CODEL TOWER'S MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN, FEBRUARY 20, 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01370R000801030003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 19, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 22, 1984
• Content Type: CABLE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/25: CIA-RDP90B01370R000801030003-7
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PAGE 001
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00 RUEAIIB
ZNY SSSSS ZOC STATE ZZH
UTS2874
00 RUEHC
DE RUEHAM #1717/01 0530937
ZNY 55SSS ZZH
0 220915Z FEB 84
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8732
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 0852
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 3125
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 1387
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY 0346
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD PRIORITY 4665
RUEHRH/USELO RIYADH PRIORITY 4069
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 8463
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 7593
BT
-AMMAN 01717
EXDIS
DEPARTMENT PASS TO CODEL TOWER
MILITARY ADDRESSEE HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS PREL, OREP, JO
SUBJECT CODEL TOWER'S MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN,
-- FEBRUARY 20, 1984
-- IN RESPONSE TO SENATOR TOWER'S QUESTION ON THE
RESULTS OF THE KING'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON, HUSSEIN
SAID HE DID NOT COME BACK WITH ANYTHING CONCLUSIVE
OR TANGIBLE. ALTHOUGH HE SENSED AN OVERALL DEEP
PREOCCUPATION IN WASHINGTON WITH LEBANON, HE ALSO
NOTED AN INTEREST ON REFOCUSING THE USG'S EFFORTS
ON THE MAJOR CAUSE OF INSTABILITY IN THE REGION --
THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE -- AND ON THE ARAB/ISRAELI PEACE
PROCESS. HUSSEIN SAID HE MADE IT CLEAR IN WASHINGTON
THAT IF JORDAN ENGAGES ITSELF IN THE PEACE PROCESS, IT
IS IMPORTANT TO KNOW WHAT THE END RESULT WILL BE AND
EXACTLY WHAT THE U.S. POSITION IS. HUSSEIN REITERATED
HIS VIEW THAT NEGOTIATION OF A TRANSITIONAL REGIME FOR
THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES MUST BE FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY BY
FINAL STATUS NEGOTIATIONS.
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-- JORDAN WILL GO AHEAD IN ITS BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS
WITH THE PLO TO DETERMINE IF THERE IS A CHANCE FOR REAL
COOPERATION LEADING TO NEGOTIATIONS. ARAFAT IS EXPECTED
IN AMMAN BEFORE THE END OF THE MONTH. HUSSEIN SAID HE
WANTS ARAFAT TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY MEMBERS OF THE PLO
DECISION-MAKING BODIES TO PREVENT ARAFAT FROM PLAYING
FOR TIME BY REFERRING DECISIONS BACK TO HIS ORGANIZA-
TION. ALSO, PALESTINIANS FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
SHOULD BE PRESENT IN AMMAN. CONCOMITANTLY, JORDAN WILL
CONTINUE TO SEEK A BALANCED RELATIONSHIP WITH PALES-
TINIANS AS EVIDENCED BY THE KING'S DECISION TO RECONVENE
PARLIAMENT.
-- HUSSEIN FAULTED ISRAELI POLICY FOR REJECTING THE
REAGAN INITIATIVE, CONTINUING SETTLEMENTS ACTIVITIES,
AND CONTINUING THE OCCUPATION OF SOUTHERN LEBANON.
-- ON LEBANON, THE KING TOLD TOWER THAT HIS WORST
FEARS HAVE BEEN REALIZED: LEBANON IS EFFECTIVELY
PARTITIONED AND OCCUPIED BY TWO BELLIGERENTS; THE
LEBANESE PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED AND THE AIMS OF THE
SOVIETS AND THE ARAB RADICALS TO UNDERMINE THE U.S.
POSITION IN THE AREA ARE BEING REALIZED. HUSSEIN
SUGGESTED THAT THE ONLY WAY TO UNDO THE SITUATION
IS TO ATTACK THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE REGION S PROBLEM
WHICH IS THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE.
-- HUSSEIN STRESSED THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE
PROPOSED IRAQ-AQABA PIPELINE PROJECT AND THE POSITIVE
EFFECT THIS WOULD HAVE ON THE IRAQ/IRAN WAR AND ON
IRAQI/ARAB AND IRAQ/U.S. RELATIONS.
-- ON THE U.S./JORDANIAN MILITARY RELATIONSHIP,
HUSSEIN REFERRED TO THE GROWING MILITARY AND SECURITY
THREAT TO JORDAN FROM SYRIA AND SYRIAN-SUPPORTED
TERRORISM. HE VOICED THE HOPE THAT THE STINGER SALE
TO JORDAN WILL COME THROUGH. CONCERNING THE JLP
HUSSEIN CITED THE MUTUAL INTERESTS OF BOTH THE U.S.
