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August 20, 1986
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4t Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP90B00017R000400190032-6 20 August 1986 Legislative Division, STAT FROM: Office of Congressional Affairs PRB Reference Center SUBJECT: Reference Points re Agency Provided Publication Support In response to your questions regarding the Church Committee testimony, the following reference appears to meet your search criteria. The reference passage (see attachment) discusses Agency support of publication for propaganda purposes. Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, April 1976, Book I; pages 179-203. For your information I am also enclosing two other references of roughly the same vintage as the Church Committee Report that also discuss the subject of Agency supported publication: The CIA and the Cult of Intelli ence, by Victor Marchetti and John Marks, 1974, pages 164-5, 174-179. The CIA's Secret Operation, by Harry Rositzke, 1977, pages 158, 163-4. Attachment As Stated STAT STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP90B00017R000400190032-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP90B00017R000400190032-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP90B00017R000400190032-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP90B00017R000400190032-6 X. THE DOMESTIC IMPACT OF, FOREIGN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS : THE CIA AND , ACADEMIC INSTITU- TIONS, THE MEDIA, AND RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS Although its operational arena is outside the United. States; CIA clandestine operations make use of American.. citizens as indivr ua, or rou American . insti to ions. an estine activities . t uc merican institutions and individuals have taken many forms and are effected through.a .wide variety of means : university officials. and, pro- f e88or8 provide lead R and make introductions for intelligence pur- poses; 1 scholars and journalists collect intelligence:;'journalists devise and place propaganda; United States publicaitions.provide cover: for CIA agents overseas. These forms of clandestine cooperationlhad their origins in the early Cold War period when most. Americans perceived a real threat of a communist imperium and were prepared to assist their government to counter that threat. As. the communists pressed to influence and to control international orranizajtions and; movements, muss-communica- tions, and cultural- instithtio-ns, the United States responded -by in- volvinngg American private institutions, and. individuals in,. the secret strurgle over minds, institutions and ideas. Over time national per- ceptions would change as to the nature .and seriousness of the com- munist ideological and institutional-threat. Time and experience would also give increasing currency to doubts as to whether it made sense for a democracy to resort to practices such As the clandestine use of free American institutions and individuals--practices that tended to blur the very difference between "our" system,.and "theirs" that .these covert programs were designed. to . prese4e. . These covert relationships have attracted .public concern and the attention of this Committee.. because.? of..the: importance Americans attach to the independence of rivate institutions. Americans recognize that insofar as universities, newspapers, ? and religious groups hel mold the beliefs of the public and . the .policymakers, their diversity ersity and legitimacy must be rigorously. protected._It'is through them that a society informs and criticizes itself; educates its young,.: interprets its history, and sets new goals. At the same time, Americans also recognize the legitimacy and necessity of certain clandestine operations, particularly the collection of foreign intelligence. To conclude that certain sectors of American life must be placed "off limits"; to clandestine operations inevitably raises questions not only on possible intelligence losses which. would result from such a prohibition, but on whether the United States can The material italicized nn this : reporthas Been substantially abridge,at the request of the executive agencies. The. classilled version of this material is avail able to members of the Senate under the provisions of Senate Resolution 21 and the Standing Rules of the Senate. See also p. IX. n70% Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP90B00017R000400190032-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP90B00017R000400190032-6 law 181 - 'afford to forego the clandestine use of our universities, our media, and our religious groups in competing with our adversaries. hooks published after 1967 were denied the Comm In exploring this problem the Committee has given special atten- on the contemporary clandestine use of the Amer tion to the CIA's past clandestine relationships with American institu- to q4t tions. The Committee has examined the past to illuminate the attitudes and perceptions that shaped these clandestine programs using Amer As or the media and re ro e o e in ivi ua s. iean.institutions and to determine whether the internal CIA regula bers of institutions and individuals involved and operational relationships since 1951 and then selec igious groups, the Committee inspected precis o tions established in 1967 are sufficient to prevent the large scale program's of the past from 'being reinstated in the future. closer inspection. The documents from these some Some of these concerns were addressed almost a decade ago during and screened by the Agency and; by mutual agree in, investigation that proved to 'be a watershed in the Central Intelli- viduals and institutions were removed. ' ggeenes Aggeency's relationship to American. institutions. President Therefore, the Committee has far from the full p ships dohnsion moved 'by public and congressional uproar over the and extent of these relation 4,061 >disclosure of the CIA's covert funding of the National Gtndent clandestine operations. Nevertheless, it has eno ssociation 'NSA and other domestic private institutions, cell bushed dimensions of the problem and to underscore its he stzeiv sa ommittee. The Committee, chaired by the then Under conclusions and Secretary of State, Nicholas The 'badirected its investigation recommendations must .necessa tentative and subject to 'careful review by the su oversight committee (s) of the Congress . primarily at the CIA's covert fundin of American educational and rivate volunta. or amza ions. a recommen ations of the Kaitzen In presenting the facts and issues associated wi mtiuttee, a t ou ey ad great impact on the CIA's opera tions, spoke only to the issue of the covert funding of institutions. tions with United Sues private institutions, this as follows : I. Covert Use of Academic and Volun se of United States Religious Groups. ' In its investigation the Committee has looked not only at the impact II. Covert Relationships with the United States of foreign clandestine operations on American institutions but has Use particular attention on the v n se of individuals. It should emphasized from the outset that the integrity o these institutions A . COVERT USE OF ACADEMR, AND VOLUNTARY or individuals is not jeopardized by open contact or cooperation with: Government intelligence institutions. United States Govern- The Central Intelli nee A nc :has ton -de ment support and cooperation, openly acknowledged, plays an essen relations i with the American ace emit . comm from, ac emzcs making intro uetions or in z tial role in American education. Equally important, Government pol- icymakers draw on the -technical expertise and advice available from ac demic consultants and university-related research- organizations. in i nee collection while abro , to academic r where I sponsors u is en. 'T e. gency' a Open and regular contact with Government agencies is a necessary part of the journalist's responsibility, as well. t~es o American private organizations around th be activities supported-or could be convinced , to foreign policy dbjectives. Until 1967 :the?Agen A secret or a covert relationship with any of these institutions, how- ever, is another matter, and requires careful evaluation, given the the pre-1967 projects. Access to post-1967 material was far more .,- -- certain of the titles and names of aut critical role these institutions play in maintaining the freedom of our covert, ties to American foundations in order to pa private groups whose work the CIA supported. society. In approaching the subject the Committee has inquired: Are The relationships have varied according to wh the independence and integrity of American institutions in any way laid, or whether the individuals are "witting', endangered by clandestine relationships with the Central Intelligence Agency? Should clandestine use of institutions or individuals within those institutions be permitted? If not, should there be explicit guide- lines laid down to regulate Government clandestine support or opera- institution or an individual, whether the relation involvement. In some cases; covert involvement 'pro little or no operational control of the institutions turned into influence, and finally even to bpera~tion P rin the 1950s and 1960s the CIA turned in was primarily a way to enable people to. do things tional use of such institutions or individuals? Should such guidelines In other cases, influence was exerted. Nor was the case -;`be in the form of executive directives or by statute? 5 .rIn addressing these issues, the Committee's access to CIA documents aftd.files varied with the subject matter. In reviewing the clandestine activities that roceed nbach Co Litt in ui of 1967.- action in the area of student and labor matters, c Select Commit ee had full and unfettered access to most files and comm en a struggle..with'comt - documen ion with sm a exec ion o recor s on me la re a i ? n ition, the mmittee took extensive sworn testimony add be, at center, a struggle between our institutions a that would compete with the communists around vi wall subsidized, advised, and even helped develop "pri m. lly all of those involved in the management and review of For ex lanati f it li h ors of propaganda ittee; access to files ican acaImc ic com- a description o e ations ips With re- r summaries of all t ed over 20 cases for 20 files were selected ment, names of indi- icture of the nature u gh' to outline t ie serious nature. The rily be considered ccessor intelligence th CIA covert rela- report is organized tary Organizations. Media. III. Covert ORGANIZATIONS velo ed clandestine unity, w i m rige aenee vur"eA to esearch and writ n1 g s funded teat ivi- e world when those s upport.--American c y also maintained ss funds secretly to ether made with an ship is paid or un-* aware-of CIA vided the CIA with ' involved;' funding they wanted to do. nature of these re- individuals support aluse.reasing l to covert c u tura affairs, and nunism was.seen to nd theirs. The CIA vate" organizations the world. Some of Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP90B00017R000400190032-6 p on o a cs see footnote p 179 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP90B00017R000400190032-6 these organizations w f 183 er e oreign; others were international; yet others were U.S.