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December 22, 2016
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March 3, 1980
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In STAT 03 PAGA j 4? N HIS STATE OF THE UNION All- 1- J, All Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP90-01208R000100070041-1 ~... M .i,},t:,::ri, NEW YORK MAUALINE dress, President Carter called for the end of unwarranted restric- tions. on American intelligence agencies. "An effective intelli- gence capability," he said, "is vital to our nation's security." Although the remark drew an ovation, there have been no dramatic initiatives from the Carter administration to revitalize what is generally considered to be a demoral- ized and often dangerously ineffective American intelligence community. Yet the president's words demonstrate that the mood of the administration-and with it, by all indications, that of the country-has changed dramatically from the time when the Central Intelligence Agency was considered to be a "rogue elephant" dangerously out of control. 3 March 1980 What is required to realize the presi- dent's goals? According to those who By Michael Ledee - have spent their lives in and around the intelligence business, the primary requirement is a change in the domes- tic attitude toward the CIA. Such per- sons-including former directors and top officials of the agency-say the CIA must be freed from some of the more exaggerated forms of congressional scrutiny, such as the Hughes-Ryan` Amendment, which gives more than 200 senators and staff members ac- cess to agency data. They also urge that those members of government and the media who have harassed the intelligence community for the past half decade must now recognize that a vi- able intelligence agency is urgently needed. And, they say, the agency and the. intelligence community as a whole badly need the finest possible leader- ship, both from the White House and from the office of the director of central intelligence (DCI). That post is cur- rently occupied by Admiral Stansfield Turner, and in the view of an impres- sive number of intelligence experts, Admiral Turner is not able to lead the CIA back to respectability. ITHIN MONTHS OF HIS 1977 appointment. as DCI, Stansfield Turner had acquired the nick-.. name "Captain Queeg" in CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia. One morning in January 1979, he came to work to find the bulletin boards and mailboxes full of a forged edition of his own "Notes From the Director." Dated January 15, it has become an round classic in the intelli under e ce g g n ! community: StansfieldTurne~ critics sa has office fairly exhausted last ' ~y ~ evening atter stopping ork at 10 p As demoralized politicized E le ~ ? ti~' ism wont ont after a long day, I asked ed the ~ Michael Ledeen is executive editor of The Washington Quarterly. GO 1 _ r Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP90-01208R000100070041-1 u1L 9 1 _-I 1L l...l i ILL I Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP90-01208R000100070041-1 oteward to bring me a bowl of strawberries and cream. He's a good enough fellow- if a bit shiftless-and it wasn't long before he shuffled back to report that someone had stolen the strawberries from my re- frigerator. It was my hardest blow since coming here ... but I did without. I could leave it at that. After all a new supply of strawberries can be purchased. But it's not that simple. I deem this a personal attack by someone who knew of my propensity for the fruit, using innocent strawberries to get at me. I am therefore ordering that until the strawberries are returned to my refrigera- tor, no one will leave the building. The General Services Administration will be asked to augment meal service while we wait. As an added stimulus I am riffing 100 people per day until the wrong is righted. Any person helping to identify the thief will, beside an immediate qual- ity step increase, be given a pair of stain- less steel spheres similar to those I use for thinking the unpalatable thoughts our Communist adversaries force us to think. at Langley-has largely confirmed this gloomy analysis. Leading CIA offi- cials-some of whom have left only within recent months, and others who are in the process of leaving -say that Turner has done more harm to the CIA than all the recent congressional investigations combined. And it is difficult finding any Turner supporters. When I asked National Security Council press man Jerry Schecter to arrange some interviews for me with NSC officials and staffers, he called hack a few days later to say that nobody wanted to discuss the CIA, and Admiral Turner. Not for the record, not on background, no way at all. Later, when I advised the CIA's information office that I had been given a great quantity of infor- mation critical of Admiral Turner, and that I would like. to go over it with agency officials in an effort to get amore rounded picture, I was permitted to speak with just one man: Bruce Clarke, the elegant and erudite head of the National Foreign Assessment Center. But Clarke is only recently re- turned to the CIA after five years in Vienna and thus is in no position to evaluate