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July 29, 1979
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP90-01208R000100070057-4 ARTICLE APPEARED ON PAGE /-_R By Tad Szulc THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE 29 July 1979 immy Carter was - furious. He. sat in the Oval Office on Novem- this chill ber day, staring at the note paper be- fore . him. Riots were sweeping Iran. The Shah had just been forced to impose a military gov- eminent on his nation. And the 1 .President . of the United States ' Those handwritten messages of last 'Nov. 11 were not the President's first expression of concern over the state of -American intelligence, but they were by all odds his strongest. They removed any doubts of White House determination to force change upon the intelli- gence apparatus. It had failed him in a most astonish- ing manner. - ., ..- _... A nation Jimmy Carter considered America's linch- pin of stability in the Middle East, a nation in which the United States had essential strategic and economic stakes, was in the midst of a profound crisis. By Eebru- . ary, Mr. Carter would see, Shah -Mohammed Riza :4. Pahlevi's government replaced by a radical Islamic re- Tad Szulc is a Washington writer who specializes in international affairs. hadn't even known a revolution was coming - had, in fact, been assured all along. by the American intelli- gence community that there such danger. Mr.. Carter lifted his pen and wrote: "I am not satisfied with the quality of political intelligence." The notes were addressed to "Cy," "Stan" and "Zbig". Secre- tary of State Cyrus R. Vance, Director of Central In- telligence Stansfield Turner and National., Security. Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP90-01208R000100070057-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP90-01208R000100070057-4 gime with which the United States had established no contact. The loss of America's secret tracking stations that monitored Soviet missile testing would damage prospects for Congressional ap- proval of the latest strategic arms limitations talks (SALT II.) The cutoff of Iranian oil production would spark shortages that plague American motorists, to this day. Yet the President, until the end was almost -at -hand;, had "not -~ known the depth or extent of the- Shah's problems. That kind of failure over the last few' years has. led to the most comprehensive shake-up in the history of the nation's intelligence community. A major reorganization, begun early in 1978, continues. Special groups have been created to critique the com- munity's efforts, including a new top-level unit, the Political Intelligence Working Group, that is forcing traditionally turf-conscious. agencies to work together. Hundreds of Central Intelligence Agency operatives have been fired, sending the organization's morale already law following the' traumatic investigations of the mid-70's -plummeting to new depths. Congress is putting together legislation that would, for the first time, legally define the powers of, and limitations on, the intelligence community. Only a few years ago, the C.I.A. and its partner agen- cies. were being attacked as too aggressive and too powerful. Now, - irony of ironies, some of the same liberals in Congress and the. Administration who had. led the charge have begun to worry over the failures in political intelligence. And they are calling upon the C.I.A. to assert itself, to take a greater role in policy formulation. The watchdog Senate Select Committee. on Intelligence is actually approving clandestine missions that would have been taboo as recently as 1976. Meanwhile, the uproar over the na- tion's intelligence record has come full circle. The brickbats are no longer re- served for the "producers" of intelli- gence, such as the C.I.A. Critics charge that preconceptions and misconcep- tions on the part of the "consumers," the top policy makers, have prevented good decisions, regardless of the qual- ity of the intelligence material pre- sented them. The "consumers," of course, are primarily the National Se_ curity Council - and an angry letter- wnter named Jimmy Carter. THE GATHERING STORM.. ''We will continue to anticipate tomorrow's crises as often as we can,,, says Adm. Stanfield Turner. "But our record here will never be as good as we would like it to be." Admiral Turner rules an empire with an estimated an- nual budget of $15 billion and an army of 11 tens of thousands, at home and abroad, overt and covert. But uneasy lies the head that wears that crown; the record of Admiral Turner's troops is. not as good as his peers and masters would like it to be. Since Harry Truman carved the C.I.A. out of the wartime Office of Spe- cial Services in 1947, the chief of thator- ganization has also been responsible in theory for the larger intelligence com- munity. Hence Admiral Turner's off I. cial title: Director of Central Intelli- gence/Director of the Central Intelli- gence Agency. . But keeping rein on the dozen or so elements of the intelligence community can try, a Director's soul. The C.I.A.,. the mainspring of the community, is a single, clearly defined entity. The other members of the community are a dis- f pa "rate lot, ranging from the Penta- gon's National Reconnaissance office. with its spy-in-the-sky satellites, to a Treasury Department unit that collects foreign financial data. Thus the Direc- tor of the community faces a built-in division of loyalty: The offices of the Department of Defense that collect for- eign intelligence, for example, operate within a military hierarchy as well as within the intelligence community hier- archy. .cONT14NUI.