SOVIET DEFENSE SPENDING 1973-82

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01370R001501890032-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 6, 2008
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: September 18, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

STAT
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of External Affairs
Washington, D. C. 20505
Telephone: [phone] Sep 84
TO: Jim Dykstra
Select Committee on Intelligence
U.S. Senate
Attached is a memo on Soviet Defense
Spending 1973-82, updating our paper
of last year, for Senator Cohen. You
will notice that the data stops in
1982. We are currently in the last
stages of our annual database update
which will lead to a decent preliminary
look at 1983. Because the new database
has not been fully reviewed and audited,
we feel it is too early to release the
1983 estimate.
Liaison Division
OBSOLETE
1533 V US
3-79 EDITIONS.
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18 September 1984
SUBJECT: Soviet Defense Spending 1973-82
1. Over the 1973-82 period, the Soviet Union has devoted a considerable
amount of resources to their military forces. We estimate that cumulative
Soviet expenditures for all defense activities during the period--including
military RDT&E--was about 650 billion rubles. In 1982 alone, we estimate that
Soviet spending on these activities consumed about 13-14 percent of their
GNP.
.2. The Soviet commitment of resources to defense has increased each year
since 1973 by about 3 percent per year. However, while spending grew by about
6 percent a year for 1973-76, after 1976 growth slowed to less that 2 percent
a year through 1982. In our estimate, military RDT&E expenditures have been
the primary source of growth in total defense spending since the mid-1970s.
In contrast, procurement of weapons and equipment, which had been the most
important driver of Soviet defense spending growth prior to 1976, has shown
little or no growth since then and was a major contributor to the decline in
the rate of spending growth since 1976. It is important to note, however,
that while Soviet procurement spending leveled off after 1976, it did so at a
relatively high level--nearly half of total defense spending--and provided
sufficient resources for the Soviets to continue to modernize, and in some
cases expand, their military forces in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
3. Soviet defense expenditures can also be aggregated in terms of major
missions carried out by the different components of the forces. This enables
us to measure the relative emphasis, in resource terms, that the Soviets have
placed on the various military missions over time. For example, we estimate
that Soviet spending on strategic offensive and defensive programs--about one-
fifth of total cumulative defense spending--has declined slightly since the
mid-1970s and was a major contributor to the slower growth in total defense
spending since 1976. In part, this decline reflects a historical pattern
where costs temporarily decline as older programs are completed and retooling
takes place for production of new programs that we already see in the late
stages of development. The major contributor to the decline in strategic
costs was the intercontinental attack component--ICBMs, SSBNs, and heavy
bombers--which accounted for about one-third of the costs for the entire
strategic mission and declined by about 6 percent per year from 1976 to
1982. The costs of the peripheral attack component--MR/IRBMs, medium bombers,
* We estimate the resource devoted to defense in constant 1970
ruble prices, so that we can measure real growth in defense --
that is changes in military manpower, the volume of procurement
and construction and the scale of RDT&E and O&M--excluding the
effects of inflation.
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and some submarines--and the strategic defense component--air defense
interceptors, strategic SAMs, and ABM defenses--had less of an impact on cost
trends for the strategic mission although they account for 10 percent and 40
percent respectivley of the cumulative costs for the entire mission. The cost
of Soviet general purpose forces--about one-third of total spending--has
increased since the mid-1970s, but at a slow rate. This growth reflected
continued Soviet efforts to expand and modernize their ground forces and
general purpose naval forces, about 50 and 20 percent respectively of
cumulative costs for the entire general purpose mission.
4. Two observations are in order. First, our estimates of Soviet
defense spending are best used to measure the overall magnitudes and trends in
the Soviet commitment to defense in terms of resource inputs. They are useful
primarily as a measure of the burden of defense on the Soviet economy and not
as a measure of military effectiveness. They also allow us to measure the
relative emphasis the Soviets place on the different missions of their armed
forces. Second, the slower growth in total defense spending that has taken
place since the mid-1970s should be viewed in the context of the absolute
magnitude of these expenditures. Because of the steady spending growth that
occurred prior to the mid-1970s, the levels are so great it has enabled the
Soviets to undertake a substantial amount of military modernization even with
the slower growth.
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