADCAST HIGHLIGHTS is drawn from the American Security Council's daily radio programs - Washington
Report of the Air and RADIO FREE AMERICAS, the Spanish-language service. Washington Report of the Air is a
comprehensive daily radio news analysis of developments affecting the security of the United States. The five-minute
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Washington Report, or companies interested in sponsoring the program, write to Philip C. Clarke, Editor,
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Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP90-01I37R000100100001-7
8 - WASHINGTON REPORT
 ~For Release 2001/d"+/2F-YR64~-01137R00010
report said.
'-~ - The chiefs also conceded that "civil =
defense has received little consldera-
tion during past US. -Soviet arms ? con-
trot negotiations:' Keegan . has
charged that the 1972 treaty limiting
is ` me Hy-- e o
na, _e Lilt missile defenses by both sides was
Luc .7---> wcic UUL scnously build- J
By George- C. Wilson r -Keegan , has been warning abot--~ ing a defense for n
l
a
uc
e
r war
.
wanhiaatoa Pos;.a.ate writer. ?='.. --the Soviet threat through most of his The chiefs confirmed th t
a
The nations top military leaders, in Au' force career, and helped make an ~' oa
current-studies indicate" that 10 times
a report that rebuts charges. by the independent assessment of Russian As man- Americans as Russians might
former head of Air Force Intellig p0tary prod ams for the director of -.be killed' in a nuclear exchange "but "I
ei?ce^ the Central Intelligence .Agency' He E 'onl in a worst case scenario
-yesterday disputed the claim that'lhe - -r y
did thi; as a member'I of the panel such studies are, scenario-dependent
edged States. has - lost its rategic known as "Team B" which worked in- and should not be regarded.-as defini.
edge to the: Soviet'Umom ;:...
dependently to produce ='a;report sepative forecasts of outcomes."
"The JoinntChi
fso% " o
St
f
ns
e
a
# c
istat f thin
, .- rerome national =;te,lioence ? Pro rmrel in releasing the report of
in- of the heads of the ? mili sere- estimates put togethe
b
th
Cll th
j
i
r
y
e
e
o
nt chiefs yeserdayid Th
.t, sa:is
lees, '- not agree that the e Soviet .Un--.?. _
ion,has achieved. m11it In discussing; 25 separate issues of was` a courageous statement ' by then
ary superiority"; American strategic policy, - the chiefs . Joint Chiefs of Staff" who "publicly
ever- the rtirited -States;,': Air Force`-'did rovide' `ammunition for those refute" the "exaggerated and,'in many
e"
-G Cacr?ar G_ .S2rnmra ', t, ;... . - e - p
h
th
-S
eases
a
G
.
a
e
oviet civu uerense
~? ~ ear
,
en the joint /twefs; said in-th-e report t,
!eased esterda program should. be viewed' with. grave:- pan. ;.-
T'roxmiz y _' by Sezi :.William= :concern, : - :: - Proxmire, who in the past has often
~ assailed military and civilian le
d
r
_= "B
n'b
a
e
s
ro vno
ehalf of the chiefs di
,.,s In- th it Il-page paper, the chiefs -: puted Keegan-by declaring in the-re.- at the Pentagon, called ..the-' chiefs.
toak . t-i sue with Air:Force Maj. -;? . port-that despite .Soviet civil defense statement "a- sei?z,ce to the American
Gen.=G r'ge-J.-Keegan Jr, -who said P
. !. ., ublic which needs a fair accountin
;
.. . US.
in fare ell rexrarks as;,he retired efforts, weapons,
-as of Soviet actvides, not scare tactics"
-Mr r Force Intelligence on Jan' `' 1980s" would be,able to. inflict throughict the the. ... .
- ` : amount of retaliation on Russia that = ~-. :- -
l that a Soviets had'
ai
d
g
ne
su
- national policy makers want.,
orityouer the
Secretary Brown told the Senate
? '..
