NSSD 1-84 - PART II OF THIRD WORLD HUNGER STUDY

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8
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RIPPUB
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C
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52
Document Creation Date: 
December 27, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 30, 2013
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3
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Publication Date: 
January 7, 1985
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LETTER
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03 : CIA-RDP90601013R000400030003-8 DOCUMENTS CROSS-REFERENCED ATTACHED: kE4(---(03ei 3// q0 /di! 171,3 . ? , Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03 : CIA-RDP90601013R000400030003-8 EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03 : CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 TO: ACTION INFO DATE INITIAL 1 DCI . X . 2 DDCI - X 3 EXDIR ? X 4 D/ICS 5 DDI X 6 DDA 7 DDO 8 DDS&T 9 Chm/NIC 10 GC . i 11 IG - 12 Compt 13 D/Pers 14 . A D/OLL . 15 D/PAO 16 SA/IA . 17 AO/Da 18 C/IPD/OIS 19 \NIO/ECON X' 20 NIO/Afri ca X ,OGI ? X 22Y-2i SUSPENSE Remarks STAT Executive Secretary 7 Jan 85 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03 : CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 STAT STAT Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 STAT 25X6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 U1211.CU ouncs Jut:1hall.1111;111. Washington, D.C. 20520 'January 4, 1985 TO Mr. Robert C. McFarlane, The White House FROM : Ambassador Robert B. Keating Chairman, Third Third World Hunger Study SUBJECT: NSSD 1-84 - Part II of Third World Hunger Study NSSD 1-84 established the terms of reference for a study aimed at making better use of U.S. food aid for Third world emergency and non-emergency food problems. In Part I of our work, completed in July1984, we made ten recommendations for achieving a more rapid, high-visibility response to acute hunger crises in the Third world. These recommendations were accepted by the President and promulgated in NSDD 143. In Part II of our assignment, we gave priority attention to making more effective use of food aid to promote better agricultural policies in key Third World countries. The United States has encouraged agricultural reform through existing food aid programs with insufficient results, partic- ularly in sub-Saharan Africa. Changing economic circumstances in the Third World are creating a new context and new oppor- tunities for U.S. foreign policy. Socialist economic models have failed to generate growth for Third World countries, and many Third World leaders are now experimenting with more market-oriented approaches in four critical areas: -- agricultural price policy; -- marketing reform and liberalization; -- input supply and distribution policy, and -- private sector involvement. However, many of these leaders fear the political risks of food shortages during the transitional period to a more market-oriented economy. To overcome these concerns, we need an innovative and flexible instrument that would provide addi- tional food assurance as an inducement to policy changes con- sistent with the Reagan Administration's objectives. Conclusion: Mindful of the need for budgetary stringency in implementing an additional food aid program, we recom- mend an expansion of Section 416 authority for a four-year period in order to match the temporary availability of USG-acquired food stocks with the transitional needs of key Third World governments; initially in sub-Saharan Africa. We have called this new Presidential initiative to provide additional food aid, "Food for Progress" (a fuller explan- ation of this new program is appended). 1 LDeclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03 : CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 In addition to developing the new "Food for Progress" initiative, we examined the complex interagency decision- making process for allocating food aid under the major non-emergency food aid programs (PL 480 titles I/III). This complex process involves the interplay of important multiple objectives, competing interests and sometimes conflicting criteria advanced by USDA/State/AID/OMB/Treasury in a time-consuming adversarial exercise. We found, however, it is possible to apply a more analytical and rational method for illuminating issues and facilitating decision-making. Improved analysis would assist decision-makers in the weigh- ing of priorities and recognition of trade-offs. Conclusion: An analytical framework is needed for a rational examination of the many factors which interact, influence and condition our response to Third World food problems and the achievement of U.S. food aid goals. The decision-analysis methodology (multi- attribute utility theory) tested in this study ,merits its, use in allocating food aid for multiple objectives, and in determining the appropriate mix of food aid instrumentalities. We also studied the array of existing commercial and concessional credit and grant aid programs through which the USG directly influences the flow of over $6 billion worth of U.S. foodstuffs for Third World countries. We found that any attempt to improve the fit between the agricultural potential of the U.S. and the chronic food deficits of Third World countries came up against the dilemma that many Third World countries are unable to pay cash for U.S. food while we are limited in the amounts we can give or sell on credit. Moreover, there are formidable institutional and political barriers to revising our international approach. No concen- sus existed among the lead agencies on the direction of needed changes, particularly in light of our difficult budgetary sit- uation, on the following key programs issues: . Whether to initiate intermediate credits of 7-10 years to help key Third World countries with their food needs during a period of debt crisis. . If so, whether to seek intermediate credit guarantee authority from Congress. . Or, whether to seek funding for the defunct intermedi- ate direct credit program on the books. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 . Whether to revise the terms for PL 480 Title I conces- sional loans and Title III conditional grant programs. . Whether to turn Title I into a multiyear program and scrap the separate Title III. . Whether to provide a higher overall level of PL 480 food aid. . Whether to challenge the legislatively prescribed minimum level for Title II non-emergency regular programming of private voluntary ortanizations. Conclusion: It will require considerable time to develop a clear consensus on the revision of the existing array of pro- grams. The structure of U.S. programs of food aid and credit has evolved over thirty years in response to circumstances and pressures. Taken together, these programs are performing useful functions. Some are excellent instruments (e.g., the GSM-102 3-year credit guarantee program) for meeting their stated objec- tives. On the other hand, the PL 480 Title III program which refocussed a portion of Title I resources in the hopes of achiev- ing important economic development changes is an instrument which failed to fulfill its promise. L_ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 ? The New Initiative - "Food for Progress" The "Food for Progress" initiative will absorb 500,000 metric tons annually of USG-owned food resources for a period of four years. These food resources would come from the 17.5 million metric tons of surplus commodities acquired by the Com- modity Credit Corporation (CCC) through extending the authority of Section 416 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act. The sole objec- tive of the program is to provide additional food assurance for key Third World countries during a transitional period of agri- cultural policy reform. This special program is not open-ended and no extension beyond four years is foreseen. The CCC inventories have again reached burdensome levels in 1984, overhanging markets and depressing farm prices. Projections are for continued weak exports of U.S. agricultural commodities. This being the case, the expected continuing high level of surplus commodities held in CCC inventories should not present a problem of unavailability of supply for the relatively small quantities of food involved in the "Food for Progress" proposal. CCC storage costs now stand at about $.33/bushel. For the 500,000 metric bons each year recommended for the new program, there would be a savings of $6 million per year in storage costs or $60 million over the four-year period.*/ As consideration is given to the 1985 Farm Bill, decisions must be made about the disposal of these stocks in a manner which _ would help rather than hinder the shift to a more market-responsive U.S. agricultural policy. It should be borne in mind that both the Department of Agriculture and OMB's proposals for the 1985 Farm Bill would terminate the farmer-owned grain reserve (FOR) and fold all stocks into the CCC-owned inventories when the three-year grain reserve contracts expire. However, the two agencies make no spe- cific proposals as to how these augmented CCC inventories would be drawn down. With the depressed state of the farm economy, it is important that they be drawn down in a manner which would not fur- ther depress market prices. Accessing these stocks for "Food for Progress" is consistent with this criterion and the objective of creating future credit-worthy Third World markets for U.S. food exports. The underlying premise of the "Food for Progress" program is that it could be operated more effectively in helping achieve policy reform in key Third World countries than the food aid instrumentali- ties inherited by the Reagan Administration. To accomplish this single objective in a program of limited duration requires a more innovative and flexible instrument than the PL 480 programs. We can * 500,000 MT X 36.7 bu/MT x .33 cents/bu = $6.05 million/yr savings in storage costs 6M for 1 yr plus 12M for 2 yrs plus 18m for 3 yrs plus 24M for 4 yrs = $60M total savings in storage costs Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90601013R000400030003-8 find the attributes needed by expanding the Reagan administration's Section 416 authority to cover a wider range of commodities and their use for a new program. Under this implementation plan, "Food for Progress" would: 1. make clear President Reagan's intent to match the temporary availability of USG-acquired food stocks with the food needs of key Third World governments during their transition per- iods to more market-oriented agricultural systems, initially in 6-8 sub-Saharan African countries; 2. be the only U.S. food aid instrument employing additional food resources solely for the purpose of leveraging agri- cultural policy reform in key Third World countries; 3. use food resources already acquired by the USG. There would be a new additional cost for transport (est.$40 million/yr.) with a savings in domestic storage (est. $6 million/yr. or $60 million over four years);* 4. not disrupt the food aid levels of other PL 48,0 programs, nor impair achievement of their important multiple aims; 5. permit multiyear food aid programming free from "use or lose" annual appropriation constraints, and the associated pressures from commodity interest groups affecting PL 480 Title 1/Ill programs; 6. enjoy broad congressional support as a new initiative with greater promise of achieving agricultural policy reform in key Third World countries than the usual food programs under PL 480. */ As with other draw-downs of CCC-acquired stocks (e.g., for the $9 billion domestic PIK Program), the CCC would require replenishment of its capital stock to cover the cost of the commodities at a future date. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDPqnRninvnD nnnAnnnn^^^,, ? !