RECOLLECTIONS OF A SOVIET DIPLOMAT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-01226R000100040002-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 3, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REPORT

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TRANSLATION
SOURCE: LE MATIN, No. 16722,
Paris, December 31,
1929.
N
RECOLLECTIONS OF A SOVIET DIPLOMAT
IX. The Soviets and the United States
The Amtorg, of the board of directors of which I
became a member, is a private commercial company which
operates in the United States according to the local laws.
An attempt had been made to obtain authorization in
the United States to set up a semi-official Soviet agency;
after a categorical refusal, opposed by Washington, recourse
was had to a subterfuge: a joint stock company with
officials of the commissariat, who became shareholders and
certain American citizens - Russians who had emigrated long
before and were established in the United States--who would
give the enterprise a sufficiently acceptable aspect for the
local authorities. Shares were issued which were, of course,
paid for by the commissariat and the Amtorg - the American
Trading Corporation - became a non-official agency of the
Soviets in New York. American visas being very d.fficult
to obtain, the majority of the officials of the Amtorg were
enrolled on the spot and only the chiefs of divisions were
sent from Moscow. Everyone was, however, appointed by
orders signed by the commissariat of commerce, these
orders being styled secret, but the least important usher
of the commissariat knew what to believe.
Only the most tried members of the Party were appointed
division chiefs of the Amtorg, for they were to become
owners
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owners of a rather large block of stock. As a matter of
fact, these shares were never delivered to them in kind,
the president alone being charged with keeping them;
but, legally, each division chief had the right to.require
that these shares be transmitted to him. A little later,
the Political Bureau instituted a precautionary measure:
at the time of being sent to the United States, the future
division chief had to sign or accept drafts for an amount
double the capital represented by his "shares". But in
1926, that had not yet been thought of.
In order to go to the United States, the official in
question was depicted as being the representative of a
Soviet organization needing to place a large order with
American manufacturers. Thus, in my case, I shamelessly
pretended that the Gostorg, another Soviet crganization,
was prepared to purchase, through me, 10,000 American
tractors, perhaps even more. Such a large order was to
dazzle the American consuls and secure for me a visa for
at least twelve months. Upon my arrival in New York,
another million dollars worth of stock was to be issued
which I would pay for from my "own funds": after which,
I would have the extension of my visa. They had even
thought, at the Political Bureau, of appointing me semi-
official agent of the Soviets in the United States;
this post, moreover, does exist and it is held by a
certain Svirsky, who arrived in Washington in 1922 as the
representative of an operetta republic (of the Far East);
since then, he has remained as an observer, without having
any influence either at Moscow or at Washington; from time
to
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to time, he publishes a small informative leaflet, relating
how he went to see this or that American statesman to dis-
cuss the subject of the possible recognition of the Soviets.
In 1926, the Political Bureau decided to make the
work in the United States more effective. Certain mem-
bers of the Political Bureau agreed with Trctzky. He
claimed that the antagonism between Europe and the United
States was going to increase that. that, in order to
weaken Europe, Uncle Sam might, perhaps, need to inoculate
it a little more with bolshevism, as Ludendorf had pre-
viously tried in his relations with the Entente, which he
had wished to hold in check with the Bolshevik spectre.
It was accordingly decided to appear exceedingly
accommodating to Washington, to pay the American debt,
to give complete compensation for nationalized American
property and to offer Americans the best Ruesian con-
cessions.
The Commissariat of Foreign Affairs had. indeed tried
to protest, saying that other countries would endeavor to
take advantage of the precedent created by such an agree-
ment with America, but the Political Bureau replied to
these arguments with smiles. The watchword on this subject
was as follows: "Recognized de jure by the United States,
we can dispense with the rest of Europe. Having the United
States on our side, politically and economically, we can
risk a diplomatic break with all the rest of the world."
This idea al,ays seemed infantile to me.
But, in 1926, the illusions on the subject of the
United States were still very great, and Moscow decided to
entrust
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entrust a diplomatic task to me, putting Svirsky under
my orders.
In order to meet this new situation, I had to become
acquainted with the political work carried on in the
United States.
Piatnitzky, one of the members of the Komintern,
that is, of the executive committee of the Third Inter-
national, told me that the work of the Komir.Ltern in the
United States was hindered by the impossibility of
establishing a sufficiently powerful communist party there.
