A 1980 SOVIET TEST: HOW TO INVADE IRAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01390R000100090003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 7, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 16, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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WASHINGTON. Det 14 - The
Soviet Union carried out an ambitious
exercise of Its ability to Invade Iran six
on Soviet territory just north of Iran,
senior Soviet military officials tested
communications systems that would
be used and acted out the roles they
volve a significant buildup of Soviet
troops on the Iranian border or any
large-scale movement of Soviet forces.?
particular turmoil in the
Encouraged New U
what. diplomatic
shipment of arms to Iran.
tional security adviser, argued that the
Administration was justified in trying
to open a channel to so-called Iranian
moderates because of Iranian concern
over Soviet military activity north of
the border. A Soviet invasion of Iran is
"more than conceivable if you have ex-
A 1980 Soviet Test: How to Invade Iran
iltary inter-
df region.
by for-
some steps to improve its forces north
of Iran, the', Ceotra~,.]nteuigepoe
Agency has told a House.'.Foreign Af-
fairs subcommitee ''that' "outright
Soviet military tnternntlooorarrkwa-
slon of Iran remains a remgee F
ity" - remote?urukss' Ulq~yd es
intervened, fnilltsrfly; It>ina
Central Government (0 basso
and "leftist" groups sehed coats 4i'
some regions. The GLA. aealysb was
presented in confidential ' 1913 : ie tI-
mony that has only recently been de-
ere.
-.be wla ti e s
-added tha d &At'
recent years," Mr. McFarlane said in a
speech on Thursday.
The Pentagon evaluation was ob-
tained by The New York Times before
the Administration's decision to said
formation was supplied officials
who have become concerned about ex-
aggerated reports of the exercise.
pected the 1980 exercise to be. ted
alast year, but this did not happen. Some
experts speculated that the Soviet
Union had not repeated the exercise so
as to avoid hurting Its politibal rela-
tions with Iran.
Another Exercises In 11185
The Soviet Union has, conducted
year, for example, it staged a field ex=
ercise there involving move than 25,000
troops. In that exercise, called "Kav-
of ran, Central Intelligence
Agency has told a House Foreign Af-
fairs subcommitee that "outright
Soviet military intervention or an Inva-
Government in Iran collapsed and
"leftist" groups seized control in some
regions. The CIA analysis was pre-
which has only recently new oeciassu-
fled
The 1980 Soviet exercise simulating
the Invasion of Iran took place at a time
when Americans were being held hos-
tage In Teheran and Soviet troops were
newly arrived In AfganWan. In Janu-
ary 1980. Mr. Carter articulated the
Carter doctrine. which stated that the
United States would use force to defend
Its interests in the region.
At the time. the United States strat-
egy for responding to possible Soviet
military actions in the region were the
focus of debate in the Government. ?
The State Department opposed the
idea of using American force based on
intelligence readings that were some-
what ambiguous, fearing that It could
trigger a Soviet invasion.
But some civilians in the Defense De-
partment stressed the need to act
the basis of intelligence re-
could get
might
was held In the transborder area." the
reports says. "A complex. theater-level
command. control and communica-
tions system was developed, evaluated
ers and staffs rehearsed _ in n in_
vasion scenario-
.`r-Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/07: CIA-RDP90B01390R000100090003-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/07: CIA-RDP90BO139OR000100090003-7
How Exercise Was Conducted
In a command-post exercise. com-
manders practice the execution of bat-
tle plans and test communications sys-
tems, but large numbers of troops are
not moved on the field.
Many command centers for military
units were activated. Including those of
Soviet units that are normally sta-
tioned far from the border with Iran
Because American intelligence agen-
cies learned of the exercise by monitor-
ing Soviet communications, the United
States was Initially unsure whether the
communications they were monitoring
were only part of an exercise or of an
actual invasion.
"It threw a scare through us." a for-
mer military officer said.
An increased intelligence watch was
ordered. hief staff consideratlon was given
in the joint to
strength-
presence
ening the American miltary
in the. Arabian Sea and the Persian
Gulf.