-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/96/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 Third World Hunger Study Part II (Non-Emergency, Chronic Food Deficit Problems) Chairman: Ambassador Robert B. Keating Date: December 20, 1984 KEAT01.001 STAFF 2/0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/--06/631CIA:kbP9OBTRO13RE60-46663-0003-8 ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 Third World Hunger Study, Part II A. Actual Food Aid Decision-Making Process 1. Actual Decision-Making Process for PL 480 Title I. Programs 2. Areas of Inter-Agency Conflict 3. Actual Allocation Criteria for Inter-Agency Decision-Making Process 4. Multi-Attribute Utility Theory 5. Inter-Agency Food Aid Decision-Making B. A New Food Aid Initiative 1. US Food Export Policy Dilemma 2. The Changing Economic Circumstances of Third World Countries 3. "Food for Progress" to Back Up Agricultural Policy Reform in Key Third World Countries 4. Reasons for "Food for Progress" Initiative 5. Size and Cost of "Food for Progress" Initiative 6. "Food for Progress" to Back Up Agricultural Policy Reform 7. USG-Owned Grain Stocks 8. Sub-Saharan Africa Food Import Needs 9. Sub-Saharan Africa Long-Term Decline in Per Capita Grain Producti;n ams.ption 10. "Food for Progress" Decision Analysis for Selection of Recipient Countries (Illustrative) 11. The Leveraging of Agricultural Policy Reform 12. Selection of "Food for Progress" Policy Targets 13. Implementation of "Food for Progress" Overtime 14. USG Bi-Lateral Assistance Programs 15. An Integrated Food Aid Program for Sub-Saharan Africa 16. Why Should We Use USG-Owned Food Stocks? 17. Why Would Reprogramming of Existing PL 480 Instrumentalities Fail to Accomplish the "Food for Progress" Objective?Agricultural Policy Reform? 18. Program Characteristics Needed to Promote Agricultural Policy Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa 19. Why Would the "Food for Progress" Initiative Based on the Use of Surplus Commodities Owned by the Commodity Credit Authority (CCC?Section 416) Succeed Better Than Existing Food Aid Programs in Achieving Agricultural Policy Reform? 20. US Domestic Political Acceptability of the "Food for Progress" Initiative 1-26 1-66 ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 Actual Allocation Criteria for Inter-Agency Decision Making Process USDA ? Develops markets for US commercial exports of food. ? Disposes of surplus agricultural produce. State ? Avoids trade frictions. ? Protects strategic balance and political objectives worldwide. Treasury ? Maintains stability of international financial system. OMB ? Limits USG spending. AID ? Promotes effective economic development using local currency proceeds. ? Responds to real food shortfalls. KEAT01.024 STAFF 2/0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000406036-0-08 ? m Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 ?KEAT01.022 STAFF 2/0 U. , U., iec'sion-Making'Process for PL 480 AID Desks AID Regional Bureaus Ale I Proarams " Lines indicate degree. of interaction between IAD agencies .during decision-Making process. Primary Secondary ------ Occasional AID/ FFP Decision 1 Treasury (Veto Power) State/ OFP AF EAP NEA State Desks KEATO1 0.2'2 STAFF 2 0 Country Team Recommendation OMB (Veto Power) USDA! EC Asia/ Near East (EC) AF/ EUR (EC) (EC) t # Commodity Interests IAgricultural Attaches Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 Areas of Inter-Agency Conflict ? Diagram three key agencies and six recurring areas of substantive conflict. ? Red line indicates inter-agency areas of conflict. ? Yellow line highlights crucially important role of third agency in reconciling conflicts between other two agencies. ? OMB and Treasury can exercise veto power, but are not generally involved in formulating specific aspects of PL 480 programs. KEAT01.023 STAFF 2/0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 KEAT01.028 STAFF 2/0 A 88.S o :nter-Agency Conflict Politically Costly Self-Help Measures STATE/EB KEATO1 028 STAFF 2 0 UMR Level AID/FFP Self-Help Measures Designed to Supplant Agricultural Imports Commodity COMpOsition USDA/EC UMR (Tied to U.S. Market) Balance of Payments Support (Food Aid Reduces Need for Commercial Imports) Agency at. origin of arrow. takes'role of disinterested intermediary in resolving dispute Indicates fundamental conflict of interest between two agencies UMR - Usual Marketing Requirement (Commercial import levels) Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 Actual Allocation Criteria for Inter-Agency Decision-Making Process USDA?Promote U.S. Agricultural Exports and Support Domestic Farm Income STATE?Support Allies and Avoid Trade Friction AID? Promote Economic Development in Recipient Countries TREASURY ? Protect Stability of International Financial System and Evaluate Credit Worthiness of Sovereign Borrowers 1 Dispose of Surplus Commodities 4 Strategic Importance of Recipient Country No Disincentive to Local Agriculture 10 Willingness to Repay Previous PL 480 Loans 2 Protect Commerical Food Exports 5 Willingness to Undertake Market-Oriented Policies 8 Willingness to Accept UMRs 11 ? Willingness to Undertake Economic Adjustment Measures 3 Increase Future Food Exports 6 Balance of Payments Support 9 Humanitarian Need to Cover Food Shortfall Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 Multi-Attribute Utility Theory for Inter-Agency Food Aid Decision-Making Purposes: 1.) Assessing the achievement of the overall objectives of PL 480 legislation: market development, foreign policy support, economic development, and minimum cost to USG. 2.) Evaluating the allocation criteria actually used in the inter-agency decision-making process (the attached matrix assigns a number from -10 to +10 as a means of measuring each criterion's importance in achieving a specific food aid objective.) 3.) Ranking allocation criteria as a function of relative weighting of food aid objectives. KEAT01.002 STAFF 2/0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 v Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 Inter-Agency Food Aid Decision Making PL480 Objectives Actual Allocation Criteria I II III IV Market Minimum Foreign Economic Development Cost Policy Development to U.S.G Leverage Outcome (Depends on Relative Weights) Even 56 H 1-=70. 25.4 11=70. 19.4 111=70' 5.6 IV=70-: 5.6 1 Willingness to Accept Abundant Commodities ? USDA Rank . Rank o Rank '0 Rank 9 33 7 23 0 0 0 0 2 Non-Displacement of U S. Food Export ? USDA 10 37 1 3 0 0 0 0 40 26.2 5.8 4.0 4.0 3 Potential Commercial Market -USDA 10 37 2 6 0 0 0 0 43 26.5 H 7.9 3.7 4.3 - ? 