AND JORDAN IN THE PROGRAM AND HOPED IT COULD
BE REALIZED -- BUT NOT AT A PRICE WHICH AFFECTS JORDAN'S
DIGNITY. SENATOR TOWER SAID HE AND THE MAJORITY OF HIS
COLLEAGUES ON THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE WILL
SUPPORT THE ADMINISTRATION'S REQUESTS ON JORDAN'S
MILITARY REQUIREMENTS.
EXDIS
DEPARTMENT PASS TO CODEL TOWER
MILITARY ADDRESSEE HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS PREL, OREP, JO
SUBJECT CODEL TOWER'S MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN,
3. KING HUSSEIN MET WITH SENATOR TOWER AND
CONGRESSMAN MC CAIN AT THE DIWAN ON FEBRUARY 20.
MARWAN KASEM, THE DIRECTOR OF THE ROYAL COURT,
ATTENDED THE MEETING. AMBASSADOR VIETS, DCM
SECRET
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DJEREJIAN AND CODEL STAFFERS JAMES MC GOVERN,
JAMES LOCHER, AND JAMES JONES ATTENDED ON THE
U.S. SIDE.
4. SENATOR TOWER ASKED HUSSEIN FOR HIS ASSESSMENT
OF HIS RECENT TRIP TO WASHINGTON AND HIS DISCUSSIONS
WITH THE PRESIDENT.
5. HUSSEIN SAID HIS WASHINGTON VISIT PROVIDED A GOOD
OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN, OTHER TOP
U.S. OFFICIALS AND PRESIDENT MUBARAK ALSO. BEING IN
THE UNITED STATES FOR HIS MEDICAL CHECKUP, HE DECIDED
TO GO TO WASHINGTON TO FIND OUT WHAT THE THINKING IS ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND TO DETERMINE WHAT THE POSSIBILITIES
ARE FOR THE FUTURE.
6. INSOFAR AS JORDAN IS CONCERNED, HE HAS TAKEN
SIGNIFICANT STEPS WHICH HAVE RELAXED THE ATMOSPHERE
WITHIN THE COUNTRY AND GIVEN HOPE FOR A BETTER
POLITICAL FUTURE BY THE RESTORATION OF PARLIAMENTARY
LIFE. THE KING INDICATED THAT HIS DECISION TO
RECONVENE PARLIAMENT WAS TAKEN QUITE A WHILE AGO
BUT HE WAS LOOKING AT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE REGION
TO CHOOSE THE MOST APPROPRIATE TIME TO ACT. THE
TIMING OF HIS DECISION WAS ALSO BASED ON THE FACT
HE HAD TO MOVE RAPIDLY LEST THE DEATH OF SOME OF
THE ELDER MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT RESULT IN LOSING
A QUORUM FOR RECONVENING THAT BODY.
7. HUSSEIN REFERRED TO THE 1974 RABAT SUMMIT DECISION
RECOGNIZING THE PLO AS THE SOLE, LEGITIMATE REPRESENTA-
TIVE OF THE PALESTINIANS AND SAID THAT DECISION CREATED
A VACUUM FOR JORDAN SINCE IT HAD BEEN INVOLVED UP TO
THAT POINT IN THE RECUPERATION OF THE "LOST TERRI-
TORIES" AND ESTABLISHING PEACE. MORE RECENTLY, THE
ATTEMPTS BY SYRIA TO SPLIT AND CONTAIN THE PLO HAVE
BEEN THE CAUSE OF MUCH CONCERN. THE SYRIANS ARE
CREATING AN EVEN MORE DANGEROUS VACUUM THAN THAT
FLOWING FROM THE RABAT DECISION. THIS IS A CRITICAL
MOMENT AND JORDAN DECIDED WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS TO GIVE
SUBSTANCE TO THE POLITICAL LIFE OF THIS COUNTRY. THE
KING SAID HE WAS HAPPY WITH THE RESULTS OF HIS DECI-
SION ON PARLIAMENT WHICH HAS GIVEN NOT ONLY JORDANIANS
BUT THE INHABITANTS OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES NEW
HOPE.
8. JORDAN, THE KING CONTINUED, SEEKS A BALANCED
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JORDANIANS AND PALESTINIANS.
