THE REAGAN MODEL
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E. The Reagan Model
president Reagan entered office with a
strong commitment to cabinet government. His
principal advisors on national security affairs
were to be the Secretaries of State and De-
fense, and to a lesser extent the Director of
Central Intelligence. The position of the Na-
tional Security Advisor was initially downgrad-
ed in both status and access to the President.
Over the next six years, five different people
held that position.
The Administration's first National Security
Advisor, Richard Allen, reported to the Presi-
dent through the senior White House staff.
Consequently, the NSC staff assumed a re-
duced role. Mr. Allen believed that the Secre-
tary of State had primacy in the field of foreign
policy. He viewed the job of the National Secu-
rity Advisor as that of a policy coordinator.
President Reagan initially declared that the
National Security Council would be the princi-
pal forum for consideration of national security
issues. To support the work of the Council,
President Reagan established an interagency
committee system headed by three Senior
Interagency Groups (or "SIGs"), one each for
foreign policy, defense policy, and intelligence.
They were chaired by the Secretary of State,
the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of
Central Intelligence, respectively.
Over time, the Administration's original con-
ception of the role of the National Security Ad-
visor changed. William Clark, who succeeded
Richard Allen in 1982, was a long-time associ-
ate of the President and dealt directly with him.
Robert McFarlane, who replaced judge Clark in
1983, although personally less close to the
President, continued to have direct access to
him. The same was true for VADM John Poin-
dexter, who was appointed to the position in
December, 1985.
President Reagan appointed several addition-
al members to his National Security Council
and allowed staff attendance at meetings. The
resultant size of the meetings led the President
to turn increasingly to a smaller group (called
the National Security Planning Group or
"NSPG"). Attendance at its meetings was more
restricted but included the statutory principals
of the NSC. The NSPG was supported by the
SIGs, and new SIGs were occasionally created
to deal with particular issues. These were fre-
quently chaired by the National Security Advi-
sor. But generally the SIGs and many of their
subsidiary groups (called Interagency Groups
or "IGs") fell into disuse.
As a supplement to the normal NSC process,
the Reagan Administration adopted -compre-
hensive procedures for covert actions. These
are contained in a classified document, NSDD-
159, establishing the process for deciding, im-
plementing, monitoring, and reviewing covert
activities.
F. The Problem of Covert
Operations
Covert activities place a great strain on the
process of decision in a free society. Disclosure
of even the existence of the operation could
threaten its effectiveness and risk embarrass-
ment to the Government. As a result, there is
strong pressure to withhold information, to
limit knowledge of the operation to a minimum
number of people.
These pressures come into play with great
force when covert activities are undertaken in
an effort to obtain the release of U.S. citizens
held hostage abroad. Because of the legitimate
human concern all Presidents have felt over the
fate of such hostages, our national pride as a
powerful country with a tradition of protecting
its citizens abroad, and the great attention paid
by the news media to hostage situations, the
pressures on any President to take action to
free hostages are enormous. Frequently to be
effective, this action must necessarily be covert.
Disclosure would directly threaten the lives of
the hostages as well as those willing to contem-
plate their release.
Since covert arms sales to Iran played such a
central role in the creation of this Board, it has
focused its attention in large measure on the
role of the NSC staff where covert activity is in-
volved. This is not to denigrate, however, the
importance of other decisions taken by the gov-
ernment. In those areas as well the National
Security Council and its staff play a critical
role. But in many respects the best test of a
system is its performance under stress. The
conditions of greatest stress are often found in
the crucible of covert activities.
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his access to the President. He told Mr. Ghor-
banifar stories of conversations with the Presi-
dent which were wholly fanciful. He suggested
without authority a shift in U.S. policy adverse
to Iraq in general and Saddam Husain in par-
ticular. Finally, in the nine-point agenda dis-
cussed on October 26-28, he committed the
United States, without authorization, to a posi-
tion contrary to well established U.S. policy on
the prisoners held by Kuwait.
The conduct of the negotiators with Mr.
Ghorbanifar and the second channel were han-
dled in a way that revealed obvious inexperi-
ence. The discussions were too casual for deal-
ings with intermediaries to a regime so hostile
to U.S. interests. The U.S. hand was repeatedly
tipped and unskillfully played. The arrange-
ments failed to guarantee that the U.S. ob-
tained its hostages in exchange for the arms.
