TINKER, TURNER, SAILOR, SPY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-01208R000100070041-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 22, 2011
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: March 3, 1980
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

In
STAT
03 PAGA j 4?
N HIS STATE OF THE UNION All-
1- J, All
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~... M .i,},t:,::ri, NEW YORK MAUALINE
dress, President Carter called for
the end of unwarranted restric-
tions. on American intelligence
agencies. "An effective intelli-
gence capability," he said, "is vital
to our nation's security." Although
the remark drew an ovation, there have
been no dramatic initiatives from the
Carter administration to revitalize what
is generally considered to be a demoral-
ized and often dangerously ineffective
American intelligence community. Yet
the president's words demonstrate that
the mood of the administration-and
with it, by all indications, that of the
country-has changed dramatically from
the time when the Central Intelligence
Agency was considered to be a "rogue
elephant" dangerously out of control.
3 March 1980
What is required to realize the presi-
dent's goals? According to those who By Michael Ledee -
have spent their lives in and around
the intelligence business, the primary
requirement is a change in the domes-
tic attitude toward the CIA. Such per-
sons-including former directors and
top officials of the agency-say the CIA
must be freed from some of the more
exaggerated forms of congressional
scrutiny, such as the Hughes-Ryan`
Amendment, which gives more than
200 senators and staff members ac-
cess to agency data. They also urge
that those members of government and
the media who have harassed the
intelligence community for the past half
decade must now recognize that a vi-
able intelligence agency is urgently
needed. And, they say, the agency and
the. intelligence community as a whole
badly need the finest possible leader-
ship, both from the White House and
from the office of the director of central
intelligence (DCI). That post is cur-
rently occupied by Admiral Stansfield
Turner, and in the view of an impres-
sive number of intelligence experts,
Admiral Turner is not able to lead the
CIA back to respectability.
ITHIN MONTHS OF HIS
1977 appointment. as
DCI, Stansfield Turner
had acquired the nick-..
name "Captain Queeg"
in CIA headquarters
in Langley, Virginia.
One morning in January 1979, he
came to work to find the bulletin boards
and mailboxes full of a forged edition of
his own "Notes From the Director."
Dated January 15, it has become an
round classic in the intelli
under
e
ce
g
g
n
!
community: StansfieldTurne~ critics sa has
office fairly exhausted last ' ~y
~
evening atter stopping ork at 10 p As demoralized politicized E le ~ ? ti~'
ism wont ont after a long day, I asked ed the ~
Michael Ledeen is executive editor of
The Washington Quarterly. GO 1
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1 _-I 1L l...l i ILL I
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oteward to bring me a bowl of strawberries
and cream. He's a good enough fellow-
if a bit shiftless-and it wasn't long before
he shuffled back to report that someone
had stolen the strawberries from my re-
frigerator. It was my hardest blow since
coming here ... but I did without.
I could leave it at that. After all a new
supply of strawberries can be purchased.
But it's not that simple. I deem this a
personal attack by someone who knew of
my propensity for the fruit, using innocent
strawberries to get at me.
I am therefore ordering that until the
strawberries are returned to my refrigera-
tor, no one will leave the building. The
General Services Administration will be
asked to augment meal service while we
wait. As an added stimulus I am riffing
100 people per day until the wrong is
righted. Any person helping to identify
the thief will, beside an immediate qual-
ity step increase, be given a pair of stain-
less steel spheres similar to those I use
for thinking the unpalatable thoughts our
Communist adversaries force us to think.
at Langley-has largely confirmed this
gloomy analysis. Leading CIA offi-
cials-some of whom have left only
within recent months, and others
who are in the process of leaving
-say that Turner has done more
harm to the CIA than all the recent
congressional investigations combined.
And it is difficult finding any Turner
supporters. When I asked National
Security Council press man Jerry
Schecter to arrange some interviews
for me with NSC officials and staffers,
he called hack a few days later to
say that nobody wanted to discuss the
CIA, and Admiral Turner. Not for
the record, not on background, no way
at all. Later, when I advised the
CIA's information office that I had
been given a great quantity of infor-
mation critical of Admiral Turner, and
that I would like. to go over it with
agency officials in an effort to get amore rounded picture, I was permitted
to speak with just one man: Bruce
Clarke, the elegant and erudite head
of the National Foreign Assessment
Center. But Clarke is only recently re-
turned to the CIA after five years in
Vienna and thus is in no position to
evaluate Turner in context. And I was
not even permitted to be alone with
Clarke; Director of Public Affairs
Herbert Hetu, a man with a reputation
for loyalty to the admiral, sat in. Simi-
larly, during the interview with Turner
himself, three assistants-including the
redoubtable Hetu-were at the table.
