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May 19, 1987
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IT At Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/20: CIA-RDP90B00017R000500140004-1 S 6712 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE May 19, 1987 The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Mr. SIMPSON. May I ask the major- ity leader to ask that the time be equally divided prior to that time and that it may be yielded back if there be remaining time? Mr. BYRD. Yes; that is a good sug- gestion. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Hear- ing no objection to the majority lead- er's request, it will be so ordered. Mr. BYRD. I thank the Chair. ORDER OF PROCEDURE Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the distin- guished Senator from Missouri may proceed for 2 minutes as in morning business, that he may be permitted to speak for 2 minutes; that upon the conclusion thereof the Senate proceed to executive session for the consider- ation of the nomination of Mr. Wil- liam Webster, and that the time be- tween that moment and the hour of 5:45 p.m. today be equally divided today between the distinguished Sena- tor from Oklatioma, Mr. BOREN, the chairman of the Intelligence Commit- tee, and the distinguished Senator from Maine, Mr. CoREN. The PRESIDING OFFICER. With- out objection, it is so ordered. Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, ask unanimous consent that it be in order, as in executive session, at this moment to ask for the yeas and nays on the Webster nomination. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is suf- ficient second. The yeas and nays ordered. Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished assistant Republican leader and all Senators who have con- tributed in bringing these agreements Into effect. Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, may I just respond that it is always a tre- mendous pleasure to work with the majority leader. He has always been most courteous and most extraordi- nary to me even when we were, in spir- ited moments. Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the Senator. Mr. SIMPSON, Mr. President, may I inquire, so we might know, if the Web- ster vote might be the last vote this evening? Is that appropriate, too? Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the answer is yes, may I say. CLOTURE MOTION Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, so that all Senators will be on notice, I send an- other cloture motion to the desk while the Senate is on the motion to pro- ceed. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the motion. The legislative clerk read as follows: We, the undersigned Senators, in accord- ance with the provisions of Rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, hereby move to bring to a close debate on the motion to proceed to the consideration of S. 1174. a bill to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 1988 and 1989 for military ac- tivities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activi- ties of the Department of Energy, to pre- scribe personnel strengths for such fiscal years for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes. Senators Robert C. Byrd, John Melcher. Quentin Burdick. Wendell Ford, Paul Sarbanes. Jim Sasser, Bill Proxmire, Brock Adams. Max Baucus. Barbara Mikulski, John Glenn, Timothy Wirth. Frank Lautenberg. Patrick Leahy. Daniel K. Inouye, George J.J. Exon. Dale Bumpers, John F. Kerry, and Terry Sanford. Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, in re- sponse to the question by the distin- guished assistant Republican leader, there will be no more rollcall votes today following the vote on the nomi- nation of Mr. Webster. Mr. SIMPSON. I thank the majority leader. Mr. DANFORTH addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri. OPPOSITION TO IMPOSITION OF CERTAIN TAXES BY THE EU- ROPEAN COMMUNITY Mr. DANFORTH. Mr. President, in late March the Senate passed S. Con. Res. 21, which expresses the sense of the Congress that the administration should vigorously oppose the estab- lishment of a tax on vegetable and marine fats and oils by the European Community, and further states that in the event that such a tax is imposed, then our Government should adopt strong and immediate countermeas- ures. ? Last week, the European parliament met on this matter and did recom- mend the imposition of such a vegeta- ble oil tax. The effect of that tax would be a tax, the same as a tariff, equal to 90 percent of the selling price of soybeans in the European market. The European market accounts for nearly half of our export market for soybeans. This week, the agricultural ministers of the European Community are taking up the question of the vegeta- ble oil tax. I believe, and Senator HEFLIN be- lieves, that it is exceptionally impor- tant for us to get the message to the European Community that this is a very serious matter. When we talk about trade wars, this really comes as close to a real trade war possibility as anything on the horizon. Therefore, Senator HEFLIN and I .ate circulating a letter to Hon. Willy De Clera, who is a commissioner of the European Community, to reiterate the very strong position of the Congress with respect to the vegetable oil tax before any action is taken by the agri- cultural mingters of the European Community. I hope to have the letter present during the rollcall vote on the Webster nomination. I would invite all interested Senators to sign the letter. So far we have about a dozen or so from both parties who have signed the letter. I would welcome any Senators who are concerned about this pro- posed vegetable oil tax to sign on during the Webster vote. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired. EXECUTIVE SESSION The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now go into executive session to con- sider the nomination of William H. Webster, which the clerk will report. NOMINATION OF WILLIAM H. WEBSTER TO BE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE The legislative clerk read the nomi- nation of William H. Webster, of Mis- souri, to be Director of Central Intelli- gence. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma. Mr. BOREN. Mr. President, I am pleased to speak as chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelli- gence in favor of the nomination of Judge William H. Webster to be the Director of Central Intelligence. The Senate Select Committee on In- telligence reported out this nomina- tion, by unanimous vote, on May 1. 1987, after an exhaustive review of his qualifications, character, judgment and experience. The committee exam- ined in detail Judge Webster's views regarding the role of DCI as well as ways in which, working together, the executive and legislative branches will be able to strengthen the congression- al oversight process. In our deliberations, the Intelligence Committee took great care to pursue at length all issues pertinent to the confirmation process, including issues that emerged during the course of the hearings. These matters involved a number of topics including Judge Webster's record during his nine years as Director of FBI. In particular, the Committee carefully and painstaking- ly addressed concerns raised about FBI links to Lt. Col. Oliver North in the Iran-Contra matter. In my judgment, the committee's findings fully supported its unanimous vote to submit Judge Webster's nomi- nation favorably to the U.S. Senate. Based upon the information available to the Intelligence Committee and the sworn testimony of Judge Webster, I personally, and as chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelli- gence. recommend that the Senate confirm Judge Webster's nomination. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/20: CIA-RDP90B00017R000500140004-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/20: CIA-RDP90B00017R000500140004-1 May 19, 1987 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE It is my view that Judge Webster is fully qualified in all respects to pro- vide the leadership needed by the In- telligence Community at this critical time. I would add that I hope the Senate will act promptly on this nomination. While Robert Gates has done an out- standing job as Acting Director, the position of Director of Central Intelli- gence is an extremely sensitive and im- portant one to our national security and requires permanent leadership as soon as possible. And Judge Webster is clearly qualified to fill that role. Mr. President, in addition I will submit for the record a more complete summary of the work of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in a form of a letter to Senator BYRD and Senator Doi x from Senator COHEN and myself as chairman and vice chair- man of the Committee. Mr. President, I was particularly im- pressed during the confirmation proc- ess with the commitment of Judge Webster to the oversight process. He made it clear that he will place trust In the committee; that oversight is le- gitimate in his eyes; that we will at- tempt, working together, to develop the kind of full and candid relation- ship that will benefit the country. Much has been said in the special committees investigating the Iranian affairs over the last several days about the need to rebuild a bipartisan spirit in this country, particularly when it comes to national security policy and foreign policy. We must be able to pull together so that we have one foreign policy and one national security policy that is the American policy. Not a Re- publican policy or a Democratic policy, not a White House policy or a congres- sional policy, but one that will serve the entire Nation. I am convinced that working togeth- er with this candid spirit we can build, with Judge Webster, through his lead- ership, the kind of mutual trust that will benefit this Nation and will bene- fit our national security interests. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent that the full text of the letter which I referred to earlier citing in detail the considerations of the com- mittee, the nature of the evidence which we considered, and the process which we followed, be printed in the RECORD at this point. There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the REcORD, as follows: U.S. SENATE, SELECT CobnarrEE ON INTELLIGENCE, Washington, DC, May 8, 1987. Hon. ROBERT C. Bran, Majority Leader. Hon, ROBERT DOLE, Minority Leader, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. DEAR SENATOR BYRD and SENATOR DOLE: In our capacities as Chairman and Vice Chair- man of the Senate Select Committee on In- telligence, we would like to submit for the consideration of the Senate a summary of the Committee's hearings and other inquir- ies with respect to the nomination of Judge William H. Webster to be Director of Cen- tral Intelligence. The nomination Itself was reported to the Senate on May 1. 1987, pur- suant to a unanimous vote by the Intelli- gence Committee. We have taken great care to examine all the issues that emerged in the course of the hearings. and Judge Webster has responded under oath to all relevant questions. This letter is designed to give the Senate a de- scription of the Intelligence Committee's in- quiry prior to formal debate on the nomina- tion. We believe that the Committee's find- ings support its unanimous vote to recom- mend, based upon the information available to us, that the Senate confirm Judge Web- ster's nomination. In particular, based on the sworn testimony of Judge Webster and other information made available to the Committee, concerns raised about FBI links to Lt. Col. Oliver North and the Iran-contra matter were carefully considered by the Committee and were resolved by the Com- mittee. We hope the Senate will be able to act promptly on this nomination. The position of director of the CIA is an extremely sensi- tive and important one to our national secu- rity and needs to be filled by a permanent director as soon as possible. It was the as- sessment of the Committee that Judge Web- ster is qualified to provide the leadership needed by the intelligence community. BACKGROUND On May 1, 1987. the Select Committee on Intelligence voted 15-0 to report favorably to the Senate on the nomination of Judge William H. Webster to be Director of Cen- tral Intelligence. The Committee undertook an exhaustive review of the qualifications of Judge Webster to head the Central Intelli- gence Agency, to manage the U.S. intelli- gence community, and to advise the Presi- dent and the National Security Council on intelligence matters. The Committee fo- cused on Judge Webster's conception of the role of the DCI, especially in relation to congressional oversight, and on his steward- ship as Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This letter summarizes the Committee's inquiry, with particular atten- tion to issues that arose with respect to mat- ters that are currently the subject of inves- tigations by an Independent Counsel and the Select Committee on Secret Military As- sistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Resist- ance. The Committee received sworn testimony from Judge Webster at three public hear- ings on April 8, 9, and 30 and at two closed hearings on April 9 and May 1. The Com- mittee also examined documents made avail- able by the FBI, the Select Committee, and the Independent Counsel. Committee staff Interviewed officials of the FBI and other elements of the Department of Justice. The closed hearings dealt with classified documents which suggested the possibility of improper efforts by staff members of the National Security Countil to influence the FBI. Judge Webster testified under oath at the closed hearings that he was entirely un- aware of these apparent efforts. Other in- formation provided to, the Committee indi- cated that no NSC staff contacts with the FBI in fact occurred with respect to the classified matters discussed in the closed hearings. The Committee explored FBI relation- ships generally with Lt. Col. Oliver North because of the importance of Judge Web- ster's role in initiating the FBI investigation of NSC staff involvement in the Iran arms sales. The FBI investigation began on No- vember 26, 1986, the day after Attorney General Edwin Meese announced at a news conference that he had discovered evidence of diversion of Iran arms sale proceeds to S 6713 the Nicaraguan contras. In the days before the Attorney General's announcement, doc- uments in NSC files appear to have been de- stroyed. Moreover, the Attorney General's interviews of Lt. Col. North and National Security Adviser John Poindexter, among others, during the period November 21 through 25. were conducted without the as- sistance of experienced FBI investigators. According to testimony received by the Committee, Attorney General Meese talked to Judge Webster on November 21. 1986, about the inquiry Mr. Meese was undertak- ing for the President. Judge Webster testi- fied that he offered the FBI's assistance. but Mr. Meese declined and Judge Webster did not press the matter. A key issue ad- dressed by the Committee was whether Judge Webster's prior knowledge of ques- tionable activities by IA. Col. North should have caused him to insist more strongly on FBI participation in the Attorney General's inquiry. Such participation might have led to the securing of NSC files at an earlier date and to more thorough conduct and re- porting of the interviews with North and Poindexter, among others. This concern was intensified when the In- dependent Counsel's office called to the Committee's attention an internal FBI memorandum dated October 30, 1986, and initialed by Judge Webster. which cited the opinion of a senior Justice Department at- torney that Lt. Col. North might become in- volved in a criminal investigation by an In- dependent Counsel. The first two public hearings covered this matter, as well as a re- quest by Lt. Col. North through Attorney General Meese also on October 30. 1986 to delay an FBI investigation of Southern Air Transport involvement with private support to the Nicaraguan contras. After the initial public hearings were com- pleted, the FBI reported to the Committee other instances where Lt. Col. North sought to influence FBI investigations, and the FBI provided information in response to press allegations of additional North-FBI con- tacts. This information raised the question whether Judge Webster had ignored or not responded to warning signs to stop North's activities. These matters were addressed at the final public hearing, and we believe that the record speaks for itself in that regard. The entire Senate is generally familiar with Judge Webster's performance as FBI Director over the past nine years. The Judi- ciary. Intelligence, and Appropriations Com- mittees have reviewed many aspects of the FBI's work under his direction, and the FBI's conduct in the ABSCAM case and other undercover operations was examined in depth during 1982 by the Senate Select Committee to Study Undercover Activities of Components of the Department of Jus- tice. In considering Judge Webster's qualifi- cations to be Director of Central Intelli- gence, the Intelligence Committee has taken this record into account and has ques- tioned the nominee about certain aspects of FBI conduct during his nine years as Direc- tor. The results of the Committee's hearings on Judge Webster's nomination may be summarized as follows: CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT The conduct of the Executive branch in the sale of arms to Iran raised questions of noncompliance with legal requirements for intelligence operations. Therefore, the Com- mittee questioned Judge Webster closely on his understanding and intentions with regard to those legal requirements. Section 501 of the National Security Act of 1997. as amended in 1980. generally re- quires the Director of Central Intelligence Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/20: CIA-RDP90B00017R000500140004-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/20: CIA-RDP90B00017R000500140004-1 S 6714 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE May 19, 1987 and the heads of all departments, agencies. and other "entities" of the Government to give We House and Senate Intelligence Committees prior notice of covert action op- erations such as the Iran arms sale. A spe- cial provision allows the President to limit prior notice to eight Committee and Con- gressional leaders. The law also recognizes the possibility that the President may assert a claim of constitutional authority to with- hold prior notice in extreme circumstances, but requires in such cases that the Commit- tees be notified "in a timely fashion." Judge Webster pledged to the Committee that he would recommend to the President against withholding notification of the Committees under any except the most ex- treme circumstances involving life and death and then only for a few days. Judge Webster also stated that he would like to see the Committees notified "in less than 48 hours if it's possible to do so in a rational. reasonable way." If he could not support the President's de- cision regarding covert action notice. Judge Webster testified, he "would have to advise the President of my position on that, and if he would not authorize me to speak to you. I would have to leave." Asked whether he would then Inform the Committees, Judge Webster said he "would do so to the extent permitted me by law and I know of no rea- sons why I could not, but only after I had resigned." Other legal issues were raised by the ab- sence of a Presidential Finding, as required by Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (the Hughes-Ryan amendment), for CIA assistance to the transfer of arms to Iran in November. 