PRESIDENT REAGAN SIGNED NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION DIRECTIVE 84 (NSDD-84)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01370R000200310021-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2008
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: January 26, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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U.C. U p rt menf of Justice
Office of. t-r Deputy Attorney Gera :
MEMORANDUM FOR, THOSE ATTENDING 4:30 MEETING ON'JANUARY.2
Pres.ident...Reagan. signed National SecurityDecision Dire
tive
c
14-(NSDD-84) on March 11, 1983.-(See Tab A.) This directive
contains a number of measures to safeguard classified infor-
mation from unauthorized disclosure. Implementation-of the
directive has been delayed by controversy regarding two aspects.
Paragraph l.b. of the directive requires
that persons with-access to Sensitive.
Compartmented. Information (SCI) sign
secrecy agreements that include a pre
publication review provision. This sort"
of "lifetime censorship agreement" has
been upheld.by the Supreme Court in the
Snepp case.and used at CIA and NSA for
some years. (See Tab B.)
Paragraph 5 of- the directive requires that
agencies clarify -their
policies so that
"appropriate adverse consequences" could
follow an employee's -refusal to be poly-
graphed in a-leak investigation. This-
does not-require.use of the polygraph in
any particular case; it does mean that
agency policies cannot effectively preclude
-polygraph use. (See Tab C..)
This controversy has become linked to an unrelated Department of
Defense proposal to permit greater use of the polygraph in deter-
mining security clearances for certain employees in highly sensi-
tive jobs. (See Tab C.) In addition, some press critics have
linked these measures with other -Administration..initiatives :as
part of an overall program to squelch the First ,Amendment. (:S.ee
Tab Di)
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Issue for Decision
Congress has enacted legislation that blocks =- until
April 15, 1984.-- any change in polygraph policy at the
Departmen.t..of Defense, and any new policy regarding prepubli-
cation review, throughout' the government. It is quite likely,
that legislation will. be introduced to extend the current mora-
toria until 1985 or.to impose permanent restrictions on the use
of polygraphs and: prepublicatiOn review.
gs in ebruary. Other-hearings are likely.
We need to decide how to respond to this legislative chal
lenge Administration witnesses will be called to. testify
starting on February-7 before-a. joint hearing of subcommittees
chaired by=Don Edwards and Pat Schroeder. Senator.Mathias also
plans hearin F
--Options-
(l) Abandon efforts to imo.le`ment- F.haco
cance. Permanent legislation could- be avoided at most, the-
current - _._
m
t0: thi-s effect--would -Drobably
oratoria would be extended another year.
Implementation of this option would require rev t'
is could be
--combined, with option-3 so as. to_ avoi_d an, impress-ion that we no
lonner carp ahr-i i. 4.l-..
oca ion or
suspension of-paragraphs l.b. and 5 of NSDD-84 Th'
t
ions. The
intelligence committees, especially in the r c
Senate, are likely to
be..most sympatheti-c- to- these- policies However, some. (at -least, in the prepublication- review program) will be
.ne_cessary._to- win- _su_fici.ent support. The precise modifications
-would have to-:be developed in consultation with key Senators
(such as Ch f
(-2) Seek to implement these. policies, with some modi.fi .,
cations, and OD Dose further legislative rest
f
i se only in the manner of implementation.
period of time
(e.g.., 12 years) after leaving.-the go;vernme-nt. Another:possible
change wouldbe to limit the scope of- materials required to-be-
.submitted for review. Such modifications would not. require any
change in NSDD-84 t i
t
g emen could be
modified to require submissions for a limit d
For' example the
prepublication review a rP
CI ee,. Lugar,, and Huddlest.on)
re
quire indications
from the White House to key Senators -that the Administration is
serious about implementing these policies, as modified. -The
White House legislative affairs and communications ;off.ce:would
have to work closely with NSC,-;Justice,"CIA and Defense in this
Successful pursuit of this option will
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effort- It would be particularly helpful if CIA and NSA-,.could
declassify a few specific examples of the damage to flat ional:
security caused by unauthorized disclosures of classified
problem. The intelligence community has long sought a com-
prehensive criminalstlatute to punish . unauthorized disclosures
of classified information A statute. providing civil penalties
could,be sought., instead of, or in addition to, a criminal
:statute. Enactment of such legislation would provide more
effective remedies. than are available under existing law and,
(3) Seek. to enact new. legislation to address the
is tobegin a long-range.campaign for-enactment in 1985 or
The chances'of getting such legislation enacted this year
are practically nonexistent. The main purpose-of this option
later..
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Text of NSDD-84, Mar. 11, 1983,
General ' Reference -
President's Memorandum for-Federal Employees.
Clearances and Classification Activity
Statistics on August 30, 1983 Security
Review
Form 4193 (Dec. 1981)
Some Fiction and Facts about Prepublication
Prepublication Review
Development of Policy
.New SCI Nondisclosure Agreement (Aug..1983)
Statistics on Polygraph Accuracy.
