REQUEST FROM THE OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (OTA)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01370R000300390006-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 6, 2008
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: November 26, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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OLL 84-4440
26 November 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: D/OLL
C/NIC
SUBJECT: Request from the Office of Technology
Assessment (OTA)
1. We need a policy decision to respond to OTA's 20 November
1984 request for:
1) access to six publications, including two NIEs,
one NIC Memorandum, and one typescript;
2) a third round of briefings with Agency analysts.
2. NIOs Gershwin and Ermarth believe we need top-level
guidance in formulating our response. Gershwin is concerned
about the sensitivity of the material in the NIC
publications. Ermarth feels the NSC should be consulted
before dealing further with OTA on this topic.
3. Our dealings with OTA, as with GAO and CRS, are not based
on fixed guidelines. We respond to their requests on a
case-by-case basis. OTA is a relatively infrequent customer,
but it is venturing into new territory by asking for DI and
NIC publications.
4. Our analysts are not anxious to spend more time briefing
OTA on this topic. Two two-hour sessions were held in August
and September. Our requests to OTA for specific topics do
not yield the degree of specificity we seek in order to limit
the number of briefers that must be involved.
5. There is no easy answer to this problem. If we turn down
the request for all or some of the publications, we should
have a respectable rationale. We can provide a final
briefing, but it will be more palatable to Agency briefers if
their participation has been blessed by higher authorities.
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i~cMMOLOOr Asa[[tM[Irt Eoiuto %4MBY995 n [0[ s[nns? F -[w
[aiiros K UDAI.L ARZ. CNANMAM OFFICE of TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
nD STEVEMI. ALASKA VICE CMAW&UN
Ettta* s wra U?AM OOl I Mao iaa in s u WASHINGYDEE. D.C. 70510
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Central me gence Agency
Office of Legislative Liaison
Room 7302
Washington, D.C. 20505
August 10, 1984
STAT
Thank you again for arranging the informative meeting earlier this week on
anti-satellite weapons issues between some of our staff and some of your
analysts. As you know, the ASAT Technical Memorandum we are working on is
part of a larger study of New Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies,' a
study requested of OTA by the House Armed Services Committee and the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee.
In carrying out this study, it would be of great help to us to be able to
explore the following points with relevant CIA analytic staff:
1) Description of current Soviet BMD (Ballistic Missile Defense) research,
development and testing.
2) Likely Soviet policies toward BMD and the ABM Treaty in the absence of any
U.S. intitiatives in these areas.
3) Strategic implications of U.S. SDI development and deployment, including,,
political and arms control implications -- specifically for ABM treaty.
4) Plausible Soviet countermeasures to SDI deployment including changes in
offensive forces (ballistic missiles, bombers, cruise missiles).
5) Plausible Soviet analogous responses to SDI, such as directed energy
system development, conventional Soviet ABM systems.
6) The Soviet record to date on compliance with the ABM Treaty.
7) U.S. capabilities (current and future) for verifying current and possible
future arms control agreements on ballistic missile defenses (including
national technical means and cooperative arrangements.
I realize that this is a rather full menu of issues, so, if necessary, we are
prepared to make more than one visit to cover it. We would appreciate having
the first meeting as soon as possible after Labor Day, September 3, 1984.
1 should add that our ability to keep that appointment is contingent upon
final approval of SCI clearances for two of our staff whose applications are
STAT
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still pending. The members of our staff with current SCI clearances who would
probably attend these meetings are as follows:
Dr. Peter Sharfman, Program Manager, International Security and Commerce
Dr. Thomas Karas, Project Director, New Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies
Dr. Robert Rocklin, Senior Analyst (his SCI clearances are through the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, from which we have his on detail)
In addition, we would hope that by September the following two people would
have received their SCI clearances and would also be able to attend:
Dr. Alan Shaw, Senior Analyst ~/~`
Dr. Gerald Epstein, Analyst.
Should the new clearances not yet have been granted, we would hope that
postponement of the meeting to a mutually convenient time could be arranged.
If there are any documents that it would be useful for us to read
beforehand, we would appreciate access to them. (I believe that our security
officer, Tom McGurn, will be contacting you about arranging for CIA approval
of OTA secure storage facilities for non-SCI classified materials.)