JORDAN HAS BEEN TALKING WITH THE PLO ON THE POSSIBILITIES
OF SUCH A BALANCED RELATIONSHIP WHICH WOULD BE SATISFAC-
TORY TO BOTH FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. "WE HOPE IN
EXDIS
DEPARTMENT PASS TO CODEL TOWER
MILITARY ADDRESSEE HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
SECRET
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E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS : PREL, OREP, JO
SUBJECT : CODEL TOWER'S MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN,
THE COMING PERIOD THAT WE WILL HAVE A CHANCE IN ALL
SINCERITY TO JUSTIFY THIS RELATIONSHIP." AS A LIBERA-
TION ORGANIZATION THE PLO CAN ONLY JUSTIFY ITS EXISTENCE
BY ESTABLISHING A RESPONSIBLE ATTITUDE. THE PLO HAS A
DUTY TO RESPOND TO THE NEEDS OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THE RADICALS HAVE SPLIT.
9. ANOTHER MAJOR PROBLEM IN THE ARAB WORLD IS THE
FACT THAT THE ARAB LEAGUE AND THE PLO HAVE BEEN CRIPPLED
BY CONSENSUS POLITICS. THE RADICALS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO
CONTROL THE SITUATION UP TO NOW. HOWEVER, THE TIME HAS
COME TO CHANGE THE SITUATION AND NOW THERE IS A CHANCE.
"I WILL DO MY BEST TO SEE WHAT CAN BE DONE." HUSSEIN
SAID THAT HIS THEME WITH ARAFAT IS "WE HAVE A PROBLEM.
WE ARE BOTH RESPONSIBLE AND WE ARE NOT LOOKING FOR
ANYTHING IN PARTICULAR. WE NEED TO LOOK AT ALL OPTIONS
TO REACH A SOLUTION. THIS CAN BE ACHIEVED WHEN WE HAVE
AN IDEA AS TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PLO AND
JORDAN."
10. THE NEXT PRIORITY IS THE ARAB WORLD. WE HAVE LOST
FAITH IN OURSELVES AS WITNESSED BY OUR INABILITY TO
FORMULATE POLICIES AND WORK TOGETHER. WE HOPE TO SEE
HOW WE CAN ACTIVATE THE MAJORITY AT THE ARAB LEAGUE
AND ARAB SUMMITS. IN THIS RESPECT WE NEED TO AMEND
THE ARAB LEAGUE CHARTER.
LEBANON
11. KING HUSSEIN MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS ON THE
LEBANESE CRISIS:
-- OUR WORST FEARS HAVE BEEN REALIZED. THE COUNTRY
IS EFFECTIVELY PARTITIONED AND OCCUPIED BY TWO
BELLIGERENTS. THE LEBANESE PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED.
THE AIM OF OUR OPPONENTS (I.E., THE ARAB RADICALS
AND THE SOVIET UNION) IS TO PLACE OUR FRIENDS IN
A TRAP AND UNDERMINE THE U.S.
-- THE ONLY WAY TO UNDO THIS SITUATION IS TO CHANGE
EMPHASIS AND TO TACKLE THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE PROBLEM --
THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE.
12. SENATOR TOWER SAID HE AGREED WITH THE KING'S
ASSESSMENT.
-- THE U.S. MUST DETERMINE IF IT CAN ESTABLISH
A BETTER AND MORE EFFECTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH ITS
FRIENDS IN THE AREA.
SECRET
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HAVE DONE WHAT WE CAN TO IMPROVE IRAQ'S RELATIONS WITH
THE UNITED STATES. I CAN VISUALIZE A SITUATION WHERE
IRAQ, EGYPT, JORDAN, AND OTHERS CAN WORK TOGETHER,
THEREBY CUTTING SYRIA DOWN TO ITS ACTUAL SIZE. EVEN
LEBANON MAY BECOME LESS OF A PROBLEM IF SUCH POLITICAL
COOPERATION CAN BE ACHIEVED.
EXDIS
DEPARTMENT PASS TO CODEL TOWER
MILITARY ADDRESSEE HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS PREL, OREP, JO
SUBJECT CODEL TOWER'S MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN,
-- ISRAEL HAS CAUSED THREE MAJOR PROBLEMS, FIRST,
ISRAEL REJECTS THE REAGAN INITIATIVE. SECOND, ISRAEL
CONTINUES ITS SETTLEMENTS ACTIVITY. THIRD, ISRAEL
CONTINUES ITS BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION OF SOUTHERN
LEBANON. THE SETTLEMENTS HAVE CREATED NEW REALITIES
AND NEW OBSTACLES TO PEACE. THERE IS A NEW PLAN TO
RELOCATE PEOPLE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES; IT
SUGGESTS THE ISRAELIS INTEND THAT THEY BE SENT TO
THE JORDAN VALLEY (BEN PORAT PLAN).