Statistics on Federal Polygraph Use
.DOD Polygraph Screening Proposal
Use of Polygraph inLeak Investigations
Four Categories of Polygraph Use
Polygraphs
Related Issues of Legislative Interest
Proposals to Amend FOIA
Executive Order on -Classification - (E.O. 12356)
New FBI Domestic Security/Terrorism Guidelines
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safe
uardin
4 rational Security Xngormation
As stated. In Executive Order 12356, only that information whose
-disclosure would harm the national security interests of the
Vnited States snay be classified. Every effort should be made to
declassify information that no.longer requires protection in the
inte
st
re
of national security
.
At thap same tine, however, safeguarding against unlawful disclosures
of properly classified information is a matter of grave concern
and high priority for this Administration. In addition to the
requirements set forth, In Executive Order 12356, and based on the
recommendations contained. In the interdepartmenal report
forwarded -by the Attorney -6eneral, I direct the- following:
1. Each agency of the Executive Branch. that originates
or handles. classified. Information shall ado pt internal
procedures
to safeguard against unlawful disclosures of classified
information. Such procedures shall at a minimum provide as
follows:
a. All persons with authorized access to classified
information shall be required to sign a nondisclosure
agreement as a condition of access. This requirement may.
be implemented prospectively by agencies for which the
administrative burden of compliance would otherwise be
excessive,
b. All persons with authorized access to Sensitive
Compartmented Information (SCI) shall be required to sign
a nondisclosure agreement as a condition of access to SCI
and other classified information. All such agreements
must include a provision for prepublication review to
assure deletion of SCI and other classified information.
c.- A21 -agreements required in paragraphs 1.e. and
1.b. must be in a form determined by the- Department- of
.Justice to be enforceable In 'a Civil action brought by
the United States. The Director, Information Security
Oversight Office (I500), shall develop standardised
forms that satisfy these requirements.
..d. Appropriate policies shall be adopted to govern
contacts between media representatives and agency personnel.,
so as to reduce the opportunity for negligent or deliberate
disclosures of classified information. All persons with
authorized access to classified information shall-be
clearly apprised of the agency?s policies in this regard.
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Each agency o` the xec tiv 'rars%
th
t
i
i
~
.
a
or
g
at s
r
handles classi.fled inf ara-cotion shall adopt Inter
:
al
d
n
proce
ures .
to
govern th. reporting. at
ia.
iavestigstion of unauthorized- di%cla3suie.s of
Luc
'
i f r tion
e
h
o
.
.
.
ac
oc
dures- sh ii, at -a minimum provida that&
'"""
The a..- ? All such di sc1oxures -that
2lire' 9efi'c'g- 3~$idsrs o---
.ariously d %. t
i
,o
ts mission and responsibilities
, ohall be :evaluated to ascertain the. mature of the information'
i3icloged and the
.p
e?xte t to Which It had been disseminated.
b. - The aQencv shall e-n*IAnI,?*
g ve assistance from other agencies.
Zo or Concurrently with seeking
invests- ati
c. The agency shall Maintain records of wre..,
~..___
D
d
ace
and investigated.
o
investigations of such unauthorized disclosures will be denied
further access to classified information and subjected to
other administrative sa:nctiofls as appropriate.
o
Y- - ng y
made such disclosures or to have refused coo erati
i h
e. Persons determined by the agenc to have kn
ws 1
e h
uncut orized disclosure of such Information.
g g cy by conducting internal Investigations of
th
Agencies in the possession of classifi
d i
f
ma
e
n
or
tion
originating. with another agency shall cooperate with the.
originatin a b
3. Unauthorized disclosures of classified information shall
.be reported to the Department of Justice and the Information
Security Oversight Office, as required by statute and Executive
orders. The Department of Justice shall continue to review
reported unauthorized disclosures of classified information to
..determine whether FBI investigation is warranted. Interested
departments and agencies shall be consulted in developing criteria
for evaluating such matters and In determining which cases should
receive investigative priority. The FBI Is authorized to
'Investigate such matters as constitute potential violations of
federal criminal law, even though administrative sanctions may be
sought Instead of Criminal prosecution.
4. Nothing-in this directive is intended to modify or
preclude interagency agreements between FBI and other criminal
investigative agencies regarding their responsibility for
conducting investigations within their own agencies or departments.
The Office-of Personnel Management and all departments
and agencies with employees having access to classified information
are directed to revise existing regulations and:policies, as -
necessary,so!that employees may be required to subait to polygraph-
examinations,1when appropriate, In the course of investigations of
unauthorized disclosures of classified information. As aiminimum,
_-.such. regulations shall permit an agency to decide that appropriate
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 orders, regulations, and guidelines.. .
pot .relied upon.to tha.exclusion of other information obtained
'at~v~.zse conseeguence3 will Noll?w an employee?e refusal. to coop rate
with .a. plygraph_ examine`ion that 3s limited in scope to th&
circ%ams,L lcez of the unauthorized diaclosure under Investigation.
Agency `~ lation p o i3a that or 1y .the head of :the &gencyo
or his delegate,, is empowered- to-..order- an-employee to-aubbmit_to_a.__
polygraph ex-amination. exults . of polygraph examinat.iona should
43url. nvest-igations.:
The Attorney General, in consultation with the. Director,
Office of Personnel Management, is requested to. establish an
interdepartmental group to study the federal personnel, security
program and. recommend appropriate revisions in. existing Executive
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Exh,~
V IF-. S 04n
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 30, 1983
I NORF.NDUM FOR FEDERAL L PLOYEES
SUBJECT: Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information
Recent unauthorized disclosures of classified information
concerning our diplomatic, military, and intelligence activities
threaten our ability to carry out national security policy.