I: am Unaware `of - a:- single inlpor_ Armed Services. Committee last week
tent-category" involving: the= ssfrategic that U.S. nuclear weapons could over-
balance -"iii which the- Soviets-' have come Soviet defenses in a,-nuclear.
not established a significant lead-over war. Other arms specialists have ar-:
tbe-United States,''. Keegan, said in a
geed that. living underb qund eventu--''
N ew York Times-.interview- published ally would prove futile because lethal
Jan 3. radioactivity. would last longer than
may. %
;;`h : _ ; =r food stored in sheltera..:
While `aFne :=with? Keegan ;that ;.
Soviet'~lng: rannge. missiles can-zli#t The chrefs,:in their report, said tile`
t ,- - -- -- . -. ;Soviet civil defense..progxamis._"ae response phase of this reaction-
ary cycle, just as if there we=re something new in it every
year-
Two members of the outgoing Ford Cabinet have re-
cently been heard on this great topic of "national security"
and they are on diametrically opposite sides of the ques-
tion. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, as expected, looked
into the closet where he keeps our arsenal and found it
nearly bare. He told The Washington Star (January 9)
that the "steady modernization, strengthening the improve-
ments (sic) and capability of the Soviet Union, coupled
.with a behavior pattern by the United States over some
fifteen years of actually reducing our effort in real terms,,
would inject a fundamental insecurity into the world
situation."
Secretary of State Kissinger, on the other hand, told
the National Press Club the other day that he did not
believe that the Soviet Union "is achieving military su-
premacy over the United States." He made the key point
when he added the observation that "the essence of the
contemporary problem in the military field is that the
term `supremacy,' when casualties will be in the tens of.
millions, has practically no ,operational significance as long
as we do what is necessary. to maintain a balance." (Per-.
haps the hawks will say that Kissinger was corrupted by
that Nobel Peace Prize for the 1972 Vietnam peace non- _-~ Balance is, of course, the essential idea- Even if it is
called "balance of terror,"' what it means is that either
side can inflict unacceptable damage on the other and
therefore that there can simply be no nuclear "exchange"
between the two superpowers. No amount of fiddling with
destruction ratios, throw-weights or any other component
of the balance that' has' existed for a generation can. alter
the world. = that basic fact. The military; by its very nature, will go on
That was why the CIA's Director George bush brought inventing new and more awful devices. And its allies in
in a so-called "B-team" of professional pessimists. to chal- "intelligence" will go on' :inventing rationales for more
lenge the more- sanguine "A-team" fellows of the regular and more of these weapons even if they have to justify
intelligence establishment. By all the thoroughly leaked them with the foggy stuff of. "intentions." _
accounts of what.happened in this dialectical game, the This is the nature of these beasts. All of us, and espe
official pessimists managed to tip the consensus toward a 'I cially Congress, should know that by now. We will soon -
much darker view than usual about Russia's real aims. see whether Congress and 'the Carter administration have
MAbness (mutual assured destruction) is 'out, passe, and learned anything at all from the many years of this annual
we are told that Russia is hell-bent for strategic dominance. exercise in strate is bla kmail. ,
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WASHINGTON POST
22 January 1977
ReT.?orbs 4itiwrs
Repeat, . Blend
Russians ? iarinI
By George C. Nilson
Washington Post Statf Writer
Two members of an outside team
that analyzed the Soviet threat in con-
cert with government intelligence of-
ficers contended yesterday that, Rus-
sia is striving for. military superiority
over the United States.
In taking that position Daniel 0.
'Graham and William It. Van Cleave
denied that their Team B report is a
"worst case" statement about Soviet
military capabilities and intentions.
Graham, retired Army lieutenant
general who form erly, ? headed the De-
fense Intelligence Agency, said at a
meeting sponsored by the American
Security ?? ? Council that ? Team B
"shouldn't be looked at as a bunch of.
hawks who bulldozed CIA analysts" as
they prepared national intelligence es-
timates.
" Such characterizations in the. press,
Graham complained; amount to "an
accidental attempt to blunt the im-
pact" of Team -B's report. He said he
and his colleagues on Team B went
.into the analysis of intelligence data
"with questions" but not bias.
Although asserting. that the Soviets
are driving for. m_ ilitary superiority, .
Graham said they,- cannot reach that
goal unless the United States makes a
"deliberate" decision to allow it.
"We.don't have astrategy," Graham
.Sai:d in decrying how `Fthe Pentagon is
run by program managers" rather
than strategists. He Said a cohesive
strategy, not more money?for defense,.