Thank you again for your help.
Sincerely,
f4_ylv" ~~4ia44_
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OLL 84-2965/1
7 September 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Briefing for Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)
Staffers
1. On 7 September 1984, Office of Technology Assessment
(OTA) staffers Peter Sharman, Tom Karas, and Alan Shaw were
briefed on the topics listed in their letter (attached) of
10 August 1984. CIA briefers were Larry Gershwin, National
Intelligence Officer Strategic Programs NIO/SP); 25X1
ANIO/SP; Office of 25X1
Scientific and Weapons Research; and 25X1
of the Arms Control Intelligence Staff. The 25X1
was conducted at the TS/Codeword level. 25X1
2. Mr. Gershwin led off the briefing with an overview
of Soviet strategic defense systems. Using vu-graphs, he
discussed the rationale and doctrine underlying Moscow's
strategic defense program, its protection priorities, its
R&D efforts, the Moscow ABM system, and the prospect for ABM
deployment nationwide.
3. Thi-s presentation was followed by a briefing on
directed energy by He discussed the relevant 25X1
technology in the USSR and the history of its development.
Included in the briefing was discussion of intelligence gaps
and problems in analyzing how far along the Soviets might be
in developing a space-based laser weapon. 25X1
4. Due to lack of time, the arms control aspect of
Soviet compliance with existing treaties was not covered.
This may be handled at a later date. The OTA staffers
expressed appreciation for the two-hour briefinc given today-.
Liaison Division
Office of Legislative Liaison
Distribution:
Orig - OLL Record
1 - OLL Chrono
OLL/L D~
(1 Nov 84 )
SECRET
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OLL 84-3221
7 August 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Briefing for Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)
on Ballistic Missile Defense and Antisatellite
(ASAT) Technologies
1. On 7 August 1984, OTA staffers Richard DalBello,
Michael Callaham, and Thomas Karas were briefed on Soviet
ballistic missile defense and ASAT technologies. The
briefers w I/OSWR) and
(DI/S OVA). The briefing was
25X1
2 A11
2. The attached correspondence describes the nature of
the OTA study which led to the briefing. The two-hour
session consisted of questions and answers related to Soviet
technology and research in the ASAT field.
3. The OTA staffers asked for three CIA reports 25X1
which are being ZDAI
withheld pending CIA approval of OTA secure storage
facilities. The staffers also indicated th most likely seek an additional CIA briefing. 25X1
Liaison Division
Office of Legislative Liaison
Distribution:
Orig - OLL Record
1 - OLL Chrono
1 - DI Subject
1 - DI MFR
OLL/LDA
(5 Sept 84)
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July 6, 1984
Office of Legs a ve Liaison
7BO2
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dearl 25X1
Pursuant to our conversation - Relations letters requesting OTA to
House Armed Services and Senate Foreign
study new ballistic missile ftosLhenClAnvilltbeltoeob~in,informationeon
Since the purpose of our visit
ASAT technology and policy, I have also included a draft outline of our
tec n ca memorandum and annex. This should give you some idea
propose the problem and suggest what types of information we
of how we are approaching
might find useful.
If I can be of further assistance please let me know. I look forward
to hearing from you.
Sincerely,
' C-11~ ,tom
Richard DalBello
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. Dr. John Gibbons
M14M.LIGHM COr+GI US -'
yard 5, 1984
Director
Office of Technology Assessment
U. S. Congress
Washington. D C. 20510
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pear Dr. Gibbons: during his news conference
On yarch 23-9. ~~ ? president n . attention On the mesas
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issued a call to the scientific lete
of rendering nuclear weapons impotent and gay Directive
Subsequent to the news conference,
to explore this in~?e? The
(ySSp 6-,83) called for two studies
studies were to:
is could play in the
the role that defensive system deploymen
future esecurity strategy of the free world; -
? ~
o
long-range research and development program
o objects a d and validating technologies
ev oeveloping to defend against ballistic missiles.
militarily the
militarily effective systems In response Department of Defense convened
response to ~fl &-83.
s panel under the direction of Dr. James C. t and Fletcher. University
pecial study detailed analysis of the curry
of Pittsburgh. perform a study addressed the status of the technology in
state of technology. The directed energy ~Po'ns? the ancillary systems-
convent
such as iaal ~pc~ontrol and ~nications and data p a
as coa> and tactics. countermeasures concepts, system integzat.?a T and es addressing defensive system!; ? the
this and other studs expanded research and
expanded
pyres, ide t intends to seek funds for a greatly Strategic
wh4ch has been referred to as the
development prog2'~.
