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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP90-01 ARTICLE APn ON PAGE ___ INTERNATIONAL COMBAT ARMS November 1985 The international intelligence operating techniques of the CIA and the KGB leave many experts wondering, who really is winning? By Gregg Lightbody E spionage is a battle in which almost every country in the world takes part ... whether they admit to it or not! Its history dates back to biblical times in Egypt and the 6th century B.C. in Chi- na. Though many nations declare espio- nage an illegal activity, most of them have government bureaus that engage in this un- dercover war. Whether they're called intel- ligence organizations, the security service, military, intelligence, committee for state security or the secret state police, they of- ten have the same intelligence gathering duties. Israel has their Mossad organiza- tion, France has the Second Bureau and the SDECE, Bulgaria has the Dajnavna Si- gurnost and Britain has the SIS and M16. The two largest combatants in this clandes- tine warfare are, not suprisingly, the Soviet., Union's KGB and the United States' CIA. The roots of the Central Intelligence Agency go back to 1942, founded during World War II when President Roosevelt established the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) to collect and analyze strategic war- time intelligence information required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. After the war, in 1945, President Truman closed the bureau on the grounds that intelligence operations had no place in peacetime. This peacetime euphoria, however, was very short-lived. Congress became alarmed by the escalating cold war campaign of espionage, subver- sion and hostility directed from the Krem- lin. So, in 1947, Congress passed the Na- tional Security Act, which established the CIA under the authority of the National Security Council (NSC). The CIA has little domestic involvement (with the exception of directives from the NSC regarding mat- ters of national security), leaving counter- espionage duties in the United States up to the FBI. Today, the CIA headquarters building is located in Langley, Virginia. The current Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) is William Casey, a member of the 1943 war- time staff of William Donovan, founder of the OSS. While the DCI is head of the CIA, he is also the leader of the larger U.S. Intelligence Community. This community is made up of 11 separate executive branch agencies and organizations that conduct a variety of intelligence activities and include Department of Defense elements such as the National Security Agency (NSA) and other groups such as the State and Treas- ury Departments. Current CIA organizational charts list five deputy directors; four of them repre- sent a major arm of the CIA: operations, science and technology, adminstration, and intelligence. The operations arm collects foreign intelligence largely through secret means and carries out counterintelligence abroad. Science and technology collects and processes information gathered by technical collecting systems,and is in charge of developing more advanced equip- ment to improve the process. The adminis- tration arm handles the daily administra- tion and security of the organization. The intelligence branch is the largest of the four arms and is the Director's principal adviser on the production of national and interna- tional intelligence. Offices in this branch research and analyze major geographical areas of the world. No accurate figure per- taining to the CIA's budget or number of agents is available to the public. Unlike the decentralized intelligence community of the U.S., the Soviet Union's intelligence organization is almost com- pletely centralized in the Komitet Gosu- darstvennoe Bezopasnosti (KGB) or Com- mittee for State Security. The KGB in- vades every aspect of Soviet life, with ex- pansive powers both at home and abroad. There are KGB officers in the armed serv- ices as well as the rival Soviet military in- telligence service Glavnoye Razvedyvatel- noye Upravleniye (GRU). Unlike the U.S. effort, Soviet intelligence forces have been viable since Czarist police sentenced internal dissidents to Siberian la- bor camps. The Soviets, though, have de- vised a policy to change the name of their security organization when the old name begins to connotate too sinister an image. Since the 1917 Bolshevik revolution, the original CHEKA (Extraordinary Commis- sion for Combating Counterrevolution and Espionage) organization was used as a weapon against Russian people and non- communist nations under the euphemisms GPU (1922-23), OGPU (1923-34), NKVD (1934-46), MVD (1946-54) and, finally, the KGB (1954-present). The KGB headquarters is located in Moscow's Dzerzhinsky Square, about two blocks from the Kremlin. The rear of the building houses the Lubyanka Prison for political prisoners, made infamous as the a~,+!