I have issued a directive detailing procedures to curb these
disclosures and to streamline procedures for investigating them.
However, unauthorized disclosures are so harmful to our
national security that I wish to underscore to each of you
the seriousness with which I view them.
The unauthorized disclosure of our Nation's classified informa-
tion by those entrusted with its protection is improper,
unethical, and plain.wrong. This kind of unauthorized disclosure
is more than a so-called "leak"--it is illegal. The Attorney
General has been asked to investigate a number of recent
disclosures of classified information. Let me make it clear
that we intend to take appropriate administrative action against
any Federal employee found to have engaged in unauthorized
disclosure of classified information, regardless of rank or
position. Where circumstances warrant, cases will also be
referred for criminal prosecution.
The American people have placed a special trust and confidence
in each of us to protect their property with which we are
entrusted, including classified information. They expect us
to protect fully the national security secrets used to protect
them in a dangerous and difficult world. All of us have
taken an oath faithfully to discharge ot.r duties as public
servants, an oath that is violated when unauthorized disclosures
of classified information are made.
Secrecy in national security matters is a necessity in this
world. Each of us, as we carry out our individual duties,
recognizes that certain matters require confidentiality. We
must be able to carry out diplomacy with friends and foes on
a confidential basis; peace often quite literally depends on
it--and this includes our efforts to reduce the threat of
nuclear war.
We must also be able to protect our military forces from
present or potential adversaries. From the time of the Founding
Fathers, we have accepted the need to protect military secrets.
Nuclear dangers, terrorism, and aggression similarly demand
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about these dangers -and our sources of this information
that we must be able to gather intelligence -information
must see protected if we are to continue to receive it. Even
in peacetime, lives depend on our ability to keep certain
matters secret.
As public servants, - we have-no legitimate excuse for resorting
t
e
o thes
unauthorized disclosures. There are other means
available to -express ourselves:
We make every effort to keep the Congress and the
people informed about national security policies.
and actions. Only a fraction of information
-concerning national security policy must be
classified.
- We have mechanisms for presenting alternative
views and'opinion3 within our government.
material and for downgrading information. that may
be overclassified.
Workable procedures also exist for reporting wrong-
.doing or illegalities, both'to the appropriate
Executive Branch offices and to the Congress.
Finally, each of us has the right to. leave our position of
trust and criticize our government and its policies, if that
.is what our-conscience dictates. What we do not have is. the
right to damage our country by giving away its ..necessary secrets.
We are a3 a Nation an open and trusting people, with a proud
tradition of free speech, robust debate, and the right to.
disagree strongly over all national policies. No one would
ever want to change that. But we are also a mature and
disciplined people who. understand the need for responsible
action. As servants of the people, we in. the Federal Government
must understand the duty we have to those who place their
trust in us. I ask each of you to join me in- redoubling our
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Statistics on Security Clearances
and Classification Activity
Security Clearances (Excluding CIA. and NSA)
Top Secret - SCI
Top Secret -.No-SCI
Secret
Confidential
FY
80
(Carter)
FY
81
(transition)
FY
82
(Reagan)
FY 83 (Reagan)
about "same
-About same
about same
.down 18%,
Original Plus
Derivative
Classification
up 10%
up 8%
up 1.%
up 3%
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Prepublication Review: Development of Policy
For many years CIA employees have signed secrecy agreements
United States (1980).
of court decisions have upheld the enforceability of these
agreements, including the Supreme Court.'s decision in Snepp v.
materials that might contain classified information. A number
requiring them to obtain agency clearance before publishing
-overruled some of the broader implications of the Supreme
contractual. secrecy obligations. These guidelines in effect
limit._the discretion of the Justice Department in enforcing
leaving-office, Attorney General Civiletti adopted guidelines
-Civiletti Guidelines. In December 19.80, shortly before
Court's opinion in the Snepp case.
General Smith revoked the Civiletti guidelines because they.
suggested the United States would not enforce secrecy obli-
-- Guideline Revocation. In September 1981, Attorney
gat.ions- to. the extent-.-permitted-by- the Snepp decision. The
new policy is to "evenhandedly and strenuously" enforce secrecy
obligations. The personal approval of the Attorney General is?
,required before, initiating any such litigation..
Form 4193. In 1981,'DCI Casey promulgated a new secrecy
agreement (Form 4193) for all government employees with access
to SCI, which contains a prepublication review provision. This
agreement was initially drafted-during the Carter Administration
as part of a broader plan to upgrade information security stan-
dards (APEX) which was ultimately abandoned. The language of
this agreement has several defects that would make it difficult
to enforce. For example, it only authorized deletion of SCI
(not Secretor Top Secret information) from manuscripts that are
submitted for prepublication review.
NSDD-84. This directive was issued by the President in.
