THE CIA'S QUIET LITTLE WAR IN LAOS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-01208R000100190003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: August 1, 1975
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/08: CIA-RDP90-01208R000100190003-0
A!J;1I15T, 1-T(5
THE a.,IA'S QUIET BYTE E WA, 1N LADS, OR 15
TONS C
BOMBS AMONG RIE
, 3DS? By 'R~ l~R
Fred .Branfman, 33-year-old codirec-
tor of lire Indochina Resource Center in
i f'nshirrton, D.C., has lived for four and
a half years in Indochina, three and a
half of them in Laos as a researcher and
writer and as an educational advisor
with International Voluntary Services. A
graduate of the. University of Chicago
with a master's degree in education from
Harvard, Branfman speaks Laotian,
French, Swahili, Hebrew and some
Thai and is married to a Vietnamese.
The following article will form part of
"CIA: The President's Secret Army," a
book based on his research into Amer.,
ca's clandestine war efforts in Laos.
The current controversy over the
CIA has concentrated on activities con-
ducted by a relatively small number of
people, ranging from the bugging of
Soviet embassies. to an occasional as-
sassination attempt. But the CIA ac-
tually functioned as a. major war-making
body, spending unreported billions of
dollars directing a military force of more
than 100,000 Americans and Asians and
dropping over 2 000,000 tons of bombs-
as much tonnage as was absorbed by all
of Europe and the Pacific theater during
World War Two-on the tiny country
of Laos.
To hear some officials describe the
CIA men in Laos, one would think
them a few dozen miracle men combin-
ing the qualities of Tom Dooley and
Frank Merriwell to help the '30,000
guerrillas with whom they communi-
cate in flawless native dialect. A strik-
ingly different picture emerges from
interviews with sources who know these
CIA operators.
People are still talking about the ex-
ploits of one legendary CIA man in
Laos. This -try, they say, offered a
bounty for enemy ears-which could be
deposited in a big plastic bag hanging
on D his porch-until his "boys" got car-
ried away and lopped off so many ears he
had to discontinue the practice. Prob-
ably the most famous story recalls the
time he gave a box to a pilot, asking him
to deliver it to Pat Landry, his CIA boss
at Udont Air Force Base in Thailand.
During the flight, the pilot noticed a
pre 're,.iyely worsening odor, which he
fiitah;? traced to the I,ox. Fit: tore it
open-to find inside a fresh htunan head.
The joke was, to imagine Landry's re-
action on opening the box. "I mean,"
said one source. collapsing with I:nr,liter,
"What do you do with a human Ilea d?
You can't just theory it in the wastepaper
basket."
Fot:r key organizations played a
central role in the CIA's secret army
structure- The. there Air :\nterica, an
airline owned attd directly controlled
by the CL\: Continental Air Services,
Inc., which as Continental Airlines in tite
United States is a cornntercial firm
but Operated entirely separately in Laos:
the U. S.Agenc? for International De-
velopment's Requirements Office; !lid
the Air Force's 56_?t Special Operations
tying.
A:\ and Continental. or CAST. pro-
vided military air-transport service
that, among otter things, enabled the
CIA's troops to carry out offensives
during the rainy season. when Pathet
Lao forces were r mired down in niud.
Air America and CAST drop; of rice
and armaments, t- so, were often what
kept the Men and L.-to Theung hill
"If there's air one question
posed by the CIA's Miavior in
Laos and elsewhere, it's that the
CIA may have reached the point
where it has itse!become a threat
to our national security."
tom.?+:o.---- - - --- - - - --!mot-v,a
tribes, the Thai mercenaries and I..ao
conscripts of the CIA's army fighting.
For the hill people, these rice drops
were the only means of survival, since
they had been uprooted from their
homes as many as four or five times.
The Requirements Office, one of the
most powerful organizations in Laos,
was established to receive and distribute
all military goods coming into the coun-
try. CIA logistical control of the war
through this office meant that those
Laotian generals who cooperated with
the CIA would get U. S. weapons;
those who didn't wouldn't. The reason
the office was given a USAID cover was,
once again, part of the over-all attempt
to keep the CIA secret army from pub-
lic view. The lid was somewhat blown
in 1970, when then-USAII) director
John Hannah took the unprecedented
step of co::;i,li ;ti: pule':icty that 0w.
CIA Corer.
The :,rich 'Sp :- i:: . Op r.ttiuns \1'in
a fleet Of prr.t,ct:cr-driven aircraft
headquartered in Thailand, was first
brought into t':e Laotian c:irtlict a. a
mean; of ca:-t'Jin- out extensive bonrb-
inC raids by Ar!eric:ui, 1.:rr and Thai
pilots: later, it was used to snpporr the
many irre,.ular activities of the All-
Force's Rluc Yogic,, the nto,t public:rt?tl
of which was the raid on Sou Tay
well remain in direct control of tae 55th
SOW today.
In the first year after the July 196'
`_
Geneva Accords: which prohibited for-
eign inilitarv advisory personnel. in
Laos, the CL- ran the war almost ca-
tirely through its own persornel. plug
the alorentenrinned AA, C,':\SI, 56th
SOW and US.-\If) Redriirernents O11:1ce-
Soon, however. as the r:ar cEort drew,
the CIA found itself h:tvirrg to utilize
ever-increasing numbers of :\rnericans
from other groups.
First of all, there were active-duty
U. S. military personnel, working in
Laos out of uniform, to give the ap-
pearance that the Geneva Accords were being observed. \lany of the uteri of the l
Air Force's clandestine unit known as
Project +101 lived and worked in Laos
but were ofliciaily re` isrered as rt,id-
ing in Thailand. There was even a
daily Udor n-Laos commuter flight,
carrying 20 to 3,0 air Force mechanics
and weapon.; technicians iii :rid out, .~
morning aril night. On an}' given day.
there were many other U. S. active i
dirty personnel in Laos on TD't'-
temporary duty assignment. One such
was Bob Atidersou,'who in 1967-19.53 was an Air Force ordnance expert who
was frequently sent in to Los frotrr
Thailand for such tasks as defusing urn-
exploded U. S. bombs that hard been
dropped on friendly villages. Antler-
son remembers he'd be liven S100 to
buy civilian clothing and issued a
USAID ernplo;ee's card for his visits
to Laos. There were also several thou-
sand Green Ferets on active duty in
various secret enterprises horn time to
time. The Pentagon recently declassi-
fied a series of operations that went
into southern Lao; for missions invnls--
ins? everything from espion:rye to
rnp n;_ :it:(!
15+;`_'.:\Llu c:,alt t.. nti:ru?.y under in f;tcc,
conir:rlled by tt:e CIA out of S:rig;+rtr.
:\nd filially. of course, any liain- of
U. S. rnilir.rry persuttr:el actively it;-
volved in ih,:. ear in L:io.. roust inch:d?.:
the hunttrc?di of U.S. Air Force. Navy
antJ \L-n'iae airmen who, )ica: tree -?Ot)
jet sorties surd F I;-5^ raids that tarok
place over Lacy: on a t,pit;rl tl.ty i:t
1117,1. for example. it is. of e-nt:rye,
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