-based student, labor, cultural, or philanthropic organiza- tions whose international activities the CIA subsidized. The CIA's interest in the areas of student and labor matters, cul- tural affairs, and community development reached a peak in the mid- 1960's. By 1967, when public disclosure of NSA's funding and the sub- sequent report of the Katzenbach Committee caused a major curtail- ment of these activities, interest in the major covert action efforts in these areas was already waning. -.There appear to be two reasons for this. First, there was considerable skepticism within the CIA as to the effectiveness of this approach. It differed from classical CIA "tradecraft" in, that the organizations funded were basically. independent from CIA control. Richard Helms expressed this skepticism when he remarked in testimony before this committee, The clandestine operator . . . is trained to believe that you really can't count on the honesty of your agent to do exactly what you want or to report accurately unless you own him ' body and soul.2$ >VIr; Helms contended that "the clandestine operator sneered at the other kind of operation"-the aiding and abetting of people or orga- nizations who are your "friends" or "have the same point of view that you do " . Skepticism of the clandestine operators was directed particularly at the Covert Action Staff/International Organizations Division, the CIA units which. conducted the programs in the area of student and 0ultural. exchangeSecond, it became increasingly difficult to conceal the CIA funds that supported these activities as the scale of the opera- tions was grew. By fiscal year 1967, for example, over $3 million budgeted for youth and student programs and $6 million for labor. Most of the funds were transmitted through legitimate or "devised" foundations=that is, fictitious entities established by the CIA. 1. -'CIA Use of Private Foundations, Pre-1967 The use of philanthropic organizations was a convenient way to pass funds, in that large amounts could be transferred rapidly, and in a form that need not alert unwitting officers of the recipient organi- zations to their source. In addition, foundation grants bestowed upon the recipient the apparent "blessing" of the foundation. The funding pattern involved a mixture of bona fide charitable foundations devised foundations and funds, "front men" drawn from a list of America's most. prominent citizens, and lawyers representing undisclosed clients. The CIA's intrusion into th f e oundation fild th 196 e ine0s can only tip described as massive Excl di u ng grants f th "Bi Th .romegree" - F rc .Rockefeller, and Carnegie-of the 700 grants over $10,000 given 64, er thfoundations durin th g e period 19631966t l -, aeast 108 ri ved partial or com lete CIA f p unding M itl .oremporanty, CIA (ng' was involved in nearl hal th y f e grants the"Bi Th" non-gree ?nations made during this ?o..; d tL _ ? d .. _ o in Big Three" In thhil lii e pysca,fe and social scences atso involved CIA funds. _' Richard Helms testimony, 9/12/75, p. 25--26. Bona fide foundations, rather than those cottrolled by the CIA', were considered the best and most plausible kind of fun'd . ' cover for certain kinds of operations. A4966 CIA study explained-Mr-ft-o' xplained ~oo f legitimate foundations was the most;effecytive way of concelier ' CIA's hand as well as reassuring members of funded organizations that the organization was in fact supported by private ,funds. The Agency study contended that this technirue was ` tive for democratically-run membership: gganizations,~wh which need to assure their own unwitting members and collaborators, as well as their hostile critics, that they have genuine, respectable, private sources of income." - 2. The CIA'8 Foundation-funded Covert Activity, pre-1967 The philanthropic fronts used prior to 1967 funded a seemingly limitless range of covert action programs affecting youth groups, labor unions, universities, publishing houses, and other private institutions in the United States and abroad. The following list illustrates the diversity of these operations: (1) The CIA assisted in the establishment in 1951 and the funding for over a decade of a research institute at a major American univer- sity. This assistance came as the result of a request from ,Under-secre- tary of State James Webb to General Bedell Smith, then Director of the CIA. Mr. Webb proposed that the center, which was to research worldwide political, economic, and social changes, be supported by the CIA in the interest of the entire intelligence community. (2) A project was undertaken in _collaboration with a national)?J prominent American business a8soeiation.`T?te object of the project was to promote a f avorable image of America in a foreign country un f avor- ably dispo8ed to America and to promote, citizen-to-citizen .contacts between Americans and influential 8egment8.of that country'8 soc'iety'.a (3) The cooperation of an American .labor. organization in selected overseas labor activities. (4) Support of an international organization of veterans and an international foundation for developing countries. (5) Support of an organization of journalists and an international women is association. (6) Partial support for an international-educational exchange pro- gram run by a group of United States universities.. (7) Funding of a legitimate U.S. association of farm organiza- tions. Agency funds were used to host foreign visitors, provide scholar- ships to an international cooperative training center at a United States university, and to reimburse the organization for various of its activi- ties abroad. A CIA document prepared in 1967 notes that although the organization received some overt government funds from AID, the CIA should continue its covert funding because " programs funded by AID cannot address themselves to the same political goals toward which Agency operations are targeted 'because AID programs are part of official government-to-goverrinient programs and are designed for economic-not political-results." ' For explanation of italics, see footnote, p. 179. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP90B00017R000400190032-6 i Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP90B00017R000400190032-6 184 The Beat Tinolon Cabe: Covert Funding of the National Student Association CIA funding of the National Student Association (NSA) from 1952 t0-1967 is a particularly good example of how the United States Gov- ernment entered the field of covertly supporting "friends," of the vulnerabilities felt by the CIA in undertaking to support organizations and individuals that cannot be controlled, and of the operational temp- tation to move from support to "control." The reason the CIA decided to help NSA is clear. In the years immediately after World War II the Soviet Union took the lead in trying to organize and propagandize the world student movement The first Soviet Vice P id . res ent of th Iti enernatonal Union of Stu- ents, for example, was Alexander N. Shelepin, who later became Cli'airmair of the Soviet Stat S e ecurity Citt ( ommeeKGB). The Americari'Students who sought to compete with these communist- man bred and directed student group were hampered by a lack of hinds, `while the communist groups had enough money to put on world youth festivals, conferences and forums, and regional confer- ences. In, seeking funds at home, the American students found they were considered too far to the left in the general climate of Mc- Carthyism and anti-intellectualism of the 1950s. Against this back- ground, NSA officials, after being refused by the State Department and rebuffed by the Congress, were finally directed by the State Department in 1952 to the CIA.4 The CIA maintains that its funding efforts were based on shared in- terests, not on manipulation. CIA funding of the National Student Association appears to have been intended primarily to permit United States students to represent their own ideas, in their own way, in the international forums of the day. Nevertheless, the Committee has found instances in which the CIA moved from blank-check support to operational use of individual students.3 For example, over 250 U.S. students were sponsored by the CIA to attend youth festivals in Moscow, Vienna, and Helsinki and were used for missions such as reporting on Soviet and Third World personalities or observing Soviet security practices. A United States student, for example, was recruited in 1957 to serve as a CIA "asset" at the Sixth. World Youth Festival in Moscow. According to CIA documents, he was instructed to report on Soviet counterintelligence measures and to purchase a piece of Soviet-manufactured equipment. `Under the agreed arran gement CIA fd ,uns would support only the interna- tional division of the National Student Association ; only the NSA President and the International Affairs Vice President would be witting of the CIA connection. Each year, after the election of new student leaders, the CIA held a secret briefing, for the new officers, and elicited from them a secrecy agreement. hiring the 1960s however, witting National St _. ude - - ? about the U 1.A $ __- '-"-- in 196 67 s on ne- of.them revealed the relationship to Rampartp8 magazine. until finally in e Operational.use"" of indlold....1.. .- -tting or unwitting basis, for intelligence purposes. That is, the individual is directed or "tasked" to do something for the CIA-as .',opposed to volunteering information- Such ur poses include covert action, clau- intelligence collection p funcunctitieons. (espionage) and various kinds of support f A]thourh the CIA's involvement with the National Student As- sociation was limited to the organization's international activities, CIA influence was felt to some extent in its domestic programs as well. The most direct way in which such influence may have been felt was in the selection process for NSA officers.' The hummer International Seminars conducted for NSA leaders and potential leaders in the United States during the 1950's and 1900's were a vehicle for the Agency to identify new leaders and to promote their candidacy for elective positions in the National Student Association. The Central Intelligence Agency's experience with the NSA under- lines the basic problem of an action-oriented clandestine organization entering into a covert funding relationship with private organizations : support of friends turns into the control of their actions and ulti- mately to creation of new "friends." 3. Cover is Blown: The Patman and Ramparts "Flaps" Tn a public hearing in 1964, Congressman Wright Patman, Chair man of the Subcommittee on Foundations of the Mouse Committee on Problems of Small Businesses, revealed the names of eight of the CIA's funding instruments--the so-called "Patman Eight." These dis- closures sharply jarred the Agency's confidence in the security of these philanthropic funding mechanisms: The Patnian disclosures led the CIA to' take a hard look at this technique of funding, but not: to reconsider the propriety of bringing the independence of America's foundations into question by using them as conduits for the funding of covert fiction projects. According to the Chief of the Covert Action Staff's Program and Evaluation Group : The real lesson of the Patman Flap is not that we need to get out of the business of using foundation cover for funding, but that we need to gent at it more professionally and extensively. Despite the best efforts of the Agency throughout 1966 to shore up its vulnerable funding mechanisms, it became increasingly clear that Ramparts magazine, the New York Times, and the Washington Post were moving ever closer to unraveling not only the CIA's system of clandestine funding but to exposing the-source of the support for the National Student Association. In an effort to determine whether there was foreign influence on funds behind the Ramparts expose, the CIA, in coordination with the FBI, undertook through its own counterintel- ligence staff to prepare extensive reports on the Ramparts officers and staff members.? At a press briefing on February 14, 1967, the State Department publicly confirmed a statement by leaders of NSA that their organiza- tion had received covert support from the CIA since the early 1950s. The NSA statement and disclosures in Ramparts magazine brought on a storm of public and congressional criticism. In response, President The Agency appointed a special assistant to the Deputy Director for Plans, who was charged with "pulling together information on Ramparts, includ- ing any evidence of subversion [and] devising proposals for counteraction." In pursuing the "Communist ties" of Ramparts magazine, the "case" of managing Editor, Robert Scheer, was one of the first to be developed and a report was sent on Scheer to Walt W. Rostow, Special Assistant to President Johnson. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP90B00017R000400190032-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP90B00017R000400190032-6 Johnson organized a committee composed of Undersecretary of State Nicholas" Katzenbach, Secretary of HEW John Gardner, and CIA Director Richard Helms to review government activities that may "endanger the integrity and independence of the educational commu- nity." The committee's life was short--43 days-but its recommenda- tions, accepted by President Johnson on March 29, 1967, were to have a profound effect on the CIA's clandestine operations, both in the United States and abroad. 