1985. On the question of whether CIA covert action could be authorized by a retroactive Presidential Finding. Judge Webster ex- pressed his belief that "an 'ex post facto' finding is contrary to the clear spirit of the statutory requirement." In his view, a retro- active Finding would not give legality to the action and would be merely "damage con- trol." Judge Webster testified that a strong legal case could probably be made for an oral Fending in an emergency, but he said he be. lived a written Finding should follow and he "wouldn't quit." until he had one. The purpose of a Finding, he explained, is to state in writing the basis for the action so that it can be reviewed and understood by everyone with responsibility, including the oversight committees. The fact that the Iran arms sales were con- ducted by the National Security Council staff raised the issue of whether covert action operations by the NSC staff are cov- ered by the legal requirements for intelli- gence operations. Judge Webster made clear his belief that the NSC staff is an "entity" subject to the requirements to report to the Intelligence Committees. If the National Se- curity Advisor failed to notify the Commit- tees. Judge Webster said, he would do so himself. Asked about the desirability of sunset pro- visions for covert actions, Judge Webster stated that FBI undercover operations are already subject to periodic review and that there should be regular formal review of all covert actions by the DCI and the oversight committees. Judge Webster stressed that his nine years of testifying as FBI Director on coun- terintelligence and counterterrorism demon- strate his support for congressional over- sight. He stated that he believes he must have congressional support as DCI and that he intends to enhance the capabilities of the intelligence community to serve the na- tional interest "aggressively, objectively and professionally . . ,with fidelity to our Con- stitution. our statutes and all lawful orders. . GOALS AS DCI Apart from oversight issues. Judge Web- ster discussed his goals as DC1. He ex- plained that be believes in the traditional role for the DCI and therefore will not serve as a member of the Cabinet so as to remove any possible perception that he has a politi- cal role in the Administration. He said he has been promised by the President and the National Security Adviser that he will have direct access to the President and that he will be included in Cabinet and other inner circle meetings where emerging issues that depend on accurate intelligence are being discussed. He will participate with the Na- tional Security Adviser in making certain the President is aware of intelligence affect- ing national security, but will also exercise the option to impart "his own unvarnished views" to the President alone. Judge Webster's primary goal as DCI, as expressed at the hearings, is to gather intel- ligence about foreign capabilities and inten- tions to help-policymakers make sound deci- sons. He sees the task as not to shape or ma- nipulate policy, but to provide information In which policymakers can place maximum confidence for its integrity. Covert action should, in his view, be conducted in support of legitimate national foreign policy goals controlled by "careful analysis of ideas and evolution of the plans. a Finding by the Pres- sident that supports them and oversight by the Intelligence Committees of the Con- gress to represent the American people in terms of what we are doing." Among other specific objectives, Judge Webster testified that he places great em- phasis on human intelligence and recognizes the need to maintain momentum in recruit- ment and retention of people with the "enormous wisdom, talent and selfless dedi- cation" of the present men and women in the intelligence community. Federal law establishes a maximum ten- year term for the FB1 Director. When ques- tioned, Judge Webster said he would sup- port a similar law for the DCI to remove the office from the political arena. Further, he will take steps to stand away from political activity and concerns in making speeches and attending functions. He does plan to help gain support from the American people for proper intelligence gathering activities by appropriate public statements. FBI-NORTH CONTACTS As noted above. the Committee examined a series of contacts between U. Col. North and the FBI during 1965 and 1986. Judge Webster testified that, to the bast of his knowledge, in no instance did FBI personnel convey information to North outside offi- cial, authorized channels. On two occasions North directly requested the FBI to delay activity in a criminal investigation. Judge Webster testified that in neither case was the request properly reported to him. In ad- dition to Judge Webster's sworn testimony, the Committee reviewed key documents and Committee staff interviewed FBI and Jus- tice Department officials regarding these North requests. DISSEMINATION OF INVESTIGATIVE REPORTS In a letter dated April 22, 1987, Judge Webster submitted to the Committee the re- sults of an internal FBI inquiry into press reports that the FBI had furnished Neutral- ity Act investigative reports to North. That inquiry revealed that in January 1985 North contacted the FBI office in Los Angeles to warn that a domestic group's planned inva- sion of Nicaragua would do extreme damage to the contra movement. North requested an update of the Neutrality Act investiga- tion of these plans initiated by the FBI in December 1984. The Los Angeles FBI office reported this contact and request by North to FBI Headquarters and to the other FBI field offices investigating the case. When the Miami and Houston field offices provid- ed to FBI Headquarters the results of their Investigations on January 5 and 10. 1985, a Headquarters supervisor disseminated the reports to the NSC. It was the supervisor's judgment that the information could have been of use to the NSC for foreign policy considerations. A summary of the Miami report and the Report itself, were sent to Judge Webster, who initialed it to the file. The note indicat- ed that the report was being disseminated to several federal agencies including the NSC without reference to North. When the FBI's Houston office closed its Neutrality Act investigation on September 12. 1985, FBI Headquarters again dissemi- nated its report summarizing the results to the NSC and several federal agencies. The Headquarters supervisor did so because it was consistent with prior handling of com- munications in this case. At the confirmation hearings. Judge Web- ster reported these results of the internal FBI inquiry and described the matter as having been properly handled by FBI of According to Judge Webster, the dis- semination of reports to the NSC was han- dled in accordance with established prac- tices for dissemination to the State Depart- ment and other federal agencies of FBI in- formation and intelligence relating to the conduct of foreign affairs. INVESTIGATION OF THE "PRINCE" The two requests to the FBI from North for delays in criminal investigative activity occurred in connection with the case of an alleged bank fraud committed by a self-de- scribed "Saudi Prince" going by the name of Ibrahim Al Masoud?in fact, not a Saudi prince but an Iranian named Mousalreza Ebrahim Zadeh who was ultimately convict- ed in 1987. The investigation was conducted by FBI Field Office in Philadelphia, in con- junction with the U.S. Attorney',s office in Philadelphia. In a summary memorandum volunteered to the Committee after Judge Webster's initial confirmation hearings, the FBI advised that North had asked the FBI to delay attempts to interview the "Prince" In July. 1985. The new information also in- dicated that North may have tried in April. 1986, to delay a grand jury appearance in the case by Richard R. Miller, the President of International Business Communications. Inc.. a public relations company and a "con- sultant" to the National Security Council. The first North request was made on July 18. 1985, when an FBI Agent in the Wash- ington Field Office inteviewed North re- garding the "Prince," following up leads sent by the Philadelphia FBI office. The "Prince" had persuaded a Philadelphia bank to accept a $250,000 check and trans- fer $210,000 to him before the check cleared. When the bank discovered that the check had been written on a closed account, the matter was referred to the FBI which opened a bank fraud investigation. Shortly thereafter, the Philadelphia office reported a statement by Miller that the "Prince" was closely associated with the National Securi- ty Council, and the Washington office de- termined that Miller's contact on the NSC staff was North. The FBI Agent assigned to the case in the Washington office requested and received approval to interview North from the White Collar Crimes Section Chief at FBI Headquarters. After the interview. the FBI Agent pre- pared a five-page teletype message reporting Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/20: CIA-RDP90B00017R000500140004-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/20: CIA-RDP90B00017R000500140004-1 May 19, 1987 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 6715 what transpired. According 1,0 this report. North specifically requested that attempts by tlie FBI to interview the "Prince" be held in abeyance so as not to deter the "Prince" from making a substantial contri- bution to the Nicaraguan contras. The FBI Agent told North that his request would be made known to FBI Headquarters. The teletype message was addressed to FBI Headquarters and to the FBI Philadel- phia office on a "Priority" basis and to the New York and Sacramento offices on a "routine- basis. Judge Webster testified that this teletype message was never re- ceived by FBI Headquarters officials or by the Philadelphia or Sacramento offices be- cause of an "unusual technological failure." Judge Webster submitted a detailed expla- nation of how this could have happended because the FBI was in a period of transi- tion between two teletype systems. The mes- sage was received and filed in the New York office, which did not have principal respons- biility for the case. It was also filed in the Washington Field Office, where it originat- ed. and was discovered there in April 1987, when the Washington office was asked to pursue a lead in an investigation by the FBI Sacramento Field Office of the wife of the "Prince.- Committee staff interviewed FBI officials to establish in detail the probable reasons for the apparent failure of the FBI telecommunications system in this case, and Judge Webster submitted a detailed techni- cal explanation. The failure of FBI Headquarters officials to receive the July 18, 1985, North interview report was especially significant because North discussed with the FBI Agent his fundraising efforts for the contras. The report quoted North as stating that he ad- vised Kevin Kattke (who had originally told North about the "Prince") that inasmuch as public law forbade expenditures of govern- ment funds to aid Nicaraguan insurgents, it was inadvisable for a member of the NSC (North) to meet with the "Prince" directly. The report said North confidentially ad- vised the interviewing FBI Agent that the NSC maintained indirect contact with the "Prince" through Miller for a lengthy period of time due to the desperate need for private 'funds by Nicaraguan freedom fight- ers since being cut off from 17.S. funding. The interview report also quoted North as stating that Miller's work for the NSC con- cerned the funneling of private funds to Nicaraguan freedom fighters, that the "Prince" was offering to provide his oil prof- its to support the Nicaraguan rebels, and that North had discussed the "Prince's" offer personally with President Reagan and National Security Adviser Robert McPar- lane as recently as June. Judge Webster testified that the July 18, 1985. North interview report should have been referred to him and that, if he had seen it, he would have recognized the sig- nificance of the potential violation of law by North. Judge Webster said there would have been substantial interest in a request to delay an interview of the subject of an in- vestigation based on aid to the contras, be- cause that would have been "completely im- proper." Judge Webster also sent the Com- mittee a memorandum on the internal FBI inquiry into this incident stating that the FBI Agent in the Washington office did not comply with North's request for a delay in efforts to locate and interview the "Prince." Committee staff interviews and a contempo- raneous document corroborate this state- ment. The Agent in the Washington office sent another teletype message to FBI Headquar- ters on July 31, 1985, referring to the July 18 message and reporting a further discus- sion with North in which North advised that Miller and the "Prince" were in Europe attempting to arrange funds for the contras. According to the internal FBI inquiry, this was the first knowledge by the White Collar Crimes Section at FBI Headquarters of North's facilitating the channeling of funds to the contras, and it was not disseminated outside the Section. Judge Webster testified that he did not receive this information. In September, 1985. the Washington office agent requested and received Head- quarters approval by telephone to notify North of information received from another FBI office establishing that the -Prince" was an Iranian who had previously engaged in bank frauds. A subsequent teletype to FBI headquarters reported that North had been notified and referred back to the origi- nal request to interview North (but not to the July 18 message reporting the inter- view). The Committee did not examine in detail the question of whether supervisory agents at FBI Headquarters or the agent in the Washington office should have taken fur- ther action to bring the information about North's activities to higher levels in the FBI. The Committee could find no evidence that Judge Webster was aware of any of these FBI contacts with North until April 13, 1987, when he made the information available to the Committee. A second North request to the FBI was made in April 1986, when North contacted FBI Executive Assistant Director Oliver "Buck" Revell with respect to the testimony of Richard Miller before the grand jury in Philadelphia investigating the "Prince." The April 13, 1987, summary of the FBI in- ternal inquiry into this matter stated that Revell recalled "contacting an Assistant United States Attorney in Philadelphia on a secure telephone line and requesting the postponement of Miller's appearance based on the NSC's request." On April 17, 1987, Judge Webster sent the Committee a letter from Revell in which Revell revised his recollection significantly. According to this letter, Revell now recalls that on April 30, 1986, he inquired about the scope of ques- tioning of Miller but did not request a post- ponement of Miller's appearance. This revi- sion was significant because Revell stated that he had not informed Judge Webster as he should have done if a postponement was requested. Revell's revised account is cor- roborated by a memorandum prepared by the Assistant U.S. Attorney in Philadelphia on May 2. 