March 1.983. It requires two new standard secrecy agreements, to
be approved by the Justice Department as enforceable in civil
litigation. The two agreements were developed by an interdepart-
mental committee under supervision of the NSC staff, approved.
by the Justice Department, and publicly announced in August
The classified information nondisclosure
have refused to implement this agreement
because of controversy regarding the-SCI
nondisclosure. agreement.
.for prepublication review.-and has not been
very controversial.. :.However,many-agencies
agreement does not include a provision
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-- The SCI nondisclosure agreement replaces
Form 4193 and includes a prepublication
review provision. Because the Mathias
amendment (discussed below) was introduced soon
after. its promulgation, very few officials have
signed the new agreement.
The Mathias Amendment. On October 20, 1983, the Senate
adopted by a vote of 56-34 this amendment to the State
Department authorization bill, which was finally enacted on
November 22. The amendment prohibits until April 15, 1984,
any prepublication review agreement or policy that was not in
effect prior to March 1983. The stated purpose is to delay
implementation of the new SCI nondisclosure agreement so that
Congress has time to study the issue further. The Mathias
amendment does not interfere with the continued use and
enforcement of Form 4193.
House Committee Report. On November 22, 1983, a
-majority of the House Government Operations Committee approved a
report recommending appropriate legislation unless the President
rescinds the portion of NSDD-84 requiring prepublication review
agreements. Six Republicans signed a dissenting statement sup-
porting the President's directive, but recommending that con-
sideration be given to replacing the lifetime prepublication
review provision with a commitment limited to a reasonable
period of time after leaving government employment.
Congressional Outlook. There is little congressional
interest in preventing CIA and NSA from continuing their pre
publication review programs. However, there is substantial
opposition to requiring prepublication review for other
employees with SCI access. This opposition applies to both the
new nondisclosure agreement as well as the old Form 4193 (which
went unnoticed when originally promulgated).
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Some Fiction and Facts About
Prepublication Review
Fiction: Secrecy agreements requiring prepublication review
violate the First Amendment.
Fact: The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
prepublication review for CIA employees in Snepp v.
United. States (1980).
Fiction: The Reagan Administration wants to extend prepublication
review to millions of government employees with access
Fact: The requirement will only. apply to employees with access
to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). There are
about 112,000 such employees, most in the Department of
Defense, who were not previously covered.
Fiction: Employees covered by this agreement will have to submit
for review anything they ever write for the rest of
their lives.
Fact: , Only materials that include information relating to
specified intelligence matters will have to be
.submitted.
Fiction: .This program will allow the Administration in power to
censor. views of people they disagree with.
=Fact: Only classified. information can be deleted. Judicial
-review is provided, and the . government mustbe able to
prove in court that every word it wants to delete is
properly classified.
B-3
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Fiction: Prepublication review will keep authors
their views in atimely manner.
q?,
from publishing.
Fact: The agreement requires review to be conducted in 30 days
a
Fiction: This program will effectively vrevent former. . nff 4 r?4 i's I t
s a maximum. Last year, CIA. conducted 213 such reviews
and completed them in an average of 13 days. Reviews
have been-conducted in a matter of hours for authors.
working on short deadlines.
.Prepublication'review does not apply to extemporaneous
oral comments. Only if oral statements are given from a
This. program is unnecessary because former employees
hardly ever disclose classified. information in books or
speeches.
Fact: Since 1977, some 929 items have been submitted to CIA
for prepublication review, of which 241 contained
.classified information that was protected by the
program,- A similar opportunity to vrotect classified
information would exist for other employees with access
to equally sensitive information.
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An Agreement Between ---
and the United. States
(Name - Printed or Typed)
1. Intending to be legally bound,
granted access to information J hereby accept the obligations containctl in this Agreement in consideration of my being
protected within Special Access programs, hereinafter referred to in this Agreement as Sensitive Com-
partmented Information (SCI). I have been advised that SC! involves or derives from intelligence sources or methods and is classified
or classifiable under the standards of Executive Order 12116,5 or
th
E
o
er
xecutive ord ottt Idd
err saue. unerstan and accept that by being
granted access to SCI; special confidence and trust shall be placed in me by the United States Government.
2. 1 hereby acknowledge at I have received a
ri
i
d
secu
ty
n
octrination cnigh
ocernn te nature and protection of SCI, including
::;the procedures to be followed in azccrtainirg whetlsrx other persons to whom I contemplate disclosing this information have been
approved for access to it~pnd I understand these tocedures. I understand that I may be required to sign subsequent agreements upon
-, being granted access to different categories of SCI.I further-understand th
il
at a
my obligations ud thi Am
nersgreeent continue to exist
? ?whether or not- I am required to sign such subsequent agreements.
3. 1 have been advised that direct or indirect unauthorized disclosure, una
m uthorized retention, or negligent handling of SCI by
e could cause irreparable injury to the United Stai
b
rs or
e used to advanta by fii I
ge aoregn naton. hereby agree that I will never
- divulge such information to anyone who is not authorized to receive it without prior written authorization from the United States
Government department or agency (hereinafter Department or Agency) that last authorized my access to SCI. I further understand
that I am obligated by law and regulation not to discl
s
l
ifi
o
e any c
ass
ed informatio ihid f
nn an unautorzeashion.
