GRAHAM FULLER'S IRANIAN MEMORANDUM OF MAY 1985

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01390R000200240001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 13, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 12, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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RECPT #
0C4 M-41171
12 December 1986
NOTE FOR: The Deputy Director
FROM: Dave Griesqb
SUBJECT: Graham Fuller's Iranian Memorandum of May 1985
HPSCI is requesting copies of the memorandum. Originally we
declined on grounds that it was an internal communication to the
Director. However, since HPSCI is aware that the memorandum was
sent to the NSC, it is difficult to sustain that line of
reasoning.
I have read the memorandum and see nothing harmful in it. I
recommend that we send it up to avoid a fight which we would
probably lose in any case.
V
APPROVE
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The Director of Central Intelligence
WaslUMue, D.C. 30SOS
National Intelligence Council
NIC 02545-85
17 May 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Graham E. Fuller
National Intelligence Officer for NESA
SUBJECT: Toward a Policy on Iran
1. The US faces a grim situation in developing a new policy toward
Iran. Events are moving largely against our interests and we have few
palatable alternatives. In bluntest form, the Khomeini regime is
faltering and may be moving toward a moment of truth; we will soon see a
struggle for succession. The US has almost no cards to play; the USSR
has many. Iran has obviously concluded that whether they like Russia and
Communism or not, the USSR is the country to come to terms with: the
USSR can both hurt and help Iran more than the US can. Our urgent need
is to develop a broad spec rum of policy moves designed to give us some
leverage in--the race for influence in Tehran.
The specter of the US and the USSR standing on the same side of
a major international strategic conflict, like the Gulf war, is
extraordinary. It is also an unstable situation and cannot
persist for long. We are both on Iraq's side because we lack
our preferred access to Iran. Whoever gets there first is in a
strong position to work towards the exclusion of the other.
-- Our intelligence continues to monitor Soviet progress toward
developing significant leverage in Tehran. We must monitor that
progress-but we also already know where Moscow wants to go and
that it will devote major resources to claiming this important
prize. Even if Moscow's progress is uneven, we need to develop
a strategy in response.
2. The Twin Pillars of US Policy . US policy at present comes down
to two major p ars.
-- We will respond with force directly if Iran should undertake
another terrorist outrage against the US.
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We seek to choke off all arms supplies to Tehran wherever
possible.
3. Terrorist Attack: We can and must have some policy against
terrorism. We must also recognize that this cannot repesent the bulk of
our policy toward Iran. Furthermore, radical forces in Tehran M
welcome a direct confrontation with the US--including US military..
retaliation--in the hopes of replaying its extraordinarily successful
gambit against the US in the 1979 hostage crisis.
-- During that crisis the radicals galvanized the Iranian
atmosphere, polarized all views, rendered the moderates
irrelevant, and proceeded to eliminate them in the supercharged
atmosphere of confrontation.
These radicals may seek to do so again in the expectation of doing away
with any opportunity the conservatives may have to reach accommodation
with the US. Furthermore, a strike against Iranian military facilities
will serve to alienate the one source which might just still be
sympathetic toward the US--the regular armed forces. While we cannot
allow terrorism to go unchecked, we must balance the terrorist policy
against the potential stake in Iran.
4. Choking off Arms Su lies. There are good reasons to seek to
choke off Soviet arms supplies to Iran. It may be one way of bringing an
end to the war which only Iran seeks to perpetuate. If the embargo is
successful, however, it could also have the effect of driving Iran into a
corner where the Soviets will be the only option left.
-- We first raised (about 18 months ago,) this theoretical
possibility of Soviet opportunity stemming from the US arms
embargo. The possibility is no longer theoretical. Iran has,
in fact, now begun moving toward some accommodation with the
USSR. Meanwhile, the USSR can afford to play it cool and set
its own terms, relatively confident that the US cannot steal a
march on it.
5. These two pillars of US policy--both sensible while Iran was in a
vacuum and Khomeini was strong--can no longer serve as the primary
vehicle for US policy toward Iran. Both are entirely negative in nature
and may now serve to facilitate Soviet interests more than our own. We
must develop a more positive set of plans involving a much broader
spectrum of considerations and actions.
-- It is easy to criticize our present position, and I do not mean
to suggest that any easy answers exist. It is imperative,
however, that we perhaps think in terms of a bolder--and perhaps
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slightly riskier policy which will at least ensure greater US
voice in the unfolding situation. Right now--unless we are very
lucky indeed--we stand to gain nothing, and lose more, in the
outcome of developments in Iran, which are all outside our
control.
6. Some Broader Policy Considerations. Nobody has any brilliant
ideas about how to--gel us back Into e ran. Nearly all tentative
proposals require uncomfortable choices and clear-cut down sides.
Nonetheless we need to review a broad spectrum of ideas. I submit below
a range of thoughts, carrots and sticks,--all of which are flawed--but
which might assist in sparking better and more refined positions to meet
our needs.
a. Work with Iraq to bring Tehran to its knees. We could consider
moving muc c oser to Iraq to bring the war to a quicker end--
particularly by way of encouraging crippling attacks on Kharg
Island and key Iranian economic facilities. This would serve to
put intolerable pressure upon the regime, perhaps damaging the
hardliners, maybe even leading toward the collapse of the
clerics. It would probably bring the war to a de facto
conclusion. Disadvanntta e_: We have no knowledge about who would
emerge victorious rf om such shambles; it could well be radical
elements filled with hatred of the US. The radicals have most
of the guns. It might ensure Tehran's rapid accommodation with
Moscow.
b. Open up Iran to friendl state influence. We could tell all our
European allies, as well as Israel, Turkey, Pakistan, China,
Japan, Brazil and Argentina that Western influence must develop
a paramount position during this critical period in Iran. We
would remove all restrictions in sales--including military--to
Iran. Our only proviso would be the request that truly
strategic items which could immediately affect the conduct of
the war be avoided. (In fact, in the short term, few items
would really reverse the course of the war.) Such a. step would
effectively preclude Iran turning to or needing the USSR.