1986, which recounts the conver- sation with Revell and makes no mention of a request for postponement. Revell's letter of April 17, 1987, states that he did not bring this matter to the attention of Judge Webster and did not consult with the De- partment of Justice because there was no action requested by him of the Assistant U.S. Attorney. In response to Committee questions, Judge Webster testified that he had been disturbed to discover In April 1987 the mate- rial indicating Revell's contact with the As- sistant U.S. Attorney. He said he had not previously known of Revell's contacts. Judge Webster characterized the contact as "most unusual" and said that Revell should have consulted him in advance and that Revell normally was very careful to keep him informed and had expressed regret to Judge Webster about his unintentional mis- take in this case. Judge Webster also stated that, if he had known of North's request, he would have referred it to the Justice De- partment. KNOWLEDGE OF IRAN ARMS SALES Judge Webster testified that in early August 1986, Revell told him that North had advised members of the Operations Subgroup of the NSC Terrorist Incident Working Group (chaired by North) of the Iran arms sale initiative. North had said that the Attorney General had reviewed and approved the Presidential Finding that authorized the activity. Judge Webster testi- fied that he raised the matter shortly there- after with Attorney General Meese, who confirmed that he was aware of the initia- tive and had reviewed a Finding although it may have been a draft Finding. Judge Web- ster testified that he did not inquire and was not advised as to whether the Intelli- gence Committees had been notified. SOUTHERN AIR TRANSPORT INVESTIGATION The Committee examined the circum- stances surrounding a delay in the FBI in- vestigation of the Southern Air Transport Company in connection with the Nicara- guan downing of a C-123 aircraft engaged in delivering arms to the contras in early Octo- ber 1986. As with the FBI?North contacts discussed above. the Committee's inquiry in- cluded examination of key documents and staff interviews with FBI and Justice De- partment officials, as well as Judge Web- ster's sworn testimony. Committee staff de- veloped the following chronology on the basis of this information. On October 8, 1986. the FBI's Miami Field Office opened a preliminary inquiry into possible Neutrality Act violations involving Southern Air Transport, on the basis of press reports that SAT had serviced the C- 123 aircraft shot down in Nicaragua. That evening, Lt. Col. North called FBI Executive Assistant Director Revell and told him that SAT was involved in "that other initiative," meaning U.S. arms shipments to Iran. Revell replied that the FBI would not inves- tigate "authorized" activity. Revell also called the Miami Field Office to determine the nature of the FBI's efforts on the case. On October 10, Revell met with the FBI Terrorism Section Chief and Deputy Assist- ant Attorney General Mark Richard from the Justice Department's Criminal Division. They agreed that the PSI should continue Its preliminary inquiry, while the CIA should be asked about any authorized activi- ty by Southern Air Transport, On October 14, Revell briefed Judge Web- ster, who had just returned from an out-of- town trip, on North's concern. On October 30, Associate Attorney Gener- al Stephen Trott called Judge Webster on a secure line and asked, at the request of the Attorney General, that "any non-urgent work" on the SAT investigation be suspend- ed for 10 days. Trott said that there were sensitive hostage negotiations going on and that the Attorney General, while not want- ing to "wreck the investigation," was trying to "permit a good climate for the negotia- tions to the extent possible." Judge Webster called the Assistant Director in charge of the FBI Criminal Investigative Division, Floyd Clarke, who said the investigation was "just at the preliminary stages" and could readily be suspended. Judge Webster added that Clarke should tell him if the sus- pension caused problems. Those calls were described in a memorandum from Judge Webster to Clarke the next day. On November 10, FBI officials began to ask Justice Department officials whether they could resume the SAT investigation. Further contacts were made on November 12, 13, and 18. On November 11, FBI Assistant Director Clarke told Judge Webster that the 10 days were up; Judge Webster agreed to call Asso- ciate Attorney General Trott. On November 12, a memorandum from . the Internal Security Section Chief in the Justice Department's Criminal Division in Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/20: CIA-RDP90600017R000500140004-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/20: CIA-RDP90B00017R000500140004-1 S 6716 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE May 19, 1987 formed Assistant Attorney General William F. Weld that, "[Witless you advise to the contrary. I intend to advise the Bureau that It is free to resume its investigation without further delay." On November 20. Associate Attorney Gen- eral Trott informed FBI Executive Assistant Director Revell that the suspension was lifted. On November 26. FBI Headquarters told the field to resume its preliminary inquiry. The Committee also learned that. on No- vember 6 and 14, 1986, Lt. Col. North called Revell to ask his assistance in stopping a Customs Service investigation of Southern Air Transport. Revell referred North to As- sociate Attorney General Trott and, on both occasions, asked whether North knew about SAT involvement in arms shipments to the contras. According to Revell. North replied in the negative. At the public hearings, questioning of Judge Webster focused on his reasons for complying with the Attorney General's re- quest to suspend the investigation. Judge Webster stated that he was already aware of Southern Air Transport's role in arms ship- ments to Iran, from his briefing by Revell on October 14. so he understood and accept- ed the sensitivity of the matter. Assistant Director Clarke told him that a follow-up interview with an informant was all that re- mained in the inquiry and that this could easily be postponed. Once he had been as- sured by Clarke that the suspension would not hurt the FBI investigation. Judge Web- ster saw no need to question the Attorney General's judgment. Judge Webster was also asked why he had not reacted. on October 30 or later, to an FBI memorandum which he initiated, dated October 30, that included a recommenda- tion by the Justice Department's Counsel for Intelligence Policy that North be ex- cluded from receiving confidential FBI in- telligence because "North may soon be in- volved in a criminal probe concerning U.S. activities in Central America by a special prosecutor. . . ." This recommendation also noted that "it would not be possible to advise other persons on the National Securi- ty Council to be assured the technically de- rived information would not be made avail- able to Lt. Col. N orth.- Judge Webster explained that he did not read this memorandum until after suspend- ing the SAT investigation and that, in any case, the memorandum did not make an im- pression on him because it was part of a typically large stack of informational memos and did not require him to take any action. MEESE INQUIRY On November 21, 1986. Attorney General Meese was asked by the President to con- duct an inquiry to determine an accurate chronology of the Iran arms sales. Accord- ing to the Attorney General's testimony before the Committee on December 17. 1986, he met with Judge Webster on the day that he began his inquiry. Meese testified that when he informed Judge Webster of the inquiry. "we agreed that there was no criminal matter involved and that it would not be appropriate for the FBI to be brought in." He added that Judge Webster had offered the FBI's help whenever the Attorney General might wish it. At the confirmation hearings, the Com- mittee questioned Judge Webster regarding his November 21 meeting with Attorney General Meese. Judge Webster agreed with the Attorney General's description of the meeting, saying that the conversation re- garding the Iran inquiry was a short, casual one and that Judge Webster. like the Attor- ney General, had not seen the Iran arms sales as a criminal matter on November 21. Judge Webster also noted that he had previ- ously asked the Attorney General whether a Presidential Finding for the arms sales had been cleared with Meese. and had been told that it had. In light of these facts, Judge Webster testified that he did not know of any material ways in which FBI in- volvement at that point would have changed the manner in which the inquiry was conducted. Judge Webster was asked why the Octo- ber 30 memorandum expressing a senior Justice Department official's concern about North did not lead him to entertain the pos- sibility that the Iran inquiry could get into criminal matters. He replied that although he had read that memorandum, it had not stuck in his mind and had no impact upon his thinking on November 21. Judge Web- ster similarly stated that he had not thought about the possibility that the arms sales to Iran would violate the Arms Export Control Act, because the Act was not some- thing that the FBI commonly handled and because he knew there had been a Presiden- tial Finding. He also stated that, although he knew that Southern Air Transport was involved in the Iran arms sales and might be involved in the supply of arms to the con- tras. neither that fact nor the White House interest in suspending the SAT investiga- tion had prompted any concern about possi- ble criminality in the Iran arms sales. A major line of questioning concerned re- ported document destruction by members of the National Security Council staff between November 21 and the initiation of the FBI investigation on November 26, Judge Web- ster testified that he met with Attorney General Meese on November 25. after the public announcement of discovery of possi- ble diversion of funds to the contras. At that meeting Judge Webster learned that the Justice Department was going to ask all agencies to preserve relevant records. When the FBI entered the case on the 26th. they were informed by a White House official that documents had been secured on the night of the 25th. Assistant Director Clarke testified that FBI Agents went to the NSC offices and confirmed that the documents were under seal on the 26th. Judge Webster said that on December 4, when he stated publicly that the FBI had no knowledge of any document destruction, that was an accurate statement. He declined to discuss what knowledge the FBI might now have, bemuse of constraints placed by the Independent Counsel's investigation. Judge Webster did note, however, in re- sponse to questions that North's secretary, Ms. Fawn Hall. had not yet begun to cooper- ate with the FBI as of December 4, 1986. OTHER TBI INVESTIGATIONS Committee Members questioned Judge Webster about the FBI's conduct in several other specific investigations. (1) Nevada Cases. In ?the course of im- peachment proceedings brought against U.S. District Judge Harry Claiborne, allega- tions were made of a "vendetta" against Judge Claiborne by the Special Agent in Charge of the Las Vegas Nevada. FBI Field Office, Joseph Yablonsky. Senator Hecht cited specific instances of alleged miscon- duct by Agent Yablonsky during the course of the investigation. In response. Judge Webster noted that the FBI's Office of Pro- fessional Responsibility investigated allega- tions and that Agent Yablonsky was official- ly censored and placed on probation. (2) FBI "Targeting." In connection with the FBI's ABSCAM and Claiborne cases, Members questioned whether the FBI had "targeted" individuals for investigation. Judge Webster stressed that it is not FBI practice to target individuals for investiga- tion. While it is appropriate to target prob- lems (e.g.. organized crime, labor racketeer- ing). Judge Webster emphasized that it is not appropriate to target individuals. Before the FBI opens a criminal investigation of an individual, the Bureau must have reason to believe a person has been or will be engaged in criminal activity. Judge Webster recognized shortcomings in the FBI's handling of the ABSCAM case. He stated that the FBI had incorporated recommendations made by the Senate Select Committee to Study Undercover Ac- tivities into its undercover practices and procedures which had improved the FBI's operations. (3) PFLP Case. Earlier this year, acting on the basis of FBI information. the Immigra- tion and Naturalization Service arrested sev- eral aliens who were members of the Popu- lar Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP. At issue was what authority the FBI had used to originate the investigation of PFLP members who had not committed terrorist acts in this country. Judge Webster explained that the FBI had acted under classified Attorney General's Guidelines which permit investigations of organizations that the FBI has reason to believe might be engaged in terrorist activities. He main- tained that the PFLP is a recognized world- wide terrorist organization and that the FBI was concerned an infrastructure in the United States could develop and become the basis for support of terrorist activities. (4) Warrantless Searches. Members ques- tioned Judge Webster about the FBI's use of warrantless searches for intelligence pur- poses. He replied that the FBI operated under the authority of the classified Attor- ney General's Guidelines for Foreign Coun- terintelligence Investigations and that FBI Agents made full affidavits of facts support- ing the authorization of any warrantless search. Judge Webster stressed the very lim- ited use of warrantless searches in the FBI's work and maintained that current proce- dures were satisfactory, although he said the FBI would be willing to work with Con- gress on legislation requiring a court order comparable to the Foreign Intelligence Sur- veillance Act procedures for wiretapping. He agreed to provide the Committee with addi- tional classified information concerning the use of such authority in specific instances. Varelli Allegations. Representative Pa- tricia Schroeder has been the subject of al- legations by a former FBI informant named Frank Varelli that she was listed in an FBI Terrorist Photo Album. Judge Webster stated that Rep. Schroeder had never been in the FI31 album, that she was not the sub- ject of any FBI investigation, and that he had responded to her concerns personally. Judge Webster was questioned about elle- gation.s that certain domestic groups active- ly opposing U.S. foreign policy in Central America were improperly investigated by the FBI and that the FBI's handling of in- formants in such investigations was inad- equate, especially in light of the FBI's recent experience with former informant Varelli. Members asked what mechanisms were in place to ensure that investigations of domestic political groups are handled properly and lawfully. According to Judge Webster, the primary authority for initiating such investigations Is the Attorney General's Guidelines for Do- mestic Security Investigations which specify the conditions under which an investigation can be launched. With respect to the han- dling of informants. Webster emphasized that there are substantial FBI Manual pro- visions dealing with informants which re- quire strict accountability and record-keep- Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/20: CIA-RDP90B00017R000500140004-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/20: CIA-RDP90B00017R000500140004-1 May .79, 1987 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE ins. Alleptions of impropriety are subject to investigation by the Office of Profession- al Responsibility. Judge Webster subse- quently advised the Comittee in a response for the record that the investigation in which Varelli was used as an informant was conducted under the classified Attorney General's Guidelines for Foreign Counterin- telligence Investigation& (6) Donovan Investigation. In 1981, the FBI conducted a background field investiga- tion of former Labor Secretary Raymond Donovan, who was undergoing Senate con- firmation. The background check apparent- ly failed to report information in FBI files that had a direct bearing on the nomina- tion. Judge Webster was asked how this had occurred and what had been done to pre- vent such problems in the future. He con- firmed that the investigation was not as thorough and complete as it should have been. He also advised that substantial changes in procedure and practice had been made since this incident and that he felt those changes would make recurrence un- (7) Files on Bishops. Press reports have al- leged that the FBI has maintained informa- tion in its files for a number of years on two Catholic bishops who have worked with peace and civil rights groups. Members asked about the FBI's criteria for collecting and filing information on particular individ- uals. Judge Webster stated that the FBI did not have criminal investigative files on the two bishops. Instead, their names had been cross-referenced and appeared in other files for which the FBI had legitimate investiga- tive interests. Judge Webster also said that he was concerned that FBI cross-referenc- ing guidelines were not adequately clear. He noted that the FBI had recently completed a planning and evaluation study of this process and was implementing changes to tighten up procedures to ensure that there was sufficient reason for names to be includ- ed and cross-referenced in files. (8) Cases Involving the Attorney General. Judge Webster was asked how he and the FBI handled cases in which allegations of wrongdoing reached the level of the Attor- ney General or his friends and associates, in light of the Attorney General's ability to protect those people by keeping Independ- ent Counsels from investigating them. The ?Wedtech" case was cited as a prime exam- ple of the Attorney General's possible in- volvement in wrongdoing, and the Olsen case (involving former Justice Department executives Edward Schnaults and Carol Din- kins) was cited as an example of the Attor- ney General preventing an Independent Counsel from broadening an investigation to include high officials. Judge Webster stated that the FBI's role was to conduct a preliminary inquiry under the direction of career Justice Department attorneys and then to assist any Independ- ent Counsel. Judge Webster saw the ques- tion of the limits of an Independent Coun- sel's powers as a matter for the courts and Congress to determine. With regard to the "Wedtech" case. Judge Webster stated that the Independent Counsel was investigating the case with whatever FB/ assistance he desired and that there was a separate FBI investigation that did pot involve a person covered under the Ethics in Government Act. Judge Webster added that, if a case in- volved the Attorney General himself, he would expect the Attorney General to recuse himself and "would take the neces- sary steps to be sure that he did recuse him- self." Of course, the above is only a brief sum- mary of the information developed by the Intelligence Committee in Its deliberations with respect to the nomination of Judge Webster to be Director of Central Intelli- gence. The full transcript of the hearings regarding Judge Webster's nomination, both open and closed, as well as all pertinent doc- uments, are available for review by Mem- bers of the Senate. The classified docu- ments are available in our secure committee space for examination under the rules and procedures of the Committee. Thank you for your consideration. Sincerely. DAVID L BOREN, Chairman. WILI110.1 S. Coxes, Vice Chairman, Mr. BOREN. Mr. President. I reserve the remainder of my time. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the unanimous-consent agreement, time is to be shared between the Sena- tor from Oklahoma and the Senator from Maine. The Chair assumes that the Senator from Pennsylvania is the designee of the Senator from Maine at this time and will recognize him. Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I am on the Intelligence Committee and in the absence of any other Senator on this side of the aisle, I seek recognition in my own right. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will be assuming control of the time. Under the time agreement. the time between the moment we took the nomination up to 5:45 must be di- vided equally between the majority and the minority. Under those circum- stances, the time allotted will be counted as part of the time designated to the Senator from Maine. Mr. SPECTER. I understand and I thank the Chair. I voted in favor of Judge Webster to be the Director of Central Intelligence at the conclusion of hearings conduct- ed by the Select Committee on Intelli- gence, and I intend to vote for his con- firmation before the full Senate be- cause his overall record establishes his qualifications for this most important position. Nonetheless, I am concerned by the evidence produced during the confir- mation hearings that the FBI, and to some extent Judge Webster himself, did not respond to clear danger signals of seriously improper, if not illegal, ac- tivities by LTCOL North. The totality of the evidence suggests that LTCOL North's key position in the National Security Council and the President's strong personal support for the Con- tras created a climate wherein the FBI may have winked at possible violations of law involving the Contras. At his confirmation hearings, Judge Webster referred to his concern about White House influence, stating: From time to time I have made It clear to my executives that I wanted to be closely in- formed about any kind of White House in- fluence, and as recently as September 1986 before all of this broke, I addressed a memo- randum to my executive conference remind- ing them that I wished to be informed of any committee meetings at the White House at which they were invited as my rep- resentative or for any other purpose. Starting in January 1985, LTCOL North established direct contact with S 6717 FBI field offices on their investigation of Neutrality Act violations. He re- quested that he be kept informed of those matters. At his hearings, Judge Webster stated that since the matter was a national security concern, he therefore provided the information to the NSC and other Government agen- cies. On July 18. 1985, the FBI's Wash- ington, DC field office cabled FBI headquarters a most important piece of information which, if properly pur- sued, could have short-circuited LTCOL North's activities as early as 1985. But, the cable to FBI headquar- ters was never received because, in the words of Judge Webster, of "an unusu- al technological failure." The cable points out that the FBI?if not its Di- rector?was well aware that LTCOL North: Personally discussed private aid to the Contras with President Reagan in mid 1985. Asked the FBI to delay an interview with a fraud suspect. Was dealing with an alleged Saudi Prince through an intermediary be- cause it was not advisable for North, as a member of the National Security Council, to deal directly in view of a legal prohibition against aiding the Contras. Although that cable was referenced in subsequent FBI cables, no attempts were ever made to retrieve it. Those facts could have irrunediately spot- lighted and possibly stopped LTCOL North's operations through early FBI Investigations. At a minimum, it would have alerted President Reagan to the serious implications of North's activi- ties. On the record, this key FBI docu- ment and several subsequent ones did not reach Judge Webster. so he cannot be held personally responsible for pur- poses of these confirmation hearings. Nonetheless, FBI agents knew about it and did nothing. Again. in April 1986, LTCOL North contacted one of Judge Webster's three deputies, Oliver Revell. to re- quest that Revell intercede with an Assistant U.S. Attorney in Philadel- phia to delay the questioning of Rich- ard Miller, a "consultant" to North and a witness in the Saudi Prince case. In April 1987, Richard Miller was named as a co-conspirator along with LTCOL North in a tax fraud case in- volving aid to the Contras and entered a guilty plea. Mr. Revell originally told the Intelligence Committee by letter on April 13, 1987 that he did intercede, but 4 days later, recanted his story. He admits that he never advised Judge Webster of this White House request because he never interceded, although until April 13, 1987, he thought he had. It is Judge Webster's view that Revell erred in judgment by failing to inform him in April 1986 of this re- quest and for not dealing with the As- sistant U.S. Attorney through the Jus- tice Department. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/20: CIA-RDP90B00017R000500140004-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/20: CIA-RDP90B00017R000500140004-1 S 6718 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE May 19, 1987 On October 30, 1986, a memorandum was prepared by the Attorney Gener- al's, Counsel for Intelligence Policy stating that "North may be involved in a criminal probe concerning U.S. ac- tivities in Central America by a special prosecutor." The memorandum con- tained an even more important danger signal that "it would not be possible to advise other persons in the National Security Council and he assured the technically derived information would not be made available to LTCOL North." Judge Webster testified that he did not remember having read the memorandum, although he concedes that he initialed it. Questions arise on Judge Webster's and the FBI's failure to focus and act on this memorandum in light of the fact that Judge Webster, and certainly the FBI, knew of LTCOL North's ex- tensive involvement in Contra aid and his involvement, as early as August 1986, with the arms-for-hostage effort. Judge Webster stated in testimony that he was concerned by that August 5, 1986 revelation. At about the same time the October 30 memorandum crossed his desk, Judge Webster wrote a memorandum dated October 31, 1986 concerning a request of Admiral Poin- dexter relayed by Attorney General Meese to hold up on an investigation of Southern Air Transport because of the hostage negotiations. Perhaps it is 20-20 hindsight to say that Judge Webster and senior FBI of- ficials should have been alerted to pos- sible violations of Federal law such as the Arms Export Control Act and the Boland amendment. But, there was no focus, there were no questions asked. In the context of the information which had come to Judge Webster's personal attention, a further question arises as to the adequacy of Judge Webster's reaction when Attorney General Meese told him on November 21, 1986 that he, Meese, had been asked by the President to pull the facts together on the Iran arms trans- action. Judge Webster and Attorney General Meese concurred in their tes- timony that there was no reason for FBI involvement because there was no indication of a criminal investigation. In retrospect again, perhaps more should have been expected of Judge Webster in light of: The information which had crossed his desk on the possibility of criminal allegations including the October 30 memorandum that North might be in- volved in a criminal probe concerning activities in Central America. The Iran arms transaction which was laden with questions on compli- ance with the Arms Export Control Act; and The Attorney General's obvious closeness to White House involvement on such matters which would profit from the more-detached participation of Judge Webster. In evaluating the events of Novem- ber 21, 1986, questions have been raised about the propriety of Attorney General Meese's conduct and handling of the inquiry. Judge Webster might have been in an even better position to objectively evaluate those problems and direct an inquiry which would have preserved the records which LTCOL North was able to shred. Experience has demonstrated the dual conflicting functions of the U.S. Attorney General. He is the senior lawyer of the executive branch, and he Is also the Nation's chief law enforce- ment officer. That duality is com- pounded when the Attorney General Is also a President's confidant. At about this time, Attorney General Meese was making public statements about marching "shoulder-to-shoul- der" with the President in response to some high level executive officials who were raising questions about the Presi- dent's Iranian policies. The relation- ship between President Nixon and At- torney General John Mitchell is closer to current events than ancient history as a danger signal to possible analo- gous relationships. Perhaps even perfect hindsight would not have brought this potential problem into focus, but it raises the problem for the future. Based on the Watergate experience, the time is long overdue that we give serious consider- ation to separating the roles of the Nation's chief law enforcement officer from the senior executive branch lawyer or Presidential confidant. It may be that some of these danger signals available to Judge Webster and the FBI are apparent only through 20-20 hindsight. But it may be that more should have been expected from the highly touted Federal Bureau of Investigation and its Director who enjoys a reputation for integrity and competency unsurpassed by anyone in office in Washington today. In any event, there are lessons here which should not be lost. Such issues should be identified and analyzed so that we may benefit in the future., Although not directly relevant here, it Is worth noting that the FBI is now being called upon to serve as the investigative arm for the Independent Counsel, formerly known as Special Prosecutor, who will be investigating Attorney General Edwin Meese in the WedTech matter. That role for the FM. as well as the Bureau's investigative functions on matters where others in the Executive Branch may be under investigation or have a different in- terest, should be scrutinized and evaluated in an- other proceeding. It may be that it is too much to ask a Federal agency, like the FBI, to be indifferent to the Presi- dent's stated position when they are investigating allegations of violations of law regarding U.S. as- sistance to the Contras. It is a very difficult situa- tion to have FBI personnel investigate the Attor- ney General of the United States, even when they are for the moment under the direction of Inde- pendent Counsel, because the Attorney General, after all, was their boss and probably soon again will be their boss. The adage that no man can serve two masters is firmly established. Congress. perhaps through the Judiciary Com- mittees, should review the FBI's roles in such situa- tions which have inherent conflict-of-interest impli- cations. Needless to say, no one is perfect, and we must be careful not to impose standards so rigorous that good men and women fall by the wayside or that other good men and women will be dis- couraged from seeking important Fed- eral positions. Judge Webster's record as a practicing lawyer, Federal judge and Director of the FBI is excellent. Judge Webster's record outweighs my reservations so I shall vote to confirm him as the new Director of CIA. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine has 5 minutes 20 seconds remaining: the Senator from Oklahoma has 10 minutes 4 seconds remaining. Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Missouri. Mr. DANFORTH. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Maine. Mr. President, I have known Judge Webster for a number of years. He is a very good family friend and has been for, I guess, most of his life. When I was admitted to the Missouri bar, he was a member of the board of law ex- aminers. I believe I am the only Member of the Senate ever to have tried a lawsuit in front of Judge Web- ster. I have known him in many capac- ities for many years. He is the pride of our State. I do not know of anyone in the State of Missouri who is more highly thought of than Bill Webster by people who have known him all of his life, people who have known him In every conceivable setting. And so it is with considerable pride that I rise once again to support the nomination of Bill Webster for this latest example of his support and contribution to his country. The PRESIDING OFFICkat. Who yields time? Mr. BOREN. Mr. President. I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Nevada (Mr. Run]. The PRESIDING OFFICER,. The Senator from Nevada is recognized for 4 minutes. Mr. REID. Mr. President, we are asked today to confirm as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Judge William Webster, Judge Webster is an honorable and decent man, and if these were ordinary times, I would probably vote to confirm his nomina- tion, although with some reservations. These are not, however, ordinary times. Once again the CIA has been betrayed by those in the highest corri- dors of power who are charged with maintaining its health. Each week re- veals some new action taken by the former director in direct or implicit contravention of the law and ex- pressed will of Congress. Judge Webster has been presented to us as the physician to cure these Ills. I do not believe he is the man for the job. As things now stand, I do not believe an adequate explanation has been of- fered for the conduct of the Federal Bureau of Investigation while it has sat under Judge Webster's steward- Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/20: CIA-RDP90B00017R000500140004-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/20: CIA-RDP90B00017R000500140004-1 May 19, 1987 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 6719 ship. I do not speak lightly in this vein as one example of this lack of adminis- tratioon is how the FBI has run amok In Nevada, and it did so under the di- rection of William Webster. There remain too many unanswered, unjustified, and =acceptable actions during the tenure of William Webster, and while Joseph Yablonsky served as the FBI agent in charge in Nevada. Use of the Bureau to investigate politi- cal opponents such as Nevada's Repub- lican attorney general is simply im- proper. Use of the Bureau to intimi- date those with whom the agent in charge disagrees, such as former De- tective Chuck Lee. is simply improper. Lee questioned Yablonsky's approach to law enforcement. Yablonsky even placed stakeouts on the movement of respected veteran homicide Detective Robert Hilyard. He even attempted an aborted investigation without founda- tion or substance of former U.S. Sena- tor, Paul Laxalt. He and his lieuten- ants were not above the intimidation and use of IRS agents?one of whom lost a high ranking position with the IRS because of these actions. He even planned and/or condoned the use of a convicted felon and brothel owner to get tainted evidence against others. I want to make it clear that my dis- approval has nothing to do with the guilt or innocence of Harry Claiborne, the Federal judge who claimed he was the victim of FBI persecution in Nevada. Rather. it deals with the still unanswered questions surrounding conduct by Judge Webster's subordi- nates which was nothing short of rep- rehensible: conduct in which they un- questionably harassed decent, law- abiding, and upstanding citizens: con- duct in which they violated the very laws they and Judge Webster had sworn to enforce. Even this past week the story in the Nevada press is that FBI agents have offered to drop dope charges against a private detective if he v ould implicate Clark County Sheriff John Moran and Clark County Public Defender Morgan Harris. William Webster may be a decent and honorable man. But an adminis- trator he is not. William Webster per- mitted the FBI to be used for indecent and dishonorable purposes. He is not the man to cure the CIA of its ills. Rather. I would urge my colleagues to leave him at the FBI, and give him an opportunity to deal with the sickness the Bureau has shown during his tenure. "Physician.