--is the key need right now.
Van Cleve, University of Southern
California professor who is a frequent
Pentagon consultant on strategic is-
sues, said there is "absolutely no ques
tion about the seriousness of the So-
viet quest for superiority," including .
ability to fight a nuclear war as well.
as deter one. 'Van Cleave took a swipe at Presi-
dent Carter's inaugural promise to
"move this year a step toward our ul-
timate goal-the elimination of all nu-
clear weapons from this earth." -
Van Cleave said that was "such.. a
silly platitude'that one has to wonder
why it was worth uttering in an inau?--
gural address." -
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STATINTL
 Approved For-Release 2001/07/27 : 6IA-RDP90-01137R0001001
79IZ1"IG E'4 - ' THE NEW YORK TIMES
ONPA0 22 January 1977
An" .ysis of Soviet Goal Is Def ended ;
By DAVID BINDER
.VrA 11Lrlr1Vivn.Jan. .41^- 1wa Partici-
pants in a recent.intelligence review of
Soviet military, capabilities and aims. said
today there. was unanimity ; with in. th'e in-
telligence- community that.'-the' Soviet
Union seeks'- strategic superiority-'-over-
?.,
this country-..-
`e:
N
William R.-Van Cleave, of the, Universi-
ty of Southern California, said the latest
intelligence estimate of Soviet goals came
to the conclusion: "There is absolutely
no question about the seriousness of the
Soviet quest for superiority." -
Lt. Gen. Daniel 0. Graham, the retired
chief of the Defense Intelligence Agency,
said. "The.-Soviets are -in fact: out to
achieve superiority"
Questions About Result of Study-'
'
Bath men were members of a team
of outside specialists engaged, last year
to participate 5n "competitive analis"
of Soviet . abilities -and- intentions.: with
another team of regular specialists from
the Central. Intelligence Agency and other
government intelligence offices
:,Some question has been raised. recently
as to whether the latest intelligenc6 esti-
mate had concluded that the Soviet Union
was intent, on achieving. trate is superi-
orl
General, Graham and 'Mr. Van Cle ve
made their remarks at--a meeting spon-
sored'by -the `Americas Security'Council,
a conservative organization that concen-,
trates on -military affairs..
Mr. Van Cleave rejected, allegationsiri.
the press that the -seven-members of the
team of outside. 'specialists approached,
the question,'.on `Soviet strategy on the.
.basis of 'worst case'' thinking..
-
He' said .that'--"over the last couple of,
yyearseach national intelligence estimate,.
M, been--somewhat' harsher than its.
predecessor": regarding the Soviet .nil'},.?
tary buildup..:
Says He's Not an `Ann-Waver' :..?
General Graham said that in criticizing
past intelligence estimates, "I was --criti-
cizing myself". because he had been ln~,~
volved in making estimates at the CentraTt.
o
.
didn't make my reputation - by being ; c an ~'
~~e said. _men men said the? only real disa~.
greement. among experts-in -the intellii,
Union would' achieve -military superiority
Aver this count"'. .,..a u.. --'---
"The Soviets+ will pose a great: problem.
of-disparity' in the time frame' 1980 to
1981" - - __.?__~__ . y
can buildup of strategic ca?abiEities:
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22 3an4ary 977
By Henry S. Bradsher -
- Washing' onStar Staff Writer
- and
n
fended
1Ia
Cleave de
?
any strategy for meeting the Soviet' -this conclusion as having developed
m
lit
h
ll
b
i
h
-
?
i
ary c
a
enge,
ut- w
t
out
a
strategy questions of what weapons to
buy cannot be properly considered, a
former senior intelligence officer
says. - -
Lt. Gen. Daniel 0. Graham said
this country should work out a
strategy for countering what he sees
as a long-range Soviet goal of achiev-
ing worldwide dominance, and then
the U.S. government should put to-
gether the hardware to implement
this strategy. -
But Congress argues over the capa-
bilities of the BI bomber or the pre-
cise size of the defense budget instead
of looking hard at the military tasks
facing the nation. Graham said.