+J Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP90-01208R000100070057-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 CIA-RDP90-01208R000100070057-4 Over the years, that arrangement has helped make the Directorship one of the more notorious revolving-door jobs in Washington. Between 1973 and 1977, for example, four men - James R. Schlesinger, William E. Colby and George Bush - held the post. Probably the only Director who actually suc- ceeded in exercising full control over the intelligence community as a whole was the imperious Alien W. Dulles, who was forced to resign seven months after the C.IA-sponsored Bay of Pigs disas- ter of 1961. Admiral Turner was given a decisive leg up in the struggle.. Eighteen months ago President Carter issued an execu- tive order that, for the first time, gave the Director budgetary control Byer all elements of the intelligence communi- ty. Just how long Admiral Turner - a controversial figure in his own right - would be around to enjoy the benefits of that change, however, has been a mat- ter of conjecture. The Admiral is trim and earnest, a 55- year-old intellectual who was a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University after graduation from Annapolis. He was sworn in as Director by Jimmy Carter in 1977; Senate opposition had led Mr. Carter to,drop his first candidate for the job, former Kennedy speechwriter Theodore Sorensen. Those who have worked with the Ad- miral say he's "tough" and "mean." Presumably they were necessary qual- ities for a man who commanded fleets for the United States and for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and who was in charge of Allied Forces Southern Europe. Presumably they came in handy on his C.I.A. assignment. But the Admiral has drawn different kinds of comments of late, the kindest of them being "inept.". The White House staff complained that he had failed to breathe new life into the C.I.A. There was a pronounced coolness to- ward him at the top of the Defense De- partment's intelligence establishment. Many of the Congressmen involved in C.I.A. oversight were dissatisfied. And he was not liked within the agency it.. self. For close to a year, there has been insistent speculation that Admiral Turner was on his way out of the job. However, there is some doubt that the President would wish to give the re- volving door another turn so soon. Mr. Carter's executive order of Jan. 24, 1978, calling for reorganization, was not greeted with great enthusiasm throughout the intelligence communi- ty. It was, after all, the first public sign of the deep discontent the community's top consumers were feeling about prod- uct quality. Moreover, it arrived on the heels of two of the worst years in the community's history. Attacks on the C.I.A. and its sister agencies traditionally focus on interfer- ence with the rights of other nations, or with the righzs of American citizens. And it was the illegal surveillance at home and abroad of American citizens suspected of antiwar activism that brought down on the C.I.A.'s head the Congressional investigations of 1975 and 1976. The agency's dirty linen was piled sky high: secret assassination plots against Patrice Lumumba in the Congo and Fidel Castro in Cuba ... sub- version of the Marxist regime in Chile ... mind-control experiments with dan- gerous drugs unlawful ties with American journalists and academics. The necessity for the gathering of for- eign intelligence was never seriously in question. For a President to make in- formed decisions about arms-limita- tion talks or oil imports, he requires some kind of intelligence-gath ering and analysis apparatus. But the Congres- sional revelations led to demands that the intelligence community cease in- fringing upon individual liberties, and forsake its aggressive role in the mak- ing of foreign policy. Congress named a total of eight committees in both houses to oversee C.I.A. operations. The intelligence community was shaken, but its problems were just beginning. Having been tried and con- victed in the public eye on charges of being unethical, it was up on charges of being inefficient. The issue was apparently first raised by National Security Adviser Brzezin- ski at a dinner given by Admiral Turner at C.I.A. headquarters in Langley, Va., on Oct. 27, 1977. Brzezinski complained to the senior officials present that the intelligence community had allowed its human-intelligence (known in the trade as "HUMINT") skills in gathering political data to decay because of the increased emphasis on technical intelli- gence - essentially the use of elec- tronic and photographic devices. The data and information he was receiving at the White House, he said, fell far short of the mark in terms of policy- making requirements. (He noted along the way that he had stopped reading telegrams from most American ambas- sadors abroad because they provided no coherent assessment of political Meanwhile, the staff of the National Security Council, the President's chief policy-making body for international affairs, was undertaking a full review of American security and intelligence, and that led ultimately to President Carter's executive order. Ten days be- fore that order was issued, Brzezins)d wrote forceful secret memorandums to Admiral Turner and Secretary Vance expressing his unhappiness over the quality of American political intelli- gence. gence. Among his complaints: a lack of basic source material and, as one of his associates put it, a lack of emphasis on "making sense. " There were other critics. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, in a report issued last spring, took the com- munity's "political-social analysis" record to task. In some instances, the committee found, "the performance of specialized public, sources," such as trade publications, "equaled or ex- ceeded that of the intelligence com- munity." The community was said to emphasize current developments"at the expense of analysis, and to have a lim- ited ability to integrate political and economic factors in those analyses it produced.. Ray Cline, former C.I.A. Deputy Di- rector for Intelligence, says that the agency's political intelligence skills "fell into disuse" in the late 1960's as a result of high-level decisions to econo- mize by cutting down on detailed re- porting from the field - "in favor of summary analytical reporting." But, he insists, "if you don't have patient ac- cumulation on political and economic events and trends, you're at a loss for relevant estimates when new data come in." The critics have no dearth of specific instances of community failure: ? A still-classified Senate committee study claims that the C.I.A. led the Ad. ministration to believe that Cuba was actively behind the 1978 invasion of Zaire's Shaba province by exiles at- tacking from Angola, an assessment that has never been adequately docu- ! mented. It led President. Carter to pub- licly denounce the Cubans for mounting the invasion, to his subsequent extreme embarrassment. ? When the President announced in { 1977 his plans to reduce the United States military presence in South Korea, he