-- THE ISRAELIS ARE ALSO TRYING TO EXTEND ISRAELI
LEGISLATION TO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, A STEP
TANTAMOUNT TO ANNEXATION.
-- THE ISRAELIS ARE ALSO CAUSING PROBLEMS IN TERMS
OF THE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE ACROSS THE JORDAN RIVER.
THE ISRAELI ATTITUDE TOWARD RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUALS
COMING OVER TO EXPRESS THEMSELVES, BE IT WITH THE PLO
OR JORDAN OR WITH OTHER ARABS, IS WORRISOME. A CASE
IN POINT IS THAT OF THE GAZA NOTABLE, RASHAD SHAWWA,
WHO HAS BEEN PREVENTED FROM TRAVELING TO THE EAST
BANK. ANOTHER EXAMPLE IS A MEMBER OF THE JORDANIAN
PARLIAMENT WHO WAS DENIED PERMISSION TO TRAVEL TO
JORDAN TO PARTICIPATE IN PARLIAMENT. THERE ARE
OTHER EXAMPLES ALSO.
-- THE ISRAELIS DO NOT MIND MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT
COMING OVER BUT THEY WILL NOT ALLOW PALESTINIANS TO
MOVE TO INFLUENCE THE PLO AT THIS IMPORTANT TIME.
"I UNDERSCORED THIS ISSUE AS STRONGLY AS I COULD IN
WASHINGTON. IF WE ARE TO HAVE THE RATIONAL MAJORITY
EXPRESS ITSELF, WE MUST ALLOW THESE PEOPLE TO ACT."
SECRET
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-- I DID NOT COME BACK FROM WASHINGTON WITH ANY
CONCLUSIONS. I SENSED A DEEP PREOCCUPATION WITH
LEBANON. HOWEVER. THERE IS AN IGTEREST IN WASHINGTON
IN REFOCUSING ON THE MAJOR CAUSE OF INSTABILITY IN THE
AREA -- THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE -- AND ON THE ARAB/
ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS.
-- I TOLD MY AMERICAN INTERLOCUTORS THAT IF YOU WANT
US IN THE PEACE PROCESS WE CANNOT DEAL.WITH THE U.S.
AS AN ALLY OF ISRAEL. THE LEBANESE PROBLEM IS AN
EXAMPLE BEFORE US WHERE OUR HOPES WERE THAT THE U.S.
WOULD STAND BY ITS WORD AND THAT BY THE END OF 1982
THERE WOULD BE A WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM
LEBANON.
-- WE WOULD LIKE TO DEAL WITH THE U.S. AS A SUPER
POWER. WE WERE TOLD THE U.S. WILL HAVE TO TALK WITH
EXDIS
DEPARTMENT PASS TO CODEL TOWER
MILITARY ADDRESSEE HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS PREL, OREP, JO
SUBJECT CODEL TOWER'S MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN,
ISRAEL IN THE COMING PERIOD. WE WERE FRANK IN EX-
PRESSING OUR VIEWS BUT WE DID NOT COME OUT WITH
ANYTHING TANGIBLE.
-- THE PRESIDENT ASSURED ME HE STANDS BY HIS PEACE
INITIATIVE. BUT A LOT OF GROUND HAS CHANGED SINCE
SEPTEMBER 1, 1982.. IF WE DECIDE TO ENGAGE IN THE
PEACE PROCESS WE MUST KNOW WHAT THE END RESULT WILL BE.
-- ISRAEL IS VERY STRONG ON THE GROUND. IT IS
IMPORTANT FOR US TO KNOW WHAT THE U.S. POSITION
ACTUALLY IS. WITHOUT THAT WE SEE NO HOPE. IF WE
FAIL IT WILL BE MUCH MORE DEVASTATING THAN THE
FAILURE IN LEBANON. MUCH MORE IS AT STAKE.
-- OUR VIEW OF THE PEACE PROCESS IS THAT THE
TRANSITIONAL PERIOD MUST BE FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY
BY A FINAL SETTLEMENT. WE SEEK TOTAL PEACE FOR
TOTAL WITHDRAWAL. IF SOMETHING IS ACCOMPLISHED
WE MUST MOVE RAPIDLY TO FINAL STATUS NEGOTIATIONS.