Repeatedly, LtCol North permitted arms to be
delivered without the release of a single cap-
tive.
The implementation of the initiative was
never subjected to a rigorous review. LtCol
North appears to have kept VADM Poindexter
fully informed of his activities. In addition,
VADM Poindexter, LtCol North, and the CIA
officials involved apparently apprised Director
Casey of many of the operational details. But
LtCol North and his operation functioned
largely outside the orbit of the U.S. Govern-
ment. Their activities were not subject to criti-
cal reviews of any kind.
After the initial hostage release in Septem-
ber, 1985, it was over 10 months before an-
other hostage was released. This despite recur-
ring promises of the release of all the hostages
and four intervening arms shipments. Begin-
ning with the November shipment, the United
States increasingly took over the operation of
the initiative. In January, 1986, it decided to
transfer arms directly to Iran.
Any of these developments could have served
as a useful occasion for a systematic reconsider-
ation of the initiative. Indeed, at least one of
the schemes contained a provision for reconsid-
eration if the initial assumptions proved to be
invalid. They did, but the reconsideration never
took place. It was the responsibility of the Na-
tional Security Advisor and the responsible offi-
cers on the NSC staff to call for such a review.
But they were too involved in the initiative
both as advocates and as implementors. This
made it less likely that they would initiate the
kind of review and reconsideration that should
have been undertaken.
NSC Staff Support for the Contras. -As already
noted, the NSC activities in support of the
Contras and its role in the Iran initiative were
of a piece. In the former, there was an added
element of LtCol North's intervention in the
customs investigation of the crash of the SAT
aircraft. Here, too, selected CIA officials re-
ported directly to LtCol North. The limited evi-
dence before the Board suggested that the ac-
tivities in support of the Contras involved un-
professionalism much like that in the Iran oper-
ation.
w. Congress Was Never Notified. -Congress was
of apprised either of the Iran initiative or of
the NSC staffs activities in support of the Con-
tras.
In the case of Iran, because release of the
hostages was expected within a short time after
the delivery of equipment, and because public
disclosure could have destroyed the operation
and perhaps endangered the hostages, it could
be argued that it was justifiable to defer notifi-
cation of Congress prior to the first shipment
of arms to Iran. The plan apparently was to
inform Congress immediately after the hostages
were safely in U.S. hands. But after the first de-
livery failed to release all the hostages, and as
one hostage release plan was replaced by an-
other, Congress certainly should have been in-
formed. This could have been done during a
period when no specific hostage release plan
was in execution. Consultation with Congress
could have been useful to the President, for it
might have given him some sense of how the
public would react to the initiative. It also
~7tolpursue ght have influenced his decision to continue
it.
v. Legal Issues. -In addition to conflicting with
several fundamental U.S. policies, selling arms
to Iran raised far-reaching legal questions. How
it dealt with these is important to an evaluation
of the Iran initiative.
Arms Transfers to Iran.-It was not part of the
Board's mandate to consider issues of law as
they may pertain to individuals or detailed as-
pects of the Iran initiative. Instead, the Board
focused on the legal basis for the arms trans-
fers to Iran and how issues of law were ad-
dressed in the NSC process.
IV-7
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nition that the role of the NSC staff is to
review, not to duplicate or replace, the work of
the departments and agencies.
We recommend that no substantive change
be made in the provisions of the National Se-
curity Act dealing with the structure and op-
eration of the NSC system.
2. Senate Confirmation of the National Security Ad-
visor. It has been suggested that the job of the
National Security Advisor has become so im-
portant that its holder should be screened by
the process of confirmation, and that once con-
firmed he should return frequently for ques-
tioning by the Congress. It is argued that this
would improve the accountability of the Na-
tional Security Advisor.