Graham, who retired a year ago
from. the directorship of the Penta-
gon's Defense, Intelligence Agency,
spoke yesterday at a meeting spon-
sored by the American Security Coun-
cil. a private group that publicizes the
need for stronger defenses. .. .
A SECOND SPEAKER was Dr.
William R..Van Cleave, a University
of Southern California professor of
strategic studies and consultant fo the
CIA and other government agencies.
of intelligence community analysts to - The question facing this country is i
express concern that the Soviet Union 1 not whether the Pentagon's total obli- 1
is seeking strategic superiority. gational authority for the 1978 fiscal
within the intelligence community on
the basis of hard intelligence. They
denied published lreports that the out-,
siders pushed the government into too.
alarmist a conclusion. -
Van Cleave said he believes that
"over-all Soviet strategic superiority
-already exists." Graham said
whether Moscow has superiority al-,
ready is not so much the question as
recognizing that the curves of mili-
tary developments in the Soviet Union
and the United States are leading to
it, and deciding whether the United
States will take steps to prevent it.
SOME. CRITICS of militant warn-
ings about the Soviet military buildup
argue that there cannot be meaning-
ful superiority in strategic nuclear
weapons. Neither side would win a nu-
clear war, they contend.
But Graham said he did not believe
that "the Soviet Union has any big at-
tack in mind." Instead of general
war, he expected a militarily domi-
nant Kremlin to ;show "more aggres-
Ford administration proposed: it is
whether the United States is going to
meet the Soviet challenge, Graham
contended, and then see what it costs.
"That doesn't mean adopting every
general's or admiral's proposals, but =
finding the best way to do the job."
Graham added.
VAN CLEAVE- SAID U.S. arms-
control agreements with the Soviet
Union, which he was involved in ne-
gotiating, had not slowed down Soviet
military expansion. But the negotia-
tions had reduced U.S. expectations
of Soviet good intentions about con-
trolling the arms race, he said.-
Van Cleave said the most worri-
some period in the Soviet-American
military balance, on the basis of the
present Soviet buildup, is 1980 to 1984.
live behavior -more Angolas." The..J
United States could become para-.j
lyzed by the increased risks of trying
to stop this. -
Both were members of the "B
Team" that recently reviewed U.S.
intelligence estimates of 'Soviet''.-
strategic forces. The team of seven.;;
persons now outside of the government helped influence the "A Team"
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 _ ,nA roved For Release 2001/07/ l D1PL_H1137R0001001000
r
~D
ICLG 1~??5~Gr~
ON Pf1GP
ssue and Debate
.21 JANUARY 1977
Am erican ,Securityand Expanding
So. nc
V1 C r y,
Ey DREW MIDDLETON No Challenge on Findings' Reliability
A national debate has developed over One interesting aspect of the debate
.the security of the Lr ited States in a is that-those most bitterly opposed to
period of steadily expanding Soviet the intelligence community's conciu-
nuclear and : conventional military --sions have not challenged the reliability
strength. = -. 'or the objectivity. of the' findings on
The central question is `whether' the which the conclusions were based. --
Soviet Union is seeking overall military I - Much: of this material came from
superiority, rather than the present satellite photographs of Soviet strategic
situation, in which the United States and conventional weapons. The defini-.
has parity in, some areas of military tion of these photographs. an intelli-
power and marked superiority or a gence officer- said, is nowt, so good that
degree of inferiority in others.- : "you can see clearly- the'bolts that fix
-Contribute; g to the-debate, which be- .a missile 'launcher, to the deck of, a
gan four weeks age, are reports by the 'destroyer. Ce tral Intelligence Aaenc , the De- Other- material ` cane' from covert'
fense Inte igence Agency and other "sources" in Eastern Europe 'and the So--
organizations. that study ? Russian de- viet Union. -Although the Russians'are
fense programs. Differences over the adept at manipulating double _ agents,:
-.question arise largely from opposing this material has been checked against
interpretations-of.these.reports. ; data.-reaching the intelligence services
of other. members of the North Atlantic
Background = -Treaty Organization from similar but
The debate. arose when,. on Dec.'- 2617 'not 'identical sources. One American
some or the findings of a high-level . said there was. "near-unanimity. on re-
intelligence review were ? published-in liability ."r
The New York Times: In .this review, the- = But although the material gathered
finds of the C.I.A. were- modified-by a by- the intelligence community on So-
team of outside experts. The result was ,viet military programs. is not chal-
a judgment that the,---Soviet Union is ; lenged, the community's conclusion
now -seeking not. parity but -.military 'that the Russians are seeking military
of Air Force:intelligence; communicated
even more alarming :views. He said he
Union has achieved or" is achieving
? superiority, saying that he believed
there was a "general parity" between
...the Soviet Union and the United States.