-- WE DIDN'T GET MANY ANSWERS IN WASHINGTON AT THIS
STAGE. 1984 IS AN IMPORTANT YEAR DOMESTICALLY IN THE
U.S. I DID NOT PLAN TO TELL THE PLO THAT I HAVE COME
BACK FROM THH U.S. WITH A SOLUTION. WHAT IS IMPORTANT
IS FOR JORDAN TO TALK BILATERALLY WITH THE PLO TO
EXPLORE WHAT THE POSSIBILITIES FOR MOVING TOGETHER ARE.
-- I WAS UNHAPPY WITH THE PUBLIC STATEMENT MUBARAK
MADE IN WASHINGTON AT THE END OF OUR TRILATERAL
MEETINGS. MY OWN IMPRESSION IS THAT WHEN MUBARAK MET
WITH ARAFAT IN EGYPT HE TOLD ARAFAT HE WOULD DO HIS
BEST WITH THE USG TO GET THE U.S. TO IMPROVE ITS
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-- I KNOW THE USG POSITION ON THE PLO. FURTHER, THERE
IS NO CHANCE FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND
THE PLO. THE ANSWER RESIDES BASICALLY IN A JORDANIAN
DELEGATION AND PERHAPS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PLO AT A
STAGE LATER ON.
-- THE POINT I TRIED TO MAKE IN WASHINGTON IS THAT IF
THE PALESTINIANS ARE WILLING TO BE INVOLVED IN THE PEACE
PROCESS, HOW CAN ANYONE DENY THEM THAT PROSPECT AND
POSSIBILITY? IF THE ISSUE IS THAT OF DEALING WITH A
TERRORIST ORGANIZATION, HOW DOES THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT
CLAIM TO HAVE A MONOPOLY ON DECIDING WHO IS AND WHO IS
NOT A TERRORIST. THE PALESTINIANS MUST BE INVOLVED IN
ANY ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN A SOLUTION.
IRAO
-- THE IRAQIS ARE HOLDING ON A MILITARY FRONT VERY WELL.
THE IRANIAN AIM IS TO CONTINUE THE WAR BASED ON AN ASSESS-
MENT THAT IRAQ WILL SUFFER MATERIALLY. THIS ILLUSION
MUST BE REMOVED.
EXDIS
DEPARTMENT PASS TO CODEL TOWER
MILITARY ADDRESSEE HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS PREL, OREP, JO
SUBJECT . CODEL TOWER'S MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN,
-- IRAQ'S CURRENT EXPORTS OF OIL ARE LIMITED EXCEPT
FOR THE PIPELINE THROUGH TURKEY. THE GULF REMAINS
CLOSED. MONEY FROM THE GULF STATES TO IRAQ IS
DIMINISHING.
-- IF IRAN SUCCEEDS THE RESULTANT DISARRAY WILL NOT
BE CONFINED ONLY TO IRAQ. THE WHOLE REGION WOULD BE
SERIOUSLY AFFECTED. THE PROSPECT OF A RELIGIOUS SPLIT
BETWEEN THE SUNNIS AND THE SHIITES WOULD BF ONE RESULT.
THE GULF STATES AND SAUDI ARABIA WOULD BE IN SERIOUS
JEOPARDY AND THE REGION COULD EASILY CRAGMENT AND
WEAKEN.
-- THE TALKS ON ESTABLISHING ALTERNATE PIPELINES FROM
IRAQ CONTINUE. CONCERNING THE SAUDI ARABIAN PIPELINE,
IF ANY PROBLEMS OCCUR IN THE GULF THE SAUDIS WILL HAVE
PRIORITY IN PUMPING THEIR OIL. HOWEVER, THE RED SEA
LINE WILL TAKE THREE TO FIVE YEARS TO COMPLETE.
SECRET
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-- THEREFORE, THERE IS ANOTHER IDEA THAT HAS BEEN
PRESENTED BY BECHTEL WHICH IS INTERESTED IN CON-
STRUCTING A LINE ALONG THE OLD IPC PIPELINE WHICH
ENDED IN HAIFA. THIS IS AN ESTABLISHED LINE. WE
HAVE BEEN LOOKING AT THE POSSIBILITY OF CREATING
A LINK TO AQABA. THE IDEA IS THAT THE PIPELINE
COULD BE COMPLETED BETWEEN 15 MONTHS TO TWO YEARS.
THE CAPACITY WOULD BE ONE MILLION BARRELS OF OIL A
DAY WITH AN EVENTUAL CAPACITY OF 1.5 MILLION. IT
WOULD PAY FOR ITSELF WITHIN MONTHS. THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF THIS LINE WOULD GIVE IRAQ A VERY NEEDED BREATHER.