5 Pro-Private Sector Economic Policies AID 5 18 0 0 5 10 10 22 50 15.8 5 11 18.2 H 7 No Disincentive to Local Agriculture AID -8 -29 0 0 6 12 10 22 5 -16.9 L ,5 L 7.7 13.7 9 Unanticipated Food Shortfall -AID 0 0 0 0 5 10 6 13 23 2.3 . 2.3 83 10.1 10 Willingness to Repay P1480 Loans -TREASURY 3 11 9 30 0 0 3 6 47 11.3 22.7 H 4.7 8.3 11 Economic Adjustment Measures -TREASURY 3 11 1 3 3 6 8 17 37 10 .3 . 5.5 7.3 13.9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 US Food Export Policy Dilemma Many Third World countries with potential growth prospects are unable to pay cash for US food. A Intensify efforts to take away commercial markets from other food exporting countries. PL 480 Apply additional resources to help develop and expand the markets of key Third World countries, and over time have them become credit-worthy commercial clients. GM "Food for Progress" Titles I ll III 102 5 301 (Dollar amount only (3 year credit (3 year direct (3-10 year slightly above 1972 level) guarantee) credit) intermediate ($5 billion) ($150 million) direct credit - $0) Many recipient countries cannot repay credits in three years. KEAT01.02 1 STAFF 2/0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 ---- ? - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 Key Question: Would not changes in our agricultural export credit programs help expand the economies of key Third World countries and bring a return to the US economy? Key Considerations: 1.) The pros and cons of providing intermediate credit (say 7-10 years) to help key Third World countries with their food needs during a period of debt crisis. 2.) The pros and cons of new legislation permitting a GSM intermediate guarantee program. 3.) The pros and cons of providing funding for the currently authorized direct intermediate GSM 301 credit program (or should it be scrapped?). 4.) The pros and cons of providing easier terms for PL 480 Titles I and Ill (including local currency repayment, less complicated regulations and requirements). KEAT01.003 STAFF 2/0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 Key Question: Would not changes in our agricultural export credit programs help expand the economies of key Third World countries and bring a return to the US economy? Key Considerations: (Continued) 5.) The pros and cons of turning Title I into a multi-year program and scrapping Title Ill. 6.) The pros and cons of providing a higher level of overall PL 480 food aid. 7.) The pros and cons of the present level of Title II non-emergency regular programming (1.2 million mt/yr -- too high, too low, just right?). 8.) What is the appropriate mix of present and proposed programs in our "food for progress" strategy? KEAT01.004 STAFF 2/0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 The Changing Economic Circumstances of Third World Countries Geo-Political Context (National Security Implications) ? Socialist economic model failing to generate growth for Third World countries. ? Third World countries beginning to experiment with more market-oriented approaches. ? US should target assistance to underwrite economic reform efforts during transition period austerity. ? Soviets unable to offer much in the way of economic assistance. ? Demonstrated success of economic reform measures can shift US-Soviet balance of influence in the Third World. ICEAT01.005 STAFF 2/0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 "Food for Progress" to back up agricultural policy reform in key Third World countries Goal: To use American food resources more effectively in support of Third World countries which have made commitments to policy changes in four critical areas: ? Agricultural price policy ? Marketing reform and liberalization ? Input supply and distribution policy ? Private sector involvement KEAT01.007 STAFF 2/0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 "Food for Progress" to back up agricultural policy reform in key Third World countries ? The sole objective of the "Food for Progress" initiative would be to support the IMPLEMENTATION of policy changes over a medium- term transition period in Third World countries of strategic value and trade potential, initially in Sub-Saharan Africa. ? Unlike present food aid programs with comprehensive and multiple objectives, this initiative would: ? -- Connect food aid with strategies to achieve structural reforms in food ? pricing and marketing; -- Involve co-financing with the World Bank and other financing institutions; -- Make use of government-owned food stocks (accounting model -- President Reagan's Section 416 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act). Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 Reasons for "Food for Progress" Initiative ? In Sub-Saharan Africa, food import needs are increasing by at least 700,000 mt per year. ? Use of 500,000 mt/yr of USG-owned food surpluses (17.5 million mt) would increase non-emergency US food aid by 50 percent to 1.5 million mt/yr. ? Today's emergency food crises highlight the need to tackle the underlying structural problems of agricultural stagnation. ? US food abundance can reduce the political risks to leaders of key Third World countries undertaking agricultural reform measures during a transition period of economic hardship. ? The intention of this initiative is to provide incentives for improved food production policies. KEAT01.009 STAFF 2/0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03 : CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 Size and Cost of "Food for Progress" Initiative Duration: 4 years. Size: 500,000 mt/year of wheat, corn and rice in addition to regular PL 480 commodities. Value: $90 million/year (sunk investment -- already paid for by CCC). Accounting: The use of surplus commodities owned by the Commodity Credit Authority (CCC) through the authority of Section 416. Since the new initiative would use food resources already paid for by the USG, the net cost would be transport (est. $40 million), minus savings in storage (est. $6 million). Recipient Countries: Initially, 6-8 Sub-Saharan African countries. KEAT01.010 STAFF 2/0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 "Food for Progress" to Back-Up Agricultural Policy Reform 1.) Price policy reform to provide incentives to farmers to produce food on a regular basis for the market. -- Adequate price levels for agricultural commodities. -- Timely payment to farmers for their commodities. 