PAKISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01370R000300470005-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 17, 2008
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: January 27, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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STAT
STAT
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We believe President Zia will continue in office during the
next 18 months. We doubt, however, that he can achieve his
stated goal of establishing an "Islamic Democracy" in Pakistan
through limited nonparty elections without taking the country
through a period of protracted turmoil.
Senior generals will remain extremely reluctant to replace
Zia at the behest of opposition politicians or to make a deal
allowing the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) to return to power.
Prolonged future violence, however, could seriously undermine
support for Zia among senior officers.
Zia's Proposal to End Martial Law
Zia has not yet firmed up the details of his plan to end
martial law and hold national elections, and opposition groups
will maintain pressure for:
-- The participation of political parties in the elections.
-- A return to the parliamentary system of the 1973
constitution rather than the strong presidential system
Zia wants.
-- No military constitutional veto over policies of the
civilian government.
-- No general amnesty from prosecution or other action for
the military's activities under martial law.
Zia so far has controlled the initiative, forcing his
opponents to react to his proposals. In 1984 he will seek
additional opportunities to divide the opposition through
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negotiations with moderates and conservatives. Zia believes the
PPP would win a partisan election but he might allow PPP
moderates or their surrogates to run individually in order to
reduce PPP opposition to his plans. Zia may choose to advance
the elections timetable to the fall of 1984 to assuage other
moderates and/or postpone constitutional changes until an elected
Orlin
We believe the PPP has little likelihood of returning to
power within the next 18 months. The PPP's major problem so far
has been its inability to foment significant civil disobedience
in Punjab, where it retains considerable support but lacks a
strong organization. PPP leaders know that the Movement for the
Restoration of Democracy--a multi party alliance dominated by the
PPP--has little chance of ending military rule unless it can
demonstrate major support in Punjab. 25X1
The right is critical of Zia but not hostile.
-- The principal rightist party, the Jama'at-i-Islami (JI),
is unwilling to confront Zia fearing his violent ouster
would bring to power a PPP-left dominated government that
would reverse the President's Islamization measures.
-- Pakistan's other conservative parties have limited
support and share the JI's reluctance to oust Zia. 25X1
Foreign Involvement
The unrest in Sind last summer and fall provided both the
Indians and the Soviets with an opportunity to put pressure on
Zia by aiding his opponents. Evidence is growing that New Delhi,
which would prefer a PPP led civilian government, is providing
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training to Al-Zulfikar terrorists and covert financial
assistance to the PPP.
We believe the Soviets attempted to fan unrest in Sind
although there was little evidence of any direct role. Moscow
probably believes that support for such destabilization efforts
is a low-cost way of forcing changes in Zia's Afghan policy and
could lessen his support for the Afghan insurgency. The
magnitude of future Soviet efforts will probably depend on
Moscow's perception of Zia's domestic standing. The Soviets
probably now believe that Zia has weathered the storm. Any overt
evidence of a Soviet or Indian hand in Pakistan's domestic
troubles would strengthen Zia's position and weaken the
opposition.
Military Versus Political Rule
We believe that the policies of future governments will be
much more important in determining Pakistan's political stability
than whether such governments are military or civilian. So far,
neither civilian nor military governments have been able to
prevent the growth of regional tensions. Bhutto, a Sindhi, had
no problems with Sindhi separatism, but was much more troubled
than Zia by problems in Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier
Province.
Military rule has contributed to a decline in the ability of
institutions such as the bureaucracy and the judicial system to
play a unifying role in Pakistan. Rivalries among politicians,
their tendency to put factional and personal interests ahead of
those of Pakistan, and their tendency to seek victory over
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opponents instead of compromising have contributed greatly to
Pakistan's political problems.
Economic Outlook
Pakistan's continued favorable economic performance was an
important factor in keeping anti-Zia protests limited outside of
Sind. An economic decline or a rapid drop in remittances from
Pakistani workers in the Gulf to Karachi, Punjab, and the North-
West Frontier would lead to growing opposition by important
interest groups and the public generally. In these conditions, a
party like the Pakistan People's Party would find it easier to
galvanize a broad opposition to the Zia government.