IT WOULD BE A TURNING POINT VIS-A-VIS IRAN.
-- A JOINT JORDANIAN-IRAQI COMMITTEE IS WORKING ON
NEGOTIATING THE SPECIFICS OF THIS PIPELINE DEAL. THE
IRAQIS INSIST THEY WILL NOT LOOK AT IT UNLESS THE U.S.
IS AN ACTIVE PARTICIPANT IN THE PROJECT. THIS IS A
WONDERFUL OPPORTUNITY. IT CREATES ANOTHER LINK FOR
US AND IN IRAQ'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S.
-- THE TALKS ARE PROGRESSING VERY RAPIDLY. THERE IS
ANOTHER SUGGESTION FOR A SPUR TO KUWAIT USING TAPLINE
WHICH WOULD BE LINKED UP WITH JORDAN.
-- FURTHER, A PIPELINE TERMINATING IN AQABA COULD BE
USED TO TRANSPORT OIL THROUGH THE SINAI TO THE
MEDITERRANEAN. THIS WOULD BE A NEW STRATEGIC LINE
WHICH WOULD LESSEN THE DANGER OF THE CLOSURE OF
HORMUZ WITH ALL THAT IMPLIES FOR THE EXPORT OF OIL
TO EUROPE AND THE U.S.
-- IN SUM, THIS IS A CONCRETE WAY IN WHICH OUR
RELATIONSHIPS COULD BE CONSOLIDATED.
U.S.-JORDANIAN MILITARY RELATIONSHIP
------------------------------------
17. KING HUSSEIN MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:
EXDIS
DEPARTMENT PASS TO CODEL TOWER
MILITARY ADDRESSEE HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS PREL, OREP, JO
SUBJECT CODEL TOWER'S MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN,
-- CONCERNING THE CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC PRESENTATION
ON THE JOINT LOGISTICS PROGRAM (JLP), IF IT ADVERSELY
AFFECTS THE DIGNITY OF JORDAN, WE WILL DROP IT.
-- I RECOGNIZE THE COMMUNALITY OF INTERESTS BETWEEN
JORDAN AND THE U.S., ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF JORDAN'S
INTER-REGIONAL SECURITY ROLE. THE U.S. NEEDS THIS
PROGRAM WHICH, ON OUR PART, ENHANCES OUR CAPABILITIES
TO PLAY THIS REGIONAL SECURITY ROLE MORE EFFECTIVELY.
WE HOPE SOMETHING WILL HAPPEN TO ESTABLISH THIS PROGRAM.
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-- CONCERNING OUR OWN MILITARY REQUIREMENTS, WE ARE
FACING A GROWING PROBLEM FROM OUR NORTHERN BORDER WITH
SYRIA. IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT A DECISION HAS BEEN
TAKEN BY THE SYRIANS TO INFILTRATE TERRORISTS ACROSS
THE SYRIAN-JORDAN BORDER FOR OPERATIONS WITHIN JORDAN
AND IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. APPARENTLY THE SYRIAN
GOVERNMENT HAS GIVEN DISSIDENT ELEMENTS OF THE PLO
ASSURANCES THAT THEY WILL RECEIVE ACTIVE SYRIAN SUPPORT.
SPECIFICALLY, THE SYRIAN ARMY WILL GIVE THEM MILITARY
COVER. IT WILL NOT BE TOO LONG BEFORE ANOTHER 1970 OR
1980 MILITARY BORDER CONFRONTATION BETWEEN SYRIA AND
JORDAN OCCURS.
-- ACCORDINGLY, WE NEED TO ENHANCE OUR MILITARY
CAPABILITIES.
-- WE APPRECIATE AND ARE HOPEFUL THAT THE STINGER SALE
WILL COME THROUGH. WE HAVE MANY OTHER MILITARY SHORT-
FALLS OF WHICH AMBASSADOR VIETS IS FULLY AWARE OF.
18. SENATOR TOWER ASKED, WHO DO THE SYRIANS CONSIDER
THE SPOKESMAN OF THE PALESTINIANS AFTER THE ISRAELIS
DESTROYED THE MILITARY BACKBONE OF THE PLO IN LEBANON?"
HUSSEIN REFERRED TO SYRIA'S PROMOTION OF THE PLO
DISSIDENTS WHOM SYRIA CONTROLS.
- IF IRAQ EVER GOT OUT OF THE WAR, THE WHOLE SITUATION
WOULD BE DIFFERENT IN THE AREA. ALSO, IF THE SAUDIS
MOVE COURAGEOUSLY, MUCH CAN BE DONE. IN ANY CASE, WE
ARE NOT PARTICULARLY WORRIED. WE WILL ACT IN OUR
LEGITIMATE INTERESTS.