- we should say to him, "Go from this house and cure thyself." Only when that sickness has been purged from the FB1 should we permit Judge Webster to accept another pa- tient. WILLIAM H. WEBSTER /CIA DIRECTOR (By request of Mr. Snitesox the fol- lowing statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD:1 Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I am very pleased that the Senate is voting today to confirm William H.. Webster as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. This is a critical position, and a criti- cal period for the Agency. When Judge Webster was nominated to fill this va- cancy, there was an outpouring of praise and approval. Why? Because throughout his many years in public service, as Director of the FBI, as a Federal appeals court judge, a Federal district judge, and U.S. attorney, Wil- liam Webster has established a record of integrity and competence. Today's FBI is a testament to the in- telligent, forward-looking leadership of William Webster, Since 1978. when President Jimmy Carter appointed him, he has guided the Bureau with a steady, sure hand and developed it Into a stable, aggressive, and effective law enforcement agency. Judge Webster is a real professional, who understands the ins and outs of the intelligence community. He has a proven record of dedication and achievement in Government service. And I have no doubt that he will con- tinue that course in his new rule as Di- rector of the CIA. I urge my col- leagues to follow the pattern of the Intelligence Committee, which unani- mously approved this nomination. WILLIAM WEBSTER-A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS Mr. DECONCINI. Mr. President, I know I speak for all Americans when I express my gratitude to Judge William Webster for devoting so much of his career to the judicial system of this country. All of us are indebted to this extraordinary public servant, and all of us have benefited from his service to his country. At a time when its need was great- est, Judge Webster took the helm at the Federal Bureau of Investigation where his leadership made possible the replacement of chaos with stabili- ty; of shattered effectiveness with sig- nificant accomplishment. His keen vision identified weakness and his pre- cision of purpose restored vigor to a beleaguered agency. Under his guidance, the FBI has emerged fully capable of discharging its responsibilities as the Nation's pri- mary criminal investigative agency, one of which all America can be proud. As a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, I have had many occasions during the past decade to become fa- miliar with Judge Webster's high standards, both for himself and for others: with his unassailable personal integrity and with his strength of character as he directed the FBI on a steady course. Once again, I was privileged to sit on the committee charged with consider- ation of Judge Webster's nomination. The Intelligence Committee conducted comprehensive and exhaustive confir- mation hearings which scrutinzed Judge Webster's fitness for the posi- tion of Director of Central Intelli- gence. Throughout this thorough and sometimes grueling review of his record at the FBI, Judge Webster dis- played, with unflappable patience, his solid qualifications for the job. In an expression of its support for his nomi- nation, the Intelligence Committee unanimously voted to confirm Judge Webster as Director of Central Intelli- gence. No less a challenge awaits the next Director of Central Intelligence than that which greeted William Webster at the FBI 10 years ago. In order to re- store stability and effectiveness to the intelligence community the new Direc- tor of the CIA will have to blend judi- ciously the four components of intelli- gence, analysis, counterintelligence, espionage, and covert action, to create a combination best suited to form the structure on which this country's for- eign policy can be forged and its de- fenses built to deflect threats from outside forces. In these times of dimin- ished resources hard choices must be made. I am confident that as Director William Webster will make those choices which will accurately reflect our national priorities. At a time when it is imperative to remove politics from decision making in the intelligence community, mem- bers of the Intelligence Committee were reassured by Judge Webster that he would continue to maintain his apolitical posture, but would make cer- tain he met with the President often so that he could give him his unvar- nished views. He also pledged to the committee that he would inform Congress of covert activities in a timely manner, adding. "Any project that cannot sur- vive congressional notification is sus- pect from the beginning." Judge Web- ster buttressed that statement with his declaration that "I believe the Di- rector of the CIA clearly has an obli- gation of trust- to the Senate and to this committee." Mutual trust and cooperation be- tween the CIA and the Congress arc- the ingredients required to reinforce the structure on which sound intelli- gence policy is constructed. Judge Webster in his guarantee that he would resign if the President withheld notification of a covert operation to the Congress told the committee, '1 would have to advise the President of my position on this and if he would not offer to speak to you, I would have to leave." As the country recovers from some of the most serious foreign policy blunders in its history, carried out by those without respect for the law or the will of the American people, it is important to know that in William Webster we have a man who has dedi- cated most of his life to the law and can be counted on to continue that commitment and to serve the Ameri- can people to the best of his uncom- mon ability. Just as Judge Webster responded to his country's call 10 years ago to re- store order to an organization stand- ing in tarnished disarray, his country Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/20: CIA-RDP90B00017R000500140004-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/20: CIA-RDP90B00017R000500140004-1 S 6720 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE May 19, 1987 is again asking him to fill another leadership role. This time at the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency, where, I am certain. he will answer this call by fin- parting his own high standards to that organization. Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. President, Wil- liam H. Webster has had a long and distinguished career of service as a U.S. attorney in St. Louis, as a U.S. district judge, and as judge on the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. He has served 9 years as Director of the FBI. He is not a stranger to us here in the Senate; we have confirmed him three times for positions requiring the high- est degree of integrity and ability. He has appeared before the Select Committee on Intelligence many times, and we know him well. As FBI Director he has been inti- mately involved inthe intelligence ac- tivities of the U.S. Government, and has served as Chairman of the Work- ing Group on Counterintelligence and as a member of the Special Interagen- cy Group on Intelligence. In the course of its hearings on this nomination, the Select Committee on Intelligence conducted three open hearings totaling almost 11 hours over 3 days, plus two closed sessions on matters that were deemed too sensi- tive for public discussion. Judge Webster has answered ques- tions on every conceivable subject re- lating to his conduct as FBI Director, to the activities of the FBI while he has served as Director, and on the manner in which he would conduct himself as Director of Central Intelli- gence. Following these hearings the Com- mittee voted unanimously, 15 to 0 to recommend that Judge Webster be confirmed by the Senate. The position of DCI is one of the most sensitive and important positions In Federal Government. This country has been without a per- manent DCI since William Casey was hospitalized some months ago. It is vital that we fill this position, and I am pleased that someone of Judge Webster's stature?someone who had certainly earned the right to retire with honors if he had chosen to do so?has agreed to accept the nomi- nation. CONTIRMATION OT WILLIAM WEBSTER AS DIRECTOR Of CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE Mr. DURENBERGER. Mr. Presi- dent, I am pleased to rise today to sup- port the confirmation of William H. Webster to be the 14th Director of Central Intelligence. Judge Webster faces formidable tasks in this position. Perhaps most important is to renew leadership of the intelligence commu- nity that the Congress and the Ameri- can people can trust. I spent 8 years on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the last 2 as chairman. I saw first hand how the responsibilities of the intelligence community have changed in the 1980's. The threats we expect our in- telligence agencies to deal with include state-sponsored terrorism, narcotics Interdiction, and technology security. As our expectations for the intelli- gence community increased, it was in- evitable that new lines of authority and accountability would have to be established. Congressional oversight has played an integral role in the development of new lines of accountability. The Intel- ligence Oversight Act of 1980 estab- lished precise notification procedures In order that Congress could properly exercise its constitutional oversight role. Oversight of sensitive intelligence operations involves the intelligence community, which must operate in secret if it is to be effective, and the Congress, which is accustomed to open debate and public dialog. Congressional Oversight of Intelli- gence has evolved considerably since it was formalized in the 1970's?and it will continue to evolve to meet the new intelligence challenges of the late 20th century. But oversight is a proc- ess that depends on people to make it work. It involves trust among the par- ties. Congressional oversight is a form of a social contract which must have commitment from both parties if it is to work effectively. We have witnessed what can happen when the process breaks down. The select committee hearings have heard detailed testimony, amplifying the tes- timony heard by the Senate Intelli- gence Committee last fall, which lays out how a private covert action network was established to circumvent the re- quirements of the 1980 Intelligence Oversight Act. Many have been quick to proclaim that oversight failed in the wake of the Iran-Contra affair. But this view reveals a lack of understanding about what oversight can and cannot do. Oversight can impart the wisdom of the Senate into the intelligence proc- ess. Oversight can argue for larger in- telligence budgets to meet the new threats of the 1980's. And oversights can help to improve the quality of in- telligence when it focuses on the intel- ligence process. Oversight cannot, however, prevent determined people from evading or cir- cumventing the law of our Nation. Oversight did not fail in the Iran- Contra affair?certain individuals in the administration failed to live up to their responsibilities to keep Congress adequately and fully informed of all significant intelligence activities. This was a failure of people not of the proc- ess. Some have tried to argue that Con- gress could not be trusted to keep such Important secrets as the Iran initia- tive. I have never understood why Ira- nian mullahs and middlemen like Gor- banifar were more trustworthy than the elected representatives of the American people. As the hearings in- vestigating the Iran-Contra affair pro- ceed, it is becoming increasingly clear that Congress was not informed be- cause Congress disagreed with trading arms for hostages, disagreed with ne- gotiations with a terrorist state, and disagreed with the administration's approach to Nicaragua. In fact, the track record of the intel- ligence committees keeping secrets is very good. Under my direction. the Senate Intelligence Committee under- took a study of published media ac- counts which revealed secret informa- tion and relied on leaks for such infor- mation. The result of our study were informative: 147 stories were found in a period of 151 days. Of the 147 stories only 13, or 9 percent, cited congres- sional sources and none were attrib- uted to the Intelligence Committee. Over 90 percent of the leaks came from the executive branch. I think these results show far better than any- thing else just how specious the argu- ment that "Congress cannot be trust- ed because it leaks" is. The problem is simply a lack of trust on the part of officials that were de- termined to pursue their goals irre- gardless of the will of Congress. The answer is not to pass further restric- tive legislation?the answer is to re- build the trust relationship that is so necessary for oversight to work. I have long argued that the proce- dures governing oversight of the intel- ligence community are sound and not in need of revision. Judge Webster has a tremendous opportunity to revitalize relations between the intelligence community and Congress. I believe that he will do just that. Throughout his long and distinguished career, Judge Webster has shown himself to be a dedicated and honest public serv- ant. I look forward to his confirma- tion. Mr. President, I ask uiiathous con- sent that an article by former Director of Central Intelligence, Stansfield Turner, be entered into the RECORD. Admiral Turner's article, in the form of an open letter to Judge Webster, offers much that all future DCI's should take to heart. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: [Prom the New York Times, Mar. 13, 1987) A LETTER TO WILLIAM H. WEBSTER (By Stansfield Turner) WASHINGTON.?Dear Bill. Thanks for being willing to take the job at the Central Intelli- gence Agency. The nation needs you there badly. There will likely be months of diffi- cult investigations ahead, but I would like to suggest that there can be opportunity in the adversity. So many mistakes have been made in the past few years in and around the White House and the C.I.A. that the President has agreed to make radical changes in the way he uses the C.I.A. That will help you im- measurably. Witness two excerpts from his talk to the nation March 1: "I am also determined to make the Con- gressional oversight process work. Proper procedures for consultation with the Con- gress will be followed, not only in the letter but in the spirit. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/20: CIA-RDP90B00017R000500140004-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/20: CIA-RDP90B00017R000500140004-1 ay 19, 1987 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE "I've also direeted that any covert activity be in suprkrt of clear policy objectives and in compliance with American values. I expect a covert policy that if Americans saw It on the front page of their newpaper. they'd say. "That makes sense." The Administration has previosuly resist- ed these policies strongly. The C.I.A. has re- sisted them from time to time. External forces, though, have made such policies in- evitable. Congressional oversight, for in- stance. is the result of the greater and greater democratization of American life since you and I entered Amherst College in 1941. We are much less willing today to yield to authority just because it is author- ity. You and I have come to see the tradi- tional power of committee chairmen in Con- gress watered down, junior officers in the military daring to ask why they are doing what they are doing and factory workers ad- vising management. From the 1940's to the 60s, almost no one outside the C.I.A. sought a say in what was going on inside that secret organization. The public accepted that as a necessary price of the cold war, and the Congress obliged by providing money with few ques- tions asked. By the late 60's, the Congress began to worry about the C.I.A.'s secret ac- tivities. In 1974, it passed the Hughes-Ryan Amendment requiring that Congress be in- formed when the C.I.A. undertook covert actions. A year later, it ordered a halt to a covert action in Angola. That same year brought the Church com- mittee, whose investigations revealed that unaccountable power can lead to mistakes. The Congress decided that we could not have any unaccoutable agency of Govern- ment, not even our most secret intelligence organization. From 1977 to 1981, we worked to make Congressional oversight compatible with se- crecy. It quickly became clear that you must have good will and trust on both sides to do that. Without trust, the Congress may insist on knowing details that could endanger the lives of agents or other secrets, and without good will the C.I.A. cannot win the support from Congress that it needs. In their concern for secrecy, Pregident Reagan and former Director William J. Casey told the intelligence committees as little as possible. The most obvious damage was that the Administration had neither the advice of the Congress on the Iran hos- tage swap nor its support. What you now face is the possibility of new laws requiring such full disclosure that you might feel in- hibited from conducting some sensitive op- erations. Building on Mr. Reagan's pledge to make oversight work, however, you can restore confidence and trust. The Congress would prefer this, I believe, but you will have to persuade Congress that secrecy is not being abused. There will always be some resist- ance from C.I.A. professionals to sharing in- formation with the Congress. Espionage and covert action have traditionally been viewed in the C.I.A. as unique undertakings that demand extraordinary secrecy. There is probably nowhere in our Government where so much secrecy in justifiable. We have just seen, though, where excess secre- cy can have disastrous results. The paranoia with which Vice Adm. John M. Poindexter and Lt. Col. Oliver L. North divided up information and limited its distri- bution on the grounds of secrecy is just what did them in. President Reagan's pledge on covert ac- tions should also help. His conversion here comes from having been burned four times by covert actions that the public rejected: the mining of Nicaragua's harbors, publica- tion of a manual for the contras that ap- peared to Condone assassination, support Of antiterrorist actions by Lebanese intelle- gence that got out of the C.I.A.'s control and resulted in some 80 innocent deaths, and the anus deliveries to Iran. None of these passed the verdict of "makes sense." It is also very difficult to keep a covert action covert if it does not make sense. Under the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, you must obtain Presidential approval and notify the Congress of all covert actions. There are bound to be leaks. This means that we have forsaken the ability to under- take covert actions that would not be ac- cepted by the public. The President, in effect, acknowledged that he is now willing to accept that. It is not a high price to pay, because it would be contrary to the spirit of our consti- tutional process to carry out foreign policies in secret that the public and Congress would not accept if known and also because the scope for covert action has narrowed re- markably in the past 20 years, especially ac- tions to change the political complexion of other countries. For instance, in 1954 Dwight D. Eisenhow- er decided that he did not like the Guate- malan Government. The C.I.A. with not much more than radios broadcasting reports of the movements of nonexistent troops. helped "our man" into office. That policy would probably not work today because communications are too good in most coun- tries for such deception to deceive. Tomor- row, when commercial photographic satel- lites are more broadly available, it will be even more difficult. Convert action has an important niche, but it is a more narrow one than we previously thought. Finally. what I found perhaps most dis- turbing in the Tower commission report was the evidence that some C.I.A. people were out of control: responding to Colonel North's request for covert help without proper authorization; treading close to, if not over, the law in assisting the contras, and submitting statements that have proved to be false. The people in the C.I.A. are among the very best in our Government, but the pres- sures to which we subject them are unique. A few of them may go wrong from time to time. Given the present environment, you have a marvelous opportunity to establish a more careful management system. In short, this time of trouble is also a time of opportunity to cement the President's pledges and to assert a greater degree of control at the C.I.A. Both are overdue?and both are essential. Mr. DIXON. Mr. President, I have known Bill Webster personally for a long time. Since our days together at law school at Washington University, I have never doubted my friend's hones- ty, his integrity, or his unswerving commitment to what is right and fair in Government. William Webster is committed to good government. He cares deeply about what this Nation stands for, and I sincerely believe this commitment will be reflected as he serves the American people in his capacity as Di- rector of Central Intelligence. Mr. President, this country needs a man of William Webster's character to lead its intelligence apparatus, a vital tool of U.S. foreign policy. It is unfor- tunate that this crucially important Government agency has suffered a loss of credibility. Its role in American foreign policy is too vital. S 6721 For these reasons, I believe the Senate should unanimously advise and consent to the nomination of William Webster to be Director of Centra/ In- telligence. This agency deserves a com- mitment to professionalism and excel- lence from its Director. Judge Webster offers this commitment. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? Mr. BOREN. Mr. President, I yield 4 minutes to the Senator from Montana (Mr. MELcHE111. Mr. MELCHER. Mr. President, when people of my generation first became aware of the Federal Bureau of Inves- tigation it was during the bank rob- bery days in the early thirties and the apprehension and disposal of Dil- linger. And in the later time the FBI inves- tigation of organized crime drew the attention of the public, and perhaps many of the public are aware of the FBI's work on income tax evasion, but there are also some duties that the FBI has in connection with Indian res- ervations and the major crimes that are committed on Indian reservations. It is a requirement of law that the FBI investigate on Indian reservations. The special duties of the FBI on Indian reservations in Montana caused me to write late in 1985, in November specifically, to the special agent in charge in Butte, MT, about crime on Montana reservations. I received a re- sponse from the FBI, in fact from the Director, Judge Webster, in February 1986, and it was a resume of what was occurring. Might I point out that part of that response was that on the Blackfeet Indian Reservation in Montana, just ?one -of our reservations, there were 99 major crimes with three convictions. This was during a period between June 30, 1983, until August 1, 1985. And those crimes involved death or se- rious bodily injury or other personal crimes of violence like kidnapping or assault, rape, or robbery, and so forth. Ninety-nine investigations to three convictions seemed to demonstrate the point that the investigations of these major crimes were not resulting in sig- nificant amounts of convictions. I had not been informed of significant im- provement since that date in 1985. Not much happened that I was aware of during my recent discussions with Judge Webster over the past several weeks. I have emphasized my concerns that crime on many Indian reserva- tions in Montana was not under con- trol. He has brought me up to date on some improvement, and I am pleased to say that. But there is still lack of at- tention. Judge Webster, in a letter to me today outlined the steps that the Federal Bureau of Investigation will take in trying to get better control over crime on Indian reservations. At the heart of this was a discussion of the reorganization of the FBI in the Montana and Idaho division. Judge Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/20: CIA-RDP90600017R000500140004-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/20 : CIA-RDP90B00017R000500140004-1 6722 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE Webster has also. in light ed all this se- rious concern, reennunented that ?there be a reassessment cof the studies that have gone on since 1984 about FBI reorganization. I am pleased that Judge Webster has set the course for the FBI over 'the next several months in looking Into these problems in depth and attempt- ing to get better coordination between the various agencies that are responsi- ble for law enforcement on Indian res- ervations. He will also recommend that during the reassessment period, that the FBI will consult with Mon- tana and Idaho Senators and Con- gressmen. State, local, and Indian offi- cials, and civic leaders. This approach Is needed and the coordination of all law enforcement offices is essentiaL Butte has been the location of the special agent in charge for the divi- sion. It is a proper geographic location and the essential work of adequate in- vestigation and preparation of cases has been successfully carried out in the past in the two States. Coordinat- ing the work of FBI and other law en- forcement agencies can be greatly im- proved, but it depends more an the work on the ground where the crimes are committed, than where the invi- sion headquarters are located. The problem is not Butte. It is the lack of -coordination. Today's letter from Judge Webster commits the necessary effort to get on top of the problems. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent to have printed in the Haeolle my letter to the special agent in charge, dated November 1985, and the re- sponse by Judge Webster in February 1986, with attached documents, as well as Judge Webster's letter of today and documents that are attached to it. There being no objection, the mate- rial was ordered to be printed in the RecORD, as follows: VS. DEPARTwarn or Jcsascs. FEDERAL BUREAU or lintermation. Washington, DC. February 4. 1988. BOR.-MAWR ANDREWS, Chairman, Select Committee on /iodide df - faits, ELS comet% Washington, DC. Darn Ma. Cadman, I sin writing in re- ationse to the November 22, 1985, letter from Senator John Meicher to Special Agent in Charge William Fallin of our Butte Office regarding the Senator's concerns about the effectiveness of law enforcement of Indian reservations in Montana. The fol- lowing comments concerning the FBI's rote In Federal law enforcement on Indian reser- vations in Montana -relate directly to Sena- tor Melchees six questions: L The Butte FBI Office has overall re- sponsibility for the investigation of Crimes on Indian Reservations (CIR) in Montana. The office consists of a complement of seven Special Agents, a Special Agent in Charge and an Assistant Special Agent in Charge. The Butte Office is responsible for the administration of +debt satellite offices in Montana known as Resident Agencies (HA). five of which are responsible for CIR matters. Theme RAs are located in Cut Bank (2 Agents). Great Falls (3 Agents). Glasgow (2 Agents), Missoula (3 Agents) and Billings (5 Agents). The three additional RAs are lo- cated in Helena (2 Agents), Bozeman (2 Agents) and Kalispell (2 Agents). & lindlostare I sets Tenth inornell ItAs that serve Indian teservattons in Montana and The distance between eaeli RA and his- wanton. Drielosure 2 Dots the disitance be- tween our butte Office and each res- ervation adtliln Its resporisnAllty. At the present time, my associates are cad/a/rang a proposal submitted by Special Agent In Charge Falba to ander* the three- Agent complement in Great Palls to two Agents, said to reestablish the RA at Havre with one Agent. Under this prepense the Havre RA would handle Investigative mat- ters In Liberty County, Hill County, Blaine County and at the Fort Belknap and Rocky Boy Indian Reservations. This new change would afford our assigned Agent immediate access to Fort Belknap (50 miles) and Rocky Boy (25 miles). 3-5. Refer to enclosure & which is a two- year statistical analysis of CHL cases opened by our Butte Office from June 80, 1983, through October 8, 1985. Listed declinations are based upon U.S. Attorney guidelines. 6. The FBI's working relationship with Montana tribal and Bureau of Indian Af- fairs (BIA) offices is projected toward the eventual nationwide shifting of the FBI's primary investigative responsibiBties for law eriforeesnient on Indian reservations to the HU. Department of the Interior (DOI), and the tribal police. during the past five years, extensive efforts have been implemented to accomplish this goal, which has been the policy of the Department of Justice since 1980. This policy encourages U.S. Attorneys having jutisdiction over Indian triatters to utilize the investigative services of tribal and DIA police as a means toward Indian self-determinaiton. It is currently published in the United States Attorneys Manual, and reads as follows: 9-20.145 INVESTIGATIVE JURISDIC- TION. 'The fin has investigative jurisdiction over Uolatiors of 18 U.S.C. 1152 and 1153. Frequently by the time the MU wives an the reservation some investigation will have been undertaken by tribal or Bureau of Incline Affairs (BIA) police. it is recogaized that the ability of the tribal mid Bee police can wary from naservatiow to tn.-serve/ion, and United States Attorneys are free to ask far FBI investigation in all eases Where It is telt that such is requried. However, United States Attorneys are ericoaraged and au- thorized to accept investigative reports di- rectly from trent' or BIA police and prepare a case for prosecution without FBI investi- gation to all eases where you feel a suff - dent investigation can be undertaken by BIA or tribal law enforcement officers." In spite of the implementation of this De- partmental policy, the .F131 continues to -conduct the majority of the investigations of major criminal offenses that occur on Indian reservations. In various conferences, meetings and seminars with U.S. Attorneys and -FBI officials, it has been determined that a variety of concerns have been ex- pressed in regard to transferring investiga- tive responsibilities in all major felonies to the Bill and tribal police. Among the con- cerns voiced is the importance of uniformity In delivering law enforcement services to The Indian people, the timeliness and thor- oughness of investigation, the reporting of investigation for prosecutive consideration, and the ability to Provide coverage of out- trfetate tends when the BIA =munes the in- vestigative responsiblities. Some U.S. Attor- neys have indicated that they had net been satisfied with BIA's investigative response on cases currently within WA's jurisdiction and did not favor a blanket transfer of re- sponsibilities. The US. Attorneys also ques- tioned the sufficiency of the manpower pool May 19, 198' -available to DIA to handle e Isig.h volume of tirvestigatiore. Consideration is presently being even to exploring the possibility of extending to the WA and other tribal police departments ju- risdiction for negligent homicide Investiga- thms. Should such extensions take place, the FBI will follow each of those investiga- tions with the respective agencies. ft should be noted that there will be no transition of law enforcement from the FBI to the Indian police until the Indian police develop a career-type law enforcement serv- ice with officers who can practice the law enforcement skills that they are taught and become expert in them. The rapid turnover of officers in the Indian police ranks is a detriment to the effectiveness of Indian police organizations and must be addressed as a number one priority prior to placing undue emphasis on removing the FBI horn Its law enforcement responsibilities on Indian land. The FBI has attended various meetings with Department of Interior (DOI) officials in efforts to expedite the shifting of the FBI's role on reservations to the BIA. The DOI has a Division of Law Enforcement Services (DLES) BLit, which does not have line authority or control of BIA Investiga- tors on reservations. The B1A Investigators are directed by nonlaw enforcementerained personnel. At the present time, if the Chief of the DLES desires any action to be taken on a reservation. he mast request this action through the BIA area Superintendent (not law enforcement trained), who then passes this request on to the Reservation Superin- tendent (not 1RW enforcement trained) to determine if he desires this action to take place. Due to this type of arrangement, the BIA DLES has been hampered at times in executing its responsibilities. The BIA is assigned one FBI National Academy (NA) student position M each of the four classes trained annually at the FBI Academy at Quantico, Virginia. During 1962, three student positions viere filled; in 1963, lour student positions were filled: in 1984, four positions were filled; and km 1985, three positions were filled by BIA students. It should be noted that Indian tribal police officers are allowed to attend the Treasury Department's consolidated Federal Law En- forcement Training Center, IBYRCO, Geor- gia. Coordination for this training Is han- dled by the BIA. The FBI has conducted numerous local Indian Training Schools for BIA and tribal police in the areas of report writing, investi- gative techniques, crime-scene search and 'evidence preservation. The total Fiscal Year BIA and Indian training statistics sponsored by the FBI for 1982 there were 29 schools 'with 516 attendees; Fiscal Year 1983 there were 33 schools with 693 attendees; Fiscal Year 1984 there were 33 schools with '752 at- tendees; and Fiscal Year 1985 there were 18 schools with 442 attendees. In December, 1985. our Butte Office conducted a three- day Basic Law Enforcement Techniques Training Session in Browning, Montana, for 20 WA and tribal police. This type of training continues to en- hance the professional capabilities of BIA and tribal officers. As their professional qualifications are enhanced, the quality of work that they produce will also improve, and we would expect subsequently the U.S. Attorneys will come to rely more and more on their invesigative efforts. In addition to the training given to the BIA and the Indian law enforcement com- munity, the FBI has also conducted two sep- arate cross-cultural Indian seminars for FBI Special Agents working primarily Indian matters. Instructors and guest speakers tn- Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/20: CIA-RDP90B00017R000500140004-1 of 10 he IU- ra- ce, DO BI ee kw rid PT a an rag al Dn gs its tie nt 're ,'a- rs ,sC1 ref 4.1 n. to Si s. I. ci Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/20: CIA-RDP90B00017R000500140004-1 May 19, 1987 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE S 6723 eluded prominent Individuals from the Indian community and the BIA. TheiFBI presently supports the Montana MA and tribal police through training and during their investigations offers guidance and counseling. as well as the services of the 7131 Laboratory and Identification Divi- sions. The FBI will continue in this regard In the event these agencies assume full re- sponsibility for all investigations on Indian reservations. Continued coordination by the FBI with leaders of the Indian community on matters of mutual interest is a priority matter to me. In this regard, as recently as October 28, 1985, Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) Allan E. Meyer, Unit Chief. General Crimes Section, Criminal Investigative Division, FBI Headquarters, attended and participat- ed in the ninth Inter-American Indian Con- ference held in Santa Fe, New Mexico. This forum presented an excellent opportunity for SSA Meyer to discuss several of the pre- viously mentioned matters, and by so doing, open additional lines of communication With other attendees. I trust that the above information will be of assistance to you and the Committee members. Sincerely yours. WILLIAM H. WEBSTER, Director. RESERVATION/RA COVERING RESERVATION Blackfeet/Cut Bank. Rocky Boy/Great Falls. Fort Belitna.p/Glasgow. Fort Peck/Glasgow. Flathead/Missoula, Crow/Billings. Northern Cheyenne/Billings. DISTANCE BETWEEN RA AND RESERVATION Blackfeet/Cut Bank: Browning-35 miles. East Glacier-48 miles. St. Mary-57 (appx). Heart Butte-55 (appx). Rocky Boy/Great Falls: Rocky Boy-93(aPPk). Iiavre-113 miles. Box Elder-91 (appa). --Fort Belknap/Glasgow: ? Fort Belknap?I 22 miles. Hays?I52 (appa). Lodge Pole-142 (appx). Harlem-135 (appx). Port Peck/Glasgow: Fort Peck-22 (appal. Poplar-70 miles. Wolf Point-49 miles. -Flathead/Missoula: Polson-66 miles. Crow/Billings: Crow Agency-57 (appx). Lodge Grass-79 (appa). Pr3'or-25 (appa). Hardin-46 miles. Northern Cheyenne/Billings: Lame Deer-103 (appx). U.S. SENATE, SELECT COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, Washington, DC, November 22, 1985. Mr. W. D. FALL'S, Special Agent in Charge, U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Butte, MT. DF.AR MR. FALUN, I have longstanding con- cerns about the effectiveness of law enforce- ment on Indian reservations in Montana. I am contacted frequently by Indian and non- Indian constituents who feel that the atten- tion and services provided by Federal law enforcement officers and prosecutors on Indian reservations in Montana are inad- equate. In order to better understand the Federal law enforcement situation on Indian reser- vations in Montana. I would like you to pro- vide me with the following information: 1. the location of the FBI field offices in Montana and the number of agents in each field office; 2. which field offices serve Indian reserva- tions in Montana and the distance between each field office and the reservation it serves: S. for each of the last five years. how many cases did the FBI investigate on each reservation in Montana (please break out by year. by reservation, and by the type of crime): 4. For each of the last five years, provide the number and type of cases, broken out by reservation. investigated by the FBI which were (a) submitted to the U.S. Attorney for prosecution: and (b) prosecuted in Federal Court. For those cases prosecuted, please in- dicate the final disposition: 5. for each of the last five years, provide the number and type of cases, broken out by reservation, which were submitted to the U.S. Attorney for prosecution and declined. Please indicate the reason for declination by the Attorney; 6. please describe the nature of the FBI's working relationship with the Tribal and Bureau of Indian Affairs enforcement offi- cers on each Indian reservation in Montana.. Include in this description any informal or formal arrangements between the FBI and reservation law enforcement that facilitates the investigation of federal crimes on the reservations in Montana. I appreciate a prompt response to this re- quest. Best regards. Sincerely, JoHle MELcaER, DISTANCE BETWEEN ROM CENTRAL orrica AND RESERVATION Blackfeet: Browning-238 miles. East Glacier-251 miles. St. Mary-260 (appx). Heart Butte-218 (appal. Rocky BOY: Havre-266 miles. Box Elder-244 (appx). Fort Belknap-315 miles: Hays-348 (appx), Harlem-310 miles. Lodge Pole-355 (appx). Fort Peck: Poplar-494 miles. Wolf Point-473 miles. Flathead: Poison-185 miles Crow: Crow Agency-367 (appx). Lodge Grass-389 (appx). Pryor-335 (appa). Hardin-269 miles Northern Cheyenne: Lame Deer-413 (appa).. JUNE 30, 1983 TO AUGUST 1, 1985 Iteservabor a a rases r.,,,,,,r4m/1" cases,. Total rases/ by offense convictions ofteme thecae,/ '1981-99 3 181/9 C-I? 6 1911-21 '2 61/2 B-1 0 C-2I 0-5 0 Fort Belknap 1984-19 1 45/2 C-25 0-1 1..._................. Fon Peck 1984-54 16 i9 C-50 Rathead 198C-5 0 6/1 0-1 1 ........._ Crow 1981-21 3 . 