4. The Katzenbach Committee President Johnson's concern for the integrity and independence of American institutions could have resulted in the Katzenbach Commit- tee being charged with general review of the domestic impact of i ` clandestine derat o ieos f and the their effect on American institutions ; includ- of institutions and individuals u=uCtii-es should be imposed on the use Instead, the Johnson Admirustration carefully and consciously limited the mandate of the Katzenbach Committee's investigation to the relationship between the CIA and "U.S. educational and private voluntary organizations which o ? the U.S. directed at such targets as foreign students, foreign business- men, foreign diplomatic and consular officials travelling or residing in the United States. Despite the narrowness of its mandate, the actual investigation of the Katzenbach Committee was vigorous and thorough. After delib- eration, the Committee issued the basic recommendation that : It should be the policy of the United States Government that no federal agency shall provide any covert financial assist- ance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations. In May 1967 the Deputy Director for Plans .Desmond FitzGerald interpreted the post-Katzenbach ground rules in a circular to the field. He stated : Several operational guidelines emerge: a. Covert relations with commercial U.S. organizations are not, repeat, not barred. b. Covert funding overseas of foreign-based international organizations is permitted. memorandum to Gardner and Helms, Kaz enbac]iIc ted the narrow- ness of the mandate in listing problems faced by the Committee: 1. The narrow scope of this mandate, as compared with the demands, by Senator Mansfield, et al, that this flap be used as a springboard for a review of all clandestine financing by CIA. 2. More specifically, the exclusion in this mandate of rela- tionships between CIA and American businesses abroad. 3. Focusing the mandate on CIA, rather than on all private organization relationships with government agencies. In testimony before this Committee, Mr. Katzenbach said that his committee was designed by President Johnson not only to deal with the relationship of the CIA to educational and voluntary organizations, but to head off a full-scale congressional investigation.' All other covert relationships were to be excluded from the investiga- tion. In .a memo to his colleagues, the Deputy Chief of the Covert Action Staff reported : It is stated that the country operations funded by black bag "[sterilized or laundered funds were not to be included in the CIA's response to the Katzenbach Commission and empha- sized that the focus of this paper was to be on organizations. In addition the Katzenbach Committee did not undertake investi- gation of CIA domestic commercial operations, specifically those de- signed to provide cover for clandestine intelligence operations which "Nicholas Katzenbach testimony, 10/11/75, p. 5. Katzenbach also said of the President's decision on membership : ll.:=.;he [the President] wanted John Gardner on it because he thought that would help politically in getting acceptance of whatever the recommendations tuthed?out to be because he thought Helms would defend everything and w to continue everythin G t d g. an e ardner would want to stop everything. It was my job to come out with something in the middle." (Ibid). He indicated that greater care would be needed in the conduct of clandestine operations, in order to prevent disclosures: a. The care required under the Katzenbach Report, with respect to the recruitment and use of U.S. students, and U.S. university professors, applies equally to the recruitment and use of foreign students. . . . In simple terms, we are now in a'different ballgame. Some of the basic ground rules have changed. When in doubt, ask HQs. 5. A Different Ballgame: CIA Respon8e'to Katzenbach The policy guidelines established in the Katzenbach Report and supplemental guidelines with which the CIA interpreted the Report brought major adjustments in covert action programs and methods. Some 77 projects were examined at high levels within the CIA, and lists were drawn up of projects to be terminated, projects to be trans- ferred to other sources of funding, projects to continue, and projects whose future required higher level decisions. The 303 Committee met frequently throughout 1967 and 1968 to deal with difficult questions, such as how to provide for continued funding of Radio Free'Europe and Radio Liberty. At the same time the Agency was withdrawing from support of a large number of domestically-based organizations, it moved rapidly to shelter certain high-priority operations from the Katzenbach pro- hibitions and to devise more secure funding mechanisms. This process was facilitated by what was termed "surge funding." The Katzen- bach guidelines called for termination of CIA funding of domesti- cally based U.S. organizations by December 31, 1967. With 303 Com- mittee approval for the largest grants, the Agency "surge funded" a number of organizations, giving them advances before the December deadline which carried them in some cases for tip to two years of op- erations. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty were so funded. In adjusting to the "new ballgame," the appearance of contraven- ing the Katzenbach guidelines, rather than specific regulations, was Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP90B00017R000400190032-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP90B00017R000400190032-6 goo seen as a reason not to continue relationships. with certain At the same time institutions. , at least one case suggests that even a clean termina- tion of funding with a private organization did not necessarily end the CIA s support of the policies and programs of the organization. A CIA report on termination plans for a large project in the Far East indicated that., with surge funding, the organization could continue into fiscal year 1969, and that thereafter "[the organization's] Board of Trustees will assume full responsibility for the organization and has pledged to continue its policies and range of activities." The following are examples of the score of .projects which the CIA reviewed in 1967 and decided to continue to fund: (1)? A publications and press institute that maintained a worldwide network of stringers and correspondents. A CIA report on the project asserted that it "exerts virtually no domestic influence in any quarter., although its publications are read by U.S. students." (2) Several international trade union organizations. (3) A foreign-based news feature service" (4) A foreign-based research and publishing institute. In reviewing the CIA's adjustments to the Katzenbach Committee's recommendations, the Committee found no violations of the policy the report sets forth. However, it is important to recognize how narrow the focus of the Katzenbach Committee's concern was. The problem was approached by the committee and by the CIA essentially as one of security : how to limit the damae caused by the revelations of CIA relationships with private U.S.- institutions. Many of the restrictions developed by the CIA in response to the events of 1967 appear to be security measures aimed at preventing further public disclosures which could jeopardize sensitive CIA operations. They did not represent significant rethinking of where boundaries ought to be drawn in a free society. Moreover, although President Johnson adopted the Katzenbach report as policy, it was not issued as an executive order or enacted as a statute. Thus, it has no firm legal status. 6. Poet 1967 Relations with, the U.S. Academic Community In analyzing the adequacy of the Katzenbach regulations and of the CIA's compliance with them, the Select Committee concen- trated much of its attention on contemporary relationships' between the CIA and the U.S. academic community. The Committee interprets "academic commuity" to include more than the Katzenbaeli Com- mittee undoubtedly had in mind when it recommended prohibition of "covert financial assistance or support . .. to any of the nation's edu- cational :... organizations." "Academic community" has been inter- preted by this Committee to include universities, university-related research centers, and the full range of individual scholars and school administrators, :ranging from department heads to career counselors and to Ph D candid t . . a es engaged in teaching. The Committee has approached this inquiry with three principal questions: (1) What is the extent and t na ure of CIA relationships with U.S. academic institutions and with individual American academics? ~21 Wlint. nr?n.+r, A_t_ t;iumu,u rotes governing CIA post- Katzenbach relations with the acad i em c community ? (3) % hat issues are at stake; what threats, if any, do current rela- tions pose for the independence, of this influential sector of society? 189. The CIA relationships with the academic community are extensive and serve many purposes, including providing leads and making intro- ductions for intelligence purposes, collaboration in research and anal- ysis, intelligence collection abroad, and preparation of books and other r d p opagan a materials. The Select Committee's concentration has been on the area of clan- destine relationships untouched by the Katzenbach Commmittee- individuals. 7. Covert Relations.with Individuals 'in the Academic Community As already noted, from the first days of the Katzenbach Commit- tee, the CIA proceeded on the operating assumption that the inquiry was directed squarely at institutional :relationships-not individuals in or affiliated with those private institutions. After the Katzenbach report, the Agency issued a basic, instruction entitled "Restrictions on Operational Use of Certain Categories of Individuals." This instruc- tion remains in force today: The instruction states that the "basic rule" for the use of Truman agents by the Operations Directorate is that "aiiry consenting adult" may be used. 1Vhile all members the American academic community, including students, certainly qualify as "consenting adults," the CIA since 1967 has been particularly sensitive to the risks associated with their use. In order to control and confine contacts with American academics, the handling of relationships with.individu ails associated with universities is largely confined to two CIA divisions of the Directorate of Opera- tions-the Domestic Collection Division and the Forei~ri. Resources Division. TM Domestic o ec ion Division is the point of. contact With ]arge numbers of American academics who travel abroad or who are otherwise consulted on the subject :of ,their expertise., .The ge er, DCD and FRD are currently in contact-ranging from the occasional debriefing to a continuing operational relationship-with many thousands of United States academics at hundreds of U.S. academic institutions. It is imperative to underline that the majority of these relationships are purely for the purpose of asking an academic about his travels abroad or open informal consulting on `subjects of the academic's, ex- pertise. The Committee sees no danger to the integrity of American private institutions in continuing such- contacts; indeed, there are benefits t o both ie overnmen an e, universi ies in such contacts. "Tie 'IA's virice o e'er rsonneTalso maintains relationships with university administrators, sometimes in the placement office. These relationships, which are usually contractual, enable the CIA to ap- proach suitable United States students for CIA employment. . The "operational use" of academics is another matter. It raises trou- bling questions as to preservation of the integrity of American aca- demic institutions. Covert Use of the U.S. Academic Community The Central Intelligence Age= is now usin several hundred ] m,erzcan academics w o in addition to providing leads and. on " "Academics" includes administrators, faculty members and graduate students engaged in teaching. Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP90B00017R000400190032-6 occasion, makin Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP90B00017R000400190032-6 190 introductions ennCe purposes, occasionally or propaganda purposes are used in an unwittina abroad. Be and these an additional few score manner or manor aetav ice. 191,' ships, the CIA is not prohibited from the operational use of all other categories of grantee support'uhder the Fulbright-Havs Act (artists, athletes, leaders, specialists, etc.). Nor is there any prohibition on the operational use of individuals participating in any other exchange program funded by the United States Government. In addressing the issues of the CIA's relationship to the American academic community the Committee is keenly aware that if the CIA is to serve the intelligence needs of the nation, it must have unfettered access to the best advice and judgment our universities can produce. But this advice and expertise can and should be openly sought-and openly given. Suspicion that such openness,of intellectual encounter and exchange is complemented by covert operational exploitation of academics and students can only prejudice, if . not destroy, the pos- sibility of a full and fruitful exchange between the nation's best minds and the nation's most critical intelligence needs. To put these intel- lects in the service of the nation, trust and confidence must be main- tained between our intelligence agencies and the academic community. -i rieee academics are located in over 100 American cone ee uidver- aitiea a re a 2n9 a u es. t the ma Ortt of institutions no one other -t ra t individual concerned is aware o t e A Zink. At -at t of rg at ast one unever8,t o is aware o t e o eration use e o ac emw8 on ie campus. n a ion, ere are severa mer- ican ac emits a ro w o serve operational purposes, primarily the collection of intelligence.12 The CIA considers these operational relationships with the United ommuiiit as perhaps its most sense ive om is area and' has strict contras overran ese o era io Ag' ency s Interns irectives, t e o owing istmctions govern the operational use of individuals : the CIA's directives prohibit the opera- tional use of individuals who are receiving support under the Mutual Education and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, commonly known as the Fulbright-Hays Act. Falling under this particular prohibition are teachers, research scholars, lecturers, and students who have been selected to receive scholarships or rants by the Board of Foreign Scholarships. This prohibition specifically does not apply to the several other- categories of grantees supported by other provisions of the Ful- bright-Hays Act, such as artists, athletes, leaders, specialists, or par- ticipants in international trade fairs or expositions, who do not come ender the aegis of the President's Board of Foreign Scholarships. As far as the three major foundations-Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie- areconcerned, the prohibition extends to "persons actively participat- .ing_'in programs which are wholly sponsored and controlled by any of these foundations. Additionally, there will be no operational use made Of the officials or.employees of these organizations." (These large foun- dations were cited by a CIA official in 1966 before the 303 Committee as "a trouble area in New York City-reluctant to cooperate on joint ventures.") 9. Covert Relationships with Acadameic and Voluntary Organizations: C, onclusions With respect to CIA covert relationships with private institutions and voluntary organizations, the Committee concludes: (1) The CIA has adhered to the 1967 Katzenbach guidelines govern- ing relationships with domestic private and voluntary institutions. The 'guidelines are so narrowly focused, however, that the covert use of .'American individuals from these institutions has continued. (2) American academics are Holy being used for such o rational 7 purposes-as .ma in TOM u..roes or zri e z enec r oeea a and f wor in or t e He a road. Aoug ie numbers are not as re at fi~day as in 196 t ere are no ro i rations to preven an increase in the o ra Iona use o acac emits. ie size o lese operations is etermine_ the CIA ? With the exception of those teachers, scholars and students who receive scholarships or grants from the Board of F S 1 1 Foreign C io ar- The Committee is disturbed both by the present practice of opera- tionally using American academics and by the awareness that the restraints on expanding this practice are,primarily those of sensitivity to the risks of disclosure and not an appreciation of dangers to the integrity of individuals and institutions. Nevertheless the Commitfl tee does not recommend a legislative prohibition on the operational and in i l and intrusion Tit, Tat si ility o rivate institutions an articular) the American acs emit communit to set the professional : and ethical standards of its mem- bers. This report on the nature and extent of covert in ivi ua re a tFoons with the CIA is intended to alert t ese' Institutions that M -ere here is ,a problem- At the same time, the Committee recommends that the CIA amend its internal directives to r uire a individual academics used or o erationa ur poses the CIA, tether wit the President or equiv- alent official of die re evant academic institutions, informed of the e ant estine re a ions I . -- - - - - -- - - - -TFe Co m m-i tt ee aTs o ?e-eTs strongly that there should be no opera- tional use made of professors, lecturers, -students, artists, and the like who are funded under United States Government-sponsored programs. The prohibition on the operational use of Fulbright grantees must be extended to other government-sponsored programs; and in this case the prohibition should be confirmed by law, given the direct responsi- bility of the Congress for these programs.; It. is unacceptable that Americans would go overseas under a cultural or academic exchange program funded openly by the United States Congress and. at the same time serve an operational purpose' directed by the Central Intelli- gence Agency. B. COVERT RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE UNITED STATES MEDIA ttFor explanation of italics, see footnote, p. 170. In pursuing its foreign intelligence mission the Central Intelligence Ibid. :aency as use the U. . met to or both the col ec ion o intelligence Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP90B00017R000400190032-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP90B00017R000400190032-6 192 and for cover. Until February 1976, iihen it announced a new policy toward U.S. media personnel, the '(IA maintained covert relation- ships with about 50 American journalists or employees of U.S. media I organizations, They are part of a network of several hundred foreign individuals around the world who provide intelligence for the CIA and at time8 attempt to influence foreign opinion through the use of covert propaganda. These individuals provide the CIA with direct access to a large number of foreign newspapers and periodicals, scores of press 8ervieee and news agencies, radio and television stations, com- mercial book publishers, and other foreign media outlets,13 The CIA has been particularly sensitive to the charge that CIA covert relationships with the American media jeopardize the credibil- ity of the American press and risk the possibility of propagandizing the U.S. public. Former Director William Colby expressed this con- cerni in recent testimony before the House Select Committee on Intelligence: We have taken particular caution to ensure that our opera- tions are focused abroad and not at the United States in order to influence the opinion of the American people about things from a CIA point of view. As early as 1967, the CIA, in the wake of the National Student Association disclosure, moved to flatly prohibit the publication of books,` magazines, or newspapers in the United States. More recently, George Bush, the new Director, undertook as one of his first'actions to recognize the "special status afforded the American media under our Constitution" and therefore pledged that "CIA will not enter into any paid or contract l l ua re ationship with any full-time or part-time news correspondent accredited by any United States news service, newspaper, periodical, radio or television network or station." 14 In approaching the subject of the CIA's relationship with the United States media, the Select Committee has been guided by several broad concerns. It has inquired into the covert publication of propaganda in order to assess its domestic impact; it has investigated the nature and purpose of the covert relationships that the CIA maintains with bona fide U.S. journalists; it has examined the use of journalistic "fallout" cover"by CIA agents; it has pursued the difficult issue of domestic from CIA's foreign press placements and other propaganda activities. Throughout, it has compared current practice to the regula- tions.restricting activities in this area, in order both to establish whether the CiA has complied with existing regulations, and, more important, in order to evaluate the adequacy of the regulations themselves. 7. Books and ? Publishing Houses Covert propaganda is the hidden exercise of the power of persua- sion. In the world of covert propaganda, book publishing activities have a special place. In 1961 the Chief of the CIA's Covert Action "For explanation of footnotes, see p. 179. 14 George Bush statement, 2/11/76. 193'' Staff, who had responsibility fQr the ,'covert propaganda program, wrote : Books differ from all other propaganda media, primarily because one single book can significantly change the reader's attitude and action to an extent unmatched by the impact of any other single medium .:.. this is, of course, not true of all books at all times and with all readers-but it is true signifi- cantly often enough to make books the most important weapon of strategic (long-range) propaganda. According to The Chief of the Covert Action Staff, the CIA's clan- destine handling of book publishing and distribution could : (a.) Get books published or distributed abroad without revealinc, any U.S. influence, by .covertly subsidizing foreign publications or booksellers. (b) Get books published which should not. be. "contam- inated" by any overt tie-in with the U.S. government, espe- cially if the position of the author is `.`delicate." (c) Get books published for operational reasons, regardless of commercial viability. (d) Initiate and subsidize indigenous national or inter- national organizations for book publishing or distributing purposes. (e) Stimulate the writing of politically significant books by unknown foreign authors--either ,by? directly subsidizing the author, if covert contact is feasible, or indirectly, through literary agents or publishers. 11 Y, Well over a thousand books were' produced, subsidized or spon- sored by the CIA before the end of 1967. Approximately 25 percent of them were written in English. Many of them' were published by cul- tural organizations which the CIA backed, and more often than not the author was unaware of CIA subsidization. Some books, however, in- volved direct collaboration between the CIA, and the writer. The Chief of the Agency's propaganda unit wrote in 1961: The advantage of our direct contact with the author is. that we can acquaint him in great detail with our intentions; that we can provide him with whatever material we want him to include and that we can check the manuscript at every stage. Our control over the writer will have to 'be enforced usually by paying him for the time he works on the manu- script, or at least advancing him sums which he might have to repay . . . [the Agency] must make sure the actual manu- script will correspond with our operational and propagandis- tic intention... . The Committee has reviewed a few examples of what the Chief of the Covert Action Staff termed "books published for operational rea- sons regardless of commercial viability." Examples included : (1) A book about the conflict -in Indochina was produced in 1954 at the initiation of the CIA's Far East Division. A major U.S. publish- ing house under contract to the CIA published the book in French and English. Copies of both editions were distributed to foreign embassies Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP90B00017R000400190032-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP90B00017R000400190032-6 lull in .the United States and to se 1 195 V., newspapers and magazine editors both in the United States and abroad. (4) The prospects for European union; (2) A book about a student from a developing country who had (5) Chile under Allende. studied in a communist country "was developed by [two area divisions ?L. Covert Use o f U.S. Journalists :and Media Institutions of the CIA] and produced by the Domestic Operations Division ... and has had a high impact in the U.S. as well as the On February 11, 1976, the CIA announced new guidelines governing market." The boo which was [foreign area] its relationship with U.S. media organizations: ubli h d b p s e y the Etlf uropean ouet o a U.S. publishing house, was published in condensed form