( -111~ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP90-01208R000100030012-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP90-01208R000100030012-7 capital's extermination center during Sta- lin's ruthless regime. The KGB's foreign operations division is housed off the 12- lane Moscow Ring Road, while another administration building is located in Ma- chovaya Ulitza. Commanding the KGB is Viktor Chebrikov, an ex-army general who succeeded Yuri Andropov to the top KGB job and a recently elected member of the ruling Soviet Politburo. The KGB is divided into four chief directorates, nine independent directorates and six independent departments. While most of the KGB's duties deal with inter- nal Soviet security in one form or another (three of the four chief directorates deal with internal security, border security and political, religious and ethnic dissent), the First Chief Directorate is responsible for most of its foreign operations and overseas espionage. Infiltration of Soviet spies into Western and third world countries is divid- ed into 10 departments that are responsible for certain geographic areas. Other depart- ments in the First Directorate are more blocks from the Kremlin. The Department A, or Disinformation Service, is charged with the responsibility for spreading Soviet propaganda, half-truths and lies. Our nation's capital-Washington, D.C.-is a hot-bed for ongoing Soviet KGB espio- nage. These special antennae atop the Russian Embassy in Washington are not there tO receive their favorite TV shows, but are used to transmit back to Russia! specialized to support the aims of the KGB; these are Dept. A (the disinforma- tion service that's charged with spreading propaganda and mistruths) and Dept. V (often called the Executive Action depart- ment), where assassins and saboteurs re- ceive specialized training. Estimates of the KGB's budget and agent strength are al- most as difficult to ascertain as the CIA's. The KGB, however, is thought to have an overall strength approaching half a million people, which is several times the size of all U.S. intelligence agencies. TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES Ensuing current operations of any intel- ligence organization is like pulling teeth. Nobody really wants to get specific about what they do. There's a lot they don't want to talk about for fear of jeopardizing agents or specific operations. Tight operational se- curity is based on a "need-to-know" princi- ple. Some methods, though, are basic. The majority of intelligence gathering operations (some 80 percent) is available from open sources. The KGB's greatest as- set in the U.S. is our nation's accessible so- ciety. We are so accessible, in fact, that the Soviets can glean upwards of 90 percent of their intelligence from nonclassified docu- ments, technical publications, educational seminars and industrial trade shows. Some publications are so valuable in analysis and technical military programs that they are flown immediately to Moscow and are even translated en route! The remaining 10 to 20 percent of infor- mation necessary for the operation of an intelligence agency is obtained through clandestine espionage activities. The man- ner in which secret information is obtained and the extent of these practices runs the gamut from payoffs, sexual exploitation, blackmail and violence, to technological eavesdropping and everything in between. Both sides actively seek to plant agents and operatives inside one another's spy Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP90-01208R000100030012-7 L 1 _~_IiL-iILLJ1Ll -LII L-L__ --- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 CIA-RDP90-01208R000100030012-7 The Undercover SPY War services and political machines. The vigor and methods used to obtain espionage goals depend mostly on what will achieve desired aims and how badly either opera- tion wants them. The KGB's advantage here is that they don't have to answer to the citizenry, nor do they have to face limi- tations from Congressional committees as the CIA does. Both sides claim successes in the espio- nage game, but both have also suffered de- feats. In the U.S. we hear mostly about the defeats of our bureau because they make the biggest headlines. The successes may not even be known to the public, depend- ing on their proximity and sensitivity to foreign governments. In this undercover world of spy vs. spy, few can say which side is coming out on top. Internally, the KGB61as an extremely free hand to deal with dissenters from the Soviet system. In Stalin's time, they would be shot. Today, the KGB may hold a mock state trial, which will either rule the defen- dant guilty and sentence him to a concen- tration camp, or find him insane and ship him off to a mental institution. In these in- stitutions, "patients" are treated for para- noid and schizophrenic delusions of re- forming society. For visitors to the Soviet Union, the need for cautious behavior cannot be over- emphasized. KGB officials begin to keep track of 'your travels and itinerary long be- fore a foreigner is allowed into the country. The day a visa application for travel to the U.S.S.R. is received by Soviet officials, the investigation begins. The visa application may be accompanied by a report from the KGB Residency. in the country where it is submitted and referred to an evaluating of- ficer in the 7th (tourist) department of the Second Chief Directorate. Files are checked and any information the KGB has on the applicant is routed through appro- priate departments. For instance, the Sci- entific and Technical Directorate is briefed about visits by scientists, the Industrial Se- curity Directorate about visits by business- men and the Disinformation department may be alerted about journalists. If a visa is granted, the KGB may decide to influence, attempt to recruit the traveler as an agent or merely watch him. Surveil- lance of visitors is facilitated by the imposi- tion of an extremely strict itinerary, where significant deviations are prohibited. Asso- ciating with Soviet citizens will be ar- ranged by the KGB, so encounters with common citizens are unlikely. If