I encountered a similar reluctance to
discuss Turner in the intelligence com-
mittees of Congress. Senate Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence Chairman Birch
Bayh was not available for comment,
nor was Staff Director William Miller.
In short; Turner's critics are talking,
while his allies-if there are any-are
lying low.
The charges against Turner are seri-
ous "ones. According to his critics he
has. undermined the morale of the in-
telligence community, wantonly and ar-
bitrarily fired hundreds of valuable offi-
cers, presided over a steady decline in
the quality of intelligence, and politi.
cized much of the information flowing
from Langley to the White House. -
I will keep you informed on our prog-
ress in this as we move along. Chances
are the pinko commie strawberry-fetish
fink will see the error of his ways and
surrender. I'd almost bet my Navy pension
on it. Finally and again, I feel some re-
morse in having to do this but national
security is hardball and not for softies.
The admiral did not find the docu-
ment amusing, and he ordered the CIA
Security Office to find the persons re-
sponsible-a task which has proved a
failure. But as Turner must have real-
ized, the forgery reflected the conviction
of a large number of agency officials
past and present that. the former ad-
miral is the wrong man for the job, and
that he should be removed before fur-
ther serious, even irreparable, damage
is done to the CIA.
My own investigation-including an
hour-long conversation with Turner
in his office at CIA headquarters
HEN HE ARRIVED IN
the spring of 1977,
Turner found a memo-
Turner has resisted ind~p~nden
checks and balances on spying
randutn left behind by
the survivors of the last
year of the Nixon-Ford
period. Drafted by Bill
Nelson (a top officer in the DDO-the
.Directorate of Operations, that director.
ate concerned with clandestine activity),
the memo claimed that there had been
a "Vietnam bulge" in the clandes-
tine services. Nelson has accordingly
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argued that several hundred agents
-could be phased out of the clandestine
side without any substantial damage to
the CIA's effectiveness. In fact, no such
"bulge" existed-or ever had. The size
of the Operations Directorate's Far East
Division increased enormously during
the Vietnam war, along with the size
of that division's overseas contingents,
in Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand. But
this increase in manpower was achieved
primarily by depleting the ranks of
the other divisions of the clandestine
services. Overall, the strength of the
clandestine services actually 'declined
during the decade 1965-75.
Stansfield Turner may not have
known all this, and in any event most
observers agree that the clandestine
services were overstaffed when Turner
came aboard. But some of his more re-
lentless critics have argued that Turner
accepted the conclusions of the Nelson
memo because they fitted so nicely
with the political mood of the early
days of the Carter administration. The
admiral denied this to me with con-
siderable intensity, and he was almost
certainly telling the truth. For had
Turner wished to perform a politically
acceptable purge of the ranks of the
clandestine services, he would not have
done it as he did.
Nelson had proposed that the number
of clandestine officers be reduced grad-
ually over a five-year period. Turner
did it -in two years. And he did it in
a way calculated to produce great re-
sentment at the agency itself. For in-
stead of entrusting the task to the
various divisions, Turner turned the
matter over to the personnel office, with
instructions to computerize the process
and thin out the ranks of the senior
people to make room for younger men
and women to move up.
. Computerized profiles were used to
draw up the lists of those who were
to be compelled to leave. All officers,
in each grade level, were competitively
ranked by the computerized formulas.
From each grade level, including the
highest (GS-18), a number of victims
were chosen. In November 1978, these
unlucky souls received pink slips signed
not by Turner but by William
Wells, then DDO. Wells himself was
then fired as DDO partly because of
the fallout from the purge.
Turner told me he was "aghast"
when he saw the harsh, terse letter that
went out to the persons on the com-
puterized hit list, and he says he toyed
with the idea of issuing a second, more
gentle note. He also told me that he
was not intimately involved in the
procedures that led to the selection of
the names, and that he had received no
complaints from the agency's senior
ranks prior to the actual firings. In
fact, the purge was not a total. surprise,
for Turner had conducted two extended
briefings on the matter in August, in
the secure "bubble" at Langley. On
each occasion the house was full: 500
persons at a time. Yet, he claims, not a
single senior official in the DDO told
him not to proceed.