was not aware of the extent to which the North Koreans had been building up their armed forces since 1970. Army intelligence campaigned for a full review, but was ignored for nearly a year; only last spring did the community finally conclude that there were 550,000 to 600,000 troops arrayed in North Korea rather than the 450,000 it had previously reported. And nine days ago the White House officially an- nounced the indefinite suspension of troop withdrawals, citing "security considerations." = CONTIIV_u l Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP90-01208R000100070057-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP90-01208R000100070057-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP90-01208R000100070057-4 l_ I I ~I J 1 1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP90-01208R000100070057-4 years the Director of Central Intelli- -break out in .1978, .but the top-secret gence, was named Ambassador to Iran document did discuss in long-range b terms the viability of the Iranian y President Nixon in 1973. armed forces, the political attitudes of There was, however some question , . Iranian students at home and abroad, about Savak's effectiveness. A senior ! and the American official well acquainted with: growing disaffection in the its operations commented, "Savak cities. Some agency officials say that wasn't all that good.... Though it did the authors of the 1975 estimate had ac- all right on Soviet clandestine opera- tually tried to "talk up" a better overt and covert collection Iran, but by their tions inside Iran, it found itself pene- had been en ignored by t effort ort bosses. traced by the Russians.... Savak also overreacted when it came to any politi-i On March 18, 1978, the nounced what would be the first first of a cal opponents. One time, in 1977, its of a agents badly beat up some innocuous) series of concessions - the release of kids in Teheran. So it was the sort of 385 prisoners. But day after day, thing that just added to the pressures through May and into June, the demon- for the Shah's overthrow." strations and riots continued, as did the There was a third leg to the bMisic in-! 'flow of assurances from the Iranian telligence relationship in Iran - Mos- Government that all was, in fact, under sad, the Israeli secret service. Mossad control. Ambassador Sullivan was tell- did not labor under the same kind of ing Washington that things were. "stir- self-imposed limits as did the Ameri. ring," but not enough to prevent him cans. Moreover, they enjoyed the ad- from flying home for a summer vaca- vantage of a major source of informa- tion at the end of June. The British Am- tion in the influential Jewish com- bassador, Sir Anthony Parsons, with munity of 80,000 in Iran. Thus, Israeli whom Sullivan was in close contact, left Ambassador Uri Lubrani was able to on vacation at the same time. correctly inform a visiting United Ambassador Sullivan returned to Te- States senator in 1976 that the greatest heran late in August. On Sept. 7, mar- danger to the Shah came from the con- tial law was declared, and the following servative Islamic clergy. And early in day, in Teheran, Government troops 1978, the Israeli Embassy in Washing- fired into protesting crowds; the oppo- ton sought to alert the' State Depart- sition claimed that thousands of civil- ment to danger signals in Iran. (It was fans were killed. repeatedly assured that all was well From Baghdad, the Ayatollah Kho- with the Sha).) meini called upon the Iranian armed William H. Sullivan arrived in Tehe- forces to rise against the Shah. In Qum ran in June 1977 to replace Helms as American Ambassador. (Sullivan's background included a stint as Ambas- sador to Laos, during which he in effect ran the "secret war" of the C.I.A. and the Air Force against the North Vietna- mese.) He quickly sized up the inade- quacies in the collection of internal political intelligence. Even contacts with the middle-of-the-road opposition, the men who would soon form the Na- tional Front movement, were limited because many of the leaders were in exile and some of the others feared Savak reprisals if they talked to Ameri- cans. There were only three officers in the embassy who could speak the Per- sian.language, Farsi; that was not enough to keep tabs on "the bazaars" -shorthand for the thousands of small shopowners who are the commercial and social heart of the big cities. One source of information the C.I.A. ignored was in its own files, the Na- tional Intelligence Estimate of 1975. It identified the Islamic religious com_ not have the capability to munity, including Khomeini, as a basic troublesome." cause of future unrest. It did not, of course, predict that a revolution would The C.I.A.'s confidence in the Shah knew no bounds. In mid-September, as part of a routine rotation of personnel and as though no crisis existed, a new station chief, Horace Fleischman, was : installed in Teheran. He had been serv- ' ing in Tokyo. There is general agreement today that the worst period of the "intelli- gence igap" ended in. September. The C.I.A. station acquired a Farsi-speak- ing officer who could pick up the gossip in the bazaars. Ambassador Sullivan's I reports home were taking on a more worried tone, as were those of ? the C.I.A. station. Strikes were erupting alI over Iran - in the oil fields, the refin- eries, the banks. - Yet even as the intelligence gap was being closed by the "producers" in the field, another gap was yawning among the intelligence "consumers" back in Washington. Pessimistic views were being consistently rejected by the White,-House in general, and by Na- tional Security Adviser Brzezinski in particular. He- remained convinced that theShah should and would survive, and he was receiving assurances to this effect from Ardeshir Zahedi, the Lra- nianAmbassadorin Washington, whom' he had selected as one of his principal sources of information. -He had other: outside sources as-well, including some Iranians who had been among his graduate students at Columbia Univer- the Ayatollah Shariat-Madari asked for sity. "revenge from God against those who During November, Brzezinski appar- so bestially. treated our children." And ently persuaded Zahedi to fly to Tehe- in Camp David, Jimmy Carter took ran to keep him advised of develop- time out from his meetings with ments. Zahedi's communications were Egypt's President Sadat and