Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
February 22, 2011
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
September 14, 1982
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP90-01208R000100060018-8.pdf65.3 KB
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP90-01208R000100060018-8 ART 'ICL 2PEARED ON PAG __&__ .'ASHL GT0:'i TADS 14 SEFTEM3ER 1982 NURNT14 LEIBSTONE CIA's Casey gets good marks W hen Bill Casey became CIA chief and Max Hugel head of the CIA's clandestine services, critics balked at their lack of experience. Hugel quit last sum- mer because of past doings, but Casey, after Senate examination of his business affairs, is still around. Mr. Casey has to provide the presi- dent a coherent view of the world. Tb do this, CIA analysts develop truth and speculation from information sent by agents or spy-machinery. Except for a January 1981 overdra- matization of weapons reaching the Salvadoran left, Mr. Casey has received good marks. There have not been repeats of such CIA jaux- pas as election rigging in Chile, con- fidence in the Shah of Iran, or misperceptions of Soviet behavior toward Afghanistan. And there have been few White House, State or Defense Department complaints about CIA documents. About all critics have of late is the Wilson-Terpil matter, an account of gun running and Libyan terrorism involving former CIA agents, which is pre-Casey stuff anyhow. If the CIA is doing well, though, is it because of Bill Casey's leadership, or is there another, perhaps more important reason? True, Mr. Casey's predecessors captained the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion, illegal spying of anti-war notables, excessive LSD experi- Marvin Leibstone, a former Army officer, is a Washington-based col- umnist: ments. Congress had the good sense to urge them to "fess up!" Some, like Richard Helms and Bill Colby, were dragged through the fires of criticism mercilessly.But too often, CIA's critics home in on broken branches while blaming the wrong tree. For example, it was President Johnson who kept returning Vietnam assessments to the CIA to have thgm reflect not truth but his politics regarding the war. It was Johnson and Nixon who ordered the CIA to spy on anti-war activities in Chicago and Washington, and Nixon who suggested dirty tricks inChile.It was Jimmy Carter's indifference to CIA capabilities that prevented tougher assessments of Iran's pre-Khomeini instability. Presidents are much to blame, it seems, for an intelligence. commun- ity's wrongdoings. Yet today's much. improved CIA performance not only results from Mr. Casey's doings, but also from a relationship that exists between him and his boss, the president. Whether President Reagan is guid- ing Director Casey or allowing him the widest of parameters is of less concern than the question of presi- dential politicalization of Mr. Casey and the CIA. The president has derv- onstrated little interest in using the CIA to support foreign policy notions or political need, and that is cer- tainly among key reasons why, today, the CIA receives better grades. Probably the non-political presi- dent-CIA relationship is the most important managerial requirement for an effective intelligence program il ... 1 . Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP90-01208R000100060018-8 '