CODEL SOLARZ MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01370R000801070042-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 30, 2010
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: August 20, 1984
• Content Type: CABLE

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OLL/LD
INCOMING
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00 RUEAIIB
ZNY SSSSS ZOC STATE ZZH
UTS2625
00 RUEHC
DE RUOMKW #4641/01 2331350
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
0 201345Z AUG 84
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8206
INFO RUOMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 8556
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 5066
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 3644
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 4184
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 2992
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 639
RUEHUM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1199
RUEHAA/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 8572
RUOMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 5357
RUEHRH/USELO RIYADH 3126
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 2087
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 5912
BT
S E C R E T KUWAIT 4641
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL KU US XF ZP
SUBJECT: CODEL SOLARZ MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER
2. SUMMARY: CODEL MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINSTER SHAIKH SABAH
LASTED WELL BEYOND SCHEDULED TIME AND FONMIN WAS RELAXED
AND RESPONSIVE THROUGHOUT. ON IRAN-IRAQ WAR, U.S. WAS
URGED TO CONVINCE UN SECGEN PEREZ DE CUELLAR TO GO TO
TEHRAN; IRAN WOULD TRY TO SEIZE ALL GULF STATES IF IT
SUCCEEDED AGAINST IRAQ; KUWAIT WOULD HAVE NO CHOICE BUT
TO DEFEND ITSELF. ON THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT, U.S.
SHOULD TALK DIRECTLY TO THE PLO WHICH ARAFAT CONTINUES
TO LEAD; THE FEZ RESOLUTIONS ARE A VALID BASIS TO BEGIN
NEGOTIATIONS WHICH SHOULD TAKE PLACE UNDER AN INTERNATIONAL
UMBRELLA; KUWAIT WILL ACCEPT ANY SETTLEMENT ACCEPTABLE
TO ALL PARTIES INVOLVED AS LONG AS IT IS NOT IMPOSED BY
FORCE; SYRIA MUST ACCEPT A SETTLEMENT OR WILL SCUTTLE
AGREEMENTS FROM WHICH IT IS EXCLUDED. ARABS WILL PUT ENOUGH
PRESSURE ON SYRIA FOR IT TO WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON BUT ONLY
AFTER ISRAEL WITHDRAWS. NEXT ARAB SUMMIT MAY DISCUSS
EGYPT'S READMISSION TO THE ARAB LEAGUE. ARABS WOULD LOSE ALL
TRUST IN U.S. SHOULD EMBASSY BE MOVED FROM TEL AVIV TO
JERUSALEM, BUT KUWAIT-- WHICH ALSO HAS TO CONTEND WITH A
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY- COULD LIVE WITH CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
THAT DID NOT COMPEL OR LEAD TO SUCH A MOVE. BRANDON GROVE
NOMINATION WAS UNACCEPTABLE BECAUSE OF REACTION THAT WOULD
HAVE FOLLOWED IN KUWAITI NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND PRESS.
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3. AUGUST 13 MEETING BETWEEN CODEL SOLARZ AND DEPUTY
PRIME MINISTER, FOREIGN AND INFORMATION MINISTER SHAIKH
SABAH EXTENDED WELL BEYOND ITS SCHEDULED FORTY-FIVE MINUTES
WITH SHAIKH SABAH RESPONDING EASILY AND FRANKLY TO THE
CONGRESSMAN'S QUESTIONS. CONGRESSMAN WAS ACCOMPANIED BY
CHARGE, HFAC STAFFER ROTH, SOLARZ ADVISER KROLL AND POLOFF.
PRESENT ON KUWAITI SIDE WERE MFA ACTING UNDERSECRETARY KHALED
AL-JA'AFAR AND SEVERAL OTHER ADVISORS TO THE FONMIN.