Turner in context. And I was not even permitted to be alone with Clarke; Director of Public Affairs Herbert Hetu, a man with a reputation for loyalty to the admiral, sat in. Simi- larly, during the interview with Turner himself, three assistants-including the redoubtable Hetu-were at the table. I encountered a similar reluctance to discuss Turner in the intelligence com- mittees of Congress. Senate Select Com- mittee on Intelligence Chairman Birch Bayh was not available for comment, nor was Staff Director William Miller. In short; Turner's critics are talking, while his allies-if there are any-are lying low. The charges against Turner are seri- ous "ones. According to his critics he has. undermined the morale of the in- telligence community, wantonly and ar- bitrarily fired hundreds of valuable offi- cers, presided over a steady decline in the quality of intelligence, and politi. cized much of the information flowing from Langley to the White House. - I will keep you informed on our prog- ress in this as we move along. Chances are the pinko commie strawberry-fetish fink will see the error of his ways and surrender. I'd almost bet my Navy pension on it. Finally and again, I feel some re- morse in having to do this but national security is hardball and not for softies. The admiral did not find the docu- ment amusing, and he ordered the CIA Security Office to find the persons re- sponsible-a task which has proved a failure. But as Turner must have real- ized, the forgery reflected the conviction of a large number of agency officials past and present that. the former ad- miral is the wrong man for the job, and that he should be removed before fur- ther serious, even irreparable, damage is done to the CIA. My own investigation-including an hour-long conversation with Turner in his office at CIA headquarters HEN HE ARRIVED IN the spring of 1977, Turner found a memo- Turner has resisted ind~p~nden checks and balances on spying randutn left behind by the survivors of the last year of the Nixon-Ford period. Drafted by Bill Nelson (a top officer in the DDO-the .Directorate of Operations, that director. ate concerned with clandestine activity), the memo claimed that there had been a "Vietnam bulge" in the clandes- tine services. Nelson has accordingly Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP90-01208R000100070041-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP90-01208R000100070041-1 argued that several hundred agents -could be phased out of the clandestine side without any substantial damage to the CIA's effectiveness. In fact, no such "bulge" existed-or ever had. The size of the Operations Directorate's Far East Division increased enormously during the Vietnam war, along with the size of that division's overseas contingents, in Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand. But this increase in manpower was achieved primarily by depleting the ranks of the other divisions of the clandestine services. Overall, the strength of the clandestine services actually 'declined during the decade 1965-75. Stansfield Turner may not have known all this, and in any event most observers agree that the clandestine services were overstaffed when Turner came aboard. But some of his more re- lentless critics have argued that Turner accepted the conclusions of the Nelson memo because they fitted so nicely with the political mood of the early days of the Carter administration. The admiral denied this to me with con- siderable intensity, and he was almost certainly telling the truth. For had Turner wished to perform a politically acceptable purge of the ranks of the clandestine services, he would not have done it as he did. Nelson had proposed that the number of clandestine officers be reduced grad- ually over a five-year period. Turner did it -in two years. And he did it in a way calculated to produce great re- sentment at the agency itself. For in- stead of entrusting the task to the various divisions, Turner turned the matter over to the personnel office, with instructions to computerize the process and thin out the ranks of the senior people to make room for younger men and women to move up. . Computerized profiles were used to draw up the lists of those who were to be compelled to leave. All officers, in each grade level, were competitively ranked by the computerized formulas. From each grade level, including the highest (GS-18), a number of victims were chosen. In November 1978, these unlucky souls received pink slips signed not by Turner but by William Wells, then DDO. Wells himself was then fired as DDO partly because of the fallout from the purge. Turner told me he was "aghast" when he saw the harsh, terse letter that went out to the persons on the com- puterized hit list, and he says he toyed with the idea of issuing a second, more gentle note. He also told me that he was not intimately involved in the procedures that led to the selection of the names, and that he had received no complaints from the agency's senior ranks prior to the actual firings. In fact, the purge was not a total. surprise, for Turner had conducted two extended briefings on the matter in August, in the secure "bubble" at Langley. On each occasion