51/3 B-1 JUNE 30, 1983 TO AUGUST 1, 1985?Continued leseratim No al coos "II (I/ ma Towr oftw omacted convicurs' C-27 0 0-1 0 Where Demme. 1984-39 I 53/8 C-13 3 0-1 1 . 49/ 74 491/74 ? Carat Descriphoe Crime on Mat Ilesavave heath a wan oratty Mon and other primal cram al mance, it. 0?g. gout rapt nthin"Y. etc ? 198A Crow N Indan Besenabas?Olher persoral arves-1988 Came o4 Indian Reservation?At property ernes-198C Crime on India tesavalta?Embeniement aft!, trawl amivtag tribal Iona-198D I One ovaietheanor. Cases closed by declination Blackfoot 54 Rocky Boy 18 Fort Belknap 20 Fort Peck 25 Flathead Crow 12 Northern Cheyenne 25 Total 154 U.S. DEPARTMENT or JusTicx, FEDERAL BITRILAT/ OF INVESTIGATION. Washington, DC, May 19, 1987. Hon. Joifs MELCHER, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. DEAR SENATOR MELCHER: I appreciate very much the opportunity to discuss the law en- forcement situation in Montana and espe- cially the management of our Butte Divi- sion, which encompasses both Montana and Idaho. This is. of course, a continuation of our previous discussions and correspondence and of the briefing provided to you by Exec- utive Assistant Director John Glover, First, I understand your deeply felt con- cern that there be more effective law en- forcement on the Indian Reservations and I agree that greater effort should be made to Improve the combined effectiveness of the law enforcement agencies involved in this effort. I believe that significant progress has been made, as reflected in our current sta- tistics, but recognize that other agencies are also involved and other statistics may vary from ours. The FBI will undertake to see what additional means are available within the law enforcement community, including the FBI, to improve coordination on the res- ervations and will fully support your efforts in this regard. Second, I know that you understand my desire to improve the management of our field offices, especially those offices with significant numbers of resident agencies scattered throughout large territories. The Attorney General has been furnished with a number of studies and recommendations that have been made dating back to 1984. None of these studies or recommendations suggest any diminution in the investigative strength of the FBI currently assigned to our Butte Division. In fact, in recent years there has been a significant increase in the division's target staffing level. I have previ- ously assured you that I would not under- take to dictate a decision during the time I remained in office should the Senate con- firm my nomination as Director of Central Intelligence. That has been, and will contin- ue to be the case. Because of your deep concern, and in def- erence also to Senator Baucus, I will recom- mend that a reassessment of the accumulat- ed studies be made under the direction of our Inspection Division and that the new Director and the Attorney General take no Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/20: CIA-RDP90B00017R000500140004-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/20: CIA-RDP90B00017R000500140004-1 S 6724 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE action on this matter until a more current assessakeit los 'been amailleted. I loll also recommend that all of the Senators and Congressmen .from Montana and Idaho, as well as other Mate, local and tribal officials and civic leaders be consulted and their views incorporated in the assessment. Final- ly, I'm certain that the Attorney General and/or the new Director will discuss their final conclusions with you at the appropri- ate time. I believe all of the above is in accordance with our discussions and I trust will be sans- factory to you. With best wishes, Sincerely. Wttutst B. WEBSTER, Director CV* ON INDIAN RESERVATION 198 CLASSIFICATION AICOMPLISHMENTS Set Um- sibents mem aid -inform toss Renal skews Aunt Says fiscal sex 1987 (10 OD) 13 16 65 1412 21 1 45 21 BUTTE'S PECENTAGE OF TOTAL litIREAti PTDs Commit iSrs frets somietla 2621 pa, 24 (55) 23(781) 16 (123P( 1986 _ 16 (105) 21(398) 12 (178) 1167 (le 69) 6 43/ 3 (36) i12 rift M461) Fguies P purstheses aselareau lot*, IMES DO qentfmg DO cars tzses lesimmt noir OM d ao ePestif fer Es* 1987 (1st 102 137 JIB 303 142 269 719 SO 131 100 BUTTES PERCENT OF =Ai 13UREAD OD CARS *ening tecoet Dosed of year Pad Se (564) 26 (1160) 96 (751) 14 173) 291119811.1-0 f, is t9131 17 (1076) r (13n) 16 4672) 15 (677) 21 4284) 17 (1118) 166223) CRIME ON INDIAN RESERVATION DEATH OR SERIOUS 1300ILY INJURY Com- *its Warw. Ion and toravi:- *rests Isms romig 1986. 8987 4201418)?__ 31 45 4 .17 10e18 UI 9898 .844log fly 00 uses 431oses wind done 1147 19I6 _ 1W (131 00) 049 .1.14 30 132 227 29 316 Si 51 Mr. BAUCUS. Mr. President, I am pleased that 'FBI =recta: WMIszo Webster has assured Senator Marcum and myself that the Bureau's Butte. 'MT division office will r?ri Butte, pending a study of FBI oper- ations on the division's Indian reserva- tions. The Butte FBI office has a distin- guished record of effectiveness. This effectiveness is enhanced by Butte's central location, conveniPtit to Mon- tana's and Idaho's Indian reservations, where many of the Bureau's investiga- tions are conducted The Butte -office also contributes substantially to the local eonununity, esnploying approximately RV People. These jobs are important to Butte, a community rich in history, but more recently hit hard by the downturn 'in the natural resource industry. I am confident that when the FBI completes Its study of Bureau -oper- ations on Indian reservations, it will become clear that Butte Is the be !ro- tation for coordinating investigations on these reservations. I thank Mr. Webster lor bls thoughtfulness In calling Icw this study and I anxiously await its recom- mendations. Mr. BOREN. Mr. President, bow much time remains to this side? The PRESIDING OFFICER. Two minutes and fifteen seconds. Mr. BOREN. Mr. President, at this time, in case other members of the committee appear, I reserve the re- mainder of my time. Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, hew much time remains on this aide? The PRESIDING OFFICER. Four minutes and seventeen seconds. Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, ca Kay 1, 1987, the Senate Intelligence 'Com- mittee voted 15-0 to report 4favnra'b1y to the Senate on the nomin' atkm of Judge William H. Webster be Direc- tor of Central Intelligence. This unan- imous vote came after extensive delib- erations on his qualifications for the position. The committee's inquiry focused on questions regarding Judge Webster's conception of the role of the DCI, his views on the congressional oversight process, and his record as Director of the Federal Bureau of investigation. We paid particular attention?both in open and closed hearings?to several issues which relate to matters current- ly being investigated by the select con- gressional committees and the inde- pendent counsel. Judge Webster has responded under oath, both orally and In written form, to all of the terseons submitted to him by the committee relevant to these issues. Based on our inquiry and those responses, I feel it imperative that the Senate confirm him as expeditiously as possible. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence community at large have been without a permanent Direc- tor since William Casey was hospital- ized last December. While Robert Gates, his former deputy. has served May 14 1.987 admirably as Acting Director through these difficult times, a position as crit- ical to the Nation as the Directorship of Central Intelligente carmot be al- lowed to languish unoccupied. The chaos which has characterized some elements of this country's na- tional security apparatus has been chronicled almost daily since last No- vember in the press, ;n the proceed- ings of select congrestional vornroit- tees and through the wort of the inde- pendent counsel. The Senate Intelli- gence Committee undertook the initial Inquiry into the Iran-Contra affair in full knowledge of the contributions in- belligence activities make to the for- mation and implementation of United States, foreign, and defense policies. The importance of maintaining a con- gruence between the foreign policy goals of the country, as articulated by the administration and in laws passed by Congress, and the execution of those policies by the iritelligence com- munity lies at the heart of intelligence oversight. It is for precisely this reason that we conducted exhaustive interrogation of candidates for the position of DCL It was clear that a complete and public disclosure of all matters which might be relevant to the tenure of the Office was in order. Investigating committees of the past have been criticized for putting too much information relating to the conduct of covert operations before the public, and in so doing, causing irreparable damage to the process by which the Nation safe- guards its security. It is a criticism which expresses a fundamental insen- sitivity to the needs of a democracy and underestimates the wisdom of the people, in whose hands the strength of the Nation ultimately rests. Secrecy can find Us proper function in a democracy only to the extent that It is used to accomplish goals and poll cies expressed through democratic legal processes and is limited by the bounds of the constitutional frame- work. In many ways, entrusting the leadership of an agency whose man- date is to support policy through secret means is the most delicate of all Executive appointments. for any abuse of the position carries catastrophic po- tential for our sometimes precarious system of checks and balances. It is for this reason that the commit- tee had to seek Judge Webster's firm pledge to abide by the legislation gov- erning the oversight of intelligence, and for this reason that his reactions to a seemingly endless stream of docu- ments and press reports detailing alle- gations of impropriety by the Bureau or ether Government entities had to be examined in full view of the public. If the CIA and other agencies of the Intelligence community are to retain support for their activities in the aftermath of the investigative process- es which are currently underway, they must be visibly occupied with the busi- ness of correcting past excesses. The Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/20: CIA-RDP90B00017R000500140004-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/20: CIA-RDP90B00017R000500140004-1 bile7grlianted eda4Skitt Un- derage, bo -le -engagediiejtiallies vesicle isiislet it 'import open swan- ny have been addremed, and that the prelerences of the leadership of the intelligence community lie in the sup- port of foreign policy rather than in Its conduct. Judge Webster has cinacenstrated his annadtment to these challenges, and he has evidenced his own predisposi- tions by requesting from the start to sit on the President's Cabinet in an &d- eism"' capacity only, without the pre- rogatives of membership. His state- ments regarding retroactive and oral readings indicate his commitment to a policymaking process which can boast both demonstrated authorization and prior policy consideration His 9-year tenure as Director of the KU has in- vested him with an appreciation of the side of law, a general knowledge of the role a Intelligence in support of policy. and specific expertise in the areas of counterintelligence and corm- torterrorism?areas which are current- ly In sore need of his stewardship. -I believe we are fortunate to have before the Senate the nomination or a man 'with such demonstrably appropri- ate qualifications for the position. I trtge Senutors to vote to confirm Judge Webster with the same enthusi- asm which our committee has report- ed his nomination. Mr. Preddent, I think we are seeing right now the importance of this par- ticular -nomination. I think everyone recognizes that we have a Central Intelligence Agency that necessarily has to function in the dark Of reeeessfty, ft also met operate within the law, and therein lies the Particular rob we face How do we in- tegrate intelligence ad:irides into the formulation of Jocelyn policy? Hoe can inieliigence operations be oanduct- ed, most of them in private and secret, and occasionally even In the dark. and at the same thee 'within the ride of law? That is what we are spending a lot of time on in the Iran-Contra hearing, io- dising on the words "rule of law." The rule of law is important to this _democracy. It is the very CeMeillt that lutds conflicting and competing inter- ests together in our melted Nation. When that tement either cracks or loses its adhesive power, then we can find those conflicting interests and opinions left floating almost on the debris of democracy. I think ft is -terribly impottant that we establish the meaning of the rule of kw in the minds of our elected *M- etals. I think we gourd 16 years ago, and again recently, that secrecy can lead to unaccountability; and if you have unaccountabilfty, that In turn can lead -to* sense Of arrogance, and that arro- gance Inevitably leads to abuse. When the abuse is &natty exposed. that can lewd to public emisinassinent at the least and political :paralysis at the wend. ant Mile have witnessed a certain disrdsaitlie. - ? _ lie Weeniest take egt!Inioiary care in how we Oversee the CoMtral betelli- settee -AMMO. Them Is :perhaps 'no more kapoitant function than to take an equal amount of care in the selec- tion of people nominated to head the agency. Bill Webster, I believe, is a man of extraordinary capability, dedication, Idealism, and kitelligence. I am satis- fied, as vice chairman of the commit- tee, that he mearnres up to all the qualities we need and seek in the di- rector of this Agency. We understand that we need to have covert operations as an option to be employed by the President from time to time. That option must be exercised very selectively and must be employed with great care. There mo no longer be covert ac- tions which seek in exclude notifica- tion to Congress, because that will lead to destruction of our Intelligente agencies. We are satisfied. I think that Bin Webster anderstands his role as Direc- tor of the Agency and the role of the Agency within our system. and I be- lieve he w make a fine contribution to ow country. Mr. President, I yield back the re- mainder of my time. Mr. BOREN, Mr. President. I yield the remainder of the time on this side to the distinguished majority leader.. Mr. BYRD. I thank the able chair- man and manager Of lite neunkation. Mr. President, in legislative session today, I will introduce ingislation to set fixed Imam for the Director and the Deputy Director of the Central ka- tefligence Agency. The CIA's involvement in the Iran arms-for-hostagies deal, evidence that has emerged in the Iran-Contra hear- ings that former CIA Director Casey was far snore deeply involved than originally thought in helping the Con- tras get mllibery supplies, and the con- troversial nomination of Robert Gates as CIA Director earlier this year sug- gest that ft would be wise to provide a degree of independence to the two Lop people at the CIA. The legislation I will introduce sets fixed terms of 7 years for the Director and Deputy Director of Central Intel- ligence. Members might not agree to a 7-year term. They may think it ought to be 10 years or some such term. In any event, the legislation would set the fixed term of? years for the Director and Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.. The Director may not serve more than one "7-year term. The legislation also would stipulate that the two posi- tions shall not be occupied simulta- neously by individuals who were em- ployed by the CIA at any time in the 7 years prior to their nomination. In the mid-1970's, las part In response to revelations about CIA excesses, there were a number of bills and ree- the Director 'Central leteiligetiee, big-,01 -them became law. Con- gress 3thi continued to struggle with the issue of the CIA's accountability On covert ?Pertinent I do not take Issue with the need of any administra- tion?Republican or Democratic?to collate intelligence and conduct eovert operations when necessary. The CIA's role in this administra- tion's assistance to the Contra rebels In Nicaragua. however, suggests that Perhaps ft would be wise to insure that the Director of Central Intelligence, and his Deputy, have a degree of inde- pendence that would make it possible for the Agency to resist pressure to engage is questionable or illegal activi- ties, As well, reports that intelligence studies were tailored to support de- sired administration conclude gas on Soviet designs on Iran, which appar- ently provided intellectual justifica- tion dor the Iran anns-for-ionetages deals suggest that the CIA needs pro- tection from political pressure to home that its intelligence analysis Is unbiased. A munber of Important executive branch officials serve fixed terms: the FBI Director serves a single 10-year tens; the Director of the Office of Personnel Management serves for 4 years; the Chairman of the ~end Reserve Board serves for 4 years. It is time for the Director and Deputy Di- rector of Central Intelligence to be added to this list. I thank the 'Senator from Oklahoma for yielding. Mr. WREN. Mr. President, does any thne remote? - The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired. Mr. DOREN. Mr. President, I-ask unanimous -consent to proceed for 30 The PRESIDING PRESIDING 'OFFICER. With- out objection it is so ordered. - Mr. COHEN. Mr. President. I want to take a moment to express my thanks to the chairman of the Intelli- gence Committee. Be conducted two sets of hearings?one on Mr. Gates and one on Mr. Webster?and conduct- ed them with intensity and great in- togrity. It was because of his patience end perseverance that every Member of the minority had a full opportunity to develop, explore, and exchange views on this important nomination. I thank him for his patience and courte- a? Mr. BOftEN_ Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for 1 minute. 