4. In consideration of being granted access to SCI a
d
f b
i
n
o
e
ng assigned or rtid iuf
i position o special eonfidena and trust
eanen a reqiring access to SCI, I hereby agree to submit for se
it
cur
y rev
ew by the Department or information, all information or materials
Agency that last authorized my access to such
includin
work
f f
i
h
,
g
s o
ict
on w
ich contain o
,r purport to contain-any
ties that produce or relate to SCI or that I have reason to believe are derived from SCI, that contemplate discilosinato any ~o~
authorized to have access to SC! or that I have prepared for public disclosure. I understand and agree that my g y person not
information and materials for review a obligation to submit such
applies durin
the c
f
g
ourse o
my access to SCId thfd I
anereater, an agree to make any required
submissions prior to discussing the information or materials with, or showing them to, anyone who is not authorized to have access to SCI.
I further agree that I will not disclose such information
r
i
l
o
mater
a
s to any persontthoid h
no aurze toave access to SCI until I have
received written authorization from the Department or Agency that last authorized my access to SC! that such disclosure is permitted.
b
d i
e
n paragraph 4 rs to give the united States a reasonable opportunity to
determine whether the information or materials submitted
pursuant to paragraph 4 set forth any SCI. I further understand that the
Department or Agency to which I have submitted materials will act upon them, coordinating within the Intelligence Community when
appropriate, and make a response to me within a reasonable ti
me not to exceed 30 worki d f df
,ngaysromate o receipt.
6. 1 have been advised that any breach of this A
reeme
t
g
n
may result in the terminatif SCI
on o my access to and retention in a
position of special confidence and trust requiring such access, as well as the termination of my employment or other relationships with
any Department or Agency that provides me with access t
SCI I
o
n addition I hav bdidh
.,eeen avse tat any unauthorized disclosure of
SCI by me may constitute violations of United States criminal laws, including the provisions of Sections 793, 794, 798, and 952, Title
18, United States Code, and of Section 783(b), Title 50, United States Code. Nothing in this Agreement constitutes a waiver by the
United States of the right to prosecute me for any statutory violation.
7. 1 understand that the United States Government may seek any remedy available to it to enforce this Agreement including,
but not limited to, application for a court crier prohibiting disclosure of information in breach of thss Agreement. I have been advised
that the action can be brought against me in any of the several appropriate United States District Courts where the United States
Government ma) elect to file the action. Court costs and reason
bl
a
assessed against me if 1 lose such action. C attorneys foes incurred by the united States Government may be
.
8. 1 understand that all information to which I may obtain access by signing this Agreement is now and will forever remain the
property of the United States Government. I do not now, nor will 1 ever, possess any right, interest, title, or claim whatsoever to such
information. I agree that I shall return all materials
which ma
hav
c
i
,
y
e
ome
nto my possession or fohih Iibl b
r wc am responseecause of.
such access, upon demand by an authorized representative of the United States Government or upon the conclusion of my employment
or other relationship with the United States Govern
t
ti
men
en
ty providing me access t shtil If I d
ouc maeras.o not return such materials
upon request, I understand this may be a violation of Section 793, Title 18, United States Code, a United States criminal law.
9.; Unless and until I am released in writing by an authorized representative of the Department or Agency that last provided me
with access to SC!, I understand that all conditions and obligations imposed upon me by this Agreement apply during the time I am
granted access to SCI, and at all times thereafter. - -
10. Each provision of this Agreement is severable If a court sh
ld f
d
i
i
ou
in
any prov
s
on of this At t bfb
.greemenoe unenorceale, till
other provisions of this Agreement shall remain in full force and effect. This Agreement concerns SCI and does not set forth such other
conditions and obligatio~is not related t
SC!
o
as may now or hereaftrti tl b
e perano my empoymenty or assignment or relationship with
the-Department or Ageky.
11. 1 have read this Agreement carefully and my questions, if any,have- been answered to my satisfaction. I acknowledge that
11'e tjiefing oMcer has made available Sections 793, 794, 798, and 952 of Title 18, United States Code, and Section 783(b) of Title-50,
United States Codc,,and Executive Order 12065, as amended,,so.ahat I may read them at this time, if Iso choose.
12. 1 hereby assign to the United States Government all rights, title and interest, and all royalties, remunerations, and emoluments that
have resulted, will result, or may result from any disclosure, publication, or revelation not consistent with the terms of this Agreement.
RMIA
4193 escort nrv,ous
EDrtgw d.A we o*eba w4 VA so V oft - _ ..~.
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The. execution of this Agreement was witnessed by the undersigned who acccpted it on behalf of the United States Government
as a prior condition of access to Sensitive Compartmented Information.
WITNESS and ACCEPTANCE:
SECURITY BRIEFING ACKNOWLEDGMENT
I hereby acknowledge that I was briefed on the following SCI Special Access P. ogom(s);
(Special Access Programs by Initials Only)
Signature of individual Briefed Date Briefed
Printed or Typed Nome
Sociar'Security Number (See Notice Solo,,,) Organisation (Name and Address)
I certify that the above SCI occess(es) were approved in accordance with relevant SCI procedures and that the briefing presented by
me on the above dote was also in accordance therewi
Printed or Typed Nome
Social Security Number (See Notice Below)
Organization (Names and Address)
SECURITY DEBRIEFING ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Moving been reminded of my continuing obligation to comply with the terms of this Agreement, I hereby acknowledge that I was de-
br iefed on the following SCI. Special Access Proprnm(s):
(Special Access Programs by Initials Only)
Social Security Number (See Notice Below) Organization (Name and Address)
I certify that the debriefing presented by me on the above-date was in accordance with relevant SCI procedures.
