LETTER TO MICHAEL B. CALLAHAM (SANITIZED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01370R000300390007-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 6, 2008
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: October 29, 1984
• Content Type: LETTER

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Ca*al IntdliFna Agff icy
OLL 84-3690/1
29 October 1984
Mr. Michael B. Callaham
Senior Analyst
International Security and
Commerce Program
Congress of the United States
Office of Technology Assessment
Washington, D.C. 20510
I am writing in response to your letter of 27 September 1984
requesting a classification review by CIA of two paragraphs
entitled "Contributions of Satellites to Mission Capabilities"
which you plan to include in an unclassified Technical
Memorandum on antisatellite weapons that OTA is preparing for
Congress.
The reviewing officials at CIA believe that the last
sentence in the first paragraph should be classified
SECRET/NOFORN (not releasable to foreign nationals).
If you have any questions about this determination, please
let me know.
Sincerely,
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - OLL Record
1 - OLL Chrono
1 L
OLL/LD
Liaison Division
Office of Legislative Liaison
(29 Oct 84)
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Liaison
I OLL
TOn (OMcer designation, room number, and
building)
ACIS
6F20
3. NIO/SP
2E49
5.
OSWR/SWB
1 F 81
FORM 610
OTA Request,
Office ofLegislativ
DM14 October 1984
OfpCER'a I COMIdNrTS (Number each comment to show from whom
INITIMi b when. Draw a line a"s column after each comment.)
In August and September 1984, OSWR,25X1
ACIS, and NI0/SP jointly provided
two briefings for OTA on its SDI
project.
Would you look at OTA's request
L4RW for a classification determination 25X1
on the material on the attached I
sheet and return to me ASAP.
Thank you,
25X1
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TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT BOARD
MORRIS K UDALL. ARIZ, CHAIRMAN
TED STEVENS. ALASKA, VICE CHAIRMAN
ORRIN G MATCH. UTAH GEORGE E BROWN. JR. CAL IF
CHARLES MCC MATHIAS. JR., MO JOHN 0 DINGELL. MICH
FOWARD M KENNEDY. MASS LARRY WINN. J. . KANS
FRNEST F HOLLINGS. S C CLARENCE E MILLER. OHIO
CI AISORNE PELL. RI COOPER EVANS. IOWA
JOHN H GIBBONS
51
Congregg of tljt Initeb 6tatt JNN H GIBPONS
DIRFCTOR
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 205 10
1 MAINE UAISON
Central Intelligence Agency Headquarters
Office of Legislative Liason
Washington, DC 20505
Dear
I am enclosing a fragment of text which I would like to include in the
unclassified Technical Memorandum on antisatellite weapons which OTA is
preparing for the Congress. The text deals with a sensitive topic, but says
nothing of substance about it beyond quoting two official sources, one
(Congressman Aspin's comment) from a published article and the other
(Secretary Perle's comment) from the unclassified transcript of an open
hearing which will be published in the near future. I believe that the text
should be unclassified, but would appreciate a classification review of it by
the CIA. I am enclosing a photocopy of the article containing Aspin's remarks
and a verbatim copy, typed by me, of the stenographic transcript of Secretary
Perle's testimony. I would appreciate receiving CIA's classification
determination as soon as possible.
Sincerely,
Michael B. Callaham
Senior Analyst
International Security
& Commerce Program
Comm. [phone]
FTS 426-0507
FSTS ID# 01146
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V 414
3.2.1 Contributions of Satellites to Mission Capabilities (U)
(U) The U.S. government has stated that it employs photographic reconnaissance
satellites for collecting imagery required to monitor compliance with certain
arms coytrol agreements. Congressman Les Aspin, describing this use, has
written : "U.S. surveillance satellites currently provide complete
photographic coverage of the U.S.S.R. at frequent intervals. If suspicions are
aroused by the regular large-area survey photographs, "close-look" cameras can
be ordered to rephotograph the area in question, providing more detailed
information. The present generation of high-resolution cameras on U.S.
satellites are theoretically capable of making a clear photograph of an object
one foot across from an altitude of 100 miles."
(U) Whether such satellites are used by the U.S. for collection of
intelligence of military value is rarely discussed in public by official
spokesmen. A rare official comment on this subject was provided recently by
the Honorable Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Policy, who, testifying on space defense matters in open session
before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services on 25 March
1984, said "...We believe that this Soviet antisatellite capability is
effective against critical U.S. satellites in relatively low orbit, that in
wartime we would have to face the possibility, indeed the likelihood, that
critical intelligence assets of the United States would be destroyed by Soviet
antisatellite systems." This comment suggests that the U.S. does operate
satellites which gather intelligence of military value and which are within
range of present Soviet ASAT weapons; however, security restrictions prohibit
further discussion of the nature of this intelligence or its utility in
enhancing military capabilities.
1
(U) In "The Verification of the SALT II Agreement," Scientific American, pp.
38 - 45, February 1979.
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Excerpts from
Stenographic Transcript
of
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Strategic & Theater Nuclear Forces
of the
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Testimony on Space Defense Matters in Review of the
FY1985 Defense Authorization Bill
Thursday, March 15, 1984
Statement of
The Honorable Richard Perle,
Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy)
Mr. Perle: "...We believe that this Soviet antisatellite capability is
effective against critical U.S. satellites in relatively low orbit,]that in
wartime we would have to face the possibility, indeed the likelihood, that
critical intelligence assets of the United States would be destroyed by Soviet ILLEGIB
antisatellite systems.