Israeli :invariably optimistic, and they became Prime Minister Begin to telephone the the. central influence on American Shah and assure him of continued policy decisions. United States support. Brzezinski was the principal officer What could have led President Carter in charge of American policy in Iran. to go out on such a limb? One factor Secretary of State Vance spent most of was a report produced by the C.I.A. on. his time on the Israeli-Egyptian peace Aug. 16, following three days of riots in negotiations, and was for all practical Isfahan and presented to Mr. Carter purposes cut off from Iranian decision personally by Admiral Turner in the I making. So were his top deputies. course of a regular Wednesday White I Nor did Admiral Turner play a major House briefing. This top-secret, 23-page ! policy role - his agency's stock at the document was far less exhaustive a White House was that low. A small but product than the National Intelligence Estimate of three years before, and it took a different tack. Its conclusion: "Iran is not in a revolutionary or even prerevolutionary situation." The re- port stated that "those who are in oppo- sition, both violent and nonviolent, do be more than telling example of how that had hap- pened was making the rounds of Wash- ington: The C.I.A. had just discovered that Khomeini had written and pub- lished years before a book about his philosophy. The book was said to state precisely, what he would do should he come to power. It was the kind of infor- mation an intelligence apparatus might have been expected to turn u automat- . CONTINUE Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP90-01208R000100070057-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP90-01208R000100070057-4 . ically; in fact, it was not found until late in the game, and even then it was a private citizen who happened upon it and informed the agency. Brzezinski was putting ever more trust in the Iranian armed forces to keep the lid on. But there were high- level doubters. In November, Lieut. Gen. Eugene F. Tighe, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, visited Teheran. He came away with the im- pression that the army was trained and equipped to defend the country from ex- ternal attack, but that it had not been taught how to deal with an internal threat. Another November visitor to Teheran was then-Treasury Secretary W. Mi- chael Blumenthal, who upon his return recommended that Mr. Carter get an independent evaluation of the mounting Iranian crisis. On Nov. 28, the Presi- dent asked George W. Ball, a New York investment banker and Under Secre- tary of State in the Kennedy and John- son Administrations, to prepare a spe- cial report. Two weeks later, as Iranian troops were killing at least 40 demon- strators in Isfahan, and Ambassador Sullivan was preparing the evacuation of dependents of American diplomatic and military personnel, George Ball submitted his report to the President, a document the Administration chose not to make public. Ball had come to Wash- ington with his mind pretty much made up that the Shah was finished; his study of the situation had reinforced that view. Ball presented his pessimistic report at a meeting in the Oval Office on Dec. 12, but later in the day, Mr. Carter told a news conference: "I fully expect the Shah to maintain power in Iran and for the present problems in Iran to be re- solved. ..,. I think the predictions of doom and disaster that came from some sources have certainly not been .realized at all." White House officials said that the "doom and disaster" reference reflected Mr. Carter's unhap- piness with the reporting by the em- bassy in Teheran and the C.I.A. station there. Another Presidential mission was in the works. According to White House sources, National Security Adviser Brzezinski had proposed that he him- self secretly travel to Teheran to get. the facts, hiding his presence there as Henry Kissinger had done in Peking in 1971. The President had agreed, but just before the scheduled Dec. 13 depar- ture, Mr. Carter canceled the expedi- tion, convinced that it simply could not remain secret. . Meanwhile, voices were beingraised, particularly in the State Department, about the need for the United States to establish some form of contact with Khomeini, who had moved from Bagh- dad to a suburb of Paris, from where he was running the revolution. Men like Ambassador Sullivan thought that it would be impossible .for the. Adminis- tration to plan future policies without understanding the Ayatollah, and a sound judgment required a face-to-face meeting. In December, there were ac- tually some secret meetings between a political officer at the American Em- bassy in Paris and Ibrahim Vazrii an American diplomat that the Ayatollah . called to Washington early in was interested in conferring with a sen- iP ary, he presented both sets of views. for United States official, and Ambas- Brzezinski and his aides gratefully ac- . r~ sador Sullivan called Secretary Vance cepted General Huyser's estimates. to recommend that the United States III The Ayatollah Khomeini returned to. Teheran in triumph on Feb. 1. In Wash- send an envoy to meet with Khomeini. ington, the Administration still ex- Vance agreed, and called Theodore the Iranian military to hold the L. Eliot Jr., who had retired three 11' pected months earlier as Inspector General of the Foreign Service. But the mission was aborted. On Jan. 6, Vance received a telegram from Guadeloupe, site of a summit meeting of Western leaders. It was signed by Brzezinski, who was with. the President at the. meeting and was speaking in the President's name. The mission to Khomeini was canceled. Later, White House officials would ex- plain that if word of Eliot's trip were to leak out, the mission might be con- strued as undermining the Shah. By the first week of January, Iran was virtually paralyzed by strikes in every sector of the economy. The Shah named Shahpur Bakhtiar, a political moderate, as Prime Minister with a general understanding that he would be asked to organize a transitional govern- ment. Ambassador Sullivan was sure that it signaled the Shah's decision to leave Iran, at least temporarily. Now American policy makers fo- cused once again on the army. Would it stand by Bakhtiar in the immediate post-Shah period and prevent Khomeini from grabbing power? Ambassador Sullivan asked Washington