in two major Effective immediately, CIA will not enter into any paid. or U.S: magazines. Eric Severeid, the CBS political commentator, in contractual rel ationship w ith any fu ll time or part time news reviewing this book, spoke a larger truth than he knew when he sug correspondent accredited by any U.S. news service, newspaper, Bested that "our propaganda servi i l d l ces cou o ica radio or television netktti16 d do th t fl per worseanoood,wor or saon. foreign] university towns with this volume." (3) Another CIA book Of the approximately 5Q U.S. journalists or personnel of U.S. media 1-be F blihd, puse organizations United States in '1965 for operational reasons", but actually covert elatio relationship v with the CIA at the time of the announcement, became' commercially viable. The book was prepared and written fewer than one-half will be terminated under: the new CIA guidelines. by witting Agency assets who drew on actual case materials. Publi- About half of the some 50 CIA relationships with the U.S. media cation rights to the manuscript were sold to a publisher through a were paid relationships, ranging from salaried operatives working trust fund which was established for the purpose. The publisher was under journalistic cover, to U.S.. journalists serving as "independent unaware of any U.S. Government interest. contractors" for the CIA and being paid regularly for their services, to The publishing program in the period before the National Student those who receive only occasional gifts and reimbursements from the Association disclosures was large in volume and varied in taste. Ins CIA.17 1967 alone the CIA published or subsidized well over 200 books, rang- More than a dozen United States news organizations and commercial from books on wildlife and safaris to translations of Machiavelli's publishing houses formerly/ provided cover for CIA agents abroad. A 7'/te Prince into Swahili and works of T. S. Eliot into Russian, to a few Of these organizations were unaware that the rovided this parody of the famous little red book of quotations from Mao entitled cover."' y p Quotations from Chairman Liu. Although the variety of the CIA relationships with the U.S. media The publicity which in 1967 surrounded several CIA sponsored or- makes a systematic breakdown of them almost impossible, former CIA ganizations and threatened to expose others caused the CIA to act Director Colby has distinguished among four types of relationships.19 quickly to limit its use of U.S. publishers. In direct response to the These are : Katzenbach report, Deputy Director for Plans Desmond FitzGerald (1) Staff of general circulation, U.S. news organizations; ordered, "We will, under no circumstances, publish books, magazines (2) Staff of small, or limited circulation, U.S. publications;. or newspapers in the United States." (3) Free-lance, stringers, propaganda writers, and employees of With this order, the CIA suspended direct publication and subsi- U.S. publishing houses; dization within the United States not only of books, but also of jour- (4) Journalists with whom CIA maintains unpaid, occasional, nals and newsletters, including: a magazine published by a United covert contact. States-based Proprietary for cultural and artistic exchange; a news- While the CIA did not provide the names of its media agents or the letter 'mailed to foreign tudents studying in North American univer- names of the media organizations with which they are connected, the sities under the sponsorship of a CIA proprietary foundation ; and a Committee reviewed summaries of, their relationships and work with publication on Latin American affairs published in the United States, the CIA. Through this review the Committee found that as of Febru- Thus since 1967 the CIA's publishing activities have almost entirely ary 1976: been eohfined to books and other materials published abroad. During (1) The first category, which would include any staff member of a the past few years, some 250 books have been published abroad, most general circulation U.S. news organization who functions as a paid of them in foreign languages. undercover contact of the CIA, appears to be virtually phased out. The As previously noted, the CIA has denied to the Committee a number of the titles and names of authors of the propaganda books published since 1967. Brief descri tions According to the CIA, "accredited" applies to individuals who are "formally p provided by the Agency indicate the authorized by contract or issuance of press credentials to represent themselves 'breadth of subject matter, which includes the following topics, among as correspondents." many others : 17 Drawn from "operational case studies". provided to the Committee 12/16/75 (1) Commercial ventures and commercial law in South an" For explanation of footnotes, see p. 179. Vietnam; '? On November 30, 1973, the Waahfnaton Star-Newq reported that Director (2) Indochina representation at the U.N.; Colby had ordered a review of CIA Media relationships in September of that (8) A i memo r of the K W oreanar: JuurnanMts in eacn or the otner three categories. in his testimony to the House Select Committee on Intelligence on November 6, 1975, Colby made a general reference to these categories. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP90B00017R000400190032-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP90B00017R000400190032-6 196 Committee has found only two current relationships that fit this cate- gory, both of which are being terminated under the CIA's Febru- ary 11, 1976 stated policy. The Committee has also found a small number of past relationships that fit this category. In some cases the cover arrangement consisted of reimbursing the U.S. newspaper for any articles by the CIA agent which the paper used. In at least one case the journalistic functions assumed by a CIA staff officer for cover purposes grew to a point where the officer concluded that he could not satisfactorily serve the require- ments of both his (unwitting) U.S. media employers and the CIA, and therefore resigned from the CIA. He maintained contact, however, with the CIA and continued, very occasionally, to report to the CIA from the countries in which he worked. (2) Of the less than ten relationships with writers for small, or limited circulation, U.S. publications, such as trade journals or news- letters; most are for cover purposes. (3) The third, and largest, category of CIA relationships with the U.S. media includes free-lance journalists; "stringers" for newspapers, news magazines and news services; itinerant authors; propaganda writers; and agents working under cover as employees of U.S. pub- lishing" houses abroad. With the exception of the last group, the majority of the individuals in this category are bona fide writers or journalists or photographers. Most are paid by the CIA, and virtually all are witting; few, however, of the news organizations to which they contribute are aware of their CIA relationships. (4) The fourth category of covert relationships resembles the kind of contact that journalists have with any other department of the U.S. Government in the routine performance of their journalistic duties. No money changes hands. The relationships are usually limited to occa- sional lunches, interviews, or telephone conversations during which information would be'exchanged or verified. The difference, of course, is that the relationships are covert. The jourralist either volunteers or is requested by the CIA to provide some sort of information about peo- ple with whom he is in contact. In several cases, the relationship began when the journalist approached a U.S. embassy officer to report that he was approached by a foreign intelligence officer; in others, the CIA initiated the relationship. The first major step to impose restrictions on the use of U.S. journal- ists was taken by former Director Colby in the fall of 1973. According to Mr. Colby's letter to the Committee: 21- (a) CIA will undertake no activity in which there is a risk of influencing domestic public opinion, either directly or in- directly. The Agency will continue its prohibition against placement of material in the American media. In certain in- stances, usually where the initiative is on the part of the media, CIA will occasionally provide factual non-attributable briefings to various elements of the media, but only in cases where we are sure that the senior editorial staff is aware of the source of the information provided. Letter from William Colby to the Select Committee, 10/21/75. (b) As a general policy, the Agencyy will not make any clandestine use of staff employees o U.S. publications which have a substantial impact or influence on public opinion. This limitation includes cover use and any other activities which mlht be directed by CIA. (c) A thorough review should be made of CIA use of non- staff journalists; i.e., stringers and free-lancers, and also those individuals involved in journalistic activities who are in non- sensitive journalist-related positions, primarily for cover backstopping. Our goal in this exercise is to reduce such usage to a minimum. Mr. Colby's letter specified that operational use of staff-that is, full- time correspondents and other employees of major U.S. news maga- zines, newspapers, wire services, or television networks-was. to be avoided. Use would be less restricted for "stringers" or occasional correspondents for these news organizations, as well as for corre- spondents working for smaller, technical, or sp.ecialized publications. The public statement that the CIA issued on February 11, 1976, ex- pressed a policy of even greater restraint -Effective immediately, CIA will not enter into any paid or contractual relationship with any full-time or part-time news correspondent accredited by any U.S. news service, newspaper, periodical, radio or television network or station. -As soon as feasible, the Agency will bring existing rela- tionships with individuals in these groups into conformity with this new policy. -CIA recognizes that members of these groups (U.S. media and religious personnel) may wish to provide infor- mation to the CIA on matters of foreign intelligence of interest to the U.S. Government. The CIA will continue to welcome information volunteered by such individuals.- From CIA testimony later that month, the Committee learned that this prohibition extends to non-Americans accredited to U.S. media organizations. Nevertheless, this prohibition does not cover "unaccred- ited" Americans serving in U.S. media organizations, or free-lance writers. As previously noted, the CIA has informed the Committee that, of the approximately 50 CIA relationships with U.S. journalists or employees of U.S. media organizations, fewer than one-half will be terminated under the new guidelines.28 3. Two 188ue8: "Fallout" and the Integrity of a Free Press In examining the CIA's past and present use of the U.S. media, the Committee finds two reasons for concern. The first is the potential, in- herent in covert media operations, for manipulating or incidentally "CIA instructions interpreting the new policy explain that "the term 'con- tractual' applies to any written or oral agreement obligating the Agency to provide financial remuneration including regular salaries, spot payments, or reimbursement of, out-of-pocket operational expenses or the provision of other material benefits that are clearly intended as a reward for services rendered the Agency." "CIA response of March 17, 1976 (76-0315/1). Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP90B00017R000400190032-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP90B00017R000400190032-6 199 misleading the American public. The second is the damage to the credibility and independence of a free covert rel ress hi ti p w a ch ma onships with U.S, journalists and media o be caused by In his 1967 order prohibitin organizations. Deputy Director for Plans DesmoCIA nd Publication tzHe stated: Gerald raised the first issue. Fallout in the United States from we support is inevitable and a nag Pl ublication sible. uent y permis- In extensive testimony, CIA employees both Past conceded that there is no way to shield the American and present resent from have such "fallout. As a former senior official of the Agency put it in testimony : There is no way in this increasingly small world of ours of insulating information that one puts out overseas and con- fining it to the area, to where one ish intelligence was operating it out. Men Brit- lant e an, l outrageous story in the last century, they could story in some local publication and feel airly confident that no one else would ever hear about it, that would be the end of it. That is no longer the cage. Whether or not this type of overseas activity should be allowed to continue is subject to differing views and judg- ments. My own would be that we would be fools to relinquish it because it serves a very useful purpose.25 The same former CIA official continued : If you plant an article in some paper overseas, and it is a hard-hitting article, or a revelation, there is no way of eiiar- anteeing that it is not going to be picked up and published by the Associated Press in this eountry.25a The domestic fallout of covert propaganda comes from many sources; books intended primarily for an English-speaking foreign audience, press placements that are picked up by international wire foreign vces, press services controlled by the CIA, and direct funding of institutions that attempt to propagandize the United States public and Congress. In the case of books, substantial fallout in the U.S. may be a neces- sary part of the propaganda process. For example, 1967 state that certain books about China subidzed CIA or ven pro- duced by the Agency "circulate principally in the U.S. as a prelude to later distribution abroad." Several of these widely reviewed in the United States, often in jouxxtapositilon to the sympathetic view of.the emerging China as presented by Edgar At least once, a book review for an Agency book which appeare Snow. the New York Time8 was written by under cont d rac in E. Howard Hunt, who had been in charge of contacts with U.S. pub- lishers in the late 1960s, acknowledged th this mittee that CIA books circulated in e U.S and su before this such fallout may not have been unintentional. gtted that such Thomas H. Karamessines testimony of a former Deputy Director for plans, 10/72/75, p. 46. "` Pormer Deputy Director for plans testimony, 10/24/75, p. 36. lish, the United States citizenry would become a likely audi- ence for publication? Mr. HUNT. A likely audience, definitely. Question. Did-you take some sort of steps to make sure that things that were published in English were kept out of or away from the American reading public? Mr. HUNT. It was impossible because Praeger was a com- mercial U.S. publisher. His books had to be seen, had to be reviewed, had to be bought here, had to be read. Question. But, with anything that was published in Eng- Hurry. If your targets are foreign, then where are they? They don't all necessarily read English, and we had a bilateral agreement with the British that we wouldn't propagandize their people. So unless the book goes into a lot of languages or it is published in India, for example, where English is a lingua franca, then you have some basic problems. And I think the way this was rationalized by the project review board ... was that the ultimate target was.foreign, which was true, but how much of the Praeger output actually got abroad for any impact I think is highly arguable.ze An American who reads one .of these books which purportedly is authored by a Chinese defector would; not know that his thoughts and opinions about China are possibly being shaped by an agency of the United States Government. Given the .paucity of information and the inaccessibility of China in the 1960s, the CIA may have helped shape American attitudes toward the emerging China. The CIA con- siders such "fallout" inevitable. Another example of the damages of "fallout" involved two propri- etary news services that the CIA maintained in Europe. Inevitably these news services had U.S. subscribers. The larger of the two was subscribed to by over 30 U.S. newspapers: In an effort to reduce the problem of fallout, the CIA made a senior official at the major U.S. dailies aware that the CIA controlled these two press services. A serious problem arises from the possible use of U.S. publications for press placements. Materials furnished to the Committee describe a relationship which poses this problem. It began in August 1967- after the Katzenbach Committee recommendations-and continued until May 1974. In this case, a U.S.-based executive of a major U.S. newspaper was contacted by the CIA "on a confidential basis in view of his access to information of intelligence and operational interests." The news executive served as a witting, unpaid collaborator for intel- ligence collection, and received briefings from the CIA which "were of porfessional benefit" to him. The CIA materials state that : It was visualized that . . . propaganda (if agreeable to him) might be initially inserted in his paper and then be available for reprinting by Latin American news outlets... . There is no indication in the file that Subject agreed ... or that he did place propaganda in his newspaper.27 E. Howard Hunt testimony, 1/10/76 pp. 73, 74. n CIA Operational case study #14. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP90B00017R000400190032-6 The da Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: C r-a --- .w 1-urninating U. sibilit S. media-"fall- out'- cu in virtually any instance of roy is quite real even when the CIA does not makers. A Propaganda use. The pos. ist or public ti ti a use any on in carrying out the propaganda project. Where a appear in many pres_ tigious news outlets around theusorldoasi occurred at the time of the Chilean elections in 1970, it is truly impossible to insulate. the United States from propaganda fallout. Indeed, CIA records for the September-October 1970 propaEanda effort in Chile indicate that "replay" of propaganda in the U.S. was not unexpected. A cable summary for September 25, 1970 reports : Sao Paulo, Tegucigalpa, Buenos Aires, Lima, Montevideo, Bogota, Mexico City report continued replay of Chile theme materials. Items also carried in New York Times, Washington Post. Propaganda activities continue to generate good cover- age of Chile developments along our theme guidance ....29 The fallout problem is probably most serious when the U.S. public is dependent on the "Polluted" media channel for its information on a particular subject. When news events have occurred in relatively isolated parts of the world, few major news organizations ma been able to cover them initially, and world-wide covera y have whatever propaganda predominates in the media of the area. reflects . Another situation in which the effects of "fallout" in the United States may be significant is that in which specialized audiences in the United States-_area study specialists, for example_ rely heavily on materials produced by or subsidized ma byy,uthe CnknowIAinThglye , . danger of this form of 'dependence is less now than it had been prior to the freer flow of Western and China. extern travelers to the Soviet Union, Eastern .In its inquiry into the activities of a Committee discovered a Vietnamese institution the fall-out of covert particularly unfortunate example of domestic inspired creation. propaganda, activities. The institution was a CIA- inspire was not The intention of the CIA, according to its own Whatever the deli undertake propaganda against the United States. gn, the propaganda effort had an impact on the American public and congressional opinion. The CIA provided $170,- 000 per year in 1974 and 1975 for the support of this institution's pub- lications. The embassy in the, United States distributed the magazine to American readers, including the offices of all United States Con- grssmen and Senators, a ess of The institution on at least one occasion invited group American Congressmen to Vietnam and sponsored their activities on at least part of their trip. Through this institution the CIA-however inadventently-engaged in propagandizing the Amer- ican public, including its Congress, on the controversial issue of involvement in Vietnam. One particular kind of U.S. sed official concern. That is fallout upon the USiGov rnment"of the CIA's "black nrona- dada"propaganda that appears source. Because the source olack gipropagandato is fsorom full an unfriendly the CIA recognizes that it risks seriously misleading U.S. policy- Chile Task Force Log (R397). IA-RDP90B00017R000400190032-6 n Agency regulation specifies that the Directorate of Opera- ons should notify appropriate' elements of the DDI d h an t e In- telligence Community if the results of a black operation might in- fluence the thinking of senior U.S. officials or affect U.S. intelligence estimates. Regular coordination between the CIA and the State De- partment's INR has been instituted to prevent the self-deception of 'senior U.S. officials" through black propaganda. It should be noted that this procedure applies only to black propaganda and only to "senior U.S. officials." No mechanism exists. to protect the U.S.'public and the Congress from fallout from black propaganda or any. other propaganda. The Committee recognizes that other countries make extensive use of the international media for their propaganda purposes. The United States public is not insulated from this propaganda either. It is clear, however, that the strongest defense a free country has from propaganda of any kind is a free and vigorous press that expresses diverse points of view. Similarly, the most effective way for this country to respond to the use of propaganda abroad is-to permit American journalists and news organizations to pursue their work without jeopardizing their credibility in the eyes of the world through covert use of them. C. COVERT USE OF U.S. 'Ri i toiotrs GRoaps The Committee considers religious groups-like academia and the press-to be among the most important of our society's institutions. As such, any covert relationship that might either influence them or jeopardize their reputation is extremely sensitive. Moreover, opera- tional use of U.S. religious organizations differs from the use of other elements of U.S. society. It is a special'case, in that virtually all re- ligions are inherently supra-national. Making-operational use of U.S. religious groups for national purposes both violates their nature and undermines their bonds with kindred groups around the world.. In its examination of CIA relationships with domestic institutions, the Committee has focused exclusively on the use of U.S. religious or- ganizations. 1. Restrictions on the Use of Religious Personnel The CIA guidelines issued in the wake of the Katzenbach Com- mittee report required prior approval by the DDO for operational use of any employee, staff member, or official of a U.S. educational. or pri- vate organization. This restriction applied to 'operational use of these individuals who were affiliated with American relioioiis organizations. The CIA has provided the Committee with no other regulations that apply specifically to the use of religious groups. In a letter to this Com- mittee, however, Mr. Colby stated that the CIA used religious groups with great caution, and that their use required special approval within the Agency : Denuty Director for Operations regulations require the. Denuty Director for Operations' approval for the u-e of re- ligious groups. He has the responsibility of ensuring that such operational use avoids infringement or damage to the individual religious personnel involved in their group. Such Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP90B00017R000400190032-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP90B00017R000400190032-6 was use is carefully weighed and approvals in rece been relatively few in number.29 nt years have. On February 11 1976, the CIA announced : CIA has no secret paid or contractual relationship with any American clergyman or ?missionary. This practice will be continued as a matter of policy. The CIA has assured the Committee that the prohibition against "all paid or contractual relationships" is in fact a prohibition against any operational use of Americans following a religious vocation. B. Scope of Relation. Aips The number of American clergy or misionaries used by the CIA has been small. The CIA has informed the Committee of a total of 14 covert arrangements. which involved direct operational use of 21 individuals. Only four of these relationships were current in August 1975, and according to the CIA,. they were used only for intelligence collection, or, in one case, for a minor role in, preserving the cover of another asset. The other ten relationships with U.S. religious personnel had been terminated before August 1975; four of them ended