19. SENATOR TOWER ASKED IF SYRIAN OPPOSITION WOULD
IMPACT ADVERSELY ON THE GULF STATES. HUSSEIN RESPONDED
"ONLY BY INTIMIDATION."
20. TOWER ASKED ABOUT THE EGYPTIAN ROLE. HUSSEIN SAID
THAT THEY CAN BE A HELP IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS
ITSELF TO FIND A COMPROMISE SOLUTION TO PROBLEMS.
HOWEVER, EGYPT CANNOT DO MUCH PHYSICALLY. WE ARE
STILL FIGHTING THE BATTLE FOR EGYPT'S RE-INTEGRATION,
ESPECIALLY IN THE ARAB LEAGUE.
21. SENATOR TOWER ASKED HOW EGYPT COULD BE USED AS
A COUNTERWEIGHT TO SYRIA. KING HUSSEIN SAID THAT IT
COULD PLAY SUCH A ROLE BUT THAT IT WOULD BE LIMITED.
THE KING REFERRED TO JORDAN'S ROLE IN TRAINING THE
MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS IN THE GULF ARAB STATES. HE
REITERATED THAT JORDAN WOULD BE WILLING TO ACT IN A
EXDIS
DEPARTMENT PASS TO CODEL TOWER
MILITARY ADDRESSEE HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS PREL, OREP, JO
SUBJECT CODEL TOWER'S MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN,
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CRISIS BUT THAT JORDAN NEEDS ENHANCED CAPABILITIES.
SENATOR TOWER COMMENTED THAT THERE IS A RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THE ENHANCEMENT OF JORDANIAN CAPABILITIES AND
THE REACTION OF THE GULF STATES TO JORDAN'S INTER-
REGIONAL SECURITY ROLE.
22. REFERRING TO THE SAUDIS AND THEIR ROLE IN LEBANON,
THE KING SAID THAT THE REPORTED EIGHT-POINT SAUDI PLAN
WAS PRESENTED AS A PACKAGE DEAL. IT WAS UNDERSTOOD. WE
WERE TOLD AT LEAST, THAT IF THE SYRIANS DIDN'T COME ALONG
THE SAUDIS WOULD TAKE A STRONG STAND AGAINST THEM. AMIN
GEMAYEL ACTED ON THE PLAN AND THE SYRIANS REJECTED IT.
SAUDI POLICY IS YET TO BE DETERMINED.
23. SENATOR TOWER ASKED ABOUT ARAFAT'S PLANS TO COME
TO JORDAN. THE KING SAID THAT HE IS EXPECTED HERE
BEFORE THE END OF THE MONTH. HUSSEIN REITERATED THAT
HE WANTS ARAFAT TO BE HERE WITH HIS EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
AND PNC MEMBERS. ALSO, HE WOULD WANT WEST BANKERS TO
BE PRESENT IN AMMAN DURING HIS TALKS WITH ARAFAT.
SENATOR TOWER REMARKED THAT ARAFAT IS A SLIPPERY FISH.
HUSSEIN SAID THAT HE IS GOING TO MAKE SURE THAT WE
CLOSE ALL THE NETS.
24. SENATOR TOWER SAID THAT HE AND THE MAJORITY OF
HIS COLLEAGUES ON THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
WILL SUPPORT THE ADMINISTRATION'S REQUESTS ON JORDAN'S
ARMS REQUIREMENTS. THERE IS A GREAT AWARENESS AND A
MUCH MORE SOPHISTICATED PERCEPTION OF WHAT YOU ARE
TRYING TO DO, TOWER STATED. HOWEVER, YOUR RECOMMENDA-
TION TO ADOPT MAJORITY RULE AND DEPART FROM CONSENSUS
WITHIN THE ARAB LEAGUE AND ARAB SUMMIT MEETINGS IS A
POINT OF CONCERN. EVEN IF ALL THE ARAB MODERATE STATES
AGREE TO A SOLUTION, AND SYRIA DISSENTS, THEN WHAT ARE
THE ALTERNATIVES? KHADDAM TOLD THE SENATOR THAT ARAFAT
IS IRRELEVANT AND THAT SYRIA IS NOT INTERESTED IN AP-
PROVING AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN ARAFAT AND THE KING.
25. HUSSEIN SAID THAT THE ALTERNATIVES WILL BE
INCREASED TERRORISM AND POSSIBLY MILITARY CONFRONTATION.
