WHAT WILL COME OUT OF ICELAND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01390R000100090031-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 7, 2012
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: October 20, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/07: CIA-RDP90B01390R000100090031-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/07: CIA-RDP90B01390R000100090031-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/07: CIA-RDP90B01390R000100090031-6
The Washington Post
12 October 1986
Jack Anderson and Dale Van Atta
What Will Come Out of Iceland
President Reagan's hard-line critics
have been fogging the air over Wash-
ington with dire predictions of a sellout
in Reykjavik this weekend. But White
House policy papers show the president
has pursued steadfastly the Soviet policy
he laid out at the start of his administra-
tion: deal from strength, but be reason.
able, not provocative.
To the hard shells, Reagan's trillion-
dollar defense buildup was supposed to
put the United States in a position to
shove the Soviets around-to outbully
the bully. To Reagan, who wisely recog-
nized that presidents can't afford the
luxury of schoolyard histrionics, rearma-
ment was simply the necessary. prereq-
uisite to negotiation from strength.
"Nothing destabilizes the interna-
tional system more than a superpower
that has lost its way in the world," a
confidential White House guideline
points out, adding: "Hence, nothing
would contribute more to international
stability . . . than the United States'
recovering its confidence, leadership
and margin of safety in world affairs."
The policy papers also show that
Reagan believes Americans "are tired
of suffering Insults at the hands of other
nations," that the president must
"stand up for America even if the rest
of the world doesn't approve" and that
"minimal risks" can be taken to restore
the United States "to a position of
leadership in the world."
The president doesn't believe it is
necessary to match the Soviets weapon
for weapon. "Static indicators compar-
ing U.S. and Soviet forces are inade-
quate measures of strategic power,"
the papers note.
The policy papers explain why the
White House clamped a news blackout
on Reykjavik. "The press will remain
allies of the Democratic Party," a White
House memo declares bluntly. "Its anti-
administration cant will not stop."
The people around the president
don't trust the Washington press corps.
"We should accept the fact that the
Washington media are what they are,"
states the-memo. "Their interpretation-
al program is never going to be support-
ive no matter how hard we try to woo
them."
The memo states: "The most unre-
liable and ineffective communication ve-
hicle for us or any president to use is the
press 'conference." The president,
therefore, will try to go over the heads
of the White House press corps and
appeal to~'the non-Washington-based
media."
The shades are thus drawn on the
Reykjavik negotiations. Afterward, the
president will try to circumvent the
press and deliver his report on the
negotiations as directly as possible to
the public.
Meanwhile, the accompanying report-
ers are learning more than they proba-
bly want to know about Iceland. It has
no army and a 300-person unarmed
police force. The only military unit it
possesses is a 20-man counter-terrorist
platoon.
In short the one thing Iceland con-
tributes to the NATO alliance is its
strategic location. It provides air and
naval bases for U.S. and other allied
forces keeping their surveillance over
the vital sea lanes of the North Atlantic,
which Soviet submarines must transit on
their way to and from their Arctic bases.
What if Iceland decided to pull out of
NATO, as a result of threats or beguile-
ment from the Kremlin? The CIA hap-
pens to have produced a Top Secret
report on "the consequences if Iceland
pulls out of NATO." Here's what it says:
"The military significance of an Ice-
landic withdrawal would depend on what
happened to the Keflavik [air] base....
"If Iceland decided to close down
Keflavik, NATO would lose strategically
located surveillance, communications
and navigation facilities. These facilities
could be relocated, perhaps to the [Brit-
ish[ Shetland or [Danish] Faeroe Is-
lands, but the cost would be high, and
some coverage would be lost while facili-
des were being transferred.
"No new site could be as advanta-
geously located, and NATO might suffer
some permanent loss in defense capabili-
ties.
"Without U.S. or NATO presence,
Iceland would become vulnerable to So-
viet pressure. Moscow would be tempt-
ed to try filling the vacuum....
"Although Soviet military interven-
tion is unlikely, careful nurturing of a
proSoviet climate in Iceland could con-
ceivably persuade Reykjavik later on to
grant the U.S.S.R. naval and air support
facilities."
Soviet designs on Iceland are a more
legitimate worry than the unreasonable
fear that Ronald Reagan will sell out his
country this weekend.
01986, United Feature Syndicate, Inc.
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