'The PRESIDING OFFICER. With- out objection, ft is so ordered. Mr. BOREN. Mr.. President, I thank my colleague from Maine for the very generous comments he has just made. It is a great privilege and pleasure to be able to serve with him in the lead- ership -of that committee. He serves ably as vice chairman and has made an immense contribution to the spirit of Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/20: CIA-RDP90B00017R000500140004-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/20: CIA-RDP90B00017R000500140004-1 S 6726 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE May 19, 1987 bipartisanship which appropriately reigns in that committee. That committee spans the entire po- liticall spectrum of the Senate. The members of the committee put in long hours, and because of the nature of the work, the amount of time they spend is often unrecognized. Under the leadership of the Senator from Maine and the spirit he exempli- fies, the members of the committee are developing the kind of spirit that I think the country needs and will serve our Nation's security interests as well. I thank him for the very gracious com- ments he made. I urge my colleagues to join in the unanimous recommendation of the Committee on Intelligence that Judge Webster's nomination be confirmed, so that he can get on with the important work at hand in the Central Intelli- gence Agency. Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I am delighted to rise in support of the nomination of William Webster as Di- rector of Central Intelligence. There is probably no more demand- ing job for an unelected official than that of DCI. The Director must have an intellectual grasp of an increasingly complex array of programs ranging from traditional espionage, to some of the world's most advanced technical systems, to the analysis of political and economic developments in virtual- ly every country in the world. He must have impressive administrative skills to lead a diverse set of agencies, both civilian and military, that make up the intelligence community. The degree of direct authority varies from one agency to the next, making the man- agement challenge that much more difficult. The DCI must have political skills of a high order if he is to successfully defend the interests of Intelligence against the competing demands of other government programs. And those same political abilities will, of course, be repeatedly tested in his reg- ular dealings with the Congress. There can be no doubt about the im- portance of this vote. The headlines of the last few months have underlined over and over again the critical role played by the DCI and the agencies he leads in defending national security. Intelligence agencies are the eyes and ears?the tripwire?of national de- fense. For instance, we are on the brink of a breakthrough in arms con- trol negotiations with the Soviet Union. The ultimate success of that effort will depend heavily on the mon- itoring capabilities of U.S. intelligence. These are demanding times for the Intelligence community. While the tasks and demands grow in scope and complexity, the budgetary resources are increasingly constrained. With all these considerations in mind, the Intelligence Committee con- ducted protracted hearings, in open and closed session, over several days. The result, I am happy to say, is a su- perbly qualified nominee. William Webster has the required ability and experience and proven integrity for this position. His nine year record as Director of the FBI confirms this. His candor and patience in responding to the committee's painstaking confirma- tion process demonstrates his readi- ness to work constructively with the oversight committees of the Congress. In several instances Judge Webster volunteered information that had re- cently come to his attention, but which was not then known to the In- telligence Committee. Mr. President, I am pleased to say that we are entrusting the intelligence community to excellent hands. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is, Will the Senate advise and consent to the nomination of William H. Webster, of Missouri, to be Director of Central Intelligence? On this ques- tion the yeas and nays have been or- dered, and the clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk called the roll. Mr. CRANSTON. I announce that the Senator from Illinois [Mr. &sum] is necessarily absent. Mr. SIMPSON. I announce that the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Dori), the Senator from Delaware [Mr. Rom], the Senator from Idaho [Mr. Snows), and the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. Wzroura) are necessarily absent. I further announce that, if present and voting the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Dour) and the Senator from Idaho [Mr. Symms) would each vote The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Cham- ber desiring to vote? The result was announced?yeas 94, nays 1, as follows: tRollca11 Vote No. 115 Ex.) YEAS-94 Adams Own Mikulski Armstrong Glenn Mitchell Baucus Gore Moynihan Bentsen Graham Murkowski Biden Granun Nickles Bingarnan Grassley Nunn Bond Harkin Packwood Boren Hatch Pell Boschwitz Hatfield Pressler Bradley Hecht Proxmire Breaux Heflin Pryor Bumpers Heinz Quayle Burdick Helms Riegle Byrd Hollings Rockefeller Chaf ee Humphrey Rudman Chiles Inouye Sanford Cochran Johnston Sarbanes Cohen Karnes Sasser Conrad Kassebaum Shelby Cranston Kasten - Simpson D'Amato Kennedy Specter Dan! orth Kerry Stafford Daschle Lau tenberg Stennis DeConcini Leahy Stevens Dixon Levin Thurmond Dodd Lugar Trible Domenici Mateunaga Wallop Durenberger McCain Warner Evans McClure Wilson Ex on McConnell Wirth Ford Melcher Fowler Metzenbaum NAYS-1 Reid NOT VOTING-5 Dole Simon Weicker Roth ? Symms So the nomination was confirmed. Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the nom- ination was confirmed. Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, / move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask that the President be immediately notified of the confirmation of the nominee. The PRESIDING OFFICER. With- out objection, it is so ordered. Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I have eight nominations which were submit- ted by the Committee on the Judiciary earlier today. These eight nominations have been cleared on both sides of the aisle. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of the eight nominations en bloc, that they might be confirmed en bloc, that a motion to reconsider en bloc be laid on the table, that the President be immediately notified of the confirmation of the nominees, and that the nominations be spread sever- ally and independently on the record. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, we have no objection to this procedure. I would say that this is acting extraordi- narily swiftly. I think it is an accom- modation to the majority leader. We acted on these today at 2 o'clock. They have now come forward. We appreci- ate the excellent efforts of the Judici- ary Committee and we thank the ma- jority leader. The PRESIDING OFFICER. With- out objection, it is so ordered. The nominations considered and confirmed en bloc are as follows: THE JUDICIARY Michael S. Kanne. of Indiana, to be US. circuit judge for the seventh circuit; Roger B. Andwelt, of the District of Co- lumbia, to be a Judge of the U.S. Claims Court; James H. Alesia, of Illinois, to be U.S. dis- trict judge for the northern district of Illi- nois; Joseph P. Stadmueller, of Wisconsin, to be U.S. district judge for the eastern district of Wisconsin: Charles W. Larson, of Iowa, to be US. at- torney for the northern district of Iowa; K. Michael Moore, of Florida, to be US. attorney for the northern district of Flori- da; George J. Terwilliger III, of Vermont, to be U.S. attorney; Michael W. Carey, of West Virginia, to be U.S. attorney for the southern district of West Virginia. Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I am pleased to support the confirmation of Mr. Michael W. Carey as the US. at- torney for the southern district of West Virginia. Mr. Carey is a native of Charleston, and is a fine public servant. He has served as an assistant U.S. attorney for the past 7 years, following his graduation from the West Virginia University College of Law, where he was first in his class, Order of the Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/20: CIA-RDP90B00017R000500140004-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/20: CIA-RDP90B00017R000500140004-1 May /9, /987 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE Coin and editor-In-chief Of the law review. Be is well respected by Ith peers, and earlier today, his nomination Was unanimously reported out of the Judi- ciary Comrafttee, 'where I was happy to have voted for him. I am very pleased that the Presklent has made this exceptional appoint- ment. and I know that Mr. Carey will continue to serve the citizens of West Virginia in an exemplary way. In these times of skepticism in the confidence of ear patine servants, it is heartening and reassuring that a person of Mr. Carey's ability arid in- tegray holds this office, requiring the laighest degree of public trust. LEGISLATIVE SESSION Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate return to legislative session. The PRESIDING OPTIC:tat. With- out objection, it is so ordered. MORNING BUSINESS Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be a brief period for the transaction of morning business, not to extend beyond 10 minutes, and that Senators may speak therein for not to exceed 6 minutes. The PRESIDING OFFICER. With- out objection, it is so ordered. "FOLLOW THROUGH" PROGRAM Mr. GRAS,SLEY. Mr. President, the Follow Through Program is a popular program that helps disadvantaged children. It maintains, or follows through, the developmental support that is available to children enrolled in Head Start, or similar preschool pro- grams. once they enter elementary school. For more than 15 years recipients of grants under this program have been awarded noncompeting continuation grants. The Department of Education is now proposing to make this a cam- petittve grant program as a result of legislative language in the Human Services Reauthorization Act of 1986. We think that the program should be competitive. That would allow addi- tional schools the opportunity Lo com- pete for the benefits of this program. Proposed regulations implementing the competitive grant process -were published on April 30, just a few weeks age. Final regulations are expected on July 31. Initially, applicants were ex- pected AO return implications for the Fonow Through grants by June 30, before the regulations would have been finalized. The Department hoped that it would be able to review and ap- prove the applications ia just 3 months, so that they could eamence awards by September 1. That would have pushed the start up date for new progriuns to October 1, after school has started. Even if the Department of Educa- tion had been able to adhere to this optimistic schedule, such timelines would not have allowed existing or new programs sufficient time to devel- op plans and complete applications. Existing programs would have had trouble maintaining their teaching staff or making plans for the next year if ftmcning would have been un- certain. New applicants would not have had adequate time to prepare India developed Follow Through pro- posals for initial start-up programs. Moreover, since this is a school based program, most local school districts would have had difficulty completing proposals during the final weeks of their school year. When these concerns were brought to my attention, I proposed to intro- duce an amendment to the Supple- mental Appropriathea Bill. That amendment would have simply de- layed the Implementation of the De- partment's rules for 1 year. Senator Kreiteren chairman of the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, was Seining me as a to-sponsor. Mr. President, I am pleased to say that the Department of Education re- sponded quickly and responsibly to the eoncerns which I and my col- leagues from Massachusetts brought to their attention. When we relayed to the Department our concern about the timing of the competitive process for Follow Through grants, the Depart- ment agreed to delay the competition mail the next year. The Department has notified current grantees that awards for the 1987-88 school year will be distributed according to the regula- tions that are currently in place. They will receive their awards on June 30. While this step means that competi- tion will, in effect, be delayed a year, we believe such a delay is fully justi- fied. The delay will enable existing programs to plan for the forthcoming year, thereby preventing unanticipat- ed staff displacement and program dis- location. Additionally, the extended application time will ensure better competition among more applicants with better proposals. Mr. President, there is going to be a Follow Through Program and next pear it will be conducted, as we intend- ed, on a fully competitive basis. Delay- ing the effective date of the new regu- lations ensures that, ferr this year, the method and the tinting for the grant award process will be both reasonable and practicable. We have a precedent for such a delay. In 1964 the Department of Edu- cation proposed that funding for its research and laboratory centers be changed to a competitive process. At that time, Senator PACKWOOD was con- cerned that the process would be dis- ruptive to the existing programs. Be was suceessful in having an amend- ment adopted which delayed the com- petition for 1 year. I should like to add, Mr. President. that staff members from my office 6727 . and Senator Siotiiirilf ontIce have discussed this problem with staff rep- resenting Senator Psats chairman of the Subcommittee on Education, Arts and Humanities and Senator Seer- rosin ranking member of that subcom- mittee. They share our concern and also believe that a single year delay in the competition for Follow Through grants is a reasonable and desirable step in these circumstances. am pleased that the Department of Education acted as it Aid. It thereby obviated the need for to take legisla- tive action this year. The regulation the Department has proposed is a good one, Mr. President. It not only introduces competition Into the program, but it redirects it in fundamental way by focusing on the demonstrations and dissemination of promising approaches for educating young children from poor families. I am delighted that the Department of Education has responded so quickly and responsibly to our concerns. TRI FOLLOW/I:URN/GM PROGRAM Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I should like to add my strong support to the statement offered by the Sena- tor from Iowa. What we are proposing is a single year delay in the grants competition for followthrongh projects. The key word is delay. We want the competi- tion to take place., but at such time and under such circumstances as to be in everyone's best interest. That is pre- cisely what this I-year delay will ac- complish. I am pleased that the Department. of Education recognkied our concerns and was willing to work out an accom- modation on this matter. I believe that this delay will rtsuit In a better com- petition with better quality proposals than would otherwise beth* case. I commend the Senator from Iowa for his efforts on this matter. THE nreisow mammas PROGRAM Mr. STAFFORD. Mr. President, 1 Join my colleague from Iowa, Senator GRASSLrY, in his support for the De- partment of Educsaioa proposal to delay implementation of recently pub- lished regulations regarding changes In the Pollowthrough Program. The substance of these regulations win provide needed revision of the Follow- through Program. Current recipients of grants ander this act have received continuation funds for many years. Competition for grant swards will revi- talize this program and encourage new districts to participate. 'The Depart- ment of Education's decision to wait until the next fiscal year to implement these regulations Is an appropriate step to take at this time. It will give local districts the time aecessary to properly prepare for a grant competi- tion. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/20: CIA-RDP90B00017R000500140004-1