4. IRAN-IRAQ WAR: SHAIKH SABAH TOLD CODEL THAT IRAN CONTINUES
TO DEMAND THE REMOVAL OF SADDAM HUSSAYN AND WOULD, IF SUC-
CESSFUL, DESTROY THE BA'ATH REGIME AND SET UP A SHIA GOVERN-
MENT IN BAGHDAD. THE BEST HOPE FOR A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION RESTS
WITH THE UN AND THE U.S. SHOULD URGE UN SECGEN PEREZ DE
DUELLAR TO PERSONALLY GO TO TEHRAN "EVEN IF HE DOESN'T
HAVE AN INVITATION." ACKNOWLEDGING THAT IRAN HAS REFUSED PAST
OFFERS BY PEREZ DE CUELLAR, THE FONMIN SAID HE THOUGHT SUCH
AN INITIATIVE MIGHT NOW BE ACCEPTABLE BECAUSE KUWAIT HAD
RECENTLY DETECTED SOME "INTERNAL DISPUTES" AMONG THE IRANIAN
LEADERSHIP. HE ALSO ALLUDED TO EROSION OF POPULAR SUPPORT BY
ASSERTING THAT SOME IRANIAN MOTHERS ARE GOING SO FAR AS TO
BREAK THEIR SONS' ARMS TO AVOID MILITARY SERVICE.
5. IN RESPONSE TO CODEL QUESTION, SABAH SAID THAT KUWAIT
WOULD DEFEND ITSELF SHOULD IRAN DEFEAT IRAQ. THE IRANIANS,
HE SAID, WOULD TRY TO SEIZE ALL THE STATES OF THE GULF
SHOULD THEY SUCCEED AGAINST IRAQ. KUWAIT'S SHIA MINORITY
IS LOYAL TO THE GOK, ALTHOUGH "A FEW" MAY HAVE PRO-KHOMEINI
SYMPATHIES. "WE DO NOT THINK ABOUT RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCES AMONG
KUWAITIS: OUR UN AMBASSADOR IS A SHIA AND WE HAVE SEVERAL
OTHER SHIA KUWAITIS IN AMBASSADORIAL POSITIONS," SABAH
COMMENTED.
6. ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT: SHAIKH SABAH SAID THAT THE FEZ SUMMIT
RESOLUTION ON THE ARAB -ISRAELI CONFLICT WAS A VALID BASIS
FOR NEGOTIATING A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT. NONE OF THE
PARTICIPANTS AT THE FEZ SUMMIT OBJECTED TO POINT SEVEN WHICH
SAID "ALL COUNTRIES" IN THE REGION SHOULD LIVE IN PEACE WITH
EACH OTHER. AFTER FIRST TELLING CODEL THAT SPECIFIC MENTION
OF ISRAEL IN POINT SEVEN HAD BEEN "UNNECESSARY," THE FONMIN
LATER SAID THAT THE U.S. WOULD HAVE TO "GIVE SOMETHING"
TO THE PLO BEFORE ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST WOULD BE
EXPLICITLY ACKNOWLEDGED.
7. THE FONMAIN SAID HE SUPPORTED THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
PROPOSED BY THE SOVIETS AS THE BEST WAY TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS
BECAUSE "AFTER THIRTY ODD YEARS" IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY
DIFFICULT FOR THE PARTIES DIRECTLY INVOLVED TO SETTLE
THEIR DIFFERENCES WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF "AN INTERNATIONAL
UMBRELLA." IN THIS CONTEXT, SABAH SAID THAT KUWAIT AND THE
OTHR ARAB COUNTRIES WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO THE USSR
RE-ESTABLISHING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. IN
RESPONSE TO CODEL PROBING, SABAH SAID, UNEQUIVOCABLY. THAT
ANY SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT HAD TO BE COMPREHENSIVE INCLUDING
THE GOLAN HEIGHTS: SYRIA. FOR EXAMPLE, COULD SCUTTLE ANY
AGREEMENT FROM WHICH IT WAS EXCLUDED. "WE WOULD OPPOSE ANY
SETTLEMENT THAT DID NOT INCLUDE THE SYRIANS. BESIDES,
JORDAN CANNOT IGNORE SYRIA, AND VICE VERSA."
