LETTER TO WILLIAM J. CASEY FROM DAVE DURENBERGER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01390R000500630013-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 21, 2011
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: June 12, 1986
• Content Type: LETTER

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DAVE DLNIENSERGIIL MINNESOTA CHAIRMAN
PATRICK J LEAKY. VERMONT, VICE CHANMLAN
WILLIAM V ROTN. JR. DELAWARE LLOYD SENTSEN. TEXAS
WILLIAM S COHEN. MAINE SAM NUNN, GEORGIA
ORRIN MATCH. UTAH THOMAS F EAGLETON. MISSOURI
FRANK MURKOWSKI. ALASKA ERNEST F. KOLLINGS. SOUTH CAROLINA
ARLEN SPECTER. PENNSYLVANIA DAVID L BONEN. OKLAHOMA
CHIC HECHT. NEVADA SILL BRADLEY. NEW JERSEY
MITCH McCONNELL KENTUCKY
ROBERT DOLE. KANSAS. EX OFFICIO
ROBERT C BYRD. WEST VIRGINIA, EX OFFICIO
BERNARD F MCMAHON. STAFF DIRECTOR
ERIC D NEWSOM. MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR
'United $tatts $enat
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON. DC 20510
June 12, 1986
The Honorable William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
Dear Bill:
I thought you might be interested in reading my
speech to the National Press Club on 10 June.
Sincerely,
Dave Durenberger
Chairman
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Senator Dave Durenberger
U.S. Senator for Minnesota
PROTECTING THE PUBLIC INTEREST:
Intelligence Oversight in a time of
Terrorism, Leaks and Covert Action
Remarks by Senator Dave Durenberger
National Press Club
Washington, D.C.
June 10, 1986
Thank you very much for the
)rtunity. It's always a pleasure
an honor -- to appear at the
Tonal Press Club.
I don't need to tell those of you
are working reporters that most
.ticians thrive on headlines.
But, national intelligence is -- by
.nition -- silent and discrete.
Pol:t-icians are often tempted to
for dramatic and simple solutions
mmediate problems. Building an
ence is, after all, supposed to
d consensus.
But, legislative oversight requires
bipartisanship and solidarity.
Silent . . . discrete . . .
ambiguous . . . long-term . . .
bipartisan . . . boring, boring, boring
And yet, intelligence oversight has
emerged as one of the most complex,
challenging, and vital duties which
Congress can perform. It is probably
also one of the most thankless -- and,
and as I've just noted, it flies in the
of conventional behavior both of
politicians and the reporters who cover
them.
But, intelligence frequently
ends ambiguity -- and does its best
when it stimulates interest in
)lems which today are just a glimmer
.he horizon.
Our entire political system is
icated on partisanship and
alism.
That's why -- eighteen months ago
-- when I stepped into Barry
Goldwater's shoes and became chairman
of the Senate Intelligence Committee
I promised my friends in the media a
boring and unnewsworthy two years.
Don't invest a lot of your time
hanging around the Intelligence
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ommittee, I said, that is if your
?ditors are looking for the kind of
stories we usually see under front page
'eadlines.
Well, all of you here know what
ind of ground we've all been over in
he past eighteen months. 1985 will
ong be remembered as "The Year of the
py"
. . and 1986 is well on its way
o being remembered as "The Year of the
We've been bombarded with headlines
"U.S. discloses secret plan
by the Sandinistas"
"CIA anti-Quaddafi plan
backed"
And, about spies like:
"Pelton convicted of selling
"Ex-analyst pleads guilty to
spying for Israel"
And, of course, the latest
controversy involving the role of the
media itself in reporting leaks and
covering spy trials.
All that kind of attention is tough
:or politicians to shake-off . . . and
I know it's the sort of thing that
makes juices flow in even the most
substantive capitol hill reporter.
So, the Intelligence Committee has
not -- as I promised -- been out of the
headlines for the past eighteen
months. And, as so often happens in
politics, attention turns to
controversy . . . and controversy, in
turn, sometimes leads to unwise calls
for change.
Unfortunately, those of us who
believe in the essential role which
congressional oversight of intelligenc,
plays in a democracy must rise in its
defense on an all-too-frequent basis.
I say that, because at least some
of the calls for changes in oversight
come from a small minority of
individuals in this country who believ
that congressional oversight and
intelligence are two paths which ought
never cross.
With each day's news headlines, I
am reminded of the proverbial Chinese
curse: "May you live in interesting
times!" We in the intelligence
oversight business are certainly living
in interesting times.
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But it's almost a truism that ours
is not only interesting, but an ever
more dangerous and complex world.
On top of the four decade old
spectre of nuclear weapons comes the
largely new threat of state-sponsored
international terrorism.