Support. for Kissinger-Vance View
A large number of State Department
-.officials; Congressmen, academics and
experts on Soviet affairs support these.
views.
Their arguments maybe summarized.
thus: .. i .
"The team of outsiders brought in to
study the C.I.A's findings was com-
posed largely of "hard-liners" who
were disposed to exaggerate the im-r
pact of current Soviet nuclear weap-
ons on the balance betyveen the super-.
powers.
There is no objectveevidence to in-?
dicate . that the Russian civil defense.-.
:_ program should be counted as a factor
,in the supposed Soviet drive toward
.-superiority. Creation of 'a vast atomic-
shelter system may be a: normal.Rus-
sian reaction to fear -of. any foreign
attacker, specifically; -against Chi-
_-nese nuclear power. In any- event, the
system is by no means as complete and
efficient as some intelligence officers
believe.
The assumption that the Russians. are
driving; toward:.-nuclear ,superiority
makes -no allowance for known de-
ficiencies and weaknesses in-military
.and industrial pro rams, and supposes.,
that.all weapons are efficient and that;
achieved military. superiority. and that Soviet Union- is not seeking-"superior- dustriaI programs and the lack of corn-'.
American defense. policy and detente .? ity in strategic nuclear weapons.., puters. are overlooked or discounted.
diplomacy would ,invite, ,`rather than I do not believe that the Soviet
Basis of.Conipasonx Qucstloned-
deter, a global Union-is, achieving military superiority
Members, of tbeF Ford- Cabinet, nota--=
-. ' over. the United States," he said on Jan-: Intelligence conclusions on Soviet'`
bly former Secretary of State Henry A 10. No -American administration, he military superiority tend ?to -_ stress
` Kissinger and former Secretary of De- .went on; would "permit" a situation to weapon-vs.-weapon comparisons ;rather
fense Donald H:Rumsfeld; took oppos- in in which.- the Russians could than. weapon-vs.-antiweapon..compari
ing sides. A-larger number of military achieve." strategic superiority" over the -sons: The Russian numerical advantage
:and' civilian experts ondefense aired' ':.United States- - ... ; : -: - in tanks,' for example is compensated
their views in the press and on tele-- ._hir. ssinger urged that conventional for by the superiority of American anti-
ision and radio. -_:i:? .:.:`. } = and tKiactical: nuclear forces, such as-tank missiles, artillery-and-air:to-sur-
The outcome of the . debate, if there thane. that -are deoloved in Europe, 'face missiles. %
is., one, snoula nave marKeu puiiuw.I . ' o -
-impact. President Carter has promised should -be. - "modernized an strenp
-
to squeeze at least $5 billion out of the c s1-His view is,
on American conventional
defense budget. If the new Administra- : cern rn should be focused
tion decides that the C.T.A. review and and tactical nuclear-forces , rather than
General Keegan are correct in their in- ?on -strategic weapons.
terpretation of the Russian aims, it will :' On the -same day Cyrus R. Vance,
be very difficult to- make more than who succeeded Mr. Kissinger yesterday,
$ also.. rejected the idea,thrr th Sret-
defense spendin
t
i
i
l
n
na
cu
marg
s
-On the. other hand, if the leaders' of.
the Administration-.reject- the- intelli-
gence findings; they will assume that
reductions can be. made safely in mili-
Pentagon sources'said.- would provoke
and "possibly one: or, ? two high-level
resignations."r
but they are noisier than American sub-,
marines and,-??consequently, -easier to
detect. The Soviet advantage, in num-
bers of factical aircraft is balanced and .
will continue to be balanced 1, by the'
superior performance of a new-genera-
tion or Air Force and Navy planes.-
prepared for war. The scars ?,:of ? World-
War II remain after almost a. third of
a century- and. the Soviet leadership is
-acutely aware that even if,,. it, had
::achieved "superiority,"--: -the-.conse--
t, L quences of a nuclear exchange would
-come close- to destroying the Commu- `1
"
^ :; :~. _;;.;.=r :;,:.?;,
nist society
:
_
.. elease 2001/07/27IA-RDP90-03~~?>~tldonventional.'