Others in the CIA tell a different
story. Two senior officials say 'they
personally implored Turner to adopt a
more traditional method of reducing
the number of officials in the clandes-
tine services. Moreover, according to
these and other sources, Turner was
intimately involved in the process from
beginning to end.
This was not the first time in the
agency's history that a new DCI had
wielded his authority like a Sword of
Damocles over the heads of his employ-
ees, but Turner's approach-whichever
version is correct-was quite different
At the ClAsVirginia headquarters,
some call Turner "Captain Queeg."
from the earlier ones. Even James
Schlesinger, whose purge in his brief
tenure at Langley is still legendary, had
the good sense to assign the selection
of the victims to other intelligence offi-
cers, not a computer. While there was
great resentment of Schlesinger's ac-
tions, there was consequently a general
appreciation of his methods, since the
implementation of someeof Schlesinger's
cuts was tempered by the more com-
passionate judgment of some of his
senior subordinates, notably his direc-
tor of personnel. With Turner, the hu-
man touch was far more distant. OfFi-
?cers with years of experience were
summarily dismissed without the slight-
est flexibility. Men a few months short
of higher pension levels were thrown
out, although no one within two years
of retirement was fired.
The Turner purge was not simply
the result of a misunderstanding about
COST l~t}~",~
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the "Vietnam bulge," for the admiral
had been approached by a group of
younger officers claiming that channels
for advancement in the clandestine serv-
ices had been blocked for years by
the "old-boy network." Turner took
these complaints seriously, and one of
the reasons for the purge was his sin-
cere conviction that it was necessary
to provide greater opportunities for the
younger officers. While the motive is
an admirable one, the analysis turned
out to be unfounded: Last year one of
the country's top management-consult-
ancy firms was asked to look at the
personnel policies of the clandestine
services, and these policies were pro-
nounced outstanding. Thus, two ma-
jor motives for the great purge-the
Vietnam bulge and the ' theory of
favoritism in the clandestine services--
were both unfounded.
. The realization. that Turner's actions
were based upon misunderstandings
and misconceptions only heightened the
bitterness toward him, especially among
senior officers. But even in the middle
and lower ranks, morale was badly
undermined, for they saw officials
struck down who were among the finest
persons at the CIA. In one cele-
brated case, for example, the computers
printed out the name of one of the top
clandestine operatives in Western Eu-
rope, a man who was on a first-name
basis with many chiefs of state and
heads of government, and who had
been operating successfully for over
twenty years. When challenged on that
particular selection, the admiral an-
nounced that he would not overrule the
computer. By last October, over 800
positions had been closed down in the
clandestine services, and more than
1,100 persons had been driven from the
ranks. And even though Turner says
that only 160 people left involuntarily,
one must wonder if some of these per-
sons are not sufficiently angry to coop-
erate with the agency's enemies..
URNER HAS LONG BEEN
known as an aloof, almost
unapproachable, individual
when it comes to dealing
with people. When he was
in charge of NATO's south-
ern . command in Naples,
Turner was notoriously awkward in
dealing with his subordinates. When it
was learned that Turner had been re-
called to Washington early in 1977 by
Carter, his navy colleagues told any-
one who cartd to listen that they
hoped the admiral would not end up
on the joint Chiefs of Staff or back in
their service.
Most damaging of all to the morale
of the CIA has been Turner's insensi-
tivity toward some of the agency's
most talented and experienced members.
Late last summer, on successive Fri-
days, there were retirement parties at
Langley for three of the CIA's most es-
teemed officers: Ted Shackley, George
Carver, and Dan Arnold. None was
fired; all were driven out by Turner's
behavior. Shackley and Carver were
forced to choose between, retirement
and accepting a post that would have
represented a de facto demotion. Ar-
nold left because he was appalled by
what was happening to the clandestine
services and because he had lost all
respect for Turner's integrity and his
capacity to exercise leadership.
A spokesman for Turner told me that
the admiral did not encourage these
people to leave, and the official line at
the agency is that resignations are only
to be expected at a time when the
agency finds it hard to compete with the
private sector in salaries, fringe benefits,
and vacations.