2.) Other policy reform to help create an efficient internal market for increased agricultural productivity. -- Greater farmer access to private, competitive markets. -- Market-determined exchange rate. -- Adequate foreign exchange for imported inputs along with their efficient and timely delivery (fertilizer, pesticide, credit). -- Adequate rural infrastructure (farm-to-market roads, collection stations, storage). KEAT01.014 STAFF 2/0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP9013.01013R000400030003-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 USG-Owned Grain Stocks (Source: USDA) Total: 17.5 MILLION MI ($2.6 Billion) Wheat 8.8 Million MT (Including the International Emergency Food Reserve of 4.0 Million MT) Corn 5.1 million MT Rice 0.9 million MT Sorghum 2.3 million MT Other Grains .4 million MT Sub-Sahara African Food Import Needs A) USDA projects a food shortfall of at least 3.7 million MT in FY 1985 B) PL 480 Titles I & II will provide 1.2 million in FY 1985 C) The "Food for Progress" initiative would provide an additional 500,000 MT/YR for four years KEAT01.028 STAFF 2/0 PL 480 Title I 780,000 MT PL 480 Title ll 435,000 MT "Food for Progress" 500,000 MT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 Potential Recipients Angola Benin Burkina-Fasso Chad Ethiopia Ghana Kenya Lesotho Liberia Madagascar Mali Mauritania Mozambique Niger Senegal Sierra Leone Somalia Sudan Tanzania Zaire Zambia "Food for Progress" Decision Analysis for Selection of Recipient Countries (Illustrative) Strategic (FY86 ESF) Co-Financing Impact (Existing W.B. Agr. Programs) Food Aid Needs (USDA Projection) Trade Potential (Population) Country Ranking Weights .40 .20 .20 .20 Index % MAUT Value Index % MAUT Value Index % MAUT Value Index % MAUT Value MAUT Value Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0.6 7 7 1.4 2.0 Resource Response Index (Proposed) I 0 0 0 3 5 1.0 3 3 0.6 2 2 0.4 _ 2.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0.6 5 5 1.0 3.6 4 6 2.4 0 0 0 2 2 0.4 2 4 0.8 3.6 0 0 0 8 13 2.6 10 9 1.8 10 10 2.0 6.4 0 0 0 7 11 2.2 8 7 1.4 7 7 1.4 5.0 8 12 4.8 0 0 0 8 7 1.4 8 8 1.6 7.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 4 0.8 0 0 0 0.8 8 12 4.8 4 6 1.2 1 1 0.2 1 1 0.2 6.4 3 5 2.0 6 10 2.0 8 7 1.4 6 6 1.2 6.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 4 1.0 5 5 1.0 2.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 4 1.0 0 0 0 1.0 5 8 3.2 0 0 0 8 7 1.4 7 7 1.4 6.0 4 6 2.4 0 0 0 5 4 1.0 3 3 0.6 4.0 5 8 3.2 5 8 1.6 8 7 1.4 5 5 1.0 7.2 0 0 0 7 11 2.2 2 2 0.4 1 1 0.2 2.8 7 11 4.4 5 8 1.6 8 7 1.4 2 2 0.4 7.8 10 15 6.0 10 16 3.2 8 7 1.4 8 8 1.6 12.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 8 1.6 8 8 1.6 3.2 5 8 3.2 0 0 0 4 3 0.6 10 10 2.0 5.8 6 9 3.6 7 11 2.2 2 2 0.4 5 5 1.0 7.2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 The Leveraging of Agricultural Policy Reform Through "FOOD FOR PROGRESS" The amount of "leverage" will be influenced by: 1.) The ratio of: "Food for Progress" additional food assurance - A country's total food needs 2.) The potential recipient country's performance in implementing agreed-upon policy reforms (World Bank/IMF conditionality). 3.) The potential recipient country's agreement to: -- More fully implement needed policy measures if provided with multi-year additional food assurance, or -- To change a disfunctional economic policy. The analytical task is to: 1.) Back-up or select those policies within a country which would yield the largest economic return for the additional food assurance of the "Food for Progress" program, and 2.) Then determine which countries would yield the largest potential economic return through participation in the "Food for Progress" program. KEATO1 015 STAFF 2/0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 - - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 KEATCt. 02.:7 STAFE2A Consumption El Production Title I PL 480 Se;e&or, of "Food for Progress" Policy Targets Food Production Response Amount of Policy Change Through "Food for Progress" KEATO1 027 STAFF 2/0 Select Policy "B" as Leverage Target Policies for Leverage 0 Farmer Prices o Exchange Rates o Food Subsidy Levels to Consumers O Involvement of Private Enterprise in Marketing System O Fertilizer Import Regulations LJ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 KEAT01.025 STAFF 2/0 Recipient Country Production and Consumption of Staple Food items Implementation of "Food for Progress" Over Time Level of Food Product on and Consumption Consumption Production PL 480fJ Other Donors' Title I Food Aid rMinimally Adequate Per Capita Food Consumption "Food for Progress" as an Inducement to Agricultural Policy Reform "Food for Progress" as an Assurance During Transition Period Austerity Commercial Food Imports timate Goal ./7 Current Situation Time Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Subsequent Years (Food for (Policy (Policy (Program Goals (A Country Becomes Progress Begins) Implementation Enhancement Met) Commercially Viable Phase) Phase) Food Importer) KEATO1 025 STAFF 2/0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 USG Bi-Lateral Assistance Programs PL 480 Title I: Food aid sold on highly concessional terms on a one-year basis to support foreign policy, economic development, and market development objectives. PL 480 Title II: Food aid given away on a one-year basis to the neediest people in a country regardless of their government's policies. ? PL 480 Title III: Multi-year food aid in support of multi-sectoral economic development objectives. GSM 102 & GSM 5: CCC guarantees and loans to develop markets for US agricultural commodities (repayment on a three-year basis). KEAT01.011 STAFF 2/0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 USG Bi-Lateral Assistance Programs (Continued) Economic Support Fund: Grants for multi-purpose budget and balance of payments support commensurate with foreign policy objectives (one-year allocation). Development Assistance: Grants and concessional loans in support of multi-sectoral economic development projects (one-year basis allocation). Economic Policy Initiative: Cash