US IS REPORTED TO HAVE GIVEN INTELLIGENCE ON GUERRILLA GROUP TO PRETORIA

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP90B01390R000100070005-7
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
5
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
November 6, 2012
Sequence Number: 
5
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Publication Date: 
July 24, 1986
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MEMO
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/06: CIA-RDP90B01390R000100070005-7 R Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/06: CIA-RDP90B01390R000100070005-7 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/06: CIA-RDP90B01390R000100070005-7 NEW YORK TIMES July 23, 1986 Al U.S. Is Reported to Have Given Intelligence on Guerrilla Group to Pretoria By SEYMOUR M. HERSH ? Special to The New York Times WASHINGTON, July 22 ? The United States, working closely with British intelligence, has provided South Africa with intelligence about the banned and exiled African National Congress, according to current and for- mer Government officials. The congress is the principal guer- rilla group seeking the overthrow of the South African Government and the end of apartheid. Warnings of Planned Attacks A senior Administration official, who did not wish to be named, categorically denied today that any intelligence on the African National Congress had been exchanged between the United States and South Africa. But the present and former officials interviewed for this article said that the information, including political in- telligence as well as specific warnings of planned attacks by the group, was given to South Africa by the Reagan Administration at least into the mid- 1980's, although they could not be spe- cific about when during the Reagan years it began. South Africa, in return, has reported on Soviet and Cuban ac- tivities in the region, the sources said. It could not be determined whether the United States was still providing in- formation on the African National Con- gress. Nor could it be learned whether South Africa had used the information to prevent African National Congress attacks or to prepare for South African raids on the congress's bases in Mozambique and elsewhere in south- ern Africa. Because South Africa has no satellite intelligence ability, the sources said, it has been dependent on the United States and Britain for communications intelligence from the black nations in Africa beyond the range of its own in- terception ,equipment. The sources, who include former White House aides in the Reagan and Carter Administrations, said the United States and South Africa had ex- changed sensitive intelligence under an arrangement dating from the 1960's. But they said the data initially con- cerned Soviet shipping and submarine movements in the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean. ? White House Won't Comment The sharing of information about the African National Congress with the South African Directorate of Military Intelligence was described as part of a reversal of a policy established under the Carter Administration, which had banned any sharing of intelligence with South Africa. It could not be learned whether President Reagan or any of his senior advisers specifically ordered or acquiesced in the policy change. Edward P. Djerejjan, a White House spokesman, asked for comment about , the sources' account, said, "We simply do not discuss or comment on intelli- gence operations or alleged intelli- gence ?operations." Senior officials of the State Depart- ment, the Defense Department and the South African Embassy in Washington, informed last week of the former and current Administration officials' ac- counts, also said they would have no comment. . American intelligence officials said a special focus of the intelligence shared with the South African Directorate of -Military Intelligence originated from the interception of communications be- tween the African National Congress ? ileadquarters in Lusaka, Zambia, its guerrilla training camps in Angola and its offices in Africa and Western Eu- - tope. Most of the conversations are con- ;ducted "in the clear" ? that is, un- ? eoded ? and the electronic "take" has :included specific advance information I?on planned bombings and disruptions :by the congress, officials said. :Administration Debate :Over Group's Ideology Many of Mr. Reagan's senior na- , tional security officials, the sources as- serted in interviews, took office con- vinced that the leadership of the Af- rican National Congress was domi- nated by pro-Soviet Communists, and . that providing South Africa with infor- ? &ration on the group was in the Amer- ican national interest. ? Other officials, including current , , members of the Administration, dis- ? agree with this view, arguing that the congress is primarily a nationalist ? group whose views must be taken into ' consideration. Last yeai, the State Department pub- licly urged South Africa to take part in talks with the African National Con- gress and to release its imprisoned leader, Nelson Mandela. A senior off cial was quoted as saying that United States policy called for South Africa to be "reaching as broadly and widely as it can," including contacts with the Af- rican National Congress. The-Airicaii-Natress has been recognized by the United Nations General Assembly and the Organiza- tion of African Unity as a national lib- eration movement. It has offices in more than 30 countries. "It all comes down to what you be- lieve about the A.N.C.," one former senior Reagan Administration official said in acknowledging tnat communi- cations intelligence on the organization had been relayed to South Africa. He described the congress as a dangerous revolutionary organization controlled by Communists and said, "Our inter- ests require helping the South Af- ricans." b An intelligence officer now serving in the Reagan Administration, acknowl- edging that the African National Con- ? gress had been a major target of Amer- . ican intelligence-gathering, said: "I've known about it for a long time, that we target the A.N.C. We've always consid- ered them to be the bad guys, to be , Soviet pawns, stalking horses for the Soviets:" Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/06: CIA-RDP90B01390R000100070005-7 ?Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/06: CIA-RDP90B01390R000100070005-7 ? south Africa, in a Government book- let published early last month, as, serted that 23 of the 30 members of thg congress's executive committee "are known to have 'membership with" the South African Communist Party, which was outlawed in 1950. Oliver Tambo, the group's president in exile, acknowledged in a newspaper Interview last year that there was "an overlapping of membership" between the two groups, but said: "It is often suggested that the A.N.C. is controlled by the Communist Party, by Commu- nists. Well, I have been long enough in the A.N.C. to know that that has never been true." ' Some Reagan Administration offi- cials acknowledged that disclosure of United States-South African intelli- gence-sharing would heighten the rebel group's suspicions about the Adminis- tration's intentions and policies on South Africa: Despite Restrictions, A Continued Flow Shortly after taking office in 1977, the Carter Administration ordered a ban on the sharing of any intelligence with South Africa, the sources said. But they said intelligence on Soviet and Cuban activities in southern Africa nonethe- less continued to flow to South Africa, apparently because elements in United States intelligence agencies chose to evade the ban. The sources said no intelligence on the African National Congress was for- warded to South Africa before 1981, when President Reagan took office. The sources for the account included a former member of the National Se- curity Agency who said he disagreed with the policy of sharing intelligence with South Africa. Senior American intelligence offi- cials acknowledged that there is a gen- eral understanding among United States intelligence agencies prohibit. Ing the passing of intelligence about a second country to a third. ' "If you're asked by a third country what you saw in a second country," a senior Reagan Administration intelli- gence official said, "you're not to it- spond." Exceptions are made for Brit- ain, some other selected Atlantic allies and Israel, the officials said, but all other contacts are to be authorized in advance. What the U.S. Gets ? From South Africa 1p?fib Former officials of the National Se- curity Agency, describing the nature of the intelligence-sharing relationship, said the agency had traditionally relied on the South African Directorate of Military Intelligence for data on Soviet shipping and submarine activities around the Cape of Good Hope and in the Indian Ocean. ? American representatives of the Na. tional Security Agency were posted at Silvermine, a South African intelli- gence installation near Cape Town, by the early 1970's, and reports on Soviet shipping were routinely flowing from South Africa to the National Security Agency's headquarters at Fort Meade, Md., according to former officials of the agency. Most of those reports, they said, were relayed through installations of the Government Communications Head- quarters, the British counterpart of the National Security Agency and the United States' closest ally in the collec- tion and distribution of communica- tions intelligence worldwide. Officials said South Africa's intelli- gence installations were vastly ex- panded in the mid-1970's, as the Soviet Union and Cuba became directly in- volved, along with the Central Intelli- gence Agency and South Africa, in the civil war that broke out in Angola after the Portuguese withdrew in 1975. Former National Security Agency of- ficials said vast quantities of electronic equipment, including antennas and so- phisticated interception receivers, were secretly shipped from Britain and West Germany to South Africa to en- able the South Africans to build more listening sites. American-made computer chips and other electronic components were in- volved In the shipments, according to former White House aides, although under Presidential directives against such shipments to South Africa the components could have been barred. The shipment of such materials was initially barred by President Kennedy, and later Administrations continued the ban, at least publicly. But national security officials of the Ford Administration chpse to look to look the other way, the sources said, in a successful effort to avoid any public debate over the American and British role in aiding South Africa's intelli- gence abilities. In the Carter Administration, Rich- ard M. Moose, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, ordered an end to all collaboration on communica- tions intelligence between the United States and South Afriba. Former offi- cials of the National Security Agency said the liaison nonetheless continued, with South Africa continuing to report on Soviet submarine and shipping ac- tivity. "Moose thought he had stopped it," a senior Carter Administration official recalled, "but the Navy really went bonkers on this and it wasn't stopped." There was no reason to believe that the National Security Agency was then sharing with the South Africans any of its separately collected intelligence on the black countries south of the Sahara, including Angola, Zambia and Mozam- bique, the official added. Shopping Lists Exchanged in Britain A former National Security Agency officer, discussing the British role in the sharing of intelligence with South Africa, recalled attending a high-level meeting in the mid-1980's at the head- quarters of the Government Communi- cations Headquarters at Cheltenham, 90 miles northwest of London. At the meeting, he said, senior American and British officials reviewed previous in- telligence assignments and future tar- gets ? a process known in intelligence jargon as "tasking." After long discussions of American and British interception programs in- volving the Soviet Union and the Mid- dle East, the officials turned to Africa. The meeting was led by a British repre- sentative of the Government Com- munications Headquarters with a small group of American intelligence officials, including two senior officials from National Security Agency head- quarters, actively taking part. At this point, the former National Se- curity Agency officer said, three South African military intelligence officers were ushered into the room. The South Africans and the British exchanged tasking requirements ? sophisticated documents outlining previous com- munications intelligence targets, such as a third-world embassy, and the fre- quencies on which they relayed intelli- gence and other communications. According to the former official, the delegations from the American and British agencies