But the Shackley case is instructive
on this matter: Widely considered one
of the most talented members of the
DDO (he was instrumental in organiz-
ing the highly successful defense of Laos
in the undeclared war of the late 1960s),
Shackley was associate DDO when
Turner arrived. He was asked to serve.
as deputy to Army Lieutenant General
Frank Camm at the newly created Na-
tional Intelligence Tasking Center. This
offICe was supposed to coordinate the
collection assignments of the entire in-
telligence community, but it never really
got off the ground, despite an impressive
bureaucratic expansion to a staff of
some 150 persons. Camm, a military
man of no particular distinction and
no real knowledge of intelligence,
stayed on for a couple of years and then
left early in 1979. Shackley was ob-
viously in line to replace him, but
Turner stalled, apparently unable to
make up his . mind. After months of
waiting, and by now convinced that
Turner had no interest in promoting
him, Shackley resigned. Turner has said
that the resignation came as a total
surprise, and that he. regretted it.
Sources close to Shackley respond in
two ways: First, it certainly seemed
that Turner wanted Shackley out, for
otherwise he could have told Shackley
something positive. Second, if Turner
in fact did not realize the impact of his
behavior, he should not be in charge
of a large organization whose proper
functioning depends primarily on the
existence of a strong esprit de corps.
Turner does not seem, to appreciate
this fact. In our conversation, he re-
peatedly stated his satisfaction with the
"new personnel policies" he has insti-
tuted, and he-boasted that the CIA is
now more "balanced and representa-
tive'" than ever before. He said that
in the old days, agency personnel came
primarily from the Ivy League uni-
versities (a charge made in the late
1950s by Senator John F. Kennedy,
but found to be false even twenty
years ago), whereas it now has better
geographical balance. .Moreover, ac-
cording to Turner, there are now more
ethnics, more blacks, and more women
in the agency. There is even a woman
at the head of a major station over-
seas, and there will he another female
station chief in the near future. And
Turner takes great personal interest in
the younger officers. A few weeks ago
he surprised everyone by having lunch
with five of the new recruits; he told
me that he was "inspired" by their
qualities of intelligence and enthusiasm.
The admiral's concern for the younger
officers and his up-to-date interest in
equal opportunity are genuine, but in
a properly functioning intelligence or-
ganization great care must also be paid
to the senior ranks. According to sev-
eral senior diplomats I spoke to, the
quality of CIA performance overseas
has dropped steadily for the past few
years, an inevitable consequence of
drooping morale and less experienced
officers. Finally, there is the story
(apocryphal, perhaps) of a person in-
structed to get in touch with a CIA
clandestine operative in a Central
European capital. He was given a
meeting place in a busy part of town
and went to the appointment only to
find that his CIA contact was a very
tall, and very black, man who was the
major curiosity in the area. Obviously,
undercover conversation was impossible.
URNER'SDIFFICULTIES WITH
his employees might be
overlooked' if the quality
of reports and estimates
had improved under his
stewardship. Unfortunately,
this has not happened. In-
stead,. there has apparently been a new
and alarming politicization of intelli-
gence. .
To be sure, there is nothing new
about the DCI's taking an active role in
tailoring intelligence estimates to fit
policy needs. Indeed, it is a vital part
of his job. But Turner seems to be par-
ticularly sensitive to White House pre-
dilections. Aside from the case of Iran,
in which CIA estimates were atrocious,
but which can be charitably laid at the
feet of several directors and administra-
tions, his critics cite three grave failures:
the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia,
the Cambodian famine, and the Soviet
brigade in Cuba.
In the Cambodian cases, Turner had
repeatedly received detailed information
from officers in the field that indicated
what was about to happen. Yet in both
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instances-in, two successive years-he Baader-Meinhof band. Yet in a closed Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB),
? passed on estimates to the White House briefing to congressional oversight com- charged with taking an independent
that took the opposite position. Were mittees, CIA representatives argued last look at the quality of the intelligence
these simple failures in analysis, or fall that it would be improper to term community's product. PFIAB had of-
were they, as some of those involved in the PLO a "terrorist" organization, that ten been able to recommend to the pres-
the estimates angrily claim, examples the group was actually "moderate" and ident and the DCI courses of action
of preparing estimates to suit the pre- simply maintained a facade of terrorism that -had not occurred to the community
vailing mood in the White House? The to curry favor with "radical Arabs." "regulars," and most CIA veterans re-
president and some of his top advisers This opinion fits nicely with the convic- garded it as extraordinarily useful. Now
were eager .to normalize relations with tions of the White House that the PLO there is no independent body with the
Vietnam, and predictions of an immi- must play a major role in a future Mid- same broad authority to make recom-
nerit invasion of Cambodia-with full die East peace settlement and that its mendations directly to the president.