to rush a senior United States military officer to Iran to establish liaison with the com- manders. Air Force Gen. Robert E. Huyser, deputy commander of United States forces in Europe, was tapped for the job. On Jan. 16, the Shah left Iran for Egypt, his first stop in exile. The mili- tary question was no longer academic, but General Huyser and Sullivan had a problem: They were receiving from Washington "tactical instructions" - how to deal with Bakhtiar on a day-to- day basis - when what they wanted was policy guidance. For the two men had developed very different assess- ments of the situation. The Ambassa- dor felt the armed forces had been "shelishocked" by the Shah's flight and If thought they would split under a severe challenge. He worried that General Huyser was concentrating only on the top brass. The general, on the other hand, felt that the army had adjusted to the loss of the Shah and that morale was so high that they would hold fast if ! challenged by Khomeini. C.I.A. Station Chief Fleischman agreed with Sullivan. The three men openly discussed their fort for Bahktiar. Even at this 11th hour, no alternative policies had been n devised. On Feb. 11, following a pro- ii Khomeini demonstration at an air r force base outside Teheran, the army withdrew to its barracks. The end had 11 come - an historic defeat for one of Washington's most important allies, for the entire American intelligence community and for the Carter Adminis- tration itself. .: 11 Immune rurr'xc BACK THE PIECES The office is quiet, spare: a wooden conference table, a large desk, no ash- ;trays, some big briefing charts with their transparent overlays. Adm. Stanfield Turner takes his private elevator to the top floor, the seventh, and moves toward his desk: It is Febru- ary 1977, and he has just been con- firmed in his new post. The C.I.A. is emerging from a public battering over its illegal misadventures in the United States and abroad. Morale is in need of 'a boost. But there is nothing to suggest to the Admiral that, before the year is . out, he and the intelligence community will be under concerted bureaucratic. attack and subjected to a sweeping reorganization. Admiral Turner's tenure has seen a dramatic change in the relationship among the members of the intelligence community. The intelligence units of agencies outside the C.I.A., once pretty much autonomous, have been incorpo- _ rated into a new chain of ' command Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP90-01208R000100070057-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22: CIA-RDP90-01208R000100070057-4 under the Director. The Director has tion Tasking, responsible for economic and political materi- also been given the power of the purse assigning intelligence units in als spew over them. Thus, the Pentagon's Na- out of banks of com- other directorates to do the ac- puters. Experts in a dozen dis- tional Security Agency, for example, tual collection of data. (In the ciplines analyze the results, which specializes in such arcane tasks jargon of the community, "as- and finally a report emerges to as breaking Soviet codes, has become signing" is translated. as make its way back up the more responsive to overall intelligence ' .:making::,) Within the direc- chain of command through the community needs. Moreover, new com- torate, the assignment job is Director's office to the Na- mittees have been created with ex- farmed out among specialists tional Security Council and, traordinary powers to poke into the in PHOTINT (Photographic eventually, to the top con, nooks and crannies of the community Intelligence), and HUMINT sumer of the intelligence com- and to cut across traditional tables of (Human Intelligence), for ex- munity's product, the Presi- organization. Such moves, plus whole- ample - who will figure out dent. sale firings, plus continuing bureau- ; what community resources to cratic hassles, have exacerbated the tap. Along with the administra- morale problem. And there is concern In addition to Collection tive changes has come a star- within the community that the legisla- Tasking, the Director and tling turnover in the top eche- tion now being drawn up in Congress to Deputy Director supervise Ions over the past 18 months. define the parameters of intelligence three other operational direc- Frank C. Carlucci, for exam- operations will cut further into C.IA. torates: National Intelligence, ple, has taken over as Deputy prerogatives. Science and Technology, Director, second only to Admi- The central goal of virtually all of Operations. All are -to be in- ral Turner in the community. these changes is to improve efficiency, volved in the Soviet troop- A short, slim bureaucratic in- to prevent the kind of failure of intelli- movement inquiry. The Direc- fighter, the 49-year-old Car- gence gathering and analysis that took tor also has the authority to lucci is a career Foreign Serv- place in Iran. And the cutting edge of task member agencies of the 'ice officer who won high change has been bureaucratic - the 1 intelligence community. For marks as ambassador in Lis- reorganization of the community, from this inquiry, he calls upon the bon during the Portuguese a relatively loose assemblage of ele- National Reconnaissance of- revolution of 1975, but he also. ments into a tightly structured table of fice and the National Security served asdhrectorof the Office organization (see chart, Page 15). Agency, both Pentagon-con- of Economic Opportunity and At the top sit Director Turner and trolled operations. in other domestic posts under Deputy Director Frank C. Carlucci. Re- I At the supersecret National the Nixon Administration. porting to them are six deputies, each 1 Photographic Interpretation President Carter named him of whom supervises a number .of spe- !Center, part of the Science and to his current post in 1978. He cialized offices. And within each office, Technology directorate, spe- has the respect of virtually all the personnel may be all C.I.A. or a-mix 1 cialists , are instructed to the power centers of Washing- of C.I.A. and other agency staffers. The search high-resolution photo- ton, legislative as well as bu- theory is that the integration improves 1 graphs from satellites and U-2 reaucratic, to a degree not en- coordination among the elements, mak- spy planes for details of the joyed by Admiral Turner. ing use of the best skills of