We hold a different view. The National Secu-
rity Advisor does, and should continue, to
serve only one master, and that is the Presi-
dent. Further, confirmation is inconsistent with
the role the National Security Advisor should
play. He should not decide, only advise. He
should not engage in policy implementation or
operations. He should serve the President, with
11 l and potentially diverting loyalties.
ra
t
making the national security process work, for
it is this process by which the President obtains
the information, background, and analysis he
requires to make decisions and build support
for his program. Most Presidents have set up
interagency committees at both a staff and
policy level to surface issues, develop options,
and clarify choices. There has typically been a
struggle for the chairmanships of these groups
between the National Security Advisor and the
NSC staff on the one hand, and the cabinet
secretaries and department officials on the
other.
Our review of the operation of the present
system and that of other administrations where
committee chairmen came from the depart-
ments has led us to the conclusion that the
system generally operates better when the com-
mittees are chaired by the individual with the
greatest stake in making the NSC system work.
We recommend that the National Security
Advisor chair the senior-level committees of
the NSC system.
i 4 Covert Actions. Policy formulation and im-
plementation are usually managed by a team of
experts led by policymaking generalists. Covert
action requirements are no different, but there
is a need to limit, sometimes severely, the
number of individuals involved. The lives of
many people may be at stake, as was the case in
the attempt to rescue the hostages in Tehran.
Premature disclosure might kill the idea in
embryo, as could have been the case in the
opening of relations with China. In such cases,
there is a tendency to limit those involved to a
small number of top officials. This practice
tends to limit severely the expertise brought to
bear on the problem and should be used very
sparingly indeed.
The obsession with secrecy and preoccupa-
tion with leaks threaten to paralyze the govern-
ment in its handling of covert operations. Un-
placed. Th f
fortunately, the concern is not mis
-1 a
n
e
no co a
Confirmation would tend to institutionalize
the natural tension that exists between the Sec-
retary of State and the National Security Advi-
sor. Questions would increasingly arise about
who really speaks for, the President in national
security matters. Foreign governments could be
confused or would be encouraged to engage in
"forum shopping.".
Only one of the former government officials
interviewed favored Senate confirmation of the
National Security Advisor. While consultation
with Congress received wide support, confirma-
tion and formal questioning were opposed.
Several suggested that if the National Security
Advisor were to become a position subject to
confirmation, it could induce the President to
turn to other internal staff or to people outside
government to play that role.
We urge the Congress not to require
Senate confirmation of the National Security
Advisor.
3. The Interagency process. it is the National Se-
curity Advisor who has the greatest interest in
selective leak has become a pnncip mea
waging bureaucratic warfare. Opponents of an
operation kill it with a leak; supporters seek to
build support through the same means.
i
-
g
We have witnessed over the past years a s
nificant deterioration in the integrity of proc-
ess. Rather than a means to obtain results more
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satisfactory than the position of any of the indi-
vidual departments, it has frequently become
something to be manipulated to reach a specif-
ic outcome. The leak becomes a primary instru-
ment in that process.
This practice is destructive of orderly gov-
ernance. It can only be reversed if the most
senior officials take the lead. If senior decision-
makers set a clear example and demand com-
pliance, subordinates are more likely to con-
form.
Most recent administrations have had careful-
ly drawn procedures for the consideration of
covert activities. The Reagan Administration
established such procedures in January, 1985,
then promptly ignored them in their consider-
ation of the Iran initiative.
before the National Security Council. The At-
torney General is currently a member of the
Council by invitation and should be in a posi-
tion to provide legal advice to the Council and
the President. It is important that the Attorney
General and his department be available to
interagency deliberations.
The Justice Department, however, should not
replace the role of counsel in the other depart-
ments. As the principal counsel on foreign af-
fairs, the Legal Adviser to the Secretary of
State should also be available to all the NSC
participants.
Of all the NSC participants, it is the Assistant
for National Security Affairs who seems to have
had the least access to expert counsel familiar
with his activities.
We recommend that each administration
formulate precise procedures for restricted
consideration of covert action and that, once
formulated, those procedures be strictly ad-
hered to.
5. The Role of the CIA. Some aspects of the
Iran arms sales raised broader questions in the
minds of members of the Board regarding the
role of CIA. The first deals with intelligence.
The NSC staff was actively involved in the
preparation of the May 20, 1985, update to the
Special National Intelligence Estimate on Iran.