Signature of Debriefing Officer
Printed or Typed
Organization (Name and Address)
Social?,3ecu6ty Number (See Notice Below)
NOTICE: The Privacy Act. 3 U.S.C. 522a, requires that federal agencies inform individuals, at the time-information is solicited from them, whether
the disclosure is mandatory or voluntary, by what authority such information is solicited, and what uses will be made of the information. You are
hereby advised that authority for soliciting your Social Security Account Number (SSN) is Executive Order 9397. Your SSN will be used to identify
you precisely when it is necessary to I) certify that you have access to the information indicated above, 2) determine that your access to the information
indicated has terminated, or 3) certify that you have witnessed a briefing or debriefing. Although disclosure of your SSN is not mandatory, your failure
to do so may impede such eenitxstiona or dcterminatiom. -
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Sensitive Compartmented Information
Nondisclosure Agreement
J%u ^gr=msnt za
(Name-print err T7z .
-1. Intending to be legally bound, I hereby accept the other classified information, I hereby agree to submit
l
A
ast
gency
obligations contained in this Agreement in consider for securty review by the Department or
known as Sensitive Compartmented Information access approval all materials, including works of
ve been advised and am aware that SCI .. fiction, that I contemplate disclosing to any person not
I h
SCI
a
(
).
involves or derives-from intelligence sourc or mesh- authorized to have such information, or that I have
ods and is classified or classifiable under the stand- prepared for public disclosure, which concern or puce
a
ins
ands of Executive Order 12356, or under other Execu- port to cont
jve
being granted access to SCI;.special confidence and . (a) any SCI, any description of activities that
-trust shall ba blaexd"in me by the United States product or relate to SCI, or any information
2. I hereby acknowledge that I have received a
-:security indoctrination concerning the nature and.
protection of SCI, including the procedures to be
whether other persons to
followed in ascersauung
whom I contemplate disclosing this information have I understand and agree that my obligation to submit
been approved for access to it, and that I understand such information and materials for review applies
these procedures. I understand that I may be required during the course of my access to SCI and. at all times
to sign subsequent agreements as a condition of being thereafter. However, I am not required to submit for
ories of SCL I further review any such materials that exclusively contain
t cate
a diff
g
eren
granted access et
understand thatall, my obligations under this Agree information lawfully obtained by me at a time when I
meat continue to exist whether or not I am required to have no employment, contract or other-relationship
-~ _a. _ ??_e-_~ e?._.~ /"_~..~~.-...? .w.e mh:rh ,,a to
sign such subsequent agreements.
be published at such time.
b. I agree to make the submissions described in
paragraph 5 prior to discussing the information or
a
ng
tion, crnegligent
irreparable injury to the United States or could be materials with, or showing them to anyone who is not
used to advantage by a foreign nation. I hereby agree. authorized to have access to such information. I
that I will never divulge such information unless I further agree that I will not disclose such information
T h
'z)1 verified that the
o a
ff
l
3. I have been advised and am aware that direct' or-
indirect unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized reten-
of SCI by me could cause
ndli
h
y
i
a
ess ve
have officially verified that the recipient has been or matertals un
properly authorized by the United States Government recipient has been properly authorized by the United
to receive it or I have been given prior written notice - States Government to receive it or I have been given.
of authorization from the United States Government written authorization from the Department or Agency
Department or Agency (bereinaftrr Department or last granting me either a security clearance or an SCI
ch disclosure is permitted
t
l th
..
su
a
Agency) last granting me either a security clearance access approva
permitted..
.. or an SCI access approval that such disclosure is
4. 1 further understand that I am obligated to comply
with laws and regulations that prohibit the unautho-
rized disclosure of classified information. As used in
this Agreement, classified information is information
that is classified under the standards of E.O. 12356,
or under any other Executive order or statute that
prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of information
in the interest of national security.
n
confidence. and trust requiring--access to SCI and wet g ays r
e
5. In consideration of bong grant accts . - % of being assigned or retained in aposition of special propriate, and substantively respond, ter me within .30
d f date a ,i,i eipt
ki
d .,o SCI and Intelligence Community or other agencies when ap-
7.1 understand that the purpose of the review de-
scrbed in paragraph S is to give the United States a
reasonable opportunity to determine whether the in-
formation or materials submitted pursuant to para-
graph S set forth any SCI or other information that is
subject to classification under E. O. 12356 or under
any other Executive order or statute that prohibits the
unauthorized disclosure of information. in the interest
of national security..I further understand that the
Department or Agency to which I have submitted
materials will act upon them coordinating with the
(c) any information concerning intelligence act v-
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Four Categories of Polygraph Use
There-are two basic ways to use the polygraph: for
screening and in particular investigations. Screening exam-
are not designed to solve specific cases of suspected
misconduct, but instead are preventive in nature. Questions in
a screening examination are to determine whether an individual
meets security, standards for_ employment or access to classified
information.
