REVIEW OF UNCLASSIFIED STATEMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01370R001201670016-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 3, 2008
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: May 15, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20301
U-31,091/DC-3A
TO: Central Intelligence Agency
Office of Legislative Liaison
Liaison Division
Washington, D.C. 20505
15 MAY 1984
SUBJECT: Review of Unclassified Statement
Reference: Congressional Tasking (enclosure 1).
1. DIA was tasked to develop a response to a Congressional inquiry and
coordinate it within the Intelligence Community. Per conversation
between the DIA and CIA Congressional Liaison offices, you were
identified as the CIA POC on this matter. If the proposed response
(enclosure 2) is acceptable to CIA, request your concurrence. If there
are security sensitivities not adequately considered in this proposal,
your recommendations for specific changes would be most helpful.
2. This response is also being coordinated with the IC Staff and NSA.
3. We would appreciate your comments by 17 May 1984.
697-5283, or Grey 3285 is the DIA POC on this matter.
FOR THE DIRECTOR:
STAT
STAT
STAT
2 Enclosures a/s
Assistant Deputy 1rec or
for Collection anagement
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 STAT
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Following a presentation of the Soviet Military Trends and Capabilities' Briefing by
f the House of Representatives an
_ _
o
ximately
y
an
sentative
Repre 27 March 1 34, Represen
isSoviet the extent and frequency of U.S. satellite reconr-ascoverage
Johnson then stated that ion
and the ensuing U.S. analytical problems. Representative J
numerous constituents in her district alledge that, because of omnipresent, detailed U.
satellite collection, U.S. Intelligence is omniscient, and the U.S. should therefore be
ntrol agreement with the Soviets. She requested
c
- -
to a group of appro
Johnson (R CT) asked several questions concernir
c
N
o
arms
free to enter into virtually any
that DLL provide-an unclassified statement-on U.S. collection capability and the actual
situation--that U.S. Intelligence has imperfect knowledge of the Soviet Union--for her
to use when speaking to these constituents. _
2. Develop a statement as requested by Representative Johnson, coordinating with othe
Intelligence Community agencies as necessary. Statement should not be addressed to
Representative Johnson; once developed,
is coordinated llwith n the Intelligence Con
other members of Congress. After statement
munity by DC, DI-3 will obtain clearance from OSD/Public Affairs Security Review.
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The United States possesses a wide range of intelligence resources which
are used to monitor foreign military developments. The phrase "national
technical means," often used in the context of arms control verification,
includes such collection capabilities as photo reconnaissance satellites
and seismic detection systems used for monitoring compliance with
agreements on strategic arms limitation and underground nuclear testing.
Human sources and various listening posts which monitor some foreign
communications also contribute to the continuous appraisal of activities
related to arms control.
A tightly controlled society such as the Soviet Union which deliberately
attempts to deny information perceived to be useful to its adversaries
makes it more difficult to obtain information which relates to arms
control. The verification of an Arms Control Treaty is in part a function
of the specific provisions in that treaty. Some treaties, such as the
Antartica Treaty of 1959 which allows on-site inspection in an isolated
area of the world, are readily verifiable. Others, such as the ban on
biological weapons (Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972) are
more difficult to verify because such activities are relatively easy to
hide in a closed society. Arms control agreements of the future are
likely to be even more difficult to verify if they contain detailed
technical provisions, such as limits on the number of warheads or missiles
rather than launchers. The quality of the pictures taken by U.S.
satellites is very good but Soviet activities conducted under cover of
darkness or concealment, for example, compound the collection problem.
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Although U.S. intelligence resources make an immense contribution to the
security of all nations, they do not provide total insight into foreign
activities which would permit the U.S. to enter into virtually any arms
control agreement. A carefully considered match between technical
provisions of proposed agreements and the U.S. national technical means to
monitor such provisions is essential to U.S. policy judgments on
verification.
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