It is a matter for concern. if this involvement
and the strong views of NSC staff members
were allowed to influence the intelligence judg-
ments contained in the update. It is also of
concern that the update contained the hint that
the United States should change its existing
policy and encourage its allies to provide arms
to Iran. It is critical that the line between intel-
ligence and advocacy of a particular policy be
preserved if intelligence is to retain its integrity
and perform its proper function. In this in-
stance, the CIA came close enough to the line
to warrant concern.
We emphasize to both the intelligence com-
munity and policymakers the importance of
maintaining the integrity and objectivity of
the intelligence process.
6. Legal Counsel. From time to time issues
with important legal ramifications will come
The Board recommends that the position
of Legal Adviser to the NSC be enhanced in
stature and in its role within the NSC staff.
7. Secrecy and Congress. There is a natural ten-
sion between the desire for secrecy and the
need to consult Congress on covert operations.
Presidents seem to become increasingly con-
cerned about leaks of classified information as
their administrations progress. They blame
Congress disproportionately. Various cabinet
officials from prior administrations indicated to
the Board that they believe Congress bears no
more blame than the Executive Branch.
However, the number of Members and staff
involved in reviewing covert activities is large;
it provides cause for concern and a convenient
excuse for Presidents to avoid Congressional
consultation.
We recommend that Congress consider re-
placing the existing Intelligence Committees
of the respective Houses with a new joint
committee with a restricted staff to oversee
the intelligence community, patterned after
the joint Committee on Atomic Energy that
existed until the mid-1970s.
8. Privatizing National Security Policy. Careful
and limited use of people outside the U.S. Gov-
ernment may be very helpful in some unique
cases. But this practice raises substantial ques-
tions. It can create conflict of interest prob-
lems. Private or foreign sources may have dif-
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influence to get the prisoners, the hos-
tages, back.
Again, this is not a precise recollection; but
my general recollection is that this was an-
ticipated: that it would take place over a
fairly short period of time-30 to 60
days-and that that was kind of the general
framework of which everybody was think-
ing, because they talked about us making
available limited quantities of arms, then
they would produce hostages as showing
that they were really able to do something
for us, and that we would then ship more
arms if their good faith had been shown by
helping us get the hostages.
It was kind of a sequence that these events
would follow, along with each other.
There was also a discussion that, because
of the extreme sensitivity, it was recom-
mended that the President not inform
Congress until we had gotten the hostages
back. I vaguely remember there was discus-
sion that as soon as we got the hostages,
even on our planes en route to Wiesbaden,
that we would notify Congress then, before
Lt became public generally.
iSo, So, the subjects and the discussion of a
finding was made at that time, that a find-
ing would be necessary because of the way
in which this was to be done, with CIA
being involved in the transfer of the weap-
ons.
This was discussed for about an hour and
twenty minutes or so. I remember because
I consulted back on my calendar, and I had
a group waiting for me in the White House
Mess that day, and I was late to that lunch-
eon by more than an hour.
Cap and George were opposed to the idea.
I don't remember what the Vice President
or Don Regan might have said. Bill Casey
was very much in favor of the idea.
My own views were that it was a very close
decision. I have called it since a "51-49
decision." But I felt, in the long run, that
the risks that were attendant to this prob-
ably were worth the potential benefit, and
the potential benefits to me were both the
opening into Iran and also the assistance
that would be provided in getting the hos-
tages back. . . . It was my independent
judgment because nobody had talked to
me about it beforehand. But it was also as
a result of the discussion back and forth,
and particularly Poindexter and Casey were
the principal protagonists of going ahead
and doing this.... There was a relatively
thorough-I mean, it was very clear that
their [Shultz's and Weinberger's] positions
were that they were opposed to it, that
George felt this was at odds with our
policy in regard to terrorism, that it could
hurt us with our allies or with friends
around the world.
Cap was concerned primarily about the ter-
rorism policy.
The rejoinder, I think by Poindexter, was
that this was a special situation and that
this was not at odds with our overall
policy; it was an exception to the general
situation.
I think what most influenced me was the
idea that we would be taking-that the
risks would be fairly short-term because if
it did not work, we would be able to stop
it; if this didn't produce results after, say,
the first foray, that the thing would be
stopped. There was quite a bit of discus-
sion about that, that this would be in
stages so that it could be stopped.