(_1) Polygraph: Screening as a Condition of
Employment.--
In:198-2, DOD proposed a new polygraph screening
program for certain employees with access to
In addition- to its use for screenin
th
g,
e polygraph is also
used as a technique to investigate particular cases of suspected
wrongdoing, includin
un
th
i
g
au
or
zed disclosures of classified
informatinn_
CIA_ and NSA have used the he.
polygraph as. part
of:-~_their 'security:.screening program for
many years - both _ prior to employment . and
periodically-- hereafter,..
2) Pot ra h Screenin as a Conditi
Information.- on of Access to
--
(3). Criminal Investigations.--
supports its use as an investigative tech
nique. .(Hearsay may also be inadmissible
nce in criminal trials. However, DOJ
routinely opposes introduction of polygraph
=vide
0
the-.polygraph. Because of undue influence
Amendment requires a subject-to consent t
In'a criminal investigation, the Fifth
evidence but is :relied upon in investigations.)
polygraphed. The polygraph-has been used in
_ In_-admini.strative ,investigations,: the. Fifth.
example, Attorney General Civiletti approved
use of the polygraph in the ABSCAM leak
investigation in 1980..)
C-1
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Use ofPolvgraph in Leak Investigations
The polygraph has been used for a number of years in
investigating unauthorized disclosures of classified infor-
mation. However, there has been some uncertainty about the
extent to which the government could encourage or require
employees to be polygraphed in such cases.. In NSDD-84 President
Reagan-ordered agencies to clarify their policies so that
"appropriate adverse consequences" could follow an employee's
refusal to be polygraphed.
Drafting-of regulations- to implement this aspect of NSDD-84 --
:was-:initially delayed so that the Off-ice of Legal Counsel could
-prepare a memorandum. analyzing the impact of the MSPB's 1980
-decision.. in:the- .Meier case. -_ _ _See Memorandum of Theodore-- B.
Olson-, August 22, 1983. We 'have now developed specific legal
and policy guidance for implementing this aspect of NSDD-84,
which was contained in DOJ testimony before the House Government
Operations Cornittee in October 1983.
The unauthorized disclosure must be a
serious offense affecting national
security or the integrity of the
employee's official conduct.
The polygraph can only be used after
investigation by other means has produced
a substantial objective basis for seeking
to examine a particular employee.
The polygraph can only be used if there
.is no other reasonable means to resolve
the matter.
-- Questions must be limited to the circum-
stances of the unauthorized disclosure and
-cannot go into "life style" matters.
The examination results cannot be conclusive
and must be considered in the context of all
available information.
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The consequences of an employee's refusal to take a poly-
graph examination will depend upon all the facts and circum-
stances.
Employees in the competitive service or
uniformed services (the vast majority:of
federal employees) cannot be fired or
demoted solely for refusing to be polygraphed.
However, they could be transferred to a less
sensitive job at,_the same level of pay.
Political appointees are subject to more
rigorous, standards and could be fired in an
appropriate case..for refusing to be polygraphed.
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DOD Polygraph Screening Proposal
(The "Random".Polygraph) -
The Department of Defense announced this proposal in 1982,
but it has not yet been implemented because of a congressional
moratorium until April 15, 1984. Administration witnesses
testified in support of.this policy before the House Government
Operations Committee in October 1983.
Only employees in "special access programs" could
be covered -- a maximum of about 100,000 in DOD
_;.and.::about.10,000.in: other: agencies if the program
The--head of-_ each- agency has discretion--to decide ---,-
whether, andto -.what.... extent.. to use--it.,- fOnly DOD --
has_._cuzre.nt. plans to ,.adopt this program.
Questions are limited to "counterintelligence"
matters, such as whether the employee has
disclosed classified information to a foreign
agent or other unauthorized person. "Life style"
questions are not permitted.
Employees. in the competitive service and uniformed
services (the vast majority of federal employees)
who do not agree to be polygraphed can be
transferred to less sensitive jobs. They cannot
be fired or demoted.
Not even all of these employees will necessarily
be po?ygraphed. A smaller number can be randomly
selected for polygraphs each year. Random
.selection protects these employees from being
singled out to be polygraphed for discriminatory
reasons.
Note: This program is not primarily designed to counter
."leaks." It is to safeguard sensitive classified information
that is likely'to be of extraordinary interest to hostile
intelligence. agents. It is part of an effort to upgrade
security. standards for employees outside of CIA and NSA who have
access to the same kind of highly sensitive information.
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Statistics on Federal Poly raph Use
DOD Other Total
CIA. NSA (Not NSA) Agencies (Except CIA)
16,291
-CIA-.-and-NSA examinations were nearly all
.rorf.personnel_. screening. Over 90% of all__
otter--examinations-were given in criminal
investigations (suspects, witnesses, in-
formants, victims).
-In 1980-82, a total of about 260 examinations
were given in cases of unauthorized disclosure
of sensitive or classified information.
.Source: OTA Study (Nov. 1983), p. 108.