within the last five years. In six or seven cases, the CIA. paid salaries, bonuses, or ex- penses to the. religious personnel, or helped to fund projects run by them.. Most of the individuals were used for covert action purposes. Sev- eral were involved in large covert action projects of the mid-sixties which were directed at "competing" . with communism in the Third World. &. Issues: "Fallout;' Violation of Trust As several of the relationships-all terminated--involved the reli- gious personnel in media activity, some of the same concerns must be voiced as when U. S. journalists are used covertly. The ' danger of U.S. "fallout" of CIA propaganda existed in three or four of the relationships with U.S. religious personnel. The more serious is h sue oweve i th ,r,se question of the confiden- tiality of the relationships among members of the clergy and their Congregations. Of the recent relationships, the most damaging would appear to be that of a U.S. Priest serving the CIA as an informant on student and "religious dissidence. Of the earlier cases one , used exemplifies the extent to which the CIA confidential pastoral relationships. The CIA used the pastor of a church in a Third World countr a " y s a principalt" agen to carry out covert action projects, and as a spotter assessor developer and recruiter. He collet d i , e I nformatili on on potical develop and on personalities H ments e passed CIAg . propaanda to the local press. According to the CIA's description of the case, the pastor's analses were based on his l t ong erm fridhiih -ensps wt the Personalities y the agents under him we and re kno t hi i wnomn his professional life." At first the CIA provided only occasional gifts to the pastor in return "Letter from William Colby to the Select Committee, 10/21/75. for his services; later, for over ten years, the CIA paid him a salary that reached $11,414 annually. 4. The CIA aid U.S. Religious Organization and Personnel: Conclu- sions and Reco7nnnendationa The Committee welcomes the policy, announced by the CIA on February 11, 1976, that prohibits any operational use of Americans following a religious vocation.. The fact that relatively few_ American clergy or missionaries have been used by the CIA suggests that neither this country's capacity to collect intelligence nor its covert action capability would be seriously affected by a total ban on their operational use. Therefore, the Com- mittee recommends that the CIA's recentprohibition on covert paid or contractual relationships between the Central Intelligence Agency and any American clergyman. or missionary should be established by law. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP90B00017R000400190032-6 -- Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP90B00017R000400190032-6 ft 1 ?e? dlmmw~ Sm 0 0 .0' 0 0 0 .0' %M Ad RE W Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP90B00017R000400190032-6 1 58 COVERT ACTION: PROPAGANDA To cover its military intervention the Soviet Union followed a familiar line: the Hungarian uprising was a bourgeois coun- terrevolution fomented by capitalist agents aimed at destroy- ing the achievements of the new socialist state. It charged that RFE, the tool of the Western imperialists, had helped incite the mobs by advocating "liberation" and anti-Soviet attitudes. At the same time in Europe and the United States, many people criticized American policy for inciting the "cap- tive peoples" of Eastern Europe to revolt and then failing to back them up with arms. A postmortem examination of RFE broadcasts in the period preceding the revolution uncovered no evidence of direct in- citement to revolt, but it was clear that the steady barrage of assurances that the West was firmly opposed to the continu- ing Communist exploitation of subject peoples could not fail to give RFE's listeners the hope that the United States would come to their aid if they did revolt. This ambivalence in American policy toward Eastern Europe has survived to this day: official acceptance of the status quo in Eastern Europe paired with an annual congressional resolution on Captive Nations Day. Anti-Soviet emigre organizations in Western Europe were also given support to produce a broad variety of publications-from flyers and leaflets to magazines and jour- nals, some of them of high intellectual caliber addressed to a sophisticated audience. Most of this material reached a largely Western audience, but some publications were smug- gled behind the Iron Curtain by legal travelers or sent into the East by balloon. A more systematic program was carried out by CIA within Western Europe itself, in effect as a covert annex to the Marshall Plan. The war had devastated the cultural and intellectual life of Europe as much as it had destroyed its industrial establishment. CIA's financial support was de- voted to reviving the cultural groups that had survived the war. Subsidies were given to publications, meetings, con- Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP90B00017R000400190032-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP90B00017R000400190032-6 There were always side products of-i value. Many prop- aganda contacts were useful sources of political intelligence. Others with an insight into local Soviet or Communist Party activities made it possible for CIA officers to develop personal contacts in these circles. Perhaps the most tangible product of these."psywar" oper- ations was the opening up of American contacts with the political dissidents within.. the. Soviet Union. The earliest links with dissident groups in; Moscow were forged-at the Moscow Youth Festival in 1957, which `was featured by a largely spontaneous dialogue between _ Soviet and Western youth. At the USIA exhibition in Moscow two years later the first underground literature and "illegal" student magazines came into Western hands. This marked the beginning of the publication of Soviet underground documents in the West- and in many cases their being smuggled back into the Soviet Union for wider distribution. The collection and publication of manuscripts produced in the Soviet Union has by now become a large-scale enterprise with many participants, both open and secret. "Gray" operations such as the above involved public prop- aganda secretly sponsored and do not require a secret agency to run them. "Black" operations, on the other hand, are designed to be attributed to the other side and must be car- ried out by a secret agency in order to hide the actual source of the propaganda. A black radio purportedly broadcasting from Central Asia or a forged document purportedly coming out of the classified files of a Soviet embassy requires exper- tise, secret funds, and anonymous participants. The Soviet commitment to black propaganda, or "disin- formation activities," has always been far greater than the American. The KGB and its satellite services have committed special sections to produce forged documents and evidence for nonexistent events, mainly to underscore the evil intent of their Western adversaries. Documentary "proof' of American plans to overthrow third world governments has been supplied to dozens of countries, sometimes through Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP90B00017R000400190032-6 Soviet or Communist Party controlled publications, some- times directly to the governments concerned. The Czech "Operation Thomas Mann" in 1964 was designed to expose a mythical hard-line American policy toward Latin America and CIA preparations for political coups in half a dozen coun- tries. It involved counterfeiting a USIA press release, pub- lishing a number of circulars by a nonexistent committee, and forging letters written by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover. Part of CIA's counterintelligence work during the fifties and sixties was devoted to detecting and exposing these forgeries, tracing their origin, and publishing the results through the Congressional Record. CIA's own disinformation activities have been far more limited and have generally concentrated on narrower targets: the improper antics of a senior official in the local Soviet Embassy or the sinister purposes of a Cuban agent in a Latin American country. In the late sixties covert propaganda, both gray and black, played a sharply diminished role in CIA's overseas work. The normal instruments of American propaganda, both official and private, were more than adequate to publish American views, at the same time that American policy, particularly in the Vietnamese war, made American propaganda increas- ingly unpersuasive. Again, it is as difficult to assess the net result of this global propaganda campaign as it is to evaluate the effects of the freedom radios. The "fight for men's minds" is an elusive fight not open to statistical measurement, and the degree to which American or Soviet propaganda, as opposed to Ameri- can or Soviet actions, has swayed those minds can never be distinguished. As the above account may suggest, I do not favor large- 'For details on this and many other disinformation operations, see a firsthand account by Ladislav Bittman, a former Czech intelligence officer, in The Decep- tion Game, The Syracuse University Research Corporation, Syracuse, 1972. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP90B00017R000400190032-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP90B00017R000400190032-6 THE CIAAND CULT OF I E The first book the U.S. Government ever went to court to censor before publication ByVICTOR MARCHETTI and JOHN D. MARKS Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP90B00017R000400190032-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP90B00017R000400190032-6 164 ? THE CIA AND THE CULT OF INTELLIGENCE had engineered a black psywar strike in Hanoi: leaflets signed by the Vietminh instructing Tonkinese on how to behave for the Vietminh takeover of the Hanoi region in early October, including items about property, money reform, and a three-day holiday of workers upon takeover. The day following the distribution of these leaflets, refugee registration tripled. Two days later Vietminh took to the radio to denounce the leaflets; the leaflets were so authentic in appearance that even most of the rank and file Vietminh were sure that the radio denunciations were a French trick. Lansdale's black propaganda also had an effect on the Ameri- can press. One of his bogus leaflets came to the attention of syndicated columnist Joseph Alsop, who was then touring South Vietnam. The .leaflet, indicating that many South Vietnamese were to be sent to China to work on the railroads,. seemed to have been written by the communists. Alsop naively accepted the leaflet at face value and, according to Lansdale, this "led to his sensational, gloomy articles later.... Alsop was never told this story." Nor, of course, was the false impression left with Alsop's readers ever corrected. CIA propaganda activities also entail the publication of books and periodicals. Over the years, the agency has provided direct subsidies to a number of magazines and publishing houses, rang- ing from Eastern European emigre organs to such reputable firms as Frederick A. Praeger, of New York-which admitted in 1967 that it had published "fifteen or sixteen books" at the CIA's request. Propaganda and Disinformation ? 