We knew, in retrospect, that it did not
work out that way.
But that was one of the things that made
it, while a close call, more acceptable, as
far as I was concerned.
(Id. at 6-10)
The Attorney General believed that the
President had an adequate understanding of
the arguments for and against the project.
Nobody described the operational details, apart
from the arms transfers from the Defense De-
partment to the CIA. Ghorbanifar's name was
mentioned, but not Khashoggi's or other mid-
dlemen's and financiers'. The "thinness" of
operational security was not raised.
The feeling was that this would not be re-
vealed, or at least not be revealed while
the hostages were still in jeopardy, and the
risks to the people involved was also dis-
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lieved to be able to exert influence with respect
to the hostages and dealing directly with kid-
nappers. The President told the Board that
only the latter would "make it pay" to take hos-
tages.
1 The President told the Board that he had not
1 been advised at any time during this period
how the plan would be implemented. He said
he thought that Israeli government officials
would be involved. He assumed that the U.S.
side would be on its guard against people such
as Mr. McFarlane had met in London in early
December. He indicated that Director Casey
had not suggested to him at any time that the
CIA assume operational responsibility for the
initiative, nor was he advised of the downside
risks if the NSC staff ran the operation. He re-
calls understanding at the time that he had a
right to defer notice to Congress, and being
concerned that any leaks would result in the
death of those with whom the United States
\ought to deal in Iran.
VI. The United States Sells Iran
1,000 TOW Missiles.
Before the President signed the Finding of
January 17, 1986, North began to lash together
the CIA and Department of Defense to imple-
ment the plan he had outlined to Poindexter in
December and incorporated in Poindexter's
memoranda to the President in January. Before
January 17, he encountered resistance. Poin-
dexter asked him to discuss the matter with the
Director of Central Intelligence. North did so
on January 14. He reported that
I[n] A[ccordance] W[ith] yr direction, met
w/Casey last night after W'bgr speech at
Ft. McNair. Casey then tried to contact
Cap but he had already departed. Casey
has called urging that you convene a mtg
w/ he and Cap ASAP so that we can move
on. Casey's view is that Cap will continue
to create roadblocks until he is told by you
that the President wants this to move
NOW and that Cap will have to make it
work. Casey points out that we have now
gone through three different methodolo-
gies in an effort to satisfy Cap's concerns
and that no matter what we do there is
always a new objection. As far as Casey is
concerned our earlier method of having
Copp deal directly with the DoD as a pur-
chasing agent was fine. He did not see any
particular problem w/ making Copp an
agent for the CIA in this endeavor but he
is concerned that Cap will find some new
objection unless he is told to proceed.
Colin Powell, who sat next to me during
Cap's speech asked the following questions
(my answers are indicated):
Q Does Copp deal w/ Iranians or Is-
raelis?
A. With the Israelis.
Q. Is the intelligence a prerequisite?
A. It is probably something that can
be negotiated but in any event it is not
a DoD matter. It is covered in the
[January 6] finding and is in fact one
of the few means we have to make a
long term penetration in Iran. Our ul-
timate objective of changing/moderat-
ing the govt. is served by this.
Q What cost are the Israelis willing to
pay for the basic TOWs?
A. They (thru Copp) have funds to pay
Fair Market Value (FMV should be
about $4900-5400 ea. depending on
age) and to cover the cost of transpor-
tation. They do not have enough to
pay for I TOW (about $9500 ea. or
TOW II (about $15000 ea.). We have
frequently sold the Israelis weaps/ma-
teriel at FMV vice the replacement
cost to the U.S. Since we have over
[quantity deleted] of the basic TOW in
our inventory and cannot even use it
in training due to its age, we ought to
look at this as an opportunity to col-
lect on a weapon which we aren't
using [location deleted] according to
Koch) and will eventually have to dis-
pose of because we cannot sell them
off otherwise. (I'm told that Hughes
Acft, the mfgr. has an agreement w/
DoD that all normal FMS transactions
will be handled as a producer sale in
order to keep DoD fin undercutting
the production line by selling off old
stocks).
The most recent proposal (Copp as agent
for the CIA and sales to the Israelis who
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