POLYGRAPH HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE ON 6 SEPTEMBER 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01370R001501960003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 30, 2008
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 7, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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OLL 84-4143
7 November 1984
SUBJECT: Polygraph Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Investigations of the House Armed Services Committee
on 6 September 1984
1. On 6 September 1984, the Investigations Subcommittee of
the House Armed Services Committee held'a hearing on the
Federal Government's use of the polygraph. The hearing focused
on H.R. 4681, the Brooks polygraph bill. Following an open
statement by Chairman Nichols (D-Alabama), General Stilwell
testified on behalf of the Department of Defense. Stilwell
indicated that the Brooks bill would prevent DOD's use of the
polygraph to resolve derogatory information, to establish bona
fides, to exculpate personnel and to investigate counter-
intelligence cases. General Stilwell discussed the DOD Pilot
program to beef-up their counterintelligence inquiry for
Special Access Required (SAR) programs. Stilwell assured the
Subcommittee that no adverse action would be taken on SAR
polygraph results without further corrobation. Refusal to take
a polygraph would not result in firings although a limitation
of SAR access could result. Stilwell also indicated that
H.R. 4681 would have a deleterious impact on the DIA program
for Critical Intelligence Provision (CIP). The exclusion of
CIA and NSA from the bill indicated the need to protect SCI and
national security information. Stilwell said that the same
information and responsibilities existed in such programs as
the CIP at DOD. Finally, the Brooks bill would restrict use of
the polygraph to permit interim access to intelligence sources
and methods before a traditional field investigation could be
completed.
2. In response to a question from Chairman Nichols,
General Stilwell said that DOD had reached a preliminary
agreement with HPSCI concerning the conduct of the Pilot
program. This statement was later corrected on the record to
say that DOD had only reached an agreement in principle with
HPSCI staff. In response to another question, Stilwell agreed
that there was a basic anomaly in the fact that the same
information for which CIA and NSA require polygraph clearance
is available in DOD without that clearance process. Stilwell
said that there were over 115,000 DOD employees with SCI
clearance; Top Secret clearance numbers ever more. Stilwell
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estimated existing Secret clearances at over 2 million. Every
five years DOD attempts to update the bona fides of those
pex,sons with Top Secret clearance, but DOD is hard pressed to
do that. This updating currently includes an interview plus
check with co-workers and supervisors. In response to a
question on the OTA study of polygraph validity General
Stilwell said that he disagreed with the OTA study and that DOD
had studies of their own that documented the accuracy of the
polygraph.
NSA's program was based upon strict program control and the use
professional interrogators. He said that a good program would
need those two components. He argued that the polygraph had
protected the United States from espionage and provided two
examples when polygraph screening caught potential penetrations
of NSA. When asked way he was testifin in opposition to the
bill in light of NSA's exemption, said that the same STAT
information circulated at NSA was available at DOD, where a
person could have access to that information without having to
take a polygraph examination. Consequently the harm to the
national security was the same.
3. Following General Stilwell, STAT
Chief of NSA
Operation Security, testified. gave a broad overview STAT
of the NSA's use of the polygraph and its importance in the
security program at NSA. outlined the nature of the STAT
security polygraph at NSA, cited statistics concerning the
productivity of polygraph in the various types of cases and
gave two examples of the polygraphs utility in developing
counterintelligence information. tressed that the STAT
5. Following testimony, Mark Roth of the STAT
American Federation of Government Employees testified in
support of H.R. 4681 and argued that the Administration had
failed to establish the need to expand the polygraph program
beyond the CIA and NSA. Mr. Roth characterized NSDD-84 as an
attempt to supplant congressional guidance with the coercive
use of the polygraph. Mr. Roth argued strenuously that the
polygraph didn't work and that the 1979 study performed by DOD
indicated that the polygraph failed to detect deception or
truth. Mr. Roth then challenged the quality of examiners
admitted that it was virtually impossible to trace leaks to one
person when hundreds of people have access to the information.
4. In response to a question whether the polygraph would
prevent leaks, stated that the polygraph would act STAT
as a deterrent, but if an individual "stonewalled," the
polygraph was of no use. believed that the use of STAT
the polygraph in investigating leaks was entirely appropriate
when SCI and national security information were involved. NSA
uses the polygraph when leaks point to NSA. However, STAT
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indicating that less than one percent had appropriate
training. Mr. Roth felt that the real danger was that the
polygraph would give a false sense of security to the United
States; the polygraph would lend credibility to a person who
was able to deceive it. Finally AFGE believes that Reagan
wants to clean up on whistle blowers and that the expanded use
of the polygraph is an attempt to come down hard on federal
employees who report waste and fraud. Mr. Roth said that
NSDD-84 was politically motivated and that if Reagan were
re-elected, NSDD-84 would be reproposed in some form or another.
6. Following Mr. Roth's testimony, the Committee went into
executive session to hear the testimon of STAT
Director of Security for the CIA. SIAI
rebuttal of many of the points that Mr. Roth made in his
presentation. indicated that Mr. Roth confused STAT
whistle blowers with leakers and that extended polygraph use
wouldn't impair whistle blowing since people who are interested
in disclosing government fraud and waste would have other ways
to get their information out (i.e. Congressional oversight
Committees.) Concerning polygraph examiners, STAT
indicated that it is important to train and monitor examiners
and that CIA had a rigorous program in this regard.
reiterated NSA's concerns about H.R. 4681, that STAT
CIA information goes throughout the intelligence community and
needs the same protection wherever it goes. then STAT
turned to his prepared statement and highlighted certain
provision, such as the indispensability of the polygraph to the
CIA security program. outlined the CIA program STAT
and indicated its major successes.
7. Chairman Nichols asked) Ifor a general
overview of the CIA's experience with the polygraph and asked
what types of questions CIA asked it's employees.
responded with an extensive explanation of the dif e rent
testing formats and the principal question types asked.
Following these questions, Chairman Nichols indicated that he
was very pleased with the CIA's testimony and very impressed
with both the Agency and the Agency's polygraph program.
STAT
STAT
STAT
Distribution Office of Legislative Liaison
Original - LEG Subject (Polygraph)
1 - D/OLL
1 - DD/OLL
1 - OLL Chrono
OLL/LEG
STAT
STAT
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