TESTIMONY ON H.R. 1013 AND H.R. 1371 NORMAN Y. MINETA, M.C. - SUBCOMMITTEE ON LEGISLATION HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B00017R000200380011-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: April 8, 1987
• Content Type: MISC

Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/08: CIA-RDP90B00017R000200380011-0
TESTIMONY ON H.R. 1013 and H.R. 1371
NORMAN Y. MINETA, M.C.
SUBCOMMITTEE ON LEGISLATION
HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
APRIL 8, 1987
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. As one who sat on the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence for six years, I am delighted to have this
opportunity to appear before this Subcommittee.
There are two bills before you today, Mr. Chairman. Both bills are
similar in that they seek to cure the defect in current law that allows the
Administration to avoid the appropriate and necessary Congressional
oversight of covert actions.
H.R. 1013, introduced by Mr. Stokes and Mr. Boland, requires written
notice of all covert activities prior to their start, with an exception that
allows notice up to 48 hours after the start of an action.
My bill, H.R. 1371, is similar, except it requires written notice to
prior to initiation of all covert activities. H.R. 1371 does give the
Administration the power to limit this notice to the so-called "Gang of
Eight" -- the leadership of both Houses and both Intelligence Committees.
I support these bills because I believe in the principle of
Congressional oversight. And I say this not just because I am protective of
Congress's.prerogatives -- which I am -- but also because I believe that
such oversight makes our intelligence efforts stronger.
As the members of this Committee know all too well, on more than one
occasion the private but careful scrutiny of Congressional oversight has
saved the intelligence community from many mistakes, and indeed disasters.
And is there any one of us who doubts that had this committee had the
opportunity to review the Iran arms deals that the nation would have been
spared this whole sad affair?
Some may say
that
current law has failed only once in several
years
--
why change -it? I
say
if a simple change would have spared us the
Iran
disaster, we must
make
the change. Or else, what fiasco may be next?
Mr. Chairman, this proposed change was first approved by this committee
in 1980. Many of us, such as myself, have fought for more thorough
oversight for many years now. This bill is more than timely, it is long
overdue.
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I cannot speak for those who are opposed to these bills, but I suggest
that at the heart of their opposition is a mistrust, a doubt, about the
usefulness, reliability and appropriateness of Congressional oversight.
Mr. Chairman, I have no such doubts. And I submit that once you fully
accept the principle of thorough Congressional oversight, these bills become
obvious necessities.
Of course,-there are those who say, in effect, that Congress and this
committee cannot be trusted. As a former military intelligence officer
myself, I do not share that view. Indeed, my six years on this committee
convinced me that the single biggest sieve in this town is not the Congress,
but the Administration.
More than once when I sat on this committee we sought documents that
the Administration said were too sensitive for us to see -- and then I saw
those same documents in the media when it suited the Administration's
purpose.
Under H.R. 1371, for example, notice of very sensitive covert actions
could be limited to Speaker Wright, Minority Leader Michel, Chairman
Stokes, Mr. Hyde, and Senators Byrd, Dole, Boren and Cohen. Just these
eight distinguished leaders. The question is: can these eight people and
their successors be trusted with national security matters? If these
officials cannot be trusted -- and we have not heard any evidence that
they cannot be trusted -- then who can?
I have no doubt that these people, and the members and staff of both
intelligence committees, are worthy of our trust.
I trust them not only to keep our secrets, but to play a useful and
contributory role in our intelligence operations.
But no oversight can continue without timely and complete information.
Without such information, the committees are charged with a vital task, but
will be denied the tools to carry it out.
Mr. Chairman, oversight is necessary. And information is necessary to
carry out that function. These bills are necessary to get that information.
I hope you will act on them promptly.
Thank you.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/08: CIA-RDP90B00017R000200380011-0