Soviet, support-were likely to irritate leadership is basically "moderate." Instead, Turner characteristically cre-
the policymakers. Similarly, reports of ated an in house body-the Senior Re-
the disastrous famine in Cambodia a OT ONLY Has
TURrt:R view Panel-that examines intelligence
year after-beginning as early as Janu- ~ overseen a politicization of. estimates at anearl stage in their
ary-were not likely to be well received y pro-
'W.'9
have "lost its inordinate fear of Corn. ~`-""' t" pluytuv vu- ui analysis. ? - . ..- . ' NVA going independent checks . Finally,IlTurner has insisted on main-
munism." Thus, as late as June 1979, and balances within the taining maximum control over the entire
the CIA said there wni-M be ,, , r ..... e
i
e
- , ???, a v.... ..un
g
ty. community and, over the day-to-day op.
Likewise the Soviet brigade. Carter Turner supported the questionable deci- . erations of, the agency. When he became
had been working for better relatio
i
'
ns s
on to eliminate the President
s Foreign director, the number-two position at the
with Castro's Cuba and had alcn 1-oan
striving to minimize the degree of So-
viet adventurism at a time when the
image of the Kremlin was crucial for
selling SALT lI to skeptical senators.
As a sign of his good faith, Carter had
ordered the suspension of U-2 surveil
-lance flights over Cuba. The National
Security Agency continued its general
interception of foreign communications
but was not instructed to "listen" for
specific bits of information. Moreover,
human sources in Cuba were reduced.
Thus,. when claims, of a new Soviet
military presence on the island were
brought forward by. Senator Richard
Stone of. Florida, the CIA. denied hav-
ing any such information. Once the sur-
veillance flights were resumed, the So-
viet troops were quickly. identified, but
no . clear picture of their purpose
emerged. That could reliably come only
from experienced human sources. Thus,
Turner's critics accuse him of failing
to insist on maintaining surveillance
over Cuba, failing to take seriously the
warnings that arrived, and failing to
use human intelligence properly. They
add that it is no accident that hu-
man intelligence is currently in short
supply, given the admiral's desire to.
open the way for less experienced nffi-
ui the oia Hands. Yet the admiral told
interviewers from National Public Ra-
dio last December that the discovery of
the Soviet brigade in Cuba was one of
the triumphs of his stewardship.
The same bending to the prevailing
l
po
itical.. winds can be seen in, the CIA's
curious handling of the Palestine Lib-
eration Organization. For years, the
agency's primary interest in interna.
tional terrorism had centered on this
organization;. it paid perceptibly less
attention to other groups like the Ital
ian Red Brigades 'and. the German
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According the CIA !'has done well, even remark-
to sources Turner has ably so, din areas where it had been
}gyp ) weak in the past. In particular, the
a
t, e9
ilo ed intelligence a n I ses to in- some f Ipartst'of Africa have beenae
x-
? ceptionally good of late, as has been pp(
,
the ~l House view Dint the material regarding China. To What I
~! t extent this has been due to Turner's
leadership. is impossible to say, but it
may well reflect-positively, for once-- {i
agency and in the community-the dep. background in Lisbon, where he suc- the increased interest in these areas by
uty director of central intelligence, or cessfully challenged. Henry Kissinger's the White House.
DDCI-=was held by E. Henry Knoche, dismal view of the future of that country, Finally, there is the case of SALT
a longtime agency professional. Under gave those unhappy with Turner cause 11, whereilTurner showed unusual tour-
Turner's predecessor George Bush, the for optimism, as did his behavior in the, age and integrity as well as striking in-
DDCI had been in charge of most nor- first few weeks at Langley. dependence of -the desires of the ad-
mal activities at the CIA, while the di- Every deputy director receives from ministration. Turner told the Senate
rector had been concerned with overall the director a written delegation of Select Committee on Intelligence that
planning, liaison with Congress and the authority, defining the DDCI's role and he could not guarantee that the United
executive branch, and the coordination authorizing him to see some or all of States wo'',uld be certain of knowing
of. the intelligence community. Turner the information that passes over the about Soviet violations of the terms of
indicated his desire to assume many of director's desk. Turner dragged his feet 'the treaty'. Given the loss of crucial
the DDCI's roles himself, leaving for weeks and then tried to get Car- listening and observation posts in Iran,
Knoche with a greatly diminished task. lucci to accept a limited document. Turner said it might be years before
Knoche lasted less than six months Carlucci refused, saying that he felt he these capabilities were replaced. He
and left on July 5, 1977. According to had to see everything that Turner saw spoke his the despite the feverish ef-
high-level
CIA sources, Knoche quit -a reasonable request, for the DDCI forts of the president, the secretary of .