-
i arms programs may have more to do.
. -reliabilityof East=
ern European allies-? and, over.:,the. un.;:-
 Approved For Release 2001/071 N-"9 I 8000100100001
;1t7 C .~ f ' rIIZ I ? 20 JAN'UAFtY 1977
Qv
EViE . & CUTLoo
.On. the Uses of - Diversity
,
g
u
e .a
uarxger or a rresident warning: to Mr. Carter in Ore-. isolated from dissent, and
has pledged an open staff . land... cxsely this regard. It would not
. other have taken any unreal range of ad-'-
pieties. What- has not ' ad.-'-
.-vice-to learn that-this .
done, though, is to surround him-..; appointment
;
self with men of -diverse -views; would be a troublesome one; the.
Rather, --be has tried to assemble editors of The Washington -Post
a Cabinet of homogenized roblem- Y warned as .much. Beyond that,, the.,
salvers.;. . ~? .._ -; i . ? _ - breadth of opposition to Mr
Soren-
In the economic area, far ex- ?sen, including many Senators usu
ample, we wonder who will be the ally taken as rathexl liberal, ought:'
Carter - administration's: no-n ian --: to be..a warning to Mr. Carter that
the political winds are changing on
This role has fallen. to the Trea-
"sury Secretary: in most adixunis-` :-:defense.: issues.: ? ? '
trations, even -Democratic ones; as We should remember, after all,
it falls.-,to the Finance Minister in :that last year an increased mili-
:most other'democracies. The man:::?? tart':budget breezed through Con-:
charged with raising'-the funds is- gress-- almost unscathed. :Since:
the logical man to set limits on the then there, -have been increased
men charged with -spending them . -warnings-in ::congressional' com-
t is not entirely clear that M'ich'ael- : mittee .documents, in new CIA in
Blumenthal will''fill-this role; he telligence= estimates,, in inde'pen
was an extraordinarily successful - dent -publications -like- Jane's-of'
-businessman-but certainly not '. a :.- the seriousness of the Soviet armsl:
-:conventional one in his political or-'-; . `build-up:If Mr..` Carter comes to.:
economic attitudes. with cuts in defense, or '=
Perhaps, "of : course; =with a- ne v arms treaty, it seems-'
menthal will sense: his natural , that for. the ' first time in a good'
role, or perhaps-Bertram Lance at-' . while real questions will be asked
the budget: office. will step in to-set : about .whether the nation can re
the brakes'..There have been some `v-main secure. Mr. Carter needs-at-.
good second=order appointments in.;. least enough diversity within the-'
'Yeasury? Kenneth- .Axelson, for,,' ,administration to know what the
- - .example, though it's too bad Mr.;': questions: -are " likely, to be, and-'
;'Blumenthal, lost -Richard Cooper whether his problem-solvers have
='to ' the State- De the answers
partmei~t. But it
seems likely, that by the time the=' . Mr Carter takes the nation's
=Carter economic program, can be..r., helm today as. a personally able
:considered the-economy will'bein- President,.; but an . mexperiencsd_
danger of slipping into an inflation *: one., We are moved to wander what
art' boom, and we:wonder, who 'y ill-? - price the nation will pay for his ed
carry the burden of turning around M -ucation, and.we would be far rnore'~
the hastily-;,announced policy. of sanguine about the cost if we felt;
Appro r leate-2p pIf1f0712'r-- "dF l- tba4 '~2b~0U04'6.E G1R%re
1, mm rea ofreigri'and de= Elan-one school of thought
.--.::`-:yi:,.:~~.~+."a'_i.c?.ca-.~:af~_ t r~.~r@?tw+ili:,C ,.py'`s"'^ +~'+~