Initiative (SDI)-
and will be pgrticularly
and development choices in the from the likelihood
The research difficult. However. . an even more difficfull roulld lead arises
the deployment
that a major research and development The effort could
of systems that will affect our national security. and, hence, generate
affect how the Soviets view the U. S. military posture e imQact on strategic
the prospects for a treaty
a arc Soviet reaction cl the SDI. START There is also a negotiations. psi
arms control to include the
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Dr. John Gibbons
March S. 1.984
Page 2
limiting anti-satellite weapons and the viability of the ABU treaty of
1972. Still another important question is whether a deployment would
tend to make the strategic balance and any oonacmnitant international
crisis more or less stable.
Accordingly, I request that your office undertake an assessment of the
technologies delineated-in the Fletcher Ccmtnission report as well as the
ancillary issues that I have identified above. I am hopeful that your
office could address the following three critical questions:
1. What actual capabilities--and in what time frame---can reasonably
be expected of each of the technologies under consideration and
which of these expectations are uncertain? I would strongly
urge your office to coordinate closely with members of the
Fletcher fission to respond to this question as well as the
questions arising from the countermeasures the Soviets might be
expected to employ.
2. What, in the judgment of your office, would be the relationship
between capabilities that can reasonably be expected and the
impact of the technology exploitation effort on the overall
strategic policy of the United States? This analysis should,
if possible, include the impact of a deployed system on deterrence
crisis stability, arms control and on national security policy.
3. In view of this analysis, what policy options would be created
for the United States?
I recognize that most of your analysis on this subject will be done
on a classified basis. However, it would be helpful if as mwch of the
findings as possible could be presented in an unclassified form.
Sincerely,
ail
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March 20, 1984
Dr. John H. Gibbons
Director
? Office of Technology Assessment
United States Congress
Washington, D.C. 20510
The Committee on Foreign Relations has conducted a series of
hearings on the security and arms control implications of space-
based and space-directed weapons, including anti-satellite weapons.
The Committee subsequently unanimously approved S.J. Res. 129, which
calls for an immediate, mutual and verifiable moratorium of limited
duration on ASAT tests, immediate resumption of ASAT talks, and a
comprehensive, verifiable treaty banning space-based or space-directed
weapons.
As a complement to the Committee's hearings, the Office of
Technology Assessment conducted a space arms control workshop and
will soon publish a background paper on ballistic missile defense.
Based upon this earlier work, we believe that Congress would
greatly benefit from an independent and thorough assessment of
relevant technologies and their political and strategic implications.
Accordingly, we are requesting that the Office of Technology
Assessment continue its efforts in this area by undertaking an
independent assessment of the following issues;
--the feasibility, effectiveness and cost of various
space-based or space-directed concepts--whether to
provide an anti-satellite weapons capability, limited
defense of military assets or an overall defense of the nation;
--the implications of a major research and development
program for space weapons--prior to a definite decision
on whether to deploy such weapons--for crisis stability,
the U.S.-Soviet arms competition, U.S. alliances, and
existing arms control agreements.
--the possible effect of such weapons upon the viability
of the U.S. military structure, including space-based assets.
--the likely consequences of such deployments on strategic
stability, including the effect upon crisis management and
upon the decision to engage in warfare;
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--the implications of anti-satellite weapons and space-based
or space-directed missile defense concepts for standing
arms control agreements, particularly the Anti-Ballistic /
Missile, Outer Space and Limited Test Ban Treaties; and,
--the prospects for future space-related arms control
agreements, including an assessment of advantages,
disadvantages and verifiability.
We want to thank you very much for the excellent work done
on the issue to date under OTA auspices and, in advance, for the
valuable help to the Congress you and your staff will be rendering
with the new assessment.
With every good wish.
Sincerely,
n . F T~nnty c
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