"...We, the Department of Defense, are simply unable to identify a means by
which we would verify a ban on antisatellite weapons. And the more
comprehensive the ban, the more difficult verification becomes.
"...and when one gets to other technologies -- laser technologies, for example
-- ...verifying research and development becomes all but impossible.
"...Let me say that this is not only the conclusion of this Administration,
that the previous Administration worked long and hard on the study of the
verifiability of an antisatellite ban, produced a lengthy report -- it must he
an inch thick -- looked at 20 or 21 or 22 different possible approaches to
ASAT arms control, and came to the conclusion that the ASAT problems were
insurmountable.
"I share that view, Senator..."
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SCIENTIFIC
Sta.Ulalhad IM3 AM E RI CAN February 1979
The Verification
of the SALT II Agreement
The U.S. has at its disposal ample "national technical means"
of surveillance to detect any attempt by the U.S.S.R. to gain
a significant military advantage by violating a new arms pact
by Les Aspin
keystone of al ar5 $.cantrol :=,t
ability of each side to make .me
the other side abides by it. Without ade-
quase verification of compliance agree-
meats such as the bilateral atrasepc-
arwm pacts between the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. are bound to collapse. As the
Senate prepares to debase the ratAcn-
tiom of the new treaty emerging from the
second rand of strategic ar'a.lieita-
tion talks (SALT 11) betwK+ea the two
superpowers. charges that the R--
will seek to evade its provisions are be-
to be heard. The cusps raise
several fundamental questions of ver-
dcatioo: How could the U.S.S.R. go
about cheating? How could the U.S. din
cover such violations? What would the
US.S..'..:und to pin and what would
the U.S. stand to lose if the Russians
were to violasa the SALT II treaty? Let
us examine each of dun question in
two to asartaM just wild the real prob-
lems of vrietttiom are.
The SALT 0 agreement will appr-
emly conait of two bath: partr a treaty
hating dttat o 1913 and a protocol
biting dtromrt 1912. A summary of
due various pwidoos included under
these two beading is giveis in the Was-
tration oo do opposite pop.
The new SALT y will provide in
the fiat instance for a gradual reduction
in the total number of strategic ogees.
rive-weapons launchers allowed on each
side. from 2.x00 at the time of ratifica-
tion to 2.230 by 1912. For the purpose
of the treaty strategic launchers are de.
Good in such a way as to include land.
based intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBM's). submarine-launched bWia-
tic miasikts (SLBM's) and long-range
heavy bombers.
The U.S.S.R. could try to evade the
ceding on the total number of strategic
launchers in three ways: by deploying
new types of strategic weapon. by de-
playing more weapons of the existing
types or by converting nonstrategic. tac.
tical weapons into strategic ones (for ex-
ample by imtxeasing their range).
'T'Ise Er.t of these cheating methods-
IL depbyw: new types of strategic
weapons-i perhaps the least feasible
and now easily detectable way in which
the U.S.S.R. could violate the SALT 11
tool-Iatmcser ceiling. The introduction
of a saw strategic weapon involves at
least five stages: research, development.
setting. production and deployment. At
any one of these stages the present abili.
ty of the U.S. to detect clandestine activ.
ity on the pan of the U.S.S.R. ranges
from fair to excellent. The key point.
however. is that the Russians would
have to disguise all five stages. and the
odds against their successfully doing so
are extremely high.
Consider the ways in which the U.S.
is currently able to monitor just one
of these stages: the testing of strategic
launchers. U.S. lino(-sight radars can
identify the distinctive "signature" of
reflected microwaves associated with
each major type of Russian missile. In
addition over-the-horizon radars can
penetrate deep into the interior of the
U.S.S.R. and recognize the characteris-
tic pattern each type of missile makes
when it disturbs the earth's ionosphere.
Early-warning satellites, originally de.
signed to detect a Russian ICBM attack,
can also serve to monitor missile teats:
the infrared sensors on thane satellites
can identify the rocket-exhaust plume of
a missile as it is being test-bed. Finally.
the U.S. has a complex array of sensors.
including assorted photographic per.
on ships and planes that routinely moni-
tor missile-sest impact areas on the pe-
riphery of the U.S.S.R. and in the Pacif-
ic. The information gathered from these
sources can be used to distinguish new
types of missiles from old ones.
In short. the "national technical
means" of surveillance available to this
country for observing Russian missile
tests are multiple. redundant and com-
plementary . They enable the U.S. to de-
tect all long-range missiles fired from
test sites in the U.S.S.R. They are, in
fact. far more reliable than most human
intelligence gathering (that is. spying).
which may yield second-hand. dated in-
formation or even false. planted infor-
mation.
To repeat. testing is only one of the
five steps that must be taken before a
new weapon is ready to be introduced to
the strategic arena. Other means of de-
tection could uncover a Russian attempt
to evade this particular treaty provision
either before testing (during the re-
search and development stages) or after
testing (during the production and de-
ployment stages).
The second method potentially avail-
able to the U.S.S.R. for cheating on the
overall strategic-launcher ailing--de-
ploying add'.':onal weapons of existing
types-is more difficult to monitor than
the first cheating method. but here the
detection capabilities of the U.S. are still
very good indeed. The national techni-
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