LETTER TO WILLIAM J. CASEY FROM LEE H. HAMILTON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01390R000400540014-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2011
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: September 26, 1986
• Content Type: LETTER

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OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS
Routing Slip
2. DD/Legislation
3. DD/Senate Affairs
4? Ch/Senate Affairs
5. DD/House Affairs
6. Ch/House Affairs
8. Executive Officer
lU Constituent Inquiries
Officer
SUSPENSE
Oct 15 86
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TO:
' ~XECUTNE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP
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NIO/USSR
Oct 1986
To 13: Please prepare appropri
Ex five Secretary
3(1 Sept 86
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Roots F~406, U.S. CAPITOL
LOUIS SI OKES. OH;O
DAVE McCURDV, OK~HOMA
ANTHONY C. BEILENSON, CALIFORNIA
ROBERT W. KASTEN METER. WISCONSIN
DAN DANIEL. VIRGINIA
ROBERT A. ROE, NEW JERSEY
GEORGE E. BROWN, JR., CALIFORNIA
MATTHEW F. MCHUGH. NEW YORK
BERNARD J. DWVER, NEW JERSEY
BOB STUMP, ARIZONA
ANDY IRELAND, FLORIDA
HENRY J. HYDE, ILLINOIS
DICK CHENEV, WYOMING
608 LIVINGSTON, LOUISIANA
BOB McEWEN, OHIO
THOMAS K. LATIMER, STAFF DIRECTOR
MICHAEL J. O'NEIL. CHIEF COUNSEL
STEVEN K. BERRY, ASSOCIATE COUNSEL
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE
September 26, 1986
Honorable William J. Casey
Director oL- Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
r v r P .. jn. f~?~ S
Dear Mr. Casey:
The publication of The Target is Destroyed by Seymour ~iersh nas caused a
flood of questions to the Committee regarding the shootdown of KAL 007 on
August 31, 1983. A major premise of the Hersh book is tnat the United States
contended at the time of the shootdown that the Soviets knew they were firing
at a civilian airliner, but that the actual intelligence did not justify this
contention.
The essence of the Administration's initial position, as I understand it,
was stated by Secretary Shultz at a news conference on September 1, 19x3 when
he said, We can see no excuse whatsoever for tnis appalling act."
Later in the?conference, the Secretary answered a question, saying, ". The
aircraft that shot the commercial airliner down moved itself into a position
with the aircraft so that with the eye you could inspect the aircraft and see
what you're looking at."
A New York Times article of September ~ stated that Administration
officials acknowledged that the Soviets may have initially confused the
Korean 747 with an RC-135. The article claimed that "The Administration
continued to maintain that there was no way the Russians could have mistaken
the identity of the plane at the time tney shot it down." Tne White House
Press Office repeatedly said that there was "irrefutable" intelligence showing
that the Soviets had visually identified Flight 007 as a civilian airliner
before destroying it. Three weeks later, on September 29, a Washington Times
article stated, "The Soviet pilot who shot down Korean Air Lines Flight 007 on
September 1 told his military commanders upon being debriefed that he knew the
airplane was a civilian aircraft, according to U.S. intelligence and military
sources."
My impression, then, is that the Administration's position was at the time
immediately following the incident that the Soviets knowingly shot down a
civilian airliner for intruding into their airspace. I am not aware of any
change in the Administration's position thereafter.
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I would like to understand the following:
1. Am I correct in my understanding of the Administration's
position? "vJhat was the intelligence available at the time that was
relied upon for the Administration's statements?
2. Did the intelligence estimates subsequently change?
3. If they did change, why did the Administration not correct its
previous statements?
4. Does the Intelligence Corrrmunity now believe that the Soviets were
confused as to the correct identification of their target?
I would appreicate your views on this matter.
Lee H. Hamilton
Chairman
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