the KGB has more than a routine in- terest in a foreigner, the surveillance is much more thorough. A photograph is se- cretly taken at the point of entry, and the picture precedes the visitor by wire photo Today, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is headquartered in a heavily guarded facility in Langley, Virginia. No exact count of agents is ever made public! wherever he goes. Restaurants, hotels and meeting places are alerted to keep an eye on the subject. Along with the standard microphones planted in the hotel room, they may install daytime and infrared cam- eras to record his actions in the dark. Paint and powdered tracing chemicals (invisible to the eye) may be introduced to the visi- tor's clothes and pockets to mark letters which the post office can detect. In recruitment operations, the KGB will try to involve the foreigner in activities ille- Mr. William Casey is the current Direc- tor of Central Intelligence (DCI) and is head of the entire intelligence community. gal to the state such as black market mon- ey trading, correspondence smuggling, professional or personal favors, heterosex- ual or homosexual blackmail or other em- barrassing circumstances. The subject is then convinced that the only way he can extricate himself is by cooperating with the Soviet authorities. They may then opt to dismiss his indiscretions. The foreigner may be held incommunicado while special- ists extract technical details of the subject's work and/or extort pledges to become a spy for them in the future. Suspect foreigners are subject to hun- dreds of ploys such as being drugged while their accommodations or person are searched. One textbook incident involved a married American politician who was drugged. When he regained consciousness, the American was confronted by an agent with compromising photos of him and an unidentified woman engaged in sex. He was told to cooperate or his political career would be ruined with the released photos. Outside the Soviet Union, the KGB can- not afford to be so blatant in a suspicious world. The old notion of awkward spies with thick accents in trenchcoats and ill- fitting suits no longer applies. Many Sovi- ets are in foreign countries under the guise of diplomatic status. KGB and GRU per- sonnel account for up to 90 percent of em- bassy officials. Their cover is their diplo- matic standing. Should they be caught at the business of espionage, they routinely claim diplomatic immunity and usually leave the country, declared persona non grata by the host nation. It's a two way Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP90-01208R000100030012-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 CIA-RDP90-01208R000100030012-7 National Intelligence Council General Counsel Inspector General Office of Legislative Liaison Director of Central Intelligence Command Responsibilities Public Affair s Office Equal Employment Opportunity DEPUTY DIRECTOR for OPERATIONS DEPUTY DIRECTOR for SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY Office of Research & Development Office of Development & Engineering Foreign Broadcast Information Service Office of SIGINT Operations The Intelligence Community Office of Technical Service 4 National Photographic Interpretation Center DIRECTOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF DEPUTY DIRECTOR for INTELLIGENCE Office of Soviet Analysis Office of European Analysis ffice of New Eastern & South Asian Analysis Office of East Asian Analysis Office of African b Latin American Anal sis Department of Defense Elements Departmental Intelligence Elements (Other than DOD) Independent Agency Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP90-01208R000100030012-7 DDCI Office of Scientific and Weapons Rewarch Office of Imagery Analysis Office of Current Production and Analytic Support Office of Central Reference DEPUTY DIRECTOR for ADMINISTRATION street, since Moscow may retaliate by de- porting a U.S. diplomat as well. Many agents aren't Russian at all, but legal citizens of the country in which they serve. This allows the agent broader access to classified and sensitive material. Their introduction into the world of espionage may be forced and cajoled through similar methods of sexual blackmail as previously described, or it could be the result of an in- dividual choice, as was true of ex-TRW employee Christopher Boyce, former Nor- throp engineer Thomas Cavanagh, or the latest headline grabber-the "all in the family" spy case of John Walker. In the Boyce case, Boyce contacted the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City with the aid of a drug dealing friend. Through some convoluted sense of morality and, adven- ture, Boyce sought to aid the Soviets with satellite research information. In the Cavanagh case, the Northrop employee tried to contact the Soviets' San Francisco Consulate, willing to sell U.S. research and technological plans for the "Stealth" bomber for $25,000. Cavanagh was appre- hended immediately because of the FBI's contact program of Soviet and Soviet bloc facilities surveillance. Boyce continued his espionage activities for quite some time due 41 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP90-01208R000100030012-7 The Undercover SPY War One of the latest Soviet espionage success stories centers around "all in the family" John Walker spy case that may have very seriously damaged and compromised U.S. Navy submarine detection oper- ations and possibly brought about radical changes in the way Soviet subs operate on a mission. to a lack of aerospace company