FY 81 NA 7,418 7,007 3,807 18,232
(Transition)
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Statistics on Polygraph Accuracy
Field Laboratory Studies
Studies
Question Knowledge
Technique Technique
Percentages reflect mean detection rat
es of
polygraph validity studies reported and analyzed
by OTA.. All involve single-issue exami
ti
na
ons for
actual or simulated criminal conduct.
Source: OTA Study (Nov. 1983), pp. 52 and 65.
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Freedom of Information Act Amendments
An early priority of this Administration was to seek
amendments. to the Freedom of Information Act. This has evolved
into two tracks: general reform and relief for CIA. Each of
these tracks has produced bills with wide bipartisan support in
the Senate but uncertain prospects in the House.
5.774. This is the general FOIA reform bill, which is
supported by Senators Hatch and Leahy. It was unanimously
approved.by the Senate Judiciary Committee in June 1983 and is
awaiting action by.. the. full Senate.. Among other things, this
-bi1.1 would-improve-the protection of law enforcement information
S. 1324. This-- is the CIA relief bi.ll...;: -CIA originally
sought___total ._exemp.tion_from. FOIA but earlier this year sought a
compromise. S. 1324: is the result. It exempts CIA operational
files, which are unlikely to contain any information that is
releasable, from the budensome requirement of FOIA searches.
However, all other CIA files remain fully subject to FOIA.
S. 1324 was unanimously approved in October 1983 by the Senate
Intelligence Committee with strong bipartisan support, and by
the full Senate in November of 1983.
Congressional Outlook--It is expected that the full
Senate will approve S. 774 in the next few weeks. It will then
be referred to the Subcommittee on Government Information of the
House Government Operations Committee, chaired by Congressman
Glenn English (D-Okla.). While it is expected that English will
hold hearings, he generally opposes FOIA reform and House action
is unlikely.
Prospects for S. 1324 are considerably better however. The
bill has been referred jointly to the House Intelligence
Committee, which has scheduled a hearing for February 8, and the
.Government Operations Committee. Although Congressman English
could block this legislation as well, it has fairly strong
support in the House and a fair chance of passage.
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Executive Order 12356 (Class.ified Information)
President Reagan signed Executive Order 12356, "National
Security Information" on April 2, 1982. The new Order includes
a number of changes that are based on litigative and administra-
tive experience under its predecessor order, which was issued by
President Carter in 1978. These changes are designed to enhance
the Executive-branch's ability to protect national security
information from unauthorized disclosure and are not intended to
increase the quantity of classified information.
The two most controversial changes are:
The minimum standard for classification
requires a determination. that unautho-
rized disclosure-"reasonably could be
-expected to cause damage to the national
"
security.
The Carter order required
,:--.The Reagan order eliminates the "balancing
t
t
" i
es
,
n which classifying officials were
required to balance.-the public interest in
disclosure against the need for secrecy.
Both of these changes were made to avoid problems in protecting
classified information in litigation, primarily under FOIA.
Statistics recently compiled by the Information Security
Oversight Office (ISOO) show that the new order has not produced
an increase in the amount of classified information. During the
first year that the new order was in effect (FY 1983), original
classification activity declined by 18%, which was the first
significant decline in four.years. Total classification acti-
vity (including derivative classification) increased by only 3%,
which is much lower than the 8-10% annual increases during the
last two years of the Carter Administration.
Congressional Outlook.--Legislation has been introduced
in the House and Senate to provide statutory standards for
classification. If enacted, this legislation would effectively
repeal the Reagan order and replace it with the Carter order.
Hearings have been held on the general subject, but passage of
legislation seems unlikely.
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FBI Domestic Security/Terrorism Guidelines
The new Domestic Security/Terrorism Guidelines became effec-
tive March 21, 1983, replacing guidelines previously issued by
Attorney General Levi in 1976 (the "Levi Guidelines").
The new guidelines incorporate instructions for domestic
security cases in the existing General Crimes and Racketeering
Enterprise Guidelines, thus giving the FBI a single.set of
.procedures for all criminal and criminal intelligence investi-
gations. This provides a consistency which did not exist in
the past. In addition, the guidelines:
Eliminate the three-tiered approach to
domestic security cases,
emphasizes the intelligence nature of
Use-a criminal enterprise approach which
these cases,
Encourage the continued monitoring of criminal
enterprises even when they may be temporarily
inactive,
Make clear that the FBI may take into account
statements made by enterprise members which
indicate an apparent intent to engage in
crime.
On April 18, 1983, Judge Getzendanner of the Northern
District of Illinois permanently enjoined in the City of Chicago
the provision of the guidelines permitting the FBI to initiate
inquiries or investigations on the basis of statements advoca-
ting criminal conduct. Alliance to End Repression v. City of
Chicago, No. 74C3268. The government is appealing this
ruling. The.court denied preliminary injunctions directed to
certain other sections of the guidelines..
Congressional Outlook.--Congressman Don Edwards has
introduced legislation that would block implementation of the
new guidelines, with the apparent intent of requiring a return
to the Levi Guidelines. Hearings have been held on the new
guidelines, but passage of blocking legislation seems unlikely.
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