Iran's diminished isolation might encourage the emergence of
Iran's moderates into a greater policy role. Disadvantage:
Possible encouragement for Iranian perpetuation o the war.
c. Go after Iran's radical allies. While direct US assault against
Iran could bring about the very thing we wish to avoid, i.e.
Soviet domination of Iran, direct attack on Iran's radical
allies, Syria and Libya, would probably sober Iran and weaken
its support from those quarters. It would be a clear blow to
the "radical entente." Qadhafi in particular is a key figure.
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We have every reason in the world to want to see Qadhafi
collapse. Bold US policies leading to his downfall would have
chilling effect on Iran and shake its confidence that the
correlation of radical forces was with them. (Pressure on Syria
would have less effect and could ideally only come from
Israel--which is hardly interested in a confrontation with Syria
at this point.) This "indirect strategy" would demonstrate US
resolve against radicalism without directly pushing Iran in the
wrong direction. Unlike Iran, we have nothing to lose in Libya
and everything to gain.
d. Battening down the hatches in Turkey and Pakistan. Assuming
that we may be heading for a ma or Soviet gain n Iran, we may
need to greatly step up our ties with Turkey and Pakistan.
Turkey is at the heart of US ability to respond to any future
Soviet military action against Iran. Both countries would be
profoundly affected by an Iranian lurch in the Soviet
direction. Turkey and Pakistan are the next two states high on
the Soviet list for neutralization. Turkey is even more
important than Pakistan because of its NATO ties, control of the
Bosphorus and contiguous border with the Soviet Union. These
states must be reassured that we are deeply committed to their
support even if we cannot control a negative course of events in
Iran. The relative importance of Turkey over Greece hardly
needs mention.
e. Getting the Message Through to Tehran. Most analysts believe
Tfiat nearly all elements In Iran are convinced that the US is
implacably hostile to the Iranian regime. In the ugly
atmosphere generated by Iranian terrorism and the war, the US
has felt it inappropriate to address words of reconciliation to
Iran in general. There is room for such broad, public statement
on a regular basis to ensure Iranian moderates--and
opportunists--that we are not dedicated to the overthrow of the
Islamic Republic or the collapse of Iran. This in itself helps
play against the barrage of propaganda from the top?Iranian
leadership which wishes to portray the US as the implacable
enemy. The hostage crisis is far past and anti-American mob
scenes are less exhilarating for the Iranian public than they
were in the heady days of the new Republic.
f. Massive reassurance to Iran of US intentions. Mere words may
not be enough to change the tide of moderate opinion and belief
in Iran about the US. We could reemphasize this issue strongly
if coupled with demonstrations of goodwill through withdrawal of
the Sixth Fleet from the vicinity of the Persian Gulf and
placing the US military presence in the Gulf on very low
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profile. Disadvantage: We might persuade Iranian radicals that
we had given up, or were paper tigers, or both. Our Arab allies
might lose confidence. On the other hand, such gestures: could
be quickly revoked if Iran itself were not forthcoming or if the
danger level rose. In any case, there are major benefits in
making a series of positive gestures toward Iran indicating
basic goodwill--even if not immediately reciprocated by Iran.
The non-radicals will get the message.
g. Bargaining with the USSR. We have little leverage here.
However, the USSR nits public statements constantly stress
that the US Is bent on placing Pershing missiles in Israel,
Pakistan and Turkey. In theory these are bargaining chips which
could be "given away" at no cost in exchange for some
"understanding" over Iran. The main problem is that we can
hardly warn the Soviets against establishing better ties with
Tehran, or even supplying arms to Tehran. These are not
belligerent acts in and of themselves and our major problem in
Iran is not Soviet invasion but rather support to radical forces
who might move the country closer to Moscow.
7. On reflection I believe that the option most constructively
oriented is that of inserting Western allies and friends into Tehran
quickly through the arms door. It would meet with broad support by all
of them and is a "positive" policy. The Arabs will be less
happy--especially Iraq. But most Gulf Arabs want a de-fanged Iran and
would not object to better Western ties in Tehran if it leads to
moderation.
The-risk of perpetuating the war is there. But the Western card
is easily undertaken and can be coupled with other US positive
gestures discussed above. We need not rule out
sticks--especially those against Iranian allies like Qadhafi.
Diminished political, economic, and military isolation could
have much positive effect on a shaky Tehran regime--especially
if some quid pro quo was sought from Iran by our allies in
moving into Iran in a big way.
B. Our tilt to Iraq was timely when Iraq was against the ropes and
the Islamic revolution was on a roll. The time may now have come to tilt
back--at least via our allies--to ensure the Soviets lose both attraction
and potential access to the clergy.
Graham E. Fuller
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NIC 02545-85
17 May 1985- -
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Toward a Policy on Iran
NIC/NIO/NESA:GEFuller:Jcn 17 May 85
Distribution:
1 - DCI
1 - DOCI
1 - SA/IA
1 -ER
1 - C/NIC
1 - VC/NIC
1 - D/SOYA
1 - D/NESA
1 - C/NE/DDO
1 - SRP
1 - NI0/USSR
2 - NIO/NESA
Outside
1 - Howard Teicher, NSC
1 - Jock Covey, NSC/ME
1 - Richard W. Murphy, Asst. Sec. NEA
1 - James A. Placke, Deputy Asst. Sec. NEA
1 - Peter Rodman, Director of Policy Planning, State
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