Political stability in the Third
World is ruptured by civil wars,
insurrections, communal conflicts and
Soviet supported subversion.
These, in turn, reflect underlying
oressures and vulnerabilities including
economic stagnation, explosive
?opulation growth, environmental
3eterioration, and the erosion of
traditional cultural values and
:ertitudes.
xpectation rise as the
_elecommunications revolution puts
laves and have nots on the same global
?arty line.
Meanwhile, 1986 finds East and West
still locked in a long twilight
struggle. While the strategic balance
has remained in a rough equilibrium,
the weapons that define that
equilibrium have grown steadily in
sophistication and destructive power.
international boundaries has become a
key concern of national security
policy. And, arms become even more
powerful and complex, the negotiations
aimed at controlling them are more
prolonged and difficult.
While much of our nation's
attention remains on the East-West
conflict, much of the current U.S.
intelligence agenda is focused on the
Third World.
Intelligence agencies are being
asked to answer such diverse questions
as:
What are Libya's antiaircraft
capabilities?
What is Quaddafi's next move in
support of international terrorism?
What are the military capabilities
of the Contras?
Where and when will the next
outbreak of fighting occur in
Angola?
What is the state of Iranian leader
Khomeini's health and who is his
likely successor?
Can the Afghan Mujaheddin counter
new Soviet military tactics and
As national power is increasingly a
function of technological prowess, the I equipment?
transfer of ?11^0- 1
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Can President Cory Aquino rekindle
economic growth in the Philippines?
In some instances, we have asked
intelligence agencies to go far beyond
gathering and analyzing information to
conducting paramilitary operations
against terrorists or narcotics
traffickers or providing training,
logistical and other support to
anti-Communist combatants.
All of these changes have increased
both the importance -- and visibility
-- of congressional oversight.
Second, as a number of intelligence
misfires have come to light, the public
has recognized that covert action
programs carry with them a significant
risk, particularly at a time when there
is little consensus on the foreign
policy goals which such programs are
designed to serve. So in order to make
sure there is adequate accountability
by responsible political authorities,
formal oversight was seen as necessary.
But the growing importance of
intelligence oversight did not come
about only because the world is
undergoing dramatic changes.
It came about, as well, because of
three very fundamental concerns:
accountability, and
efficiency.
First, constitutionality became an
ssue after Watergate and other
!xcesses made the public aware that
hey must guard against the abuse of
ntelligence services by those in
?ower. If the United States is to have
n intelligence capability, we must all
e assured that it remains an American
ntelligence capability, bound by the
onstitution and the law of the land.
Finally, at a time when the public
has come to recognize that our
resources are not inexhaustible,
efficiency is the name of the game.
It's critical that a dollar's worth of
investment produce a dollar's worth of
intelligence.
What all this means is that, over
time, rules of the road which were
tacitly understood during the 1950's
were made explicit during the 1970's.
In short, when I am asked why
oversight is needed, my response is
that formal congressional oversight
under current procedures helps to
ensure what informal oversight did 30
years ago: It keeps our intelligence
services healthy. It does so by
providing an essential two-way filter
between the intelligence community and
the public it serves.
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In one direction, oversight helps
to filter out actions which, for
whatever reason, aren't fully thought
out. When oversight fails to do this,
whether because the agencies fail to
meet their responsibilities, or because
the Committees fail to ask the right
question, the intelligence community
suffers.
An example is the unnecessary
damage done to the CIA two years ago by
the inevitable revelations that its
covert action in Nicaragua included the
mining of harbors. Had the oversight
committees had the chance to comment on
this program, we could have pointed out
how short-sighted and counterproductive
the proposal was. And, the CIA could
have been spared a great deal of
needless embarrassment -- and strain on
the balance of its operations.
But oversight does more than simply
f.-ter out the inappropriate ideas.
Let me see if I can't use the
issue of how this nation responds
to terrorism as an example.
Recent experience tells us that
this President -- and this nation
-- are oonmitted to an appropriate,
measured, and effective response to
terrorism.
The nature and target of that
resonse, however, is to depend
on irrefutable evidence --
on facts -- which link a
particular act of terrorism
to a particular country
or terrorist group.
The evidence used in determining
the nature and target of our response
to terrorism will undoubtedly
be secret information generated
by intelligence agencies.
So far, this policy sounds
Lasc ?:ble and supportable.
But, can it also be made accountable?
It acts in the other direction to
filter out potentially harmful public
exposure to agencies which must operate
in secret if they are to succeed in
their tasks. There's no greater threat
to intelligence, for example, than
revealing how conclusions are reached.
Too much scrutiny of the means by
which intelligence has reached a
judgement will ensure that no such
future judgements can ever be reached.