grants in support of multi-sectoral economic reform in Africa (one-year allocation). "Food for Progress": The use of USG-owned food on a multi-year basis in support of agricultural policy reform in key Third World countries. KEAT01.012 STAFF 2/0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R00040003000378_ S?Strong M?Moderate P?Partial N?Negligible Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 USG Bi-Lateral Assistance Programs Programs Program Value (Millions) Structure Terms Duration Program Objectives Market Development Foreign Policy Humanitarian Assistance to Neediest Multi- Sector Economic Development Reform Agricultural Pricing Program Results Domestic Political Support Effectiveness in Meeting Program Objectives PL 480 Title I $730.0 Concessional Credit (15-40 yrs) 1 Year S M P M P S S PL 480 Title II (Section 206) $800.0 $20.0 Grant Grant 1 Year 3 Years N N N N s M " N M N P S P M P PL 480 Title III $106.0 Conditional Grant 3 Years N P P S M P N GSM-102 $5,000.0 Commercial Interest (3 yrs) 1 Year S N N N N S s GSM-5 $120.0 No interest (3 yrs) 1 Year S N N N N M P GSM-301 0 1 Year S N * N N N P N Economic Support Fund $3,438.1 Grant 1 Year N S N N N P S Economic Policy Initiative $75.0 Grant 1 Year N M N S M ? P Not Yet Attempted Development Assistance $2,266.1 Concessional Credit and Grant 1 Year N M P S P P 1 M Food for Progress $90.0 Conditional Grant 4 Years M M N P s S Not Yet Attempted Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 An Integrated Food Aid Program for Sub-Saharan Africa ? "Food for Progress" and the Economic Policy Initiative (EPI) both provide additional resources for Sub-Saharan African countries. "Food for Progress" should not displace PL 480 Titles I, II, III, or other donors' food aid. ? Decision analysis (MAUT) can help determine the proper mix of "Food for Progress", EPI, PL 480, and other food aid instrumentalities for a recipient country. ICEAT01.006 STAFF 2/0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 An Integrated Food-Aid Program for Sub-Saharan Africa (Illustrative) Recipient Countries (by FY 85 ESF) Other Donors 30 % Index % MAUT Title I 20% Index % MAUT Title II 5% Index % MAUT Food Self- Sufficiency 45% Index % MAUT Country Ranking Appropriate Program Sudan 10 17 5.1 10 23 4.6 5 13 0.7 5 10 4.5 14.9 E.P.I. Kenya 7 12 3.6 5 12 2.4 8 21 1.1 2 4 1.8 8.9 Food for Progress Liberia 2 3 0.9 6 14 2.8 0 0 0 5 10 4.5 8.2 Food for Progress Somalia 10 17 5.1 7 16 3.2 0 0 0 6 12 5.4 13.7 E.P.I Zambia 6 10 3.0 5 12 2.4 0 0 0 4 83.6 9.0 E.P.I. Zaire 2 3 0.9 6 14 2.8 5 13 0.7 1 2 0.9 5.3 Food for Progress Zimbabwe 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 20 9.0 9.0 E.P.I Sengal 10 17 5.1 4 9 1.8 10 26 1.3 6 12 5.4 13.6 E.P.I Chad S5 9 2.7 0 0 0 5 13 0.7 3 6 2.7 6.1 Food for Progress Botswana 3 51.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 18 8.1 9.6 E.P.I Niger 1 2 0.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 8 3.0 4.2 Food for Progress Djibouti 2 3 0.9 0 0 0 5 13 0.7 1 2 0.9 2.5 Food for Progress Total Sub-Saharan African 58 43 . 38 50 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 Why Should We Use USG-Owned Food Stocks? ? Provides needed additional food resources without raising appropriations. ? Reduces large USG-owned food stocks overhanging depressed agricultural markets. ? Will not disrupt food aid levels of other PL 480 programs. ? Permits greater year-to-year scheduling flexibility without the pressures of annual appropriations and commodity interests, thereby increasing the "Food for Progress" program's effectiveness for recipient countries and US leverage for policy reform in the agricultural sector. ? For the same reasons, the use of USG-owned food stocks for the "Food for Progress" initiative would lend itself to co-financing arrangements with the World Bank and other financing institutions. KEAT01.013 STAFF 2/0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 -------- * Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 Why would reprogramming of existing PL 480 instrumentalities fail to accomplish the "Food for Progress" objective -- agricultural policy reform? ? Planned PL 480 resources only cover essential State/Aid/USDA requirements to meet A.) Title I/111 multiple objectives, B.) Title II non-emergency statutory minimum food aid, and C.) the Title II reserve for emergencies. ? Reprogramming PL 480 instrumentalities for "Food for Progress" would subject the new initiative to unpredictability of funds and pressures from State/ Aid/USDA to add their multiple goals to the new initiative's single objective of agricultural policy reform, and thus seriously undermine its single objective. ? Reprogramming PL 480 instrumentalities for "Food for Progress" would appear unimaginative and unimportant to the Hill. ? Reprogramming PL 480 instrumentalities for "Food for Progress" would make it unattractive as a legislative proposal because of the resulting loss of many of the unique characteristics of the new Presidential initiative, plus the lack of clearly identified funding. KEAT01.020 STAFF 2/0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 .0 Programs PL 480 Title I PL 480 Title II PL 480 Title III E.P.I. (E.S.F.) Section 416 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 ?Food for Progress" (Section 416 Expanded to Target Reform In Agriculture) Program Characteristics Needed to Promote Agricultural Policy Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa VALUE (Millions) TERMS Economic Reform Conditionality Multi-year Commitment Uses USG Owned Food Free from Annual "Use or Lose" Ap- propriation Free from Domestic Commodity Interest Pressure Free from Competing Agency Interests, ("BARNACLES")" Discretionary Control Over Delivery (Lends Itself to Co-Financing) U.S. Domestic Political Support $730.0 Concessional Credit P N N N N N N P $800.0 Grant N N N N N P N S $106.0 Conditional Grant P S N N N N N N $75.0 Grant S P N N S P P N Sunk Investment (U.S.G.-Owned Commodities) Grant N N S S S S N P Sunk Investment U.S.G.