ISSUE PAPER, NSSD 1-82

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01013R000200210015-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 28, 2013
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: April 9, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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CIA CONTROL NO.
TS820210/8
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DOC. NO. 90213
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12 April 1982
DOC. DATE 9 April 1982
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90213 add-on
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
CONFIDENTIAL WITH
TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT
April 9, 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER III
Executive Secretary
Department of State
LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT P. MEEHAN
Assistant for Interagency Matters
Office of the Secretary of Defense
THOMAS B. CORMACK
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency
COLONEL CHARLES F. STEBBINS
Executive Assistant to the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
SUBJECT: Issue Paper, NSSD 1-82
Attached is a draft Part III, Section C issue paper for
discussion at the Interagency Review Group meeting on
April 12, 1982 and subsequently for discussion at an NSC
meeting now scheduled for April 16.
Attachment
as stated
CONFIDENTIAL WITH
TOP? SECRET ATTACHMENT
Review April 9, 1988
? Michael 0. Wheeler
Staff Secretary
TS820210/8
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Issue
ISSUE PAPER
What conventional force capability should be developed by the end of
this decade to counter the Soviet threat to U.S. interests in Southwest
Asia (SWA)?
Options
Option A:
Option B:
Option C:
Facts
To acquire, by the end of the decade, the capacity to
deploy, support, and sustain military forces of
sufficient size to deter a Soviet attack against
Southwest Asia.
To acquire sufficient capability to achieve U.S.
wartime objectives in Southwest Asia against a Soviet
attack without having to resort to expansion of the
conflict beyond the region and its supporting lines
of communication.
To acquire clearly sufficient capability to achieve U.S.
wartime objectives without resorting to expansion of
the conflict beyond the region and its supporting lines
of communication.
O The United States has two primary security interests in Southwest
Asia: First, to prevent the Soviet Union from acquiring political-
military hegemony in the region; second, to maintain continued
western access to Persian Gulf. oil. In wartime, our key objectives
are to maintain control of and protect the Persian Gulf oilfields,
transshipment points, and lines of communications.
O The Soviet Union possesses a marked advantage to deploy and sustaia
forces in Southwest Asia. That advantage will remain throughout
the decade.
O The Soviet Union enjoys options of attacking on other fronts at
least as attractive as ours.
O In order to project and sustain U.S. forces in Southwest Asia,
the U.S. is. and will remain dependent on substantial support from
regional and extraregional friends and allies.
Description of Options
O All three options employ the same military components to enhance
our deterrent posture: in-theater capabilities (to include
substantial and continuous military presence in the Indian Ocean/
Southwest Asia), with rapidly deployable forces, a clear commitment
to combat Soviet forces in the theater and the potential for
escalation. At least in this context, the threat of escalation
is and will remain an essential element of U.S. deterrent strategy.
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? The distinction among the options is in the planned capability of
U.S. forces to meet direct Soviet aggression in the region.
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Option A recognizes the Soviet military advantage in the
region and the substantial escalatory pressures that would
be present in any U.S.-Soviet conflict. This option would
rely on direct combat in the theater and counteroffensives
on other fronts early on, in order to dissuade the Soviet
Union from continuing its attack and to ensure that the
lines of communication to Southwest Asia were under U.S.
control.
Option B recognizes that it is in our interest to limit the
scope of any conflict with the Soviet Union and that we should
not prejudge the inevitability of escalation. This option
would commit U.S. forces to engage fully Soviet forces in
the region in order to. prevent them from gaining control over
.the Persian Gulf. Soviet forces would not be engaged on
other fronts unless the in-theater defense was unsuccessful
or until after the Soviet Union widened the war.
Option C. Like Option B, this option also recognizes that
it is in our interest to limit the scope of any conflict with
the Soviet Union and that we should not prejudge the inevita-
bility of escalation. Option C would provide an even more
robust in-theater capability to confront the Soviet Union
directly in Southwest Asia in order to achieve our military
objectives without resorting to geographic escalation.
O All three options recognize and plan for the potential of a U.S.-
Soviet conflict in Southwest Asia to become a global war.
Discussion
O Due to the global military capabilities of both superpowers and
the interrelationship of strategic theaters, any U.S.-Soviet
conflict will produce substantial escalating pressures.
00
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Deployed forces must be reinforced and sustained over lengthy
lines of communication that are subject to hostile Soviet actio:
The United States must take precautionary actions worldwide
to protect its vital interests. These actions will include
mobilization and a heightened state of readiness for both
strategic nuclear and conventional forces, both home and
abroad. Similar actions can be expected from our allies and
adversaries.
If a conflict between the superpowers takes place in Southwest
Asia, the outcome would have a critical impact on the economies
of the U.S., Western Europe, and Japan.
O It is in the interest of the U.S. to limit any U.S.-Soviet conflict
to conventional means. However, deterrence is enhanced by an
integrated strategy which compels the Soviet Union to reckon
with the probability of nuclear escalation and the resulting risks
and costs. Additionally, geographic escalation and nuclear
escalation considerations are linked.
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In order to project and sustain U.S. forces in Southwest Asia, the
0
U.S. will remain dependent on substantial support from regional and
extraregional allies and friends. A significant increase in in-
theater-forces will require a corresponding increase in assured
access, overbuild, basing rights, and Other accommodations.
0 Our military assessments indicate that, in the near-term, a
successful in-theater defense against a determined Soviet attack
cannot be achieved. This means that whatever option is selected for
the long-term our current warfighting strategy will necessarily
continue to place significant emphasis on geographic escalation.
a By acquiring a visible, robust conventional warfighting capability,
the United States can hope to frustrate Soviet plans to establish
political-military hegemony in the region in peacetime. In
wartime, this in-theater capability could provide additional
flexibility and may provide the U.S. an alternative to spiraling
escalation or defeat.
RECOMMENDATION
Option A
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Option B Option C
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