HUDDLESTON - LEAHY AMENDMENT TO THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION WHICH DEALS WITH COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01370R001201600027-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 30, 2008
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: April 12, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20603 SPECIAL
April 12, 1984
Chron ~~
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT 1X 4
Department of State
Department of Defense
National Security Council
entral Intelligence Agency
LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM
Leg ative Liaison Officer-
D artment of Justice
Huddleston - Leahy amendment to the Intelligence
Authorization which deals with counterintelligence
and official representation.
(Markup scheduled for shortly after the Easter
recess.)
The Office of Management and Budget requests the views of your
agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to
the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular A-19.
A response to this request for your views is needed no later than
CLOSE OF BUSINESS, TUESDAY, APRIL 17, 1984.
Questions should be referred to Tracey Lawler
the legislative analyst in this office.
(395-4710 )
RONALD K. PETERSON FOR
Assistant Director for
Legislative Reference
Enclosures
cc: Russ Neely
Jim Barie
SFECIAL
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HUDDLESTON-LEAHY PROPOS
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FY 985
Counterintelligence and Official Representation
(a) It is the sense of the Congress that the numbers,
status, privileges and immunities, travel, accomodations and
facilities within the United States of*official representatives
of foreign governments that engage in intelligence activities
within the United States harmful to the national security of
the United-States should not exceed the numbers, status,
privileges sand-immunities, travel, accomodations and facilities
within such countries of official representatives of the United
States.
(b) The number of persons granted diplomatic status,
privileges and immunities and the right of entry into the
United States, as otherwise authorized by law, whose principal
purpose of entry is employment with or performance of official
functions for the embassy or consulate(s) of any foreign
government determined by the President to be engaged in
intelligence activities within the United States harmful to
the national security-of the United States may not exceed the
number of United States nationals granted similar status and
rights in such country: Provided that additional persons may
be granted right of entry and diplomatic status upon determi-
nation by the President that such action would be in the best
interests of the United States; and provided further that the
limitations of this subsection shall not apply to dependants
or spouses not employed-by or who do not perform official
.functions for any such embassy or consulate.
(c) 'The President shall report annually to the Committee
on Foreign Relations and Select Committee on Intelligence of
the.Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives
concerning the actions taken to implement the-objectives of
subsections (a) and (b) of this section.
(d) Section 203(a) of the State Department Basic
Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 4303(a)) is amended to
strike the following:. "The Director shall be an individual
who is a member of the Foreign Service, who has been a member
of the Foreign Service for at least ten years, who has
significant administrative experience, and who has served in
.countries in which the United States has had significant
problems in assuring the secure and efficient operations of
its missions."
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EXPLANATION OF HUDDLESTON-LEAHY PROPOSAL ON
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION
The purpose of the proposed Intelligence Authorization
Act language is to provide bipartisan Congressional support
for Executive Branch efforts to strengthen U.S. counter-
intelligence capabilities by reducing disparities between
the official representation in the U.S. of foreign.governments
that engage in intelligence activities harmful to our national
security and U.S. official representation in such countries.
The Administration's requests for-increased funds for
the FBI foreign counterintelligence program in FY 1984 and
FY 1985 have been based on clear evidence of substantial
growth in the hostile intelligence presence within the United
States. At the same time, in countries that pose serious
intelligence threats to the United States, our representatives
are sometimes fewer in number and subject to restrictions and
conditions that do not exist in the United States.
Subsection (a) would express the sense of the Congress
that such disparities should be eliminated. Subsection (b)
would require the President to eliminate such disparities
with regard to the number of embassy or consular officials,
unless he determines that other national interests justify
an imbalance. Subsection (c) would require regular reports
to the appropriate congressional committees on actions taken
to implement these objectives. Subsection (d) would repeal
statutory provisions that bar persons having primarily
intelligence or counterintelligence experience from serving
as Director of the Office of Foreign Missions.
Nature of the Problem
The FBI estimates that 30-40 percent of the official
representatives from Soviet Bloc countries in the U.S. are
intelligence officers. Their operations include all forms
of espionage aimed at national secrets and private technological
data, and they have done severe and extensive damage to U.S.
national security. Counterintelligence resources, despite
significant actual and planned increases, will not be adequate
to provide full coverage of these operations. Thus, the
growing hostile intelligence threat makes it especially
important to reduce disparities in official representation.
These disparities and actions that have been and can be
taken to reduce them are discussed in a classified State
Department report submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and the House
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and Senate Intelligence Committees on March 15, 1984. This
report was requested in 1983 by the State Department Authori-
zation Bill Conference Committee as a substitute for Senator
Huddleston's amendment in the Senate bill calling for
equivalence between Soviet and U.S. official representation.
There is a substantial imbalance in the number of
Soviet nationals permanently assigned to Embassy and Consulate
positions in the United States and the number of U.S. nationals
permanently assigned to Embassy and Consulate positions in the
Soviet Union. The Soviets have about 300 such personnal, while
we have about 200. Other disparities involve official treat-
ment, recreation facilities, informal travel limits, office...
locations, and housing accomodations.
The U.S. employs about 220 Soviet and third-country
personnel to perform support tasks at our diplomatic and
consular installations. Common tasks performed by these
employees are those of clerk, receptionist, telephone operator,
driver, gardner, translator, mechanic, charforce, laborer,
painter, plumber, electrician, carpenter, and-ruglayer. The
Soviets hire virtually no local American staff and depend on,
their own nationals to perform the functions we normally
assign to locally hired and third-country personnel.