the entire troop movements. The Na- . One of Carlucci''s major re- community on any given assignment. tiona] Reconnaissance office, sponsibilities is his role on the Moreover, the six directorates make it which spends the largest share ? Political Intelligence Working more easily possible for those seeking of the intelligence communi- Group, created this year with to apportion blame to pin the tail on the ty's budget, may be asked to no public notice to find ways of right donkey. send new satellites aloft. The improving the product. Under How does the intelligence complex National Security Agency or- Secretary of State for Political actually operate when confronted with ders a major new campaign of Affairs David D. Newsom and a problem? The following scenario re- electronic eavesdropping on Deputy National Security Ad- flects the community's workings as of coded Soviet communications. viser David L. Aaron are the the summer.of '79. Meanwhile, the Deputy Di- other members of the group, Assumption: The United States Gov- rector for Operations, the which has no chairman but op. ernment becomes aware of a sudden, cloak-and-dagger chief, has erates with a small staff. It unexplained movement of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe. alerted his network of agents !conducts regular studies on around the world to be on the what it calls "vulnerable eoun- In the National Security Council, it is lookout for information bear- tries," recommending priori- the Special Coordination Committee ing on the Soviet troop move- j ties in political and sociologi- that considers what is officially de- ments. More specifically, he Cal intelligence reporting in scribed as "sensitive foreign-intelli- has set his operatives in East- the field by embassies and gence collection operations." The Na- ern Europe and the Soviet C.I.A. stations. tional Security Adviser takes the chair; Union itself to ferreting out the The principal objective of the Director of Central Intelligence, the reasons for the moves. the organization is to improve Secretaries of State and Defense, the All the data stream in to the the coordination of overt and. Attorney General and the Chairman of directorate for National Intel- covert reporting by the State i the Joint Chiefs of Staff are in attend- ligence. Here the thousands of- Department and the C.I.A-, ance. bits and pieces are shaken they are now under orders to The Director of Central Intelligence down and pored over; related work together, pooling their is instructed to find the information necessary to understand the scope and intent of the Soviet troop movement. ! 'yrJ.c! I!_~tl J Upon his return to his Langley, Va., base, he calls in his Deputy for Collec- j -11 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP90-01208R000100070057-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP90-01208R000100070057-4 assets, rather than pursusing the kind of separate operations typical of the past. In the course of its coordinating ef- forts, the group takes up such matters as "nominal" versus "integrated" covers for C.I.A. personnel in the embassies. A "nominal" cover is usually ]mown to the host govern- ment; an "integrated" cover is deeply concealed. Specific intelligence assess- of major developments ments are produced for Bowie through "alert memoranda." by the corps of? National Intel- It was Lehman's staff, for ex- ligence Officers. Years ago, ample, that warned the Ad- the Office of Estimates drew ministration that China would on informationjand views from invade Vietnam last February the entire intelligence com- .and provided a correct assess- munity and reached conclu- ment of how the situation sions by consensus (with dis- would develop. "Basically, the sents footnoted). Today, a Na- warning. system is geared tc tional Intelligence Officer, a situations with a potential for specialist in a given area, may a Soviet-American confronta. seek cooperation from others tion. A coup d'etat in, say, the in the community, but he Chad, does not trigger 4r drafts his own assessment. memorandums. international networks of nar- cotics smugglers. The State Department's Intelligence and Research Bureau specializes in analyzing information flow- ing.from American embassies and consulates abroad. The Pentagon's Office of Net As- sessments is concerned with the balance of strategic and conventional forces between the United States and the Soviet Union. The net-assessments func- tion is a bone of contention be- tween the Pentagon and the C.I.A., the kind of issue that suggests 'why there's a need for coordination.. The Defense Department insists that with- out access to the most classi- fied aspects of the United States defense posture - ac- cess that the Defense Depart- ment denies to the C.I.A. - net assessment should not be made. Let the C.I.A. stick to its collection of information on the war-making potential of foreign nations, says the Pen- tagon, and leave the weighing of the balance of forces, histor- ically a military-command function, to the military. Admiral Turner protests that his agency "is not in the business of making net assess- ments nor does it intend to get into it." However, he does add that through the National In- telligence directorate the C.I.A. is "trying to find ways to make our assessments more meaningful [and) this inevita- bly involves some compari- sons...." . Another new community leader charged with increas- I' ing coordination among agen- cies is Lieut. Gen. Frank A. Camm, who runs Collection- Tasking, a new C.I.A. post. A lanky, 6-foot 4-inch native of Kentucky, he holds graduate degrees from Harvard (engi- neering) and George Washing- ton (international relations) and has helped to run the Corps of Engineers and the I Atomic Energy Commission. ! He's been given the job of set- I ting priorities within the com- munity as to who will do what jobs and how the available re- sources in terms of people and money will be expended. Under General Camm's I wing, for example, is the newly created National Intelli- gence Tasking Office, staffed by representatives of the civil- ian and military agencies that make up the intelligence com- munity along with the C.I.A. The center is intended to "coordinate" the intelligence units of these agencies, units that had been relatively au- tonomous before President Carter's Executive Order forced cooperation upon them. The Energy Department, for example, is charged with overt collection of all informa- tion on energy matters abroad, and it cooperates with the C.I.A. in preparing against the day terrorists might try nuclear thefts. The Treasury Department collects foreign financial and monetary data. The Drug Enforcement Ad- ministration is supported by the C.I.A. (abroad) and the F.B.I. (at home) in rooting out It is 'the N.I.O.'s who produce the lengthy National Intelligence Estimates (N.I: .E.'s), sometimes projecting a nation 10 yearslllinto the future; these papers, ! which include dissenting views in the actual ,text, must be approved by the National Foreign Intelligence Board, made up' of the chief in- telligence officers of the com- munity. 