the house was full: 500 persons at a time. Yet, he claims, not a single senior official in the DDO told him not to proceed. Others in the CIA tell a different story. Two senior officials say 'they personally implored Turner to adopt a more traditional method of reducing the number of officials in the clandes- tine services. Moreover, according to these and other sources, Turner was intimately involved in the process from beginning to end. This was not the first time in the agency's history that a new DCI had wielded his authority like a Sword of Damocles over the heads of his employ- ees, but Turner's approach-whichever version is correct-was quite different At the ClAsVirginia headquarters, some call Turner "Captain Queeg." from the earlier ones. Even James Schlesinger, whose purge in his brief tenure at Langley is still legendary, had the good sense to assign the selection of the victims to other intelligence offi- cers, not a computer. While there was great resentment of Schlesinger's ac- tions, there was consequently a general appreciation of his methods, since the implementation of someeof Schlesinger's cuts was tempered by the more com- passionate judgment of some of his senior subordinates, notably his direc- tor of personnel. With Turner, the hu- man touch was far more distant. OfFi- ?cers with years of experience were summarily dismissed without the slight- est flexibility. Men a few months short of higher pension levels were thrown out, although no one within two years of retirement was fired. The Turner purge was not simply the result of a misunderstanding about COST l~t}~",~ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP90-01208R000100070041-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP90-01208R000100070041-1 the "Vietnam bulge," for the admiral had been approached by a group of younger officers claiming that channels for advancement in the clandestine serv- ices had been blocked for years by the "old-boy network." Turner took these complaints seriously, and one of the reasons for the purge was his sin- cere conviction that it was necessary to provide greater opportunities for the younger officers. While the motive is an admirable one, the analysis turned out to be unfounded: Last year one of the country's top management-consult- ancy firms was asked to look at the personnel policies of the clandestine services, and these policies were pro- nounced outstanding. Thus, two ma- jor motives for the great purge-the Vietnam bulge and the ' theory of favoritism in the clandestine services-- were both unfounded. . The realization. that Turner's actions were based upon misunderstandings and misconceptions only heightened the bitterness toward him, especially among senior officers. But even in the middle and lower ranks, morale was badly undermined, for they saw officials struck down who were among the finest persons at the CIA. In one cele- brated case, for example, the computers printed out the name of one of the top clandestine operatives in Western Eu- rope, a man who was on a first-name basis with many chiefs of state and heads of government, and who had been operating successfully for over twenty years. When challenged on that particular selection, the admiral an- nounced that he would not overrule the computer. By last October, over 800 positions had been closed down in the clandestine services, and more than 1,100 persons had been driven from the ranks. And even though Turner says that only 160 people left involuntarily, one must wonder if some of these per- sons are not sufficiently angry to coop- erate with the agency's enemies.. URNER HAS LONG BEEN known as an aloof, almost unapproachable, individual when it comes to dealing with people. When he was in charge of NATO's south- ern . command in Naples, Turner was notoriously awkward in dealing with his subordinates. When it was learned that Turner had been re- called to Washington early in 1977 by Carter, his navy colleagues told any- one who cartd to listen that they hoped the admiral would not end up on the joint Chiefs of Staff or back in their service. Most damaging of all to the morale of the CIA has been Turner's insensi- tivity toward some of the agency's most talented and experienced members. Late last summer, on successive Fri- days, there were retirement parties at Langley for three of the CIA's most es- teemed officers: Ted Shackley, George Carver, and Dan Arnold. None was fired; all were driven out by Turner's behavior. Shackley and Carver were forced to choose between, retirement and accepting a post that would have represented a de facto demotion. Ar- nold left because he was appalled by what was happening to the clandestine services and because he had lost all respect for Turner's integrity and his capacity to exercise leadership. A spokesman for Turner told me that the admiral did not encourage these people to leave, and the official line at the agency is that resignations are only to be expected at a time when the agency finds it hard to compete with the private sector in salaries, fringe benefits, and vacations. But the Shackley case is instructive on this matter: Widely considered one of the most talented members of the DDO (he