-Owned Commodities Valued at $90.0 million per year Conditional Grant S S S S S S S S S?Strong P?Partial N?Negligible - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 Why would the "Food for Progress" initiative, based on the use of surplus commodities owned by the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC - Section 416), succeed better than existing food aid programs in achieving agricultural policy reform? ? The "Food for Progress" initiative would be the only US food aid instrument employing additional food resources specifically for the purpose of leveraging price and policy reform in key Third World countries. The major distinguishing characteristics of the new initiative may be summarized as follows: It would make clear President Reagan's intent to match temporary USG-owned food stocks with the food needs of key Third World countries during their transition periods to more market-oriented agricultural systems (not a 30-year food aid program). It would use food resources already paid for by the USG where the net additional cost would be transport, minus savings in storage. KEAT01.018 STAFF 2/0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 _? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 Why would the "Food for Progress" initiative, based on the use of surplus commodities owned by the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC - Section 416), succeed better than existing food aid programs in achieving agricultural policy reform? (Continued) MP =11 ea. ONO It would permit multi-year food aid programming free from "use or lose" appropriations, and the associated pressures from commodity interest groups. It would increase our discretionary ability to vary annual food deliveries in accordance with the changing needs and performance of recipient countries. It would be an efficient, carefully targetted food aid instrument free of the "barnacles" built into PL 480 by law and agency practices', and characterized by conflicting interests and institutional perspectives. It would enjoy broad congressional support as a new initiative with greater promise of achieving agricultural policy reform in key Third World countries than the usual food programs under PL 480. KEAT01.019 STAFF 2/0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 Interested parties Farm BLOC Private Voluntary Organizations Congress Executive Branch US Domestic Political Acceptability of the "Food for Progress" Initiative Essential Features PL 480 Continues Food Stockpile Not Rebuilt No Displacement of Commercial Food Exports No Adverse Budgetary Impact End Goal is Getting KeyThird World Countries Off Dole and Back into International Commercial Food Market + + + 0 + + ? 0 0 + + + + + 0 + 0 + + + + Support ? Oppose 0 Neutral/Divided _ _ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2014/06/03 : CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 Central Intelligence Agency MEMORANDUM FOR: Washington. D. C.20505 Robert M. Kimmitt Executive Secretary National Security Council SUBJECT: NSDD on "Food for Progress" ER 84-10343/1 19 December 1984 REFERENCE: Your memo to Multiple Addressees dated 18 Dec 84, Same Subject 1. We believe the proposed NSW) on a "Food for Progress" non-emergency food aid initiative for the Third World to be timely and useful. 2. As the proposed NSDD notes, a major problem that needs to be considered is whether, given the current and projected emergency needs for food in Africa--due to drought, mismanagement, and dysfunctional policies--conditional assistance is feasible. The Western response, as reflected in US assistance to the current famine in Africa, entails massive amounts of essentially unconditional humanitarian aid. 3, We call your attention to two relevant recent interagency intelligence studies on this problem: IIA: Food Problems in Sub-Saharan Africa: Prospects for 1984 and Beyond, dated 22 March 1984; and SNIE 70-84, African Famine: Short-Term Prospects, Problems, and Opportunities, dated December 1984. Execikti ve Secretary CONFID NTIAL 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 EILEUU 11 V E 1 AMA 1 ROUTING SLIP TO: ACTION INFO DATE INITIAL 1 DCI . X 2 DDCI X 3 EXDIR X 4 D/ICS 5 DDI X \ 6 DDA 7 DDO X 8 DDS&T 9 Chm/NIC 10 GC 11 IG 12 Compt 13 D/Pers 14 D/OLL 15 D/PAO 16 SA/IA 17 AO/DCI 18 C/IPD/OIS 19 SEVECON ?X -N--...__ 20 0/0Gi .-., X 21 22 SUSPENSE ? Date Remarks To 19: Pis provide concurrence/ comments for Executive Secretary's trans- mittal by 1500 hrs , 20 Dec 84. STAT Executive5e?tory - 19 P r R4 Date eft Oh /1/1 01% Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 ' Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03 : CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 NArIg04?114. SECURITY COUNCIL ulowstovimicTord. ?C. 201,0111 !December 18, 1984 UNCLASSIFIED with CONFIDENTIAL Attachmenip MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DONALD P. GREGG Assistant to the Vice President for Nation0 Security Affairs MR. CHARLES HILL Executive Secretary Department of State MR. CHRISTOPHER HICKS Executive Secretary Department of the Treasliry COLONEL R. J. AFFOURTIT ,Executive Secretary Department of Defense MR. RAYMOND LETT Executive Assistant to the Secretary Department of Agricultuge MRS. HELEN ROBBINS Executive Assistant to the Secretary Department of Commerce, MS. LINDA AREY Director, Executive Secretariat Department of Transportation SUBJECT: NSDD on "Food for SYSTEM II 91256 I Executive Registry ,-- 84- 10343 MR. ALTON KEEL Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs Office of Management and Budget Executive Secretary Central Intelligence Agency MR. DENNIS WHITFIELD Executive Assistant to the United States Trade Representative MR. WILLIAM NISKANEN Member, President's Council of Economic Advisers MR. JOHN A. SVAHN Assistant to the President for Policy Development MR. MALCOLM H. BUTLER Executive Secretary Agency for International Development MS. RAPHAELLE SEMMES Executive Secretary Peace Corps Progress" The attached NSDD on a !qiciod for Progress," non-emergency food aid initiative results from the NSSD 1-84 interagency study. It is contemplated that wflen the President signs this policy document, Richard Levine of the nsc staff will chair an interagency group which will make recommendations on an appropriate implementatlion, plan for this policy initiative. John Gordley of the Ott-lice of Policy Development will serve as vice-chair for this group. UNCLASSIFIED with CONFIDENTIAL Attachment; STAT 7 '-"7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 UNCLASSIFIED with - CONFIDENTIAL Attachment 2 ? Due to the President's interest in this matter, agency comments are requested on this drat NSDD by close of business Thursday, December 20,.1984. ? Robert M. N. Kimmitt Executive Secretary Attachment Draft NSDD . 