'The trouble with such studies, as members of the community reluctantly admit, is that policy. makers time to read them. Only the annual N.I.E.II on the Soviet Union's strategic posture and intentions has a wide reader- ship. As a -rule, policy makers prefer daily current intelli- gence ("the quick fix," as a C.I.A. officials calls it) al- though they complain about a lack of in-depth material after something - like Iran - has. gone wrong. All' of which poses what Bowie calls "tensions" between long-term and short- The single most criticized term intelligence require- area of intelligence activity is ments. He is constantly urged now centralized in the direc- to provide cur ent intelli- - Bence, making it increasingly Yet another newly crea.e?_ unit is the super-secret "Mos. cow Committee," set up by the C.I.A. this year. It seeks to deal with Soviet efforts to de- stroy American intelligence networks abroad. Meanwhile, Bowie has created a little-known but much-experienced group to oversee the whole collection and analysis effort. The Senior Review Panel is headed by the former Ambassador to Tanza- nia and Yugoslavia, William Leonhart. Its other members are retired Army Gen. Bruce Palmer, a former Vice Chief of Staff, and Princeton Univer- sity Prof. Klaus Knorr, a scholar in the field of intelli. gence. The full-time panel serves as an in-house critic o! the quality of intelligence; it h involved at the inception of every estimating process arx in all of the post-mortems. The most demoralized of the departments under Admiral Turner's wing is the director ate for Operations, home of the cloak and dagger. John N, McMahon, a graying, 50-year. w+c.~c ??? ??????~????? ...----- tiara [a spring~i anniyau #L gence, which is responsible for . for the N.I.E.'s and other in- old veteran of almost three de} maintaining the flow of data depth studies -__ caries the C1A., brings . and analysis, short-and long- Last fall Bowie established . quiet demeanor to his post an term, to policy makers. This the post of National Intelli- . is said to have considerabl army of 1,500 analysts is com-. gence Officer i! for Warning, popularity with his subord manded by Deputy Director and gave it to Richard Leh- . hates - but be has had an ul Robert.R. Bowie, a dapper, 69- man, a C.I.A.r veteran of 30 hill struggle coping with th year-old lawyer, educator and yearn The Pentagon's Strate- ~' body blows his organizatio been primarily designed to 1 The Operations responsibi provide advance notice of an + ities are officially defined a Planning Staff, but this is his .was absorbed and its role ex- .. Itgence, largely through seers first job in the intelligence I paraded by Lehman. It now community. I keeps the Government abreast I CONTINUED Admiral Turner hired in 1977. He had once been chairman of the State Department's Policy impending nuclear conflict, _ the collection of "foreign mte Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP90-01208R000100070057-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 :CIA-RDP90-012088000100070057-4 means," counterintelligence missions abroad and "other secret foreign intelligence tasks." But for all the roman- tic and/or grisly tales of its operatives, covert spying today is devoted more to so- phisticated espionage - re- cruiting foreign officials to serve as American spies, for example -than to the subver- sion, political action and guer- rillawarfare of the past. In part, that reflects the in- vestigations of a few years ago; Congressional oversight committees are still sensitive about approving major covert operations, and the National Security Council's Special Coordination Committee (chaired by Brzezinski) is re- luctant to propose "special ac- tivities." Moreover, this change has dramatically af- fected personnel. The agen- der whether _ the SALT Ii treaty was even verifiable. Government experts claimed that because of complex satel- lite and radar surveillance networks around the world, the United States would not be- come blind altogether, even if it takes three or four years to replace fully the stations in The major outside check on the community, however, is the Senate and House over- sight committees. And it is in the Congress that the most sig- nificant limits ever imposed on the country's intelligence apparatus are now being de- signed, in the form of draft legislation. The so-called Iran. What's more, though no "charters," drawn up by the one in Government will dis- Senate Select Committee on cuss the matter in detail, there Intelligence, will cover the are other sources of informs- C.I.A_, the Defense Intelli- tion concerning new missile ~gence Agency and the Federal designs, even before they have !Bureau been test flown. The indica- goal: to tions are that these sources are human agents who have in some fashion penetrated the Soviet defense establishment. Thus the human element -' HUMIIVT -can still have a' major role in strategic intelli- gence; presumably it will con- tinue to do so. "We have to of Investigation. The. define with reasonable precision the parameters for spying operations in all fields, including the setting of certain constraints on what the agen- cies are permitted to do. The central dilemma: how to , reconcile national-security needs with the constitutional rights of Americans. Reasonable men may differ on such an issue. The White House, for example, opposes as too cumbersome the com- mittee's desire to require the ` President's personal approval of all .major covert operations. The C.I.A. is holding out ; against Senators who would deny the agency the right to secretly use electronic surveil- lance on officials of foreign