The Pakistani economy recorded its sixth consecutive year of
rapid growth during Fiscal Year 1983, increasing by almost 6
percent. Agriculture, which remains the cornerstone of the
economy, has benefited from favorable weather and increases in
government procurement prices. Pakistan is now self-sufficient
in all major food categories except edible oil. The Pakistan
economy probably will continue to grow at or near these levels
for the next two years. Stagnation in the levels of remittances
and aid from Arab states and a deterioration in the balance of
payments is likely to lead to a slowdown in growth after that
period.
Although inflation was a concern of some of the protesters
and many Pakistanis dislike the increases in fuel prices and
reduced subsidies for food and fertilizer, the average Pakistani
is better off since Zia came to power. Remittances from overseas
workers and higher domestic wages have improved the purchasing
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power of many middle class and poor families as well as bazaar
merchants.
Population Pressures
Population problems will continue to work against efforts by
the Pakistani Government to achieve national integration and to
establish a politically stable and economically prosperous nation
through the end of the century.
-- Population growth, with or without the presence of the
Afghan refugees, will continue high; Pakistan's
population will surpass 152 million by the end of the
century.
-- National, provincial, and city governments will have
trouble coping with the problems of uncontrolled rapid
urban growth..
-- Interprovincial antagonisms, which have plagued every
government since independence, will be intensified as an
ever larger population competes for a share of already
limited government services.
-- The approximately 2.5 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan
will increase pressure to settle outside the camps as
their stay lengthens and prospects dim for an early
return to Afghanistan.
The Pakistani government has failed to convince couples to
have fewer children and has not instituted a family planning
program acceptable to. the majority. We believe that the buildup
of demographic pressures will increase frustrations throughout
Pakistani society that could translate into periods of social and
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economic unrest, which, in turn, could snowball into wider
antiregime demonstrations with serious political implications for
the Zia regime or its successors.
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Question 14
Political Forces in India Today: Electoral Impact. Opposition
parties are trying to make an electoral issue of several key
developments, which they blame on Prime Minister Gandhi's
domestic policies and leadership style. Gandhi in turn has
accused the opposition of exacerbating these trends, which
include:
-- Regionalism and secessionism.
-- Caste and religious-based conflict, often exploited by
state and local politicians.
-- Declining law and order, particularly in rural areas.
Tensions between national and state governments over the
division of authority and resource control.
Key Economic Trends: Electoral Impact. India has not succeeded
in improving the sluggish trend of long-run growth. Despite
greater policy support and easing of bureaucratic restrictions,
industrial and export performance has been poor. Power shortages
remain a crucial bottleneck. Lack of success in petroleum
exploration will add to future balance of payments problems.
The economy is unlikely to be a major political factor in
the election. Spurred by record foodgrain output this year,the
economy may grow 6-6.5 percent above last year's poor
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performance. Gandhi can claim credit for improvement really due
to good weather. International financial strains will not become
evident until after the election. Opposition coalitions are not
proposing any marked change in economic policy but will try to
exploit any sharp price increase or temporary shortages.
Food Production. Food production growth rates are likely to
level off just ahead of population growth rates, even with
improved efficiency and expanded irrigation. As the growth rate
slows, more expensive new technologies may push up foodgrain
prices, and strain national and state budgets. India will
require continuing imports of edible oils but only intermittent
f oodg ra i n imports.
Population Growth Rates and Prospects for Family Planning
Programs. India's annual population growth rate currently is
estimated at 2.1 percent. The rate is not expected to dip below
2 percent until 1994. US Census Bureau projections indicate that
India will reach a population of 847 million in 1990 and top 1
billion in 1998-99. India's population control effort seems to
have levelled off. The size of the rural population is an
obstacle to delivering family planning services effectively and
increasing the contraceptive prevalence rate. A recent
acceleration of the urbanization rate should help reduce
population growth rates in the longer run.
Gandhi's Pre-Election Strategy. Although Gandhi has paid lip
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service to initiating reforms in her party in response to charges
of corruption and governmental incompetence, her principal effort
has been to:
-- Project herself as the only national leader capable of
safeguarding India's security and unity against domestic
and foreign threats.
-- Prevent electoral alliances among opposition parties--
which in combination could defeat her party in the
election.
-- Reassert her party's commitment to socialism in an effort
to attract support from socialist and Communist Party of
India moderates.
-- Regain support of Muslims and untouchables by playing up
the threat of Hindu nationalism from conservative
opposition parties while also appealing to Hindus in
Jammu and Kashmir. Puniab. di-speaking
states.