security and the inherent wariness of his drug smuggling comrade. In KGB-inspired espionage cases, the methods of recruiting an indigenous agent are often limited in creativity exploiting ba- sic human weaknesses of sexual desire, re- venge, adventure-most commonly money, as we see in the Walker case. The KGB regularly haunts bars near military instal- lations and facilities and approaches people in susceptible positions. Over a short time, they will prey on the vascillating feelings of the informer. Easily obtained credit infor- mation will give the recruiter a list of overextended and debt-ridden prospects. They are then approached with financial offers in return for information. One transaction of seemingly worthless nonclassified material may seem like a harmless act to the would-be traitor. That first transaction, however, is secretly pho- tographed and can subsequently be used for blackmail purposes. Similarly, a darker side of these relation- ships exists as well. A former Hughes engi- neer, entrapped with large sums of money by Polish agents, said he was shown photo- graphs of his ex-wife and son. Another agent informed him that "our security de- pends on each other and that if anybody got out of line (he'd) take care of them." In addition to these engineer spies are pene- trative moles-clerks, runners, secretaries- who may work for an organization for years without detection. Rather than work- ing from the outside to obtain secrets, they are accepted members of the team, con- stantly exporting secrets. Why a person would turn to espionage is open to psychological questioning. Once they've consented to spy, though, many are consoled with the supportive rationale that they are valuable public servants who should be praised for helping both sides avoid surprises and helping to deter war. The ideological motives applied to this are designed to give the informant moral strength to continue the "noble" work of selling out his country. More sophisticated methods of espio- nage will never completely replace the tra- ditional spy, but state-of-the-art practices can only improve with technological ad- vances. With the growth of complex elec- tronic eavesdropping -methods, the KGB can monitor telephone conversations di- aled from specific phone numbers in a building and other "over-the-air" unse- cured communications. One look on the top of the new Soviet Embassy complex in Washington, D.C., shows a vast array of sophisticated antennae trained on nearby communications facilities. Their new facility is 350 feet above sea level with a commanding view of the entire Washington area and a clear line of sight to the State Department, the White House, the Pentagon. Commerce Department and a number of important foreign compounds, including the British, West German and French Embassies. Even the CIA head- quarters in Langley is partially in electron- ic view along with key microwave relay towers for telephone and data-transmission communications from Washington to other cities on the East Coast. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have both in- vested billions of dollars to try and inter- cept the communications of the other. Much of this, is done from reconnaissance satellites which hover over a country in a stationary orbit position. Reports of being able to read license plates of arriving and departing vehicles may or may not be exag- gerated at this time, but these satellites are only the first salvos in the growing com- plexity of electronic visual and communi- cation eavesdropping. Despite the cautions of outdoor dis- course to avoid eavesdropping methods, conversations of persons walking may still be subject to electronic surveillance Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP90-01208R000100030012-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP90-01208R000100030012-7 through the use of long-distance video cameras, lenses and "long-throw" listening devices. Gathering communications signals is such a valuable part of intelligence gather- ing that KGB collection vehicles (in the guise of fishing trawlers) dog most U.S. na- val exercises to monitor radio communica- tions and any relayed test data. They also appear at coincidental times and places in world ports. Once stolen secrets or materials are in the hands of the spy, clandestine methods are used to relay the information to the right people for transportation to appropri- ate headquarters. Elaborate hand-to-hand relays between five or six persons in a Sophisticated methods of spying will never replace the traditional "cloak and dagger" technique, but new com- plex seeing devices and listening equipment, etc., are mak- ing it even easier for the KGB to spy on U.S. interests. crowded meeting place may be used when surveillance is suspected. Often, though, a dead drop or "post box" hiding place is used to exchange information or orders. Getting the information out of the coun- try presents another problem. If the mate- rial is a written message. it can be encoded into ciphers, other elaborate codes or a telephone screech. (An ordinary tape-re- corded message can be sped up so that it sounds like a high-pitched whine. The sender plays the tape in the background as he carries on an ordinary telephone con- versation. A tape recorder on the other end records it at the same speed it was trans- mitted and then slows it down in order to decipher the message.) working with information gathered from a variety of sources. including spy satel- lite photos such as this one showing missiles in Cuba in 1962, the