was instrumental in organiz- ing the highly successful defense of Laos in the undeclared war of the late 1960s), Shackley was associate DDO when Turner arrived. He was asked to serve. as deputy to Army Lieutenant General Frank Camm at the newly created Na- tional Intelligence Tasking Center. This offICe was supposed to coordinate the collection assignments of the entire in- telligence community, but it never really got off the ground, despite an impressive bureaucratic expansion to a staff of some 150 persons. Camm, a military man of no particular distinction and no real knowledge of intelligence, stayed on for a couple of years and then left early in 1979. Shackley was ob- viously in line to replace him, but Turner stalled, apparently unable to make up his . mind. After months of waiting, and by now convinced that Turner had no interest in promoting him, Shackley resigned. Turner has said that the resignation came as a total surprise, and that he. regretted it. Sources close to Shackley respond in two ways: First, it certainly seemed that Turner wanted Shackley out, for otherwise he could have told Shackley something positive. Second, if Turner in fact did not realize the impact of his behavior, he should not be in charge of a large organization whose proper functioning depends primarily on the existence of a strong esprit de corps. Turner does not seem, to appreciate this fact. In our conversation, he re- peatedly stated his satisfaction with the "new personnel policies" he has insti- tuted, and he-boasted that the CIA is now more "balanced and representa- tive'" than ever before. He said that in the old days, agency personnel came primarily from the Ivy League uni- versities (a charge made in the late 1950s by Senator John F. Kennedy, but found to be false even twenty years ago), whereas it now has better geographical balance. .Moreover, ac- cording to Turner, there are now more ethnics, more blacks, and more women in the agency. There is even a woman at the head of a major station over- seas, and there will he another female station chief in the near future. And Turner takes great personal interest in the younger officers. A few weeks ago he surprised everyone by having lunch with five of the new recruits; he told me that he was "inspired" by their qualities of intelligence and enthusiasm. The admiral's concern for the younger officers and his up-to-date interest in equal opportunity are genuine, but in a properly functioning intelligence or- ganization great care must also be paid to the senior ranks. According to sev- eral senior diplomats I spoke to, the quality of CIA performance overseas has dropped steadily for the past few years, an inevitable consequence of drooping morale and less experienced officers. Finally, there is the story (apocryphal, perhaps) of a person in- structed to get in touch with a CIA clandestine operative in a Central European capital. He was given a meeting place in a busy part of town and went to the appointment only to find that his CIA contact was a very tall, and very black, man who was the major curiosity in the area. Obviously, undercover conversation was impossible. URNER'SDIFFICULTIES WITH his employees might be overlooked' if the quality of reports and estimates had improved under his stewardship. Unfortunately, this has not happened. In- stead,. there has apparently been a new and alarming politicization of intelli- gence. . To be sure, there is nothing new about the DCI's taking an active role in tailoring intelligence estimates to fit policy needs. Indeed, it is a vital part of his job. But Turner seems to be par- ticularly sensitive to White House pre- dilections. Aside from the case of Iran, in which CIA estimates were atrocious, but which can be charitably laid at the feet of several directors and administra- tions, his critics cite three grave failures: the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, the Cambodian famine, and the Soviet brigade in Cuba. In the Cambodian cases, Turner had repeatedly received detailed information from officers in the field that indicated what was about to happen. Yet in both ,t- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP90-01208R000100070041-1 $TI `Zp l l i l 17 I, 11 IIIIIL 11, ILIJ I I; I I I I IILI I_ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP90-01208R000100070041-1 instances-in, two successive years-he Baader-Meinhof band. Yet in a closed Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), ? passed on estimates to the White House briefing to congressional oversight com- charged with taking an independent that took the opposite position. Were mittees, CIA representatives argued last look at the quality of the intelligence these simple failures in analysis, or fall that it would be improper to term community's product. PFIAB had of- were they, as some of those involved in the PLO a "terrorist" organization, that ten been able to recommend to the pres- the estimates angrily claim, examples the group was actually "moderate" and ident and the DCI courses of action of preparing estimates to suit the pre- simply maintained a facade of terrorism that -had not occurred to the community vailing mood in the White House? The