WASHINGTON BELIEVES THAT IT CANNOT PROVIDE JORDAN THE
ASSISTANCE IT NEEDS UNTIL WE HAVE EMBARKED ON THE PEACE
PROCESS ITSELF. WE HAVE A DIFFERENT VIEW. WE NEED TO
KNOW THE U.S. POSITION NOW AND WE NEED U.S. HELP
BEFOREHAND.
26. CONGRESSMAN MC CAIN ASKED HUSSEIN WHAT THE U.S.
SHOULD DO IN LEBANON. SENATOR TOWER SAID THAT THE
AVERAGE AMERICAN DOES NOT ATTACH THAT MUCH IMPORTANCE
TO LEBANON.
27. KING HUSSEIN ANSWERED THAT THE TOTAL ABANDONMENT
OF LEBANON AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE U.S. UNDER PRESSURE
MEANS IN THE EYES OF THE PEOPLE IN THE AREA THAT THE
U.S. IS WITHDRAWING FROM THE AREA. THE MAY 17 AGREEMENT
WAS SERIOUSLY FLAWED. EVEN THOUGH IT SPECIFICED THE
WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM LEBANON, IT GAVE
THE SYRIANS AND THE SOVIET UNION A PRETEXT TO INCREASE
THEIR INFLUENCE NOT ONLY IN LEBANON BUT IN REGIONAL
AFFAIRS. THE LEBANESE ARMY IS THE LEBANESE PEOPLE.
UNFORTUNATELY, IT HAS NOW BEEN BROKEN UNDER STRESS.
THE U.S. MUST CONTINUE ITS COMMITMENT IN THE REGION
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BUT IT MUST CHANGE ITS EMPHASIS. IF IT DOES NOT OUR
ENEMIES WILL MAXIMIZE THEIR POSITIONS." THE U.S. MUST
NOT FORGET LEBANON, BUT IT MUST WORK ON TWO TRACKS.
EXDIS
DEPARTMENT PASS TO CODEL TOWER
MILITARY ADDRESSEE HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS PREL, OREP, JO
SUBJECT CODEL TOWER'S MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN,
ONE ON LEBANON AND ANOTHER ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE
PROCESS. AT THE SAME TIME THE U.S. SHOULD ENHANCE
ITS RELATIONSHIPS WITH ALL ITS FRIENDS IN THE REGION.
IT IS REALLY TRAGIC TO SEE THE U.S. PITTED AGAINST THE
JUMBLATT'S AND BERRIS. IF LEBANON GOES, THERE IS CONCERN
ON OUR PART OVER THE FATE OF 400,000 PALESTINIANS WHO
WILL BE DIVIDED BETWEEN SYRIA AND ISRAEL. IF THE TREND
CONTINUES LEBANON WILL BECOME ANOTHER RADICAL STATE IN
THE AREA FALLING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF THE SOVIET
UNION.
28. SENATOR TOWER SAID THAT IF WE MOVE* TOWARD THE
PARTITION OF LEBANON IT WILL NOT BE IN EVEN SYRIA'S
INTEREST FOR IT COULD LEAD TO A MILITARY CONFRONTATION
WITH ISRAEL. THE LATTER WILL DESTROY SYRIA. HUSSEIN
SAID THAT THERE IS A CONFLUENCE OF INTERESTS THAT IS
PERCEIVED BETWEEN SYRIA AND ISRAEL IN TERMS OF
POLARIZATION IN THE AREA.
29. SENATOR TOWER COMMENTED THAT WHEN HE MET WITH
LABOR LEADER PEREZ THERE WAS A TENDENCY TO YIELD
BACK TERRITORIES, STOP SETTLEMENTS, AND TO COUNTER
SYRIAN MILITARY PRESSURE IN LEBANON. BUT IF THERE
IS ANYTHING THAT COULD BOLSTER SHAMIR'S GOVERNMENT
AND REUNIFY THE COUNTRY IT WOULD BE THE PROSPECT
OF HAVING TO GO TO WAR AGAIN WITH SYRIA. IN THE
LAST ANALYSIS, SENATOR TOWER SAID THAT HE ADMIRES
THE KING AND THE KING'S DEDICATION IN TRYING TO
UNTIE THE KNOTS OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI PROBLEM. KING
HUSSEIN THANKED THE SENATOR AND SAID, "LET'S TRY TO
UNTIE THE KNOTS TOGETHER."
30. CODEL DID NOT SEE THIS CABLE PRIOR TO
HIS DEPARTURE.
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/25: CIA-RDP90BO137OR000801030003-7