CIA strives to keep tabs on what the "other" side is doing that could affect our nation's security. Diplomatic pouches, secret compart- ments, secret inks, microfilm and micro- dots are also used to smuggle out valuable information. Microfilm fits nicely at the bottom of a pack of cigarettes. The immu- nity of diplomatic baggage has even been used to smuggle out people (double agents who refuse to return to the motherland). Large steamer trunks so marked have been found to contain bound people. One of the most frustrating forms of es- pionage that has surfaced during the last decade is the export of embargoed. techno- logically advanced machinery and scientif- ic secrets. Export inspections have been beefed up recently, but there are many vul- turesque businessmen who don't hesitate to make fast money by shipping advanced technology with misleading manifest labels to hostile countries by a network of phoney front organizations. Top-secret computers and electronic equipment capable of mili- tary use are leaking into the hands of the Soviets at an ever increasing rate. Lenin's quote about hanging the West with the very rope they've sold the U.S.S.R. is no laughing matter. Of all the KGB organizations designed to secure information and enforce control, none is more sinister and vicious than their Executive Action Department within the First Directorate. Disbanded and re- grouped many times under a variety of names, including Dept. V, Dept. 13 and SMERSH (an acronym for the Russian phrase meaning "death to spies"), they are responsible.for the "wet (bloody) affairs" of the KGB's organization. Assassins are trained at a spy school off of Metrostroev- skaya Street in Moscow and are later trans- ferred to a country farm at Kuchino, just outside Moscow. Here, training is specialized in the use of poisons and drugs which will give the im- pression of death by natural causes. SMERSH is credited with several well- known assassinations. including Leon. Trotsky's death by an ice ax to the head and the prussiate acid (a salt of hydrocyan- ic acid) deaths of Ukranian nationalists Lev Rebet and Stefan Bandera. In 1978, Bulgarian Georgi Markov was assassinated on a London street by a puncturing um- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP90-01208R000100030012-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP90-01208R000100030012-7 The Undercover SPY War brella tipped with a tiny metal ball. The Objective latinu d i idi ll p m an r um ba measured 1.52 mm in diameter. Two pin-tip holes sealed with wax released the toxic content, ricin (one of the five most toxic substances in the world), once the ball was under Markov's skin. He died within four days. This divi- sion is also thought to have worked with the Dajnavna Sigurnost (Bulgarian Secret Police) in masterminding the shooting of the Pope in 1981. CIA OPERATIONS Naivete was the reason the OSS was dis- banded after WWII. The belief that our ad- versaries would "play by the rules" was as- saulted in the two years before the NSA was established and the CIA was created in 1947. By the mid-'50s, American foreign policy and CIA intelligence operations be- came increasingly global. The unrest that the U.S.S.R. was rousing, the rising tide of revolutionary and "liberation" actions, Mideast tensions, trouble in the Indochina states, events in the Congo and Castro's revolutionary plans for Latin America all required day-to-day intelligence coverage of behind-the-scenes activities of both friendly and unfriendly governments. Reporting on many CIA operations is speculative. Those that fail get a lot of me- dia attention, and those that succeed are often handled so gracefully that they may never be known. While CIA tactics are similar to the KGB's and espionage max- ims worldwide, the CIA has no depart- ment for assassinations that compares to Dept. V of the KGB's First Directorate. Covert action operations intended to influ- ence foreign regimes, however, are not lim- ited to either side. In addition to its infor- mation gathering missions, the CIA's duties have expanded under the Reagan Administration to combat the Soviet theft of U.S. technology, international terrorism and drug trafficking. The CIA has done a lot to combat.the Soviets' primary means of gaining U.S. technology by establishing a Technology Transfer Assessment Center that analyzes what Moscow's tech needs are and how they may attempt to get them. The Soviets have saved billions of dollars in research and development monitoring Western tech- nological developments and then stealing them. Moves have been made to better co- ordinate the FBI's counterintelligence or- ganization with the CIA and the U.S. Cus- toms Service in an effort to plug the legal and illegal export of high-tech equipment. International terrorist organizations are receiving more scrutiny from the CIA than ever before. There is movement toward creating an interpol-type data base with friendly countries to form an anti-terrorist information network to combat suspected terrorists. Special units of skilled agents are Homing Overlay Experiment (HOE) ? Demonstrate Exoatmospheric Homing & NNK Stage Separation set up and ready to perform worldwide on short notice in support of local authorities, should an incident occur. It has been known for a long time that the illegal drug market has helped finance communist guerrilla action worldwide. In- formation garnered by the CIA on narcot- ics industry methods of laundering drug money overseas and estimating the size of marijuana and opium crops through the use of surveillance