8. ON THE FORM A SETTLEMENT MIGHT TAKE, SHAIKH SABAH
SAID THAT WHATEVER WAS ACCEPTABLE TO THOSE DIRECTLY
INVOLVED--THE PLO. JORDAN, AND SYRIA--WOULD BE SUPPORTED BY
THE GOK, "AS LONG AS THE AGREEMENT WAS NOT IMPOSED BY FORCE."
IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS ON SPECIFIC DETAILS, SHAIKH SABAH
OPINED THAT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TO PRE-1967 BORDERS AND
SECRET
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REVERSION TO A DIVIDED JERUSALEM ("BUT OPEN TO ALL") WOULD
BE ACCEPTED BY THE ARABS AND THAT HE WOULD HAVE NO TROUBLE
WITH THE IDEA OF NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL IN SUCH
AN EVENTUALL ITY. SABAH THEN INTERJECTED THAT THE U.S.
MUST TALK TO THE PLO DIRECTLY. AFTER CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ
STATED THE U.S. POSITION ON SUCHTALKS, SABAH AGAIN SAID
THAT THE U.S. SHOULD OFFER SOMETHING FIRST AND THEN THE
PLO COULD RECOGNIZE ISRAEL.
9. PLO LEADERSHIP: SHAIKH SABAH, IN RESPONSE TO CODEL
QUESTION, ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE PLO HAD SUFFERED FROM EVENTS
IN LEBANON SINCE 1982: "EVERY PALESTINIAN AND EVERY ARAB"
HAD BEEN HURT BY EVENTS IN LEBANON OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS,
HE ADDED. NEVERTHELESS, YASIR ARAFAT REMAINED THE LEADER OF
THE PLO AND, IN THE FDNMIN'S OPINION, ARAFAT WAS A GOOD L
LEADER. SABAH WARNED THAT BY REFUSING TO DEAL WITH ARAFAT THE
U.S. WAS RISKING RADICALIZATION OF THE PALESTINIANS.
10. ISREAL, SYRIA, LEBANON, EGYPT: THE FONMIN SAID HE SAW
NO BASIC DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ISRAEL'S LABOR AND LIKUD
PARTIES' ATTITUDES TOWARD RESOLVING THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT.
ON SYRIA, SABAH ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SOME OF THE AL-ASSAD
REGIME'S ACTIONS--IN HAMA, AS WELL AS IN LEBANON--HAD CAUSED
STRAIN BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. KUWAIT'S NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY, HE NOTED, HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY CRITICAL OF
DAMASCUS. (WHEN CODEL DREW A PARALLEL BETWEEN EVENTS IN
HAMA AND IN SABRA/SHATILLA, SABAH DISAGREED, IMPLYING THAT
THE FORMER HAD BEEN AN INTERNAL MATTER, WHEREAS THE LATTER
WAS NOT.) AL-ASSAD WAS IN GOOD HEALTH, THE FONMIN?ASSERTED,
AND EVEN IF HE LEFT THE SCENE THE SYRAIN BA'ARTH PARTY WOULD
REMAIN IN POWER. THE FONMIN TOLD CODEL "NOT TO WORRY" ABOUT
SYRIA WITHDRAWING FROM LEBANON: IF ISRAEL PULLS OUT "WE
(THE ARABS) WILL PUT ENOUGH PRESSURE ON AL-ASSAD TO GET HIM
TO WITHDRAW HIS TROOPS." SABAH VOLUNTEERED THAT HE THOUGHT
SYRIA WOULD BE WILLING TO GIVE ISRAEL NECESSARY GUARANTEES
REGARDING ITS SECURITY FROM BORDER ATTACKS TO PERMIT THE
ISREALIS TO WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON. IN RESPONSE TO CODEL'S
QUESTION, FONMIN SAID THAT THE GOK WOULD LIKE TO SEE EGYPT
RETURN TO THE ARAB LEAGUE. SABAH MAINTAINED THAT HE HAD
OPPOSED THE ARAB BREAK IN RELATIONS WITH CAIRO. HE COMMENTED
THAT EGYPT'S READMISSION MIGHT BE ON THE AGENDA OF THE NEXT
ARAB LEAGUE SUMMIT "LATER THIS YEAR."