because Turner had made it clear he can be asked to substitute for the direc- state, and', the secretary of defense to.
did not want a deputy director with a tor in various circumstances and would convince the Senate that the reverse
substantive role, and Knoche was con- have to befullyinformed in such events. was true.
cerned that under Turner the agency In the end, Turner gave in. There may Thus, whatever his critics may say,
was losing ground with respect to the well be some private understandings be- Stansfield Turner has shown that he
other components of the intelligence tween the two, but in theory Carlucci is capable, on ; occasion, of standing
Community. knows what Turner knows. . by his guns, even when such a stance
Y
d
t
y. ? Is precisely this breach
tion of a new deputy part of loyal lieutenant to Turner. So far of political discipline that has made it
director. At first it. as is known, he has never tried to chal- . so unlikely that Turner will be re-
seemed he was content Ienge Turner on a matter of sub It d
a
et
espite this promising start, Car- is unpopular with his commander in
ITH KNOCHE's DEPAR- lucci has not played a major role within chief. This is a rare quality in Wash.
ture, Turner had a the agency. Now known as Hamlet to ington and is much to be admired..
clear field for the selec- his colleagues, Carlucci has played the Paradoxical) '
'
nte. move from his post in the near fu-
to leave the post vacant, cure. For Carter and his colleagues ICI'
and in fact he told a group of CIA offs - T WAS ALMOST CERTAINLY AN fear that firing; Turner would inevi
cers in the- late SnmmPr rif 1Q77 tt,.t
-- ___ - ,.... ?,Q, rcmuveu oecause he tailed to sup-
from Langley, operations responsibility mate to the post of director of port the administration on a policy mat-
could simply be, assumed by the chief central intelligence. But Turner is ter like SALT. 11.1
I
en
t s
and d
?
g
,
e-
n the ong run, however, Turner
did set about finding an acceptable re- spite the current closed-mouth will have to go. No matter how sub-
placement for Knoche, and his first policy regarding his achievements, he stantial his achievements (and there
choice was Lyman Kirkpatrick, one of can point with considerable pride to are undoubtedly several that are, and
the oldest of the old hands. All seemed some -substantial accomplishments. For will remain, unknown for a long time),
clear for his appointment as deputy one thing, he has taken seriously the his failure of leadership at the CIA is
when Turner suddenly changed his deteriorating security at the CIA and a fatal one. For in the next half
mind. After discussing the question with has acted to cut down on the number decade,_ the United States will face a
senior White House officials, Turner hit of leaks, both to the press and to series of challenges that cannot be
on former ambassador to Portugal Frank other outsiders. CIA analysts are no solved by the mere application of su-
Carlucci.
Despite press reports that Car- longer permitted casual contact with perior might. America rio longer holds a
lucci:, was imposed on Turner, the ad- the press and are now required to have decisive advantage over its adversaries
miral told me that the selection was en- journalists file formal requests for con- -indeed, in many categories the rela- -
tirely his own.. It was, in any event, versations, listing the time and place of tionship has been inverted. Therefore,
a remarkable choice, for it was one of the meeting along with proposed sub- the country will have to find more
the'few times since.the agency's incep- jects --for. discussion. Turner- has ?also subtle- ways of dealing with crises:
tion that the two top men in the organi- insisted upon vigorous!- action- against - This. inevitably requires a first-class,
nation came from outside the intelli those such as Philip Agee .who emergewell-functioning,and highly motivated
Bence community. Yet there was reason from the CIA:cand write , their "con- 'CIA. Without the finest caliber of
to believe that Carlucci would give the fessions." leadership, the CIA cannot function as I
CIA what it. so badly needed: an inde- Furthermore,, the quality- of intel-, it will have to in the years ahead.
pendent and,courageous person willing ligence' has improved-'in some `areas. ' Unfortunately, Stansfeld Turner is not
to ? fight for real professionalism Hi
s
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