RAS BANAS MILITARY CONSTRUCTION
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP90B01370R000801040042-3
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
C
Document Page Count:
2
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
November 30, 2010
Sequence Number:
42
Case Number:
Publication Date:
April 11, 1984
Content Type:
CABLE
File:
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TOR: 111321Z APR 84
PP RUEAIIB
ZNY CCCCC ZOC STATE ZZH
PP RUEHC RUFHNA RUEHKO RUDKGPO RUEHOT RUDKSNQ RUFHMB
RUEHMD RUEHLD RUFHLI RUFHBG RUEHRO RUEHKJ RUFHGV
RUFHFR RUDKPNQ RUFHOL RUEHBS RUFHJA RUEHTH RUEHAK
DE RUEHC #5410 1020841
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P 110715Z APR 84 ZEX
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 3005
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 8530
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS PRIORITY
BT
C O N F I DENT I A L STATE 105410
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MARR, JA, EG, NATO, ABUD
SUBJECT: RAS BANAS MILITARY CONSTRUCTION
2. THE MILITARY CONSTRUCTION SUSCONMITTL'E OF THE HOUSE
APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE IN Mff NOVEMBER RECOMMENDED
THE APPROPRIATION OF 49 MILLION FOR AIRFIELD
IMPROVEMENTS AT RAS BANAS, EGYPT. LANGUAGE ATTACHED TO
THE REPORT MADE OBLIGATION OF THOSE FUNDS CONTINGENT,
INTER ALIA, ON THE ADMINISTRATION'S DEMONSTRATING THAT
IT HAS PURSUED DIRECT AND INDIRECT OFFSET FUNDING FROM
OUR NATO ALLIES AND JAPAN FOR MIDDLE EAST CONSTRUCTION.
3. THIS CONGRESSIONAL REQUIREMENT WAS ALSO CITED IN
THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE INTERAGENCY RESPONSE TO NSDD-99,
U.S. SECURITY STRATEGY FOR THE NEAR EAST AND SOUTH
ASIA. THIS REPORT INCLUDES THE RECOMMENDATION THAT WE
SEEK ALLIED COOPERATION NOT ONLY IN THE FORM OF A
DIRECT MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE REGION AND EN ROUTE
FACILITIES BUT IN THE FORM OF ASSISTANCE WITH OUR
UNILATERAL EFFORTS THERE. THIS REPORT IS STILL
UNDERGOING WHITE HOUSE REVIEW, BUT WE ARE CONCURRENTLY
BEGINNING ITS IMPLEMENTATION.
4. WHILE NONE OF THE ALLIES HAVE MADE DIRECT
CONTRIBUTIONS TO FUND MIDDLE EAST MILITARY
CONSTRUCTION, THE AGGREGATE LEVEL OF INDIRECT ALLIED
SUPPORT AND COMPENSATION FOR US EFFORTS IN SOUTH WEST
ASIA MAY BE SUFFICIENT TO MEET CONGRESSIONAL
REQUIREMENTS. ALLIED PARTICIPATION IN, AND SUPPORT OF,
THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON IS ONE EXAMPLE OF
THE TYPE OF ACTION WHICH CONGRESS MIGHT RECOGNIZE AS AN
OFFSET. WHILE WE WILL POINT OUT THAT ALLIED PRESENCE
WITH US IN BEIRUT WAS ESSENTIAL FOR POLITICAL REASONS,
WE WILL ALSO NOTE THAT ALLIED TROOPS REDUCED THE NUMBER
OF AMERICAN MILITARY PERSONNEL REQUIRED AND THUS OUR
OVERALL SUPPORT COSTS.
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DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE THAT WOULD BE PUBLICLY
IDENTIFIED AS COMPENSATION OR INDIRECT MONETARY SUPPORT
FOR UNILATERAL US EFFORTS IN SWA. BUT WE ASK THE
MISSION TO PROVIDE US WITH A LISTING OF ANY ACTIONS BY
NATO OR BY INDIVIDUAL ALLIES WHICH COULD HELP TO MEET
CONGRESSIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND ASSIST IN SECURING
ADEQUATE CONSTRUCTION FUNDING FOR RAS BANAS.
6. FOR TOKYO: WOULD APPRECIATE EMBASSY'S ASSISTANCE
IN ANSWERING ESSIOiML CONCERN ABOUT BURDEN-SHARING
IN SWA. IN GENERAL, WE PLAN TO EMPHASIZE JAPANESE HOST
NATION SUPPORT FOR U.S. FORCES AND FACILITIES IN JAPAN
(SOME OF WHICH WOULD COME INTO PLAY IN VARIOUS SWA
CONTINGENCIES) AND JAPANESE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO
SEVERAL COUNTRIES IN THE REGION, INCLUDING ESPECIALLY
EGYPT. WE RECOGNIZE, OF COURSE, THAT DIRECT JAPANESE
FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR U.S. BASE CONSTRUCTION IN ANY
THIRD COUNTRY IS QUITE PROBABLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND,
IN ANY CASE, POLITICALLY IMPOSSIBLE.
7. FOR INFO ADDRESSEES: WE WOULD WELCOME ANY
SUGGESTIONS. GENERAL OR SPECIFIC, ON HOST COUNTRY
ACTIVITIES -- ESPECIALLY SINCE THE NOVEMBER 16
CONGRESSIONAL ACTION -- THAT WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO
PORTRAY AS AN OFFSET FOR RAS BANAS CONSTRUCTION. THIS
WOULD INCLUDE ANY CONSTRUCTION COSTS BORN BY HOST
GOVERNMENTS ANYWHERE THAT REDUCED US COSTS.
8. FOR ANKARA: WE UNDERSTAND THE DIFFICULTIES, WITH THE
TURKS IN PARTICULAR, OF TYING SUCH THINGS AS THE INCIRLIK
AIR HEAD TO OUR SWA STRATEGY. HOWEVER, WE WOULD APPRECIATE
YOUR TAKING AN ESPECIALLY CREATIVE LOOK AT THE INCIRLIK
AGREEMENT AND OTHER SUPPORTIVE TURKISH ACTIONS.
SHULTZ
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