11. JERUSALEM INITIATIVE: ON THE 7S. CONGRESSIONAL INITIATIVE
TO RELOCATE THE EMBASSY FROM TEL AVIV TO JERUSALEM, SHAIKH
SABAH SAID THAT SUCH A MOVE WOULD CAUSE THE ARABS TO LOSE
"ALL TRUST" IN THE U.S. CHARGE NOTED THE ADMINISTRATION'S
OPPOSITION TO SUCH A MOVE. THE FONMIN RESPONDED BY
OBSERVING THAT THE GOK HAD SIMILAR PROBLEMS WITH ITS OWN
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ON FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES AND THAT, AS
LONG AS THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION SUCCESSFULLY BLOCKED THE
EMBASSY MOVE, KUWAIT COULD LIVE WITH NON-BINDING CALLS FOR
SUCH ACTION. SABAH COMMENTED, HOWEVER, THAT "OF COURSE,
WE WOULD NOT BE HAPPY WITH SUCH CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTIONS,"
WHETHER OR NOT THEY WERE BINDING. (AT A LUNCH FOR CODEL
THE NEXT DAY, ACTING UNDERSECRETARY AL-JA-AFAR VOLUNTEERED
TO CHARGE THAT HE WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SO "POLITE" ON THE
JERUSALEM QUESTION.)
12. CONCLUSION: AS THE SESSION DREW TO A CLOSE, SHAIKH
SABAH SAID HE APPRECIATED CODEL'S VISIT AND THAT CODEL SHOULD
"TELL OTHER MEMBERS OF CONGRESS TO COME TO KUWAIT."
CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ RESPONDED BY OBSERVING THAT OUR FREINDLY
RELATIONS WERE SOMETIMES COMPLICATED BY SPECIFIC ACTIONS.
JUST AS THE U.S. REFUSAL TO SELL STINGER MISSILES HAD
COMPLICATED THINGS FOR THE GOK, THE GOK'S REFUSAL TO
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ACCEPT BRANDON GROVE AS AMBASSADOR HAD COMPLICATED THINGS
FOR THE U.S. THE FONMIN RESPONDED THAT HE HAD DONE ALL HE
COULD TO KEEP THE GROVE REFUSAL "INFORMAL AND NOT ON PAPER,"
BUT HAD THEN READ ABOUT KUWAIT'S ACTION IN "THE WASHINGTON
POST" THE NEXT DAY. IN REPLY TO DO CODEL'S OBSERVATION
THAT GROVE HAD NOT BEEN SEEN AS A FRIEND BY THE ISRAELIS,
SABAH SAID THAT THE PROBLEM FOR THE GOK HAD BEEN THE
VITRIOLIC REACTION GROVE'S ACCEPTANCE WOULD HAVE PRODUCED
IN THE KUWAIT NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND PRESS, NOT BECAUSE
OF GROVE, THE INDIVIDUAL, BUT BECAUSE HE WAS COMING
DIRECTLY FROM JERUSALEM. THE DIALOGUE ENDED ON A FRIENDLY
NOTE WHEN CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ OBSERVED THAT HE KNEW
AMBASSADOR QUAINTON PERSONALLY AND HELD HIM IN HIGH REGARD.
13. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH CODEL TOUCHED ON SEVERAL PARTICULARLY
SENSITIVE SUBJECTS THAT HAVE IN PAST MEETINGS PRODUCED
STRONG REACTIONS FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTER, SHAIKH SABAH
REMAINED CORDIAL AND RESPONSIVE THROUGHOUT THE ENCOUNTER.
HE MAY TRY TO CONTACT CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ IN NEW YORK
NEXT MONTH DURING THE UNGA. FONMIN PLACES AN EXTRAORDINARY
PREMIUM ON PERSONAL DIPLOMACY AND LIKES TO KNOW THE PLAYERS
ON THE VARIOUS SIDES OF ISSUES OF CONCERN TO KUWAIT. HIS
REQUEST FOR MORE VISITORS SHOULD BE MET WHENEVER WE CAN.
14. THIS MESSAGE WAS NOT SEEN BY CODEL.
SHAFT
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