Opposition Party Strategy. All opposition parties have focused
their attack on Gandhi's domestic leadership--notably its
centralization of decisionmaking at the expense of the states,
failure to handle regional and religious strife effectively, and
dynastic ambitions aimed at securing son Rajiv's succession in
the Congress Party.
Noncommunist opposition parties are trying to negotiate
electoral alliances. Prospects for a durable alliance are
problematical because of several difficulties:
-- An older generation of quarrelsome opposition leaders is
reluctant to cede leadership to younger and more flexible
junior officers.
-- Opposition parties represent a plethora of seemingly
incompatible ideologies, personalities, and
constituencies.
-- Factionalism within opposition parties may prevent party
leaders from striking meaningful deals with other
parties.
-- Gandhi may return to her familiar strategy of gaining
support for one or more regional parties with promises of
autonomy or more central aid. She may seek Indian
Communist Party support if the regional parties reject
her and an opposition coalition appears threatening.F
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Foreign Policy Issues. Foreign policy issues will be generally
less important than domestic issues in the election except in
Tamil Nadu, where Gandhi's Sri Lanka policy will be a factor.
Gandhi herself is playing up "the foreign hand" (chiefly, US and
Pakistani) as a factor in domestic unrest. She hopes to rally
electoral support by emphasizing the putative threat posed by
unfriendly neighbors, particularly Pakistan aided by the US.
Election Outcome. The Congress Party will probably secure a
plurality (but not a majority) if--as we believe likely--
opposition parties fail to form lasting electoral alliances. If
Congress loses, a coalition government of Gandhi's opponents
would be less stable than a single-party government because its
member parties could seek concessions to their conflicting
demands as the price of continued support--a pattern
characteristic of the Janata coalition that governed from
1977-79. An opposition government would probably not make major
changes in India's policies.
Pakistan and the Sikhs. We do not have firm evidence concerning
Pakistan's relationship with dissident Sikhs in Indian Punjab but
would not be surprised if the Pakistanis were encouraging and
perhaps arming Sikh leaders who enter Pakistan--without profering
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Bangladesh
We believe Ershad has a good chance of staying in power and
establishing some semblance of civilian government by next
year. Nevertheless, he will face serious difficulties in trying
to move to civilian rule and become the next elected leader. His
success in creating a popular civilian government will depend on
his ability to:
-- persuade the military to accept his political strategy
and take a lower profile in a civilian government.
-- establish a political base outside the military, probably
through local government leaders and grassroots popular
support.
-- acquire broad-based support from the urban-based
political parties. Unless Ershad works out a deal with
some moderate opposition leaders, any civilian government
officer among the other potential military contenders and the
civilian opposition--while growing more vocal--is still
factionalized. The military would not return power to weak
civilian politicians. If Ershad fails to forestall antiregime
political violence like that of last November, however, we judge
that the hardline generals would remove Ershad and institute
Ershad remains the least controversial and most senior
he sets up will lack popular participation.
stricter martial law.
Although Ershad has undertaken reforms favorable to the
private sector to halt severe economic decline--such as the
divestiture of key industries and measures to broaden the
national tax base--Bangladesh faces a difficult economic period
and will continue to need foreign aid to bolster its economy.
World Bank analysts project only modest rates of real GDP and
investment growth. Economic growth could be hampered further by
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Despite gains in recent years, domestic production of
foodgrains does not yet cover consumption, and Bangladesh will
have to continue to supplement its production with imports to
meet consumption needs. In most years, the import requirements
have been met by foreign food aid, but in lean years shortfalls
in production have required Bangladesh to purchase additional
quantities of food on the commercial market.
Bangladesh
s growing foreign debt.
Bangladesh is committed to reducing population growth, and
we expect it to continue to search for a successful family
planning program. We do not believe the government will
undertake politically risky programs, however, and we expect that
Bangladesh's daunting demographic problems, which contribute to
political instability, will continue. 25X1
We do not foresee changes in Bangladesh's moderate pro-
Western outlook. Another government reshuffle or military coup
probably would have little impact on immediate US priorities in
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South Asia. Another change could, however, undermine what little
postinde endence political and economic gains the country has 25X1
made.
CONFIDENTIAL
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