In other East European countries the U.S. has some
advantages. However, U.S. personnel must sometimes arrange
domestic travel through government-controlled agencies. In
the case of Poland, there is a wide disparity in commercial
'representation. Some 60-70 Polish commercial employees are
permanently assigned to the 18 companies in the U.S. owned
wholly or in part by the Polish government. The Bell-Zacharski
case demonstrated that Polish intelligence uses such firms for
espionage 'purposes. Although 22 American companies are
represented in Poland, no U.S. citizen businessmen are
permanently assigned to Poland.
Executive Branch Actions
The-Executive Branch has begun to remedy these problems,
and further steps are under consideration. The Foreign
Missions Act of 1982 gave the State Department additional
legal authority to impose reciprocal controls on facilities,
accomodations, travel, and services. The February, 1984,
annual report of the Office of Foreign Missions summarizes
the accomplishments thus far. The office has, for example,
imposed additional travel controls and surcharges on Soviet
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diplomats in response to Soviet treatment of U.S. diplomats.
According to the report, "This has had a national security
benefit, has improved the morale of our people in the USSR,
and has offset the cost of controls on U.S. diplomats in the
USSR." Other actions to enforce reciprocity with Soviet-bloc
counries are under study.
The Foreign Missions Act does not regulate the number
of official representatives of foreign governments in the U.S.
Nor does the Office of Foreign Missions play a direct role
in determining the size of either foreign missions in the U.S.
or U.S. missions abroad. The question of whether to set a.~
goal of eliminating disparities in this area is a matter for.
high-level policy decision.
Intent of the Proposal
The intent of the Huddleston-Leahy proposal is to establish
a long-term-objective endorsed by the-Congress and to - insure .
accountability for moving toward that goal. Rather than single
out any particular countries, the language refers to "foreign
governments that engage in intelligence activities within the
United States harmful to the national security of the United
States."' The policy aim with respect to such countries is that
the numbers, status, privileges and immunities, travel, accomo-
dations and facilities within the U.S. of their official
representatives should not exceed the number, status, privileges
and immunities, travel, accomodations and facilities of official
U.S. representatives within those countries.
Subsection (a) expresses the sense of Congress that this
.should be the policy objective.
Subsection (b) makes the President responsible for action
to ac eve this foal with respect to the number of persons
granted diplomatic status, privileges and immunities and the
right of entry into the United States for the performance of
official embassy or consular functions. The President is to
determine which countries are engaged in intelligence activities
within the-United States harmful to the national security of
the United States, for the purposes of this provision. When
.such a determination is made, the number of such persons must
not be allowed to exceed the number of United States nationals
granted similar status and rights in that country.
The first proviso in subsection (b) recognizes that the
President may require some flexibility in this area in order
to accomodate other foreign policy and national security
interests. Thus, additional persons may be granted right of
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entry and diplomatic status upon determination by the President
that such action would be in the best interests of the United
States.
It is'intended that equalization could be accomplished
over a period of time, rather than immediately. Possible
methods include negotiated modifications in existing ceilings;
gradual attrition; refusal to allow replacements after expulsion
for espionage; and other gradual measures. Numbers could also
be equalized in part by requiring that more support staff in
the U.S. be hired locally and by increasing the number of U.S.
diplomats and support staff in the particular country.
A gradual equalization program implemented through a
combination of methods over a number of years, perhaps with
an established target date for achieving equivalence, would
reduce the basis for protest or the'possibility of retaliation.
Subsection (c) provides for annual reports by the
President to the appropriate congressional committees on the
actions taken-to-implement the objectives of subsections (a)
and (b). Such reports should identify those countries that -
engage -in intelligence activities within the United States
harmful to our national security and any countries determined
by the President to meet this standard for the purpose of
subsection (b). In other respects, the reports should provide
the type of information and analysis contained in the State
Department report of March 15, 1984.with respect to all
canneries whose intelligence activities in the U.S. are harmful
to the national security, regardless of whether or not such
countries have been determined'by the President to meet this
.standard for the purposes of subsection (b).
Subsection (d affirms the importance of the position of
Director o the Office of Foreign Missions in achieving the
objectives of this proposal. The State Department Authorization
Act passed in 1983 required that the Director be appointed by
the President and confirmed by the Senate, gave the Director
the rank of ambassador, and required that the Director be
"a member of the Foreign Service, who has been a member of the
Foreign Service for at least ten years, who has significant
administrative experience, and who has served in countries in
which the United States has had significant problems in
assuring the secure and efficient operations of its missions
as the result of the actions of other countries." Subsection
(d) repeals the Foreign Service qualifications-so as not to
foreclose appointment of an official having significant
foreign intelligence or counterintelligence experience.
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The first Director, James Nolan, was Deputy Assistant
Director for the FBI Intelligence Division and one of the
most experienced and widely respected counterintelligence
experts,in the U.S. government. There is no indication that
he has done less than an excellent job, as demonstrated by
the accomplishments described in the first annual report of
the Office-of Foreign Missions.
No change would be made in the requirement of Senate
confirmation, which makes the appointment subject to the
scrutiny of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, or in
the granting of ambassador status.
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