4 UNCLASSIFIED with CONFIDENTIAL Attachment L._ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 z ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 .??? CONFIDENTIAL .NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION DIRECTIVE NUMBER U.S. T11RD WORLD FOOD AID: A "FOOD FOR eROGRESS" PROGRAM (U) NSSD 1-84 established the terms of reference for a study aimed at producing new, effective initiatives to addreps Third World hunger problems; that is, both emergency situations and 1ong-ter* problems, and how U.S. and donor country food aid program' affect these cases. The NSSD 1-84 study of emergency food aid was completed in July 1984 and resulted in a ten-point program to better respond to grave food crises, as articulAted in NSDD 143. Today's food emergency reemphasizes the need to tackle the underlying structural problems of aiw-icultural stagnation in the Third World. (U) The study of non-emcrgepcy food aid has focused on how U.S. food aid could be used ,as an incentive for Third World countries to increase tpletr food production through agricultural reform, noting that an adequate agricultural sector is a prerequisit4 gor development in Third World countries. This study an considered the economic and political conditions in mioly Third World countries experiencing chronic food shortages. (U) Socialist economic systmgi, prevalent in underdeveloped countries, have failed Ito achieve economic growth. As a CONFIDENTIAL Declassify .on: OADR Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 * Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 CONFIDENTIAL 2 result of this, and insufficient aid by the USSR, an increasing number of Third World countries once dominated by ? the socialist model are experimenting with free market approaches. (C) In response to this policy context, the United States Government will begin a new food aid program to be can.ed "Food for Progress which will use American resources to support key Third Woxld countries which have made commitments to agricultural policy changes in six basic areas: wa?????? WNW MM. IMO ?=111, Adequate price levels; for agricultural commodities and timely payment to indigenous farmers; Greater farmer ace,rsq to private, competitive markets; A market-determine 0 exchange rate; Adequate foreign e,Kchange supplies for agricultural Inputs (fertilizer, pesticides, equipment, etc.), along with their efficieolt and timely delivery; Adequate rural inffantructure (farm-to-market roads, collection station, etc.); and Involvement of the private sector in agriculture and marketing. (C) CONFIDENTIAL 1 'I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03. CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 ' Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 CONFIDENTIAL 3 Anierltn regbiri-s'i;irrp-p-O-a"ifiiiiip re-Me ntat cy changes over a medium-term transition period in Third World countries--initially those in Sub-Saharan Africa. This Judicious use of foreign 4id--where appropriate on a multi-year basis--will reduce the political risks to leaders of Third World countries committed to undertaking - ? agricultural reform during a transition period of economic hardship. (C) Resources to support policy changes will be obtained from two sources: The African Economic Policy Initiative, a 5-year, $500 million program intended to support economic reform in Africa. First-year funding of $75 million was provided by. the Congress in the Economic Support Fund in 1985. 0 The P.L. 480 f orlf3id program, either through more effective use of eKisting Title I resources or, if necessary, through additional resources. (C) In contrast with other Ipx4sting.41d programs with Comprehensive and multiiple objectives, this initiative will have as its objective title achievement of and agricultural policy reform in Third IfJorJd countries. "Food for Progress" may benefit from co-finAncing with the World Bank and other financial institutions. (tl) CONFIDENTIAL Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 CONFIDENTIAL 4 The National Security'C,ounCil will-chair an interagency group with repreSentatives (cosi State, AID, USDA, CEA, Ota, Treasury and the White jiouse Congressional Affairs Office to develop an appropritite implementation plan for this Presidential initiative. The Office for Policy. Development will serve as vice-chair (or this. group. Priority should be given to implementing this initiative within current. Eirograms and budgets. Prompt an43 positive congressional action is to be considered a signifiant concern in preparing an implementation program-..which may include changes in existing laws and authorities or new legislation. This interagency group should also consicler the relationship between this 'initiative and cuTtent ,And proposed U.S. responses to the emergency situation cre;ited by the life-threatening hunger situation in Africa. (1p) The interagency group sl4ou1d -forward an implementation plan, with options as appxopriate, to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs 20 working days from the date of this memorahdum, noting agency and congressional views, .This implementation plan will be decided upon through the NSC and budget procIpsn. (U) CONFIDENTIAL Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 . . Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8 I71. ? F. i3 : 19 rtii ? 561 to I WASHFAX RECEIPT E Will "PE HO CSE C MESSAGE NO.' cLAss.,..TioN comic FROM /4! Aridsofirr____, (NAME) =NW, aie6 6A) 7- PAGES E XTENS ION ) ( ROOM NUMBER) MESSAGE DESC R I PT I ON___LS_P44 p 'AJ "fikiN) et- Aoaite,s's* TO ( AGENCY ) VI o B/G4-1/o DELIVER TO: elf&/57-01)!*-ir 5 Col. Aecilale/r` AsTelt/ 44441/Alir "4-teeeoel elerugz. DEPT/ROOM NO. EXTENS ION REmARics.1.4.4 ??????????." . Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/06/03: CIA-RDP90B01013R000400030003-8