No Responses Were Ordered
But the nature of the exercise be-
came clear before any military re-
sponses were ordere4 former officials
site Iran have not reached an advanced
readiness posture, and there Is no'Mdi-
cation that an invasion is imminent."
according to the Pentagon report.
which was prepared soon after the ex-
ercise.. -'No- largeacala mobYizatm
repositioning or forces, logistics ui bui
gherr
up. or major (division or hi
inq, exercises. have bee ob-
serve&
"Substantlal additional preparation
- 30 days or mare--would be required
to initiate and sustain a full-scale lava-
sion." the report said. It added that the
United States "could expect to detect
preparations necessary for a M I-scale
invasion of Iran within one or two
weeks after commencement"
As reconstructed by American intel-
ligence agencim the scenario used in
the exercise Involved a full-scale inva-
sion of Iran in which Soviet forces
moved south to the Persian Gulf in a
three-pronged attack
One prong moved into northern Iran.
Another group of Soviet forces drove
south toward the Strait of Hormuz,
through which oil tankers carry
Persian Gulf oil. Other Soviet forces
positioned themselves at the top of the
Gulf for a possible thrust toward Ku-
wait and Saudi Arabi}
ohe conclusions of the Pentagon rs
po
port raise questions about some pub
Iisbod accounts. The Armed Forces
Journal, In a report recounted by The
New York Times and other news or-
ganizations, asserted in a September
article that the Soviet Union undertook
a "sudden buildup" of its forces north
of Iran In August 1990 and placed those
troops on a "war footing."
Zbign sw Brsez nksi, national se-
cirky adviser for President Carter.
wrote In his memoirs that the United
States "had mounting Intelligence" in
late August 1990 "that the Soviets were
deploying forces on the Iranian frontier
in a mode suited for intervention in
Iran." I,B QedWied to dis-
cuss the n Ping concerrns over
fe .And.ws of the
Intelligence repot at the moment.
does riot ~a'y i3nuDeir ila't Ocnd u
slens`~ere rti ei _ .. .~...
Some former military officials said
they believe the exercise was intended
to improve Soviet military abilities be-
cause Moscow was increasingly con-
cerned about Instability on its borders
in the region.
Polltleal Signal Possible
'
Other former officials said it might
have been Intended, in part. to send a
political signal that the -Soviet Union
was the dominant military force in the
region and that the United States
should not try to develop an effective
military counter.
But officals said that if that was the
Soviet intent. the exercise did not have
that effect
The Soviet exercise encouraged the
United States to step up its efforts to
develop the Rapid Deployment Force.
which was embryonic at the time. and
American military leaders cited the
Soviet exercise to buttress their argu-
/1 1/Y-
ments that the United States should
conduct major e e rcises in the region.
"it accelerated programs for the
R.D.F. in a significant way," a former
official said
The question of what diplomatic re-
c I to malm to the Soviet activity
caused ce c ra at the highest levels of
the Carter. AdminIstration, according
to Mr. Brseabiksl's book.
According to Mr. Brzezinks's ac-
count. a contentious meeting was held
at the White House on Sept 5 to assess
the implications of the intelligence and
to discuss what to tell Moscow.
'Firm Message to Soviets'
That debate was' resolved the next
day. when Mr. Carter deecided to de-
liver a "firm message to the Soviets,"
Mr. Brzezinksl say. Mr. Carter later
approved "talking points" for Secre-
tary of State Edmund S. Muskie for his
meeting later that month with the
Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei -A.
Gromyko. The "talking points" re-
stated strong American concerns
about maintaining "the stability of the
ngion."
A former ranking offkW recalled
that the United States was not con-
cerned that the Soviet Union might In-
vade. but rather that it would follow up
this exercise with other ambitious ex-
ercises to Improve its military ability
and wanted to caution Moscow not to
doss
The potential Soviet threat to Iran In-
fluenced military planning In the early
part of the Reagan Administration.
At first. the Soviet threat to the
Persian Gulf was can as a top planning
scenario, second only to an attack on
Western Europe. Military officials said
this view was supported Dy the Army
and the Air Force. which would receive
much of the funds for improving Amer-,
scan ability to fight in the Persian Gulf.
But for the last three years, planning
for the Pacific has been treated as of
equal importance, reflecting concerns
of the Navy.
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