165 DELETED Many other anti-communist publishing .concerns in Germany, Italy, and France were also supported and encouraged by the agency during the post-World War II years. ( DELETED ) According to a former high-ranking agency official, DELETED ) and the Parisian newspaper, "L.e Combat." This same ex-official also recalls with an ironic smile- that for several years the agency subsidized the New' York communist paper, The Daily Worker. In fairness to the Worker's staff, it must be noted that they were unaware "of the `CIA's assistance, which came in the form of several thousand secretly` purchased prepaid subscriptions. The CIA apparently hoped. to demonstrate by this means to the American public that the threat. of communism in this country was indeed real. Although the CIA inherited from the OSS responsibility for covert propaganda operations, the agency has no specific authority in the open law to engage in such operations=-other than the vague charge to carry out "such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct. Yet since its founding in 1947 the CIA has spent over one billion dollars for propaganda activities (mainly foreign but also domestic) to further what it perceived to be the national interests of the United States. Sometimes this means simply telling the truth to an audience (called "white" propaganda); other times a mixture of truths, half-truths, and slight distortions is used to slant the views of the audience ("gray" propaganda); and, on occasion, outright lies ("black" propaganda) are used, although usually accompanied for credibility's sake by some truths and half-truths. "Black" propaganda on the one hand and-"disinformation" on the other are virtually indistinguishable. Both refer to the spread- ing of false information in order to influence people's opinions or actions. Disinformation actually is a special type of "black" propaganda which hinges on absolute secrecy and which is usually supported by false documents; originally, it was something of a Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP90B00017R000400190032-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP90B00017R000400190032-6 174 ? THE CIA AND THE CULT OF INTELLIGENCE The CIA has also used defectors from communist governments for propaganda purposes-a practice which has had more impact in this country than overseas. These defectors, without any prod- ding by the CIA, would have interesting stories to tell of politics and events in their homelands, but almost all are immediately taken under the CIA's control and subjected to extensive secret de- briefings at a special defector reception center near Frankfurt, West Germany, or, in the cases of particularly knowledgeable ones, at agency "safe houses" in the United States. In return for the intelligence supplied about the defector's former life and work, the CIA usually takes care of his resettlement in the West, even providing a new identity if necessary. Sometimes, after the lengthy debriefing has been finished, the agency will encourage-and will help-the defector to write articles or books about his past life. As he may still be living at a CIA facility or be dependent on the agency for his livelihood, the defector would be extremely reluctant to jeopardize his future by not cooperating. The CIA does not try to alter the defector's writings drastically; it simply influences him to leave out certain information because of security considera- tions, or because the thrust of the information runs counter to ex- isting American policy. The inclusion of information justifying U.S. or CIA practices is, of course, encouraged, and the CIA will pro- vide whatever literary assistance is needed by the defector. While such books tend to show the communist intelligence services as diabolical and unprincipled organs (which they are), almost never do these books describe triumphs by the opposition services over the CIA. Although the other side does indeed win on occasion, the agency would prefer that the world did not know that. And the defector dependent on the CIA will hardly act counter to its interests. In helping the defector with his writing, the agency often steers him toward a publisher. Even some of the public-relations aspects of promoting his book may be aided by the CIA, as in the case of Major Ladislav Bittman, a Czech intelligence officer who de- fected in 1968. Prior to the 1972 publication of his book, The Deception Game, Bittman was interviewed by the Wall Street Propaganda and Disinformation ? 175 Journal, which quoted him on U.S. intelligence's use of the dis- information techniques. "It was our opinion," the former Czech operative said, "that the Americans had more effective means than this sort of trickery-things such as economic-aid programs-that were more influential than any black propaganda operation." While Bittman may well have been reflecting attitudes held by his former colleagues in Czech intelligence, his words must be considered suspect. The Czechs almost certainly know something about the CIA's propaganda and disinformation programs, just as the CIA knows of theirs. But Bittman's statement, taken along with his extensive descriptions of Czech and Russian disinformation programs, reflects exactly the image the CIA wants to' promote to the American public-that the communists are always out to de- fraud the West, while the CIA,,skillfully uncovering these deceits, eschews such unprincipled tactics. To the CIA, propaganda through book publishing has long been a successful technique. In 1953. the' agency backed the publication of a book called The Dynamics of Soviet Society, which was written by Walt Rostov, later President Johnson's Assistant for National Security Affairs, and other members of the staff of the Center for International Studies at the Mas- sachusetts Institute of Technology. The center had been set up with CIA money in 1950, and this book was published in two versions, one classified (for the CIA. and government policy- makers) and the other unclassified (for the public). Both versions, except in some minor details, promoted the thesis that the Soviet Union is an imperialistic power bent on world conquest, and that it is the responsibility of the United States to blunt the communist menace. Most CIA book operations, however, are more subtle and clandestine. A former CIA official who specialized in Soviet affairs recalls how one day in 1967 a CIA operator on the Covert Action Staff showed him a book called The Foreign Aid Programs of the Soviet Bloc and Communist China by. a German named Kurt Muller. The book looked interesting to the Soviet expert, and he asked to borrow it. The Covert Action man replied, "Keep it. We've got hundreds more downstairs.". Muller's book was some- Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP90B00017R000400190032-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP90B00017R000400190032-6 176 ? THE CIA AND THE CULT OF INTELLIGENCE thing less than an unbiased treatment of the subject; it was highly critical of communist foreign assistance to the Third World. The Soviet specialist is convinced that the agency had found out Muller was : interested in communist foreign-aid programs, encouraged him to write a book which would have a strong anti-communist slant, provided him with information, and then helped to get the book published and distributed. Financing books is a standard technique used by all intelligence services. Many writers are glad to write on subjects which will further their own careers, and with a slant that will contribute to the propaganda objectives of a friendly agency. Books of this sort, however, add only a false aura of respectability and authority .to the information the intelligence agency would like to see spread --even when that information is perfectly accurate-because they are by definition restricted from presenting an objective analysis of the ,subject under consideration. And once exposed, both the writer and his data become suspect. ( Spies, however, do not keep journals. They simply do not take that kind of risk, nor do they have the time to do so while they are leading double lives. Propaganda and Disinformation ? 177 ) Allen Dulles seemed to be rubbing salt in their wounds when he wrote in The Craft of Intelligence that"the Penkovsky defection had shaken the Soviet intelligence services with the knowledge that the West had located Russian officials willing to work "in place for long periods of time," and others who "have never been `surfaced' and [who] for their own protection must remain unknown to the public." And, of course, the publication of The Penkovsky Papers opened the Soviets up to the embarrassment of having the world learn that the top level of their government had been penetrated by a Western spy. Furthermore, Penkovsky's success as an agent made the CIA look good, both to the American people and to the rest of the world. Failures such as the Bay of Pigs might be forgiven and forgotten if the agency could recruit agents like Penkovsky to accomplish the one task the CIA is weakest at-gathering intelli- gence from inside the Soviet Union or China. The facts were otherwise, however. In the beginning, Penkovsky was not a CIA spy. He worked for British Intelligence. He had tried to join the CIA in Turkey, but he had been turned down, in large part because the Soviet Bloc Divlslonof the Clandestine Services was overly careful not to be taken in by KGB provocateurs and double agents. To the skittish CIA operators, Penkovsky seemed too good to be true, especially in' the period following the Burgess-McLean catastrophe. The CIA had also suffered several recent defeats at the hands of the KGB in Europe, and it was understandably reluctant to be duped again. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP90B00017R000400190032-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP90B00017R000400190032-6 178 ? THE CIA AND THE CULT OF INTELLIGENCE Penkovsky, however, was determined to spy for the West, and in 1960 he made contact with British intelligence, which eventually recruited him. The British informed the CIA of Penkovsky's avail- ability and offered to conduct the operation as a joint project. CIA operators in Moscow and elsewhere participated in the elab- orated clandestine techniques used to receive information from Penkovsky and to debrief the Soviet spy on his visits to Western Europe. ( The Penkovsky Papers was a best-seller around the world, and especially in the United States. Its publication certainly caused discomfort in the Soviet Union. ( Richard Helms years later again referred to Penkovsky in this vein, although not by name, when he claimed in a speech before the American Society of Newspaper Editors that "a number of well-placed and courageous Russians .:. helped us" in uncovering the Soviet move. One person taken in by this deception was Senator Milton Young of North Dakota, who serves on the CIA oversight subcommittee. In a 1971 Senate debate on cutting the intelligence budget, the Senator said, "And if you want to read something very interesting and authoritative where intelligence is concerned, read the Penkovsky papers ... this is a very interesting story, on why the intelligence we had in Cuba was so important- to us, and on what the Russians were thinking and just how far they would go." Yet the CIA intelligence analysts who were working on the Cuban problem at the time of the missile crisis and preparing the Propaganda and Disinformation ? 179 agency's intelligence reports for the President up to and after the discovery of the Soviet missiles saw no such information from Penkovsky or any other Soviet spy. The key intelligence that led to the discovery of the missiles came from the analysis of satellite photography of the U.S.S.R., Soviet ship movements, U-2 photo- graphs of Cuba, and information supplied by Cuban refugees. Penkovsky's technical background information, provided well be- fore the crisis, was of some use-but not of major or critical im- portance. Several scholars of the Soviet Union' have independently char- acterized The Penkovsky Papers as being partly bogus and as not having come from Penkovsky's "journal." The respected Soviet expert and columnist for the Manchester Guardian and the Wash- ington Post, Victor Zorza, wrote that "the book could have been compiled only by the Central Intelligence Agency." Zorza pointed out that Penkovsky had neither the time nor the opportunity to have produced such it manuscript; that the book's publisher (Dou- bleday and Company) and translator (Peter Deriabin, himself a KGB defector to the CIA) both refused Ito 'produce the original Russian manuscript for inspection; and that The Penkovsky Papers contained errors of style, technique, and fact that Penkov- sky would not have made. British intelligence also was not above scoring a propaganda victory of its own in the Penkovsky affair. Penkovsky's contact officer had been MI-6's Greville Wynne, who, working under the cover of being a businessman, had been arrested at the same time as Penkovsky and later exchanged for the Soviet spy Gordon Lons- dale. When Wynne returned to Britain, MI-6 helped him write a book about his experiences, called Contact on'Gorky Street. British intelligence wanted the book published in part to make some money for Wynne, who had gone through the ordeal of a year and a half in Soviet prisons, but the MI-6's main motive was to counteract the extremely unfavorable publicity that had been generated by the defection of its own senior officer, Harold "Kim" Philby, in 1963, and the subsequent publication of his memoirs prepared under the auspices of the KGB. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDP90B00017R000400190032-6