satellites is beginning to pay off. The hefty 580 billion-a-year nar- cotics trade is starting to feel pressure from the combined efforts of the CIA, Drug En- forcement Agency (DEA), Customs De- partment and the State Department. Infor- mation leading to the arrest of the Chief Minister and other cabinet officials of the Caribbean island colonies of Turks and Caicos Islands came from DEA and CIA cooperation. CIA activities along the Bur- ma-Thailand border, the "golden triangle" of opium; production, are helping to stem the flow of illegal drugs from that area. Internally, the CIA's position is that they have no domestic involvement and One area in which the KGB is expending a lot of effort is in the a- rena of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) or "Star Wars." ICA was told by one spokes- man for the Pentagon that it is the "Soviet spy's 0 t target." Pro- grams such as the Hom- ing Overlay Experiment, where the "net" war- head (left) actually intercepted a missile in space (above right), is of great interest! leave counterintelligence up to the FBI. It's the FBI's responsibility to follow the affairs of visiting Soviets and diplomats of other countries. The CIA, however, is au- thorized by the charter of the NSC to fol- low internal directives to provide for na- tional security. The CIA is also alerted to the visa appli- cations of visiting foreigners. Before the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics, a number of foreign "trainers" traveling with their teams to the summer games received healthy skepticism from the agency. Some were refused entry into the U.S. due to their questionable backgrounds. Because of the U.S.S.R.'s closed society, where public information is not printed in volumes as it is in the West, more emphasis is given to espionage activities and the placement and recruitment of informants and agents. The CIA has been fortunate in the area of recruiting dissenters from the Soviet system. An increasing number of valuable defectors have provided insight into the operations of the KGB, Eastern European countries and the Kremlin. b&W Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP90-01208R000100030012-7 __I j U LJ I iii i Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP90-01208R000100030012-7 e. Indoctrinated agents of both countries have occasionally chosen to split ranks and break with their espionage systems to join the other side-and it's not always money that entices them to defect. It's more than interesting to record, though, that the CIA is the winner more often than the KGB in this defection game. All kinds of conclusions can be drawn from this proportion, but time and again, defecting Soviet agents cite a hypocritical attitude in high communist authorities and a brutal disregard for the dignities of hu- man existence. These denunciations are so strong that they imply a hatred of the sys- tem from which they come. It's safe to say that neither side will ever really "win" this undercover war of spy vs. spy. Information objectives are short-lived victories that may or may not lead to stra- tegic and tactical victories. While each side practices their own brand of warfare, with differing moral standards, the goal is the same: learn as much as you can about the other side, anticipate their moves and counter without blowing your cover. N One of the premiere informants in the Western world was GRU Colonel Oleg Penkovskiy, who gave valuable informa- tion on the operations of the Kremlin dur- ing the threatened Berlin showdown of 1961 and the Cuban missile threat of 1962. Penkovskiy and more recent informants such as U.N. Diplomat Arkady Shevchen- ko were neither paid agents nor ordinary defectors. They were two intelligent and high-ranking officials who detested the way their government did business. They sought to alter the balance of that system as best they could. The CIA is back on its feet again, revi- talized after embarrassing revelations and excesses in the 1970s and short-sighted cut- backs under previous White House ad- ministrations. The clearest sign of the CIA's revitalization is its progress in pro- viding National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) for analyzing world issues. These estimates have become more accurate and are completed for congressional and ad- ministration review more rapidly than be- fore. They also give more credence to con- flicting opinions within the agency. Among the most controversial, and sometimes crucial operations of the CIA, are covert actions designed to affect the af- fairs of foreign governments. Assistance for guns and ammunition in Afghanistan continues, as does open assistance to the Contras of Central America. Many agency employees may not advocate covert opera- tions of this sort, but there must be an al- ternative course of action between a faulty democracy and calling out the Marines. IS EITHER SIDE WINNING? The spooky world of the CIA & KGB is interfused with, shadowy agents, lies, dou- ble agents and dirty tricks. Agents on both sides are sworn to do what is necessary to ensure their country's success, as under- handed or illegal as their methods may be. Atomic weapons, lasers, particle beams, communications satellites or any new system that the U.S. military is developing is going to remain a prime target for the KGB and any "traitorous" spies they can enlist. Needless to say, the teeth are being put back into the CIA in order to combat this ever-growing problem. --iii Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP90-01208R000100030012-7