to curry favor with "radical Arabs." "regulars," and most CIA veterans re- president and some of his top advisers This opinion fits nicely with the convic- garded it as extraordinarily useful. Now were eager .to normalize relations with tions of the White House that the PLO there is no independent body with the Vietnam, and predictions of an immi- must play a major role in a future Mid- same broad authority to make recom- nerit invasion of Cambodia-with full die East peace settlement and that its mendations directly to the president. Soviet, support-were likely to irritate leadership is basically "moderate." Instead, Turner characteristically cre- the policymakers. Similarly, reports of ated an in house body-the Senior Re- the disastrous famine in Cambodia a OT ONLY Has TURrt:R view Panel-that examines intelligence year after-beginning as early as Janu- ~ overseen a politicization of. estimates at anearl stage in their ary-were not likely to be well received y pro- 'W.'9 have "lost its inordinate fear of Corn. ~`-""' t" pluytuv vu- ui analysis. ? - . ..- . ' NVA going independent checks . Finally,IlTurner has insisted on main- munism." Thus, as late as June 1979, and balances within the taining maximum control over the entire the CIA said there wni-M be ,, , r ..... e i e - , ???, a v.... ..un g ty. community and, over the day-to-day op. Likewise the Soviet brigade. Carter Turner supported the questionable deci- . erations of, the agency. When he became had been working for better relatio i ' ns s on to eliminate the President s Foreign director, the number-two position at the with Castro's Cuba and had alcn 1-oan striving to minimize the degree of So- viet adventurism at a time when the image of the Kremlin was crucial for selling SALT lI to skeptical senators. As a sign of his good faith, Carter had ordered the suspension of U-2 surveil -lance flights over Cuba. The National Security Agency continued its general interception of foreign communications but was not instructed to "listen" for specific bits of information. Moreover, human sources in Cuba were reduced. Thus,. when claims, of a new Soviet military presence on the island were brought forward by. Senator Richard Stone of. Florida, the CIA. denied hav- ing any such information. Once the sur- veillance flights were resumed, the So- viet troops were quickly. identified, but no . clear picture of their purpose emerged. That could reliably come only from experienced human sources. Thus, Turner's critics accuse him of failing to insist on maintaining surveillance over Cuba, failing to take seriously the warnings that arrived, and failing to use human intelligence properly. They add that it is no accident that hu- man intelligence is currently in short supply, given the admiral's desire to. open the way for less experienced nffi- ui the oia Hands. Yet the admiral told interviewers from National Public Ra- dio last December that the discovery of the Soviet brigade in Cuba was one of the triumphs of his stewardship. The same bending to the prevailing l po itical.. winds can be seen in, the CIA's curious handling of the Palestine Lib- eration Organization. For years, the agency's primary interest in interna. tional terrorism had centered on this organization;. it paid perceptibly less attention to other groups like the Ital ian Red Brigades 'and. the German Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP90-01208R000100070041-1 _iII~ 1 hII IIIIllLLI II'I I I~ ! L _ Sanitized Co A roved for Release 2011/02/22 CIA-RDP90-012088000100070041-1 py pp According the CIA !'has done well, even remark- to sources Turner has ably so, din areas where it had been }gyp ) weak in the past. In particular, the a t, e9 ilo ed intelligence a n I ses to in- some f Ipartst'of Africa have beenae x- ? ceptionally good of late, as has been pp( , the ~l House view Dint the material regarding China. To What I ~! t extent this has been due to Turner's leadership. is impossible to say, but it may well reflect-positively, for once-- {i agency and in the community-the dep. background in Lisbon, where he suc- the increased interest in these areas by uty director of central intelligence, or cessfully challenged. Henry Kissinger's the White House. DDCI-=was held by E. Henry Knoche, dismal view of the future of that country, Finally, there is the case of SALT a longtime agency professional. Under gave those unhappy with Turner cause 11, whereilTurner showed unusual tour- Turner's predecessor George Bush, the for optimism, as did his behavior in the, age and integrity as well as striking in- DDCI had been in charge of most nor- first few weeks at Langley. dependence of -the desires of the ad- mal activities at the CIA, while the di- Every deputy director receives from ministration. Turner told the Senate rector had been concerned with overall the director a written delegation of Select Committee on Intelligence that planning, liaison with Congress and the authority, defining the DDCI's role and he could not guarantee that the United executive branch, and the coordination authorizing him to see some or all of States wo'',uld be certain of knowing of. the intelligence community. Turner the information that