asked South Africa to continue its efforts to monitor Soviet and Cuban activity in Angola and Mozambique, as well as Soviet ship- ping and submarine activity around the Cape of Good Hope. The South Africans were asked to pro?vie-1e their reports on Soviet and , Cuban activity on a weekly basis, in- stead of reporting monthly, as they had in the past. Other targets were to in- clude Soviet commercial and economic activity south of the Sahara, with spe- cial emphasis on support for the rebels in South-West Africa, or Namibia, where South Africa has been engaged in a guerrilla war with the South-West Africa People's Organization. In return, a participant said, the South African delegation had its own requirements for American and British intelligence. Two copies of a South Af- rican document were turned over, out- lining previous targets for the United States and Britain and new targets to be added to the day-to-day intelligence 'collection. These included a South African re- quest that an extensive array of politi- cal, military, diplomatic and economic activity south of the Sahara be col- lected and relayed to Pretoria, includ- ing intercepted ? information dealing with the Governments of Angola, Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana, the former National Security Agency official 'recalled. . "I saw the list," the former official said, "and they also wanted any and all tasking related to the A.N.C., Including the movements of Oliver Tambo, We Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/06: CIA-RDP90B01390R000100070005-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/06: CIA-RDP90B01390R000100070005-7 - I got a list of 10 people of Tambo's staff] I ? the A.N.C. high command ? and they wanted information from us." The South African request "ap- peared routine" and "nobody seemed surprised about it," the officer said, al- though he recalled his personal sur- prise at how "extensive" the coopera- -tion was between the South Africans and the United States and Britain. One specific request for the United States was to monitor the international travel of Mr. Tambo and report when he was taking flights aboard Soviet and Cuban airlines. There was also specific ;mention of the frequencies on which the Governments of Zambia, Mozambique, Angola and Tanzania transmitted intel- ligence and diplomatic information; the National Security Agency and.the Government Communications Head- quarters were asked to monitor those frequencies for items of interest to South Africa, the former official said. A 'Special Emphasis' . On Guerrila Group ? Most important, the former official said, the South Africans made what: was known among intelligence officials as a" "special emphasis' request from the South Africans for th tional Congress's communications. . The South Africans listed the fre- quencies used by the rebel group and the pattern of when they talked, the of- ficial said. It was clear, the official added, that the South African Director- ate of Military Intelligence was unable. to independently intercept all of the communications it deemed essential. The African National Congress's communication system was arranged much like a normal military com- mand, the South Africans explained, with military communications domi- nating the traffic by day and political and covert activities discussed at night. The former National Security Agency official said most of the inter- ceptions of African National Congress communications in Zambia were the responsibility of the Government Com- munications Headquarters, the British agency, which has far more extensive communications intelligence coverage in Africa than the National Security Agency. ? . By the early 1980's, the former cal; cial said. the African National Con- gress was considered by the National Security Agency to have the status of an international organization, such as the Palestine Liberation Organization, and assigned surveillance to what was then ? known in the agency as the. G-Group, which is responsible for the. monitoring of all non-Communist coun-, Ple!ft. ? _ - Fornier National Security Agency of- ficials described tasking conferences, such as the one in Cheltenham, as de- signed to carry out previously estab- lished policy. Inevitably, the number of targets whose signals are to be inter- cepted expands with each conference. -1 The conferences are normally held more than once a year. It could not be learned which of the South African requests were new or simply reiterations of previously agreed-upon targets. Senior Carter Ad- ministration intelligence officials said, however, that no such tasking confer- ences took place before 1981. Many of the targets included in the South African tasking document, the participant "said, were designated by what is known in the National Security Agency as "case notation," letter and number designators that enable the ? collected data to be properly routed by computer in the vast information re- trieval systems used by the agency and by British intelligence. Former National Security Agency of- ficials said the fact that African Na- tional Congress targets were installed , in the case notation system was evi- dence that the information-sharing ar- I ? rangement was permanent, not ad hoc. I "To put it in case notation," an offi- cial said, "means that it's an institu: tional and organized effort. It allows you to technically manage the issue." Such exchanges have taken place in . the past, other officials of the agency noted, especially with countries In those areas of the world where ? the I agency end its British counterpart have little intelligence coverage,. sech as in South Africa. "In some cases," a former genier National Security Agency .official' ex- plained, the liaison "ran counter to di- plomacy or larger moral issues.". ? "What the Fort does is considered technical and not diplomatic," the -for- mer official added, referring to -the agency's headquarters at Fert and it is rarely if ever shared with the State Department. The National -Se- curity Agency's attitude toward clues. tions of diplomacy or morality, the for- mer official added, is: "So what? On a worldwide basis we need the cover- age." - ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/06: CIA-RDP90B01390R000100070005-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/06: CIA-RDP90B01390R000100070005-7 R Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/06: CIA-RDP90B01390R000100070005-7 25X1