To be sure, they were sending directions and a great deal
of money, but they were still far from an impressive
mass movement. In 1925, the American Communists had
allowed several good opportunities to escape them: the
agitation of the discontented farmers, the presidential
campaign and everything relating to the blacks.
We know, Piatnitzky repeated, that it :Ls not easy
to organize the work in that Republic. Ame:rican workers
are reluctant to enter the ranks of a clearly proletarian
party. The Federation of Labor has enormous influence
in the United States....
The unemployed are not affected by our propaganda.
The subsidies paid annually amount to 4 100,,000, however,
which is not little for a party having, in all, barely
a few thousand members. The Prof intern (Trade Union
International), for its part, sends 4,x25,000 to the
.Trade Union Propaganda League. Now, when, for example we
ask them to make a small demonstration to protest - let us
say against the imperialism of the United States in South
America
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America - they are fundamentally incapable of drawing a
large enough crowd into the streets. As for a strike of
protest, it must not even be thought of!
G. Bessedovsky
former Charge d'Affaires and
1st counsellor of the. Embassy
of the U. S. S.R. at Paris.
(Copyright by the Matin for France and by
Mr. Bessedovsky for the whole world)
(Continuation)
"For these reasons, the Komintern has decided to
send two energetic comrades to the United States, charged
with directing the Party and the League at ,;he same time.
They are two Germans, so that if they should happen to be
caught, Moscow could not be accused of having fomented
disorders. They are named ? ragner and Neumann.
"The American Communists are subsidized through our
agency at Berlin. If need should be felt, you could
advance these two comrades sums of ,,10,000 as a maximum,
on the credit of the funds of the Amtorg. These amounts
will be returned to you by Berlin. The amounts advanced
by the Amtorg would be charged to the personal account
of the President of the Amtorg and the money sent from
Berlin would be credited to him. In America, everything
is seen on a large scale, and some ten thousand dollars
lent to your president should not distrub your financial
comptrollership. It is for proletarians that that is a
great deal of money."
I also had a talk with the chief of military espionage,
Berzine. He explain-d to me that two illegal organizations
were working in the United States, with their center of
action
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action at New York. Their purpose was technical, military
and naval espionage. The head of these two organizations
was named Filin (pseudonom: Semen). Provided with a
Polish passport, he is said to be one of the best Soviet
spies. He is said to pass for the owner of a small
office for the importation of medicinal herbs, particularly
what the English call licorice, reg lisse. In. this way, he
can, from time to time, appear in the offices of the Amtorg
and there meet. the representatives of the division of
military technical orders.
Lastly, I had an interview with Trilisser, chief
of the foreign department of the G.P.U. (State Political
Administration). The G.P.U., because of lack of money,
could not develop any extensive action in the United States,
and its role was limited in particular to supervision of
the officials of the Amtorg. A certain Gordon (I do not
know whether he went to the United States under his real
name) is at the head of this organization: he represents
himself as clerk of the Amtorg. Formerly chief of one of
the sections of the central committee of the party, Gordon
enjoys great influence at Moscow, particularly with Molotoff.
There also exists a small nucleus of political
espionage, the head of which is the Latvian Alxnis, an
official of the G.P.U., who arrived in the 'United States
with a Latvian passport, I no longer remember under what
name.
To guarantee the transmission of information coming
from this organization, there is now under consideratim
the matter of sending to the United States another official
of the G.P.U., Dr. Scheftel, who would be presented as a,
representative
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representative of the Soviet Red Cross. The expenses of
the G.P.U. in the United States are said not to exceed
50,000 dollars a year.
After a stay of two weeks, I left for the United
States. The visa was to be given me at the American
Consulate at Riga. I was received there in a friendly
manner and turned over to Mr. Martens, counsellor of the
mission, who spoke Russian very well. Mr. Martens
carefully examined my papers and the full power of the
Gostorg authorizing me to purchase 20,000 tractors in
the United States. Then he told me that, according to
his information, I had been appointed the semi-official
representative of the U.S.S.R. in the United States,
which made it impossible for him to give me a visa, for
the United States was not in need of a diplomatic
representative of the Soviets.
Such was the end of that enterprise. The Amtorg
protested to Washington, but the Department of State
confirmed the decision of its .representative at Riga.
Some time after this incident, the Department of
State refused to visa the passports of piatakoff and
Sokolnikoff (now ambassador at London) who were also to
represent the Soviets semi-officially in the United
States.
Tr-AVA
1-25-30
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