countries who hold American citizenship. The committee staff hopes. to have a draft completed by Labor Day, in an atmosphere viewed as remarkably favora- ble toward the intelligence community, given past histo- ry. "The environment has changed,".says Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana, committee chairman. He says .that .the proposed charter wilt not in- terfere with the agency's "ability to penetrate the deci- sion-making process of foreign nations." But some members of the intelligence community, given the shaking up they've received of fate, feel they're entitled to a few doubts. cy's paramilitary capability, I play alt the systems together," for instance, has virtually van- ~ a senior C.I.A. official said the fished. Some 27 percent of the ;other day. "Spies tell you that: C.I.A.'s clandestine services .there's something unusual on' staff is now 50 years of age or the ground, say; in the Soviet i older; and replacements don't Union, so you order photogra-I grow on trees. As Admiral Phy and signal intercepts, and Turner recently remarked., then you have to go back to the "You can't just recruit from spy. On the other hand, you the street for the spy shop.'. don't want to send a spy to get Recruiting, of course. has What can be obtained from (not been a major activity Photographs. So it's a syner- I within the community of late. getic affair; the problem is I During the last two years. the how to get the synergism I Admiral has fired more than going." ~ 400 officers in the clandestine ~ _ services. The C.I.A. had be- come "top-heavy," he says. The public concern over the The personnel cutback has ethics of the C.I.A. was re- damaged the agency's morale fleeted in the creation of the more than the Congressional intelligence Oversight Board, investigations and all the other a private citizens' panel ap- criticism put together_ Pointed by the President and operating from 'the Executive All of which is not to suggest Office Building next to the that spy satellites and elec- White House. Its members are tropic gadgets have totally Thomas L. Farmer, aWash- taken over from flesh-and- ington lawyer, chairman; for- blood spies. Covert operations mer Senator Albert Gore of continue, and in at least one Teru~essee and former Gov. important instance, they may William S. Scranton of Penn- be taking the place of scien- Sylvania. tific hardware. The board reviews all activi- Theloss of the missile-track- ties of the inteNigence agen- ing stations in Iran was a low Gies that might raise questions blow to American surveillance of propriety and legality. It ~ of Soviet strategic testing, and has a mandate to report di- j it made some in Congress won- redly to the President any such flaws. ' TP!E C~EV! AGg ~F SY7?Ii4GfyCE There has been no obvious change in the status of Ameri- ca's intelligence community. Each morning, the President `. of the United States still re- ceives the top-secret docu- ment called the President's Daily Intelligence Brief. (Only five copies are produced.) Once a week, the President continues to welcome Admiral 'Turner or Deputy Director ~ Carlucci to the Oval Office for ~ a half-hour intelligence up- date. The very reorganization j that Jimmy Carter has de- "? mantled of the intelligence 1 community indicates his con- tinuing interest -not to men. lion disappointment. Yet the glory days of the C.I.A. seem to have passed. When the Cold War was per- ceived by the nation and its President as representing a clear and present danger, the intelligence community had a i special aura. There was tittle public discussion then of its "efficiency" (which in all like- lihoodwas nogreater than it is today) and Congress tended to look the other way when ques- tions ofineans and ends arose. There is no lack of major problem areas for the modern intelligence community to ex- ~ plore, from the growing turbu- lence in Latin America and the f Caribbean to the strategic issues of SALT II and the eco- nomic threat posed by the Or- ganization of Petroleum Ex- porting Countries. And the C.I.A. is expected by its mas- ters in the White House to come up with the data and analyses needed to deal with those issues. But it is apt to be a more careful, deliberate ef- fort, relying more on elec- tronic tools and patient collec- tion than on the cloak and dag- geT- ~ .. _ _... . ~3Na U~3 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 :CIA-RDP90-012088000100070057-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 :CIA-RDP90-012088000100070057-4 On the top levels of the intel- Iigence community, there is some uncertainty about that prospect, and considerable re- ; sentment of the criticism the agencies have attracted. A Senator recently commented, for example, on the failure of today's C.I.A. to play a role on the policy-making level: "They must have some opin- ions." Towhich atop C.t.A. of- ficial responds: "What is it that they want us to do? It's damned if we get involved in policy and damned if we don't. I guess, on balance, we prefer . . to stay out of it." The complaints about the agency's efficiency, according to Admiral Turner, ,reflect some confusion as to Lhe na- ture of intelligence work. Ac- curate political analysis, he says, "depends upon anticipat- ing and correctly interpreting :. human action and reaction, some of which is inconsistent, ; or irrational, or driven by per-' sonal rather than national con- siderations. The best the ana- lyst can do is to alert the deci- sion maker to trends, possibil- ities, likelihoods." As Admiral Turner sees it,! the whole process of intelli- gence gathering and analysis is undergoing evolution from what he has called the old- fashioned "military-intelli- gence mentality" to a modern political, economic and socio- logical approach. "We are re- tooling," he says, ."trying to understand the world." There is, however, pressure to speed up the process. The Congress and the President are impa_ ~, tient. 67 C011TTINUED Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 :CIA-RDP90-012088000100070057-4 ' Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 :CIA-RDP90-012088000100070057-4 sS~D~ 3N~~4i~G~~t~! ~~~ ~ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 :CIA-RDP90-012088000100070057-4 In on effort to improve the quality of its "product," the intelligence ~. community -the C.I.A, and other agencies-has been reorganized. Four of the key new