DRAFT NSDD ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD SOUTH AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01013R000300480003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 4, 2008
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: September 10, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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S/S 8227233
UNCLASSIFIED
(With SECRET Attachment)
Interagency Group No. 24
TO OVP
NSC
ACDA
AID
CIA
Commerce
Defense
JCS
OMB
Treasury
UNA
USIA
USTR
September 10, 1982
- Mr.
- Mr.
- Mr.
- Mr.
Donald P. Gregg
Michael 0. Wheeler
Joseph Presel
Gerald Pagano
-
STAT
- Mrs.
Fla en o ins
- COL
John Stanford
- MAJ
- Mr.
- Mr.
Dennis Stanley
Alton Keel
David Pickford
- Amb.
- Ms.
- Mr.
Harvey Feldman
Teresa Collins
Dennis Whitfield
SUBJECT: Draft NSDD on U.S. Policy Toward South America
Attached is the draft NSDD corresponding to the NSDD 10-82
policy study and executive summary circulated under our memoran-
dum 8225479 dated August 25.
Addressees are asked to review the draft NSDD in connection
with the previously circulated documents. Clearance of the three
documents is requested at?a senior policy-making level. Concur-
rence or comments should be conveyed to Mr. Tain Tompkins at
632-5804 by COB Thursday, September 16. It is hoped that a final
version of the documents can be ready for submission to the White
House the week of September 20.
Your prompt attention is appreciated.
Executive Secretary
Attachment:
Draft NSDD
UNCLASSIFIED
(With SECRET Attachment)
~~gno0da~~
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Draft NSDD in response to NSSD 10-82
U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE AMERICAS
IN THE WAKE OF THE FALKLANDS CRISIS
1. U.S. interests in Latin America and the Caribbean
include a_region.free of Soviet-dominated or other hostile
governments; the development of stable and democratic political
systems and institutions which promote respect for basic
human rights; cooperative bilateral relations to deal with
security and other issues flowing from geographic proximity;
protection of major U.S.-trade and investment; access to
raw materials; prevention of nuclear proliferation and
maintenance of stable balance of power among.the states
in the region; and receptivity to U.S. leadership.
2. The Falklands crisis strained, to varying degrees,
our relations with Latin American countries, and highlighted
the potential for instability in South America. .Our policy
must address the following specific problems:
Instability and irredentism in Argentina, which
imply new opportunities for the USSR to gain
access to a strategic position in the Southern
Cone;
Disillusionment with U.S. leadership in Venezuela
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and elsewhere, which provides tempting opportunities
for Cuba to reenter inter-American diplomacy;
The increased importance of Brazil as a potential
stabilizing factor in South America at a time
when economic pressures are eroding our ties
and influence in that country.
3. The highest United States priority in Latin America
continues to be the prevention of further inroads by the
Soviet Union or its client states in our immediate environs
-- Central America, the Caribbean and Mexico.
4. To restore and assert U.S. influence in South
America, the United States will; subject to Congressional and
statutory limitation:
-- Maintain its diplomatic position on the fundamental
Falklands issues as it was before the crisis,
specifically: U.S. neutrality on the question
of sovereignty over the islands and support for
negotiations or other peaceful efforts to resolve
this dispute;
Lift the military pipeline embargo on Argentina
soon, after discussion with the UK;
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Depending on discussions with Chile and on Argentine
behavior, certify Argentina and Chile jointly,
to preserve regional political and military balance,
before the end of 1982.
.Rebuild a close relationship with Brazil, to
include Cabinet-level consultations, renewed
cooperation in military training and trade,
and a dialogue on nuclear issues. To develop
this process, the U.S. will seek appropriate
Brazilian nonproliferation-related concessions
(e.g. restraint in exports to sensitive regions)
which could allow Presidential waiver of
Symington/Glenn. We should also seek progress
in discussions on the Treaty of Tlatelolco and
safeguards which could resolve the fuel supply
issue and permit resumed nuclear cooperation.
The United States will also explore arms co-production
agreements. We should also review our global
sugar policy in the light of its foreign and
domestic impact.
Use flexibility within NSDD 5 guidelines to respond
promptly to arms transfer requests. The U.S.
will seek to prevent regional arms races, as
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well as to preserve sub-regional. arms balances
and to upgrade bilateral ties. Measures should
be sought to lessen Peru's dependence on Soviet
arms supplies.
Use our influence through traditional diplomatic
channels to promote human rights so as to facilitate
public support for expanded, closer relationships
with the governments concerned;
Seek to play a supportive role, to the extent
our resources permit, in such economically weak
states as Bolivia, Ecuador and Paraguay.
Pursue a more active bilateral diplomacy throughout
the continent, while seeking to turn back efforts
to alter the Inter-American System. The United
States will make no attempt. to buy back our friends
or to give the appearance of guilt. Nor will
the U.S. court the most resentful (Venezuela
and Peru). Rather we will use a series of ad
hoc bilateral cabinet-level meetings.with-a
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substantial but not exclusive economic focus
to show that,dialogue. with_the U_S. Is possible.-
The U.S. will. lead with Brazil, then Mexico and
Venezuela when the time is appropriate.
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