passes over the about Soviet violations of the terms of indicated his desire to assume many of director's desk. Turner dragged his feet 'the treaty'. Given the loss of crucial the DDCI's roles himself, leaving for weeks and then tried to get Car- listening and observation posts in Iran, Knoche with a greatly diminished task. lucci to accept a limited document. Turner said it might be years before Knoche lasted less than six months Carlucci refused, saying that he felt he these capabilities were replaced. He and left on July 5, 1977. According to had to see everything that Turner saw spoke his the despite the feverish ef- high-level CIA sources, Knoche quit -a reasonable request, for the DDCI forts of the president, the secretary of . because Turner had made it clear he can be asked to substitute for the direc- state, and', the secretary of defense to. did not want a deputy director with a tor in various circumstances and would convince the Senate that the reverse substantive role, and Knoche was con- have to befullyinformed in such events. was true. cerned that under Turner the agency In the end, Turner gave in. There may Thus, whatever his critics may say, was losing ground with respect to the well be some private understandings be- Stansfield Turner has shown that he other components of the intelligence tween the two, but in theory Carlucci is capable, on ; occasion, of standing Community. knows what Turner knows. . by his guns, even when such a stance Y d t y. ? Is precisely this breach tion of a new deputy part of loyal lieutenant to Turner. So far of political discipline that has made it director. At first it. as is known, he has never tried to chal- . so unlikely that Turner will be re- seemed he was content Ienge Turner on a matter of sub It d a et espite this promising start, Car- is unpopular with his commander in ITH KNOCHE's DEPAR- lucci has not played a major role within chief. This is a rare quality in Wash. ture, Turner had a the agency. Now known as Hamlet to ington and is much to be admired.. clear field for the selec- his colleagues, Carlucci has played the Paradoxical) ' ' nte. move from his post in the near fu- to leave the post vacant, cure. For Carter and his colleagues ICI' and in fact he told a group of CIA offs - T WAS ALMOST CERTAINLY AN fear that firing; Turner would inevi cers in the- late SnmmPr rif 1Q77 tt,.t -- ___ - ,.... ?,Q, rcmuveu oecause he tailed to sup- from Langley, operations responsibility mate to the post of director of port the administration on a policy mat- could simply be, assumed by the chief central intelligence. But Turner is ter like SALT. 11.1 I en t s and d ? g , e- n the ong run, however, Turner did set about finding an acceptable re- spite the current closed-mouth will have to go. No matter how sub- placement for Knoche, and his first policy regarding his achievements, he stantial his achievements (and there choice was Lyman Kirkpatrick, one of can point with considerable pride to are undoubtedly several that are, and the oldest of the old hands. All seemed some -substantial accomplishments. For will remain, unknown for a long time), clear for his appointment as deputy one thing, he has taken seriously the his failure of leadership at the CIA is when Turner suddenly changed his deteriorating security at the CIA and a fatal one. For in the next half mind. After discussing the question with has acted to cut down on the number decade,_ the United States will face a senior White House officials, Turner hit of leaks, both to the press and to series of challenges that cannot be on former ambassador to Portugal Frank other outsiders. CIA analysts are no solved by the mere application of su- Carlucci. Despite press reports that Car- longer permitted casual contact with perior might. America rio longer holds a lucci:, was imposed on Turner, the ad- the press and are now required to have decisive advantage over its adversaries miral told me that the selection was en- journalists file formal requests for con- -indeed, in many categories the rela- - tirely his own.. It was, in any event, versations, listing the time and place of tionship has been inverted. Therefore, a remarkable choice, for it was one of the meeting along with proposed sub- the country will have to find more the'few times since.the agency's incep- jects --for. discussion. Turner- has ?also subtle- ways of dealing with crises: tion that the two top men in the organi- insisted upon vigorous!- action- against - This. inevitably requires a first-class, nation came from outside the intelli those such as Philip Agee .who emergewell-functioning,and highly motivated Bence community. Yet there was reason from the CIA:cand write , their "con- 'CIA. Without the finest caliber of to believe that Carlucci would give the fessions." leadership, the CIA cannot function as I CIA what it. so badly needed: an inde- Furthermore,, the quality- of intel-, it will have to in the years ahead. pendent and,courageous person willing ligence' has improved-'in some `areas. ' Unfortunately, Stansfeld Turner is not to ? fight for real professionalism Hi s III __;.__ 7-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP90-01208R000100070041-1 -