How, in other words, can the
Congress and the American people
be assured that acts by our government
in response to terrorism are
justified by intelligence information
which -- by its very nature
-cannot be disclosed.
And, how can we as a nation
avoid the "Catch 22" situation
of a President who may be tempted
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to reveal sensitive sources
and methods in a very lauable effort
to build popular support and
maintain accountability?
develop the expertise, depth,
patience, and restraint to earn
the kind of confidence - trust,
if you will -- which effective
The answer to this seeming
dilemma is trust -- trust in
a congressional oversight process which
knows enough at the appropriate time
. . . an oversight process
which says -- in the case of
terrorism -- "Mr. President, we
have seen the proof and it justifies
your response."
This kind of accountability
for controversial actions
based on secret intelligence
information will not work in
an atmosphere of corrosive
cynicism concerning the integrity
and motivations of the
White House and the Congress
-- particularly where national
security is concerned.
At some point, we must simply
trust our leaders.
But that trust must be earned.
And, that's where having confidence
in intelligence oversight
becomes an essential ingredient
in the conduct of U.S. foreign
policy.
But, how can a political body --
like the Senate Intelligence Commmmittee
oversight requires.
Bi-partisanship -- both among
the membership and staff - is
certainly an essential first step.
So is diversity - The Senate
Intelligence Committee includes
the full spectrtm of political
thought represented in the Senate.
As a result, the committee
benefits from both strong
individual views and collective
judgement.
This system has made it possible
for the Intelligence Committee
to undertake something which
is long overdue: A continuing
examination of the quality of
the intelligence which is pro-
vided to senior policymakers.
Over the past year, the
Committee has taken two
initiatives aimed at
meeting this goal:
First, the committee con-
ducted an exhaustive inquiry
to determine how the
consumers of intelligence
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identify questions and how
the producers of intelligence
answer them.
Following the inquiry, we
worked collaboratively with
Director Casey on the develop-
ment of a comprehensive,
integrated statement outlining
a long-term national intelligence
strategy.
This strategy represents the
first time that senior officials
in the intelligence community
have been able to sit down, take a
long hard look at current and
future requirements, and set
priorities which shill direct
the intelligence community over a
multi-year period.
Just as important, the Congress
lacked analytic tools to take an
overall look at broad questions,
and to explicitly relate intelli-
gence problems to plans, and plans
to budgets.
Only a few Senators who served
on our Committee's budget
subcommittee took the time to explore
such issues, and they were not given
the kind of overview needed to focus
on the larget quesitons.
Thus the few senators and staff
members inclined to ask budget-
related quesitons were driven to
an inevitable focus on the bits
and bites of intelligence,
leading to charges of line-item,
micro managment.
In the past, intelligence budget
requests were examined piecemeal,
agency by agency, and the Committee's
budget review lacked any reference
point in the real world of policy
and intelligence.
As is so often the case through-
out the government, the Director
lacked the management tools needed
to bring diverse agencies into
coherence, and the agencies
were not willing to help him
develop them.
Director Casey has just submitted
his first comprehensive annual
strategy statement, under the
guidelines which were developed
in the Committee.
This strategy is not a plan, a
program, a budget, or a shopping
list for systems or capabilities.
Rather, it's a statement by the
entire intelligence community. . .
A statement of what this diverse
group of agencies understands to be
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the interests and requirements of
the policy-makers who consume
intelligence.
The national intelligence strategy
lso reflects the community's under-
tanding of the avenues through which
he intelligence product move to
atisfy those interests. It gives
s two things we have lacked in the
ast: a coherent and unified picture of
he intelligence world reflecting the
ontributions of the entire intelligence
ommunity. And, an early warning about
roblems on the horizon which will affect
ur intelligence capabilities in
he future.
The second initiative we have under-
taken this year is the ntus and bolts
of intelligence: the business of
--oducing finished intelligence
analysis.
Too often, people forget that the
real business of intelligence is the
sober and objective reporting of the
truth. It's not cloaks and daggers,
and James Bond, and all the other
things that make good fiction.
of the product, they are concentrating
on the essence of intelligence. And,
they are making it clear to the public {
that intelligence is about truth,
not fiction.
At the time that the Committee releas
ts report on the sit
ti
i
i
ua
on
n the
Philippines, some critics argued that
we were attempting to manipulate
events to force an election and the
later demise of the Marcos regime.
That, I'm afraid, is "intelligence
fiction."
Instead, after working with the CIA
to ensure that we did not compromise
sensitive intelligence sources and
methods, we reported facts to the
American public. That's the real
business of intelligence, and it
will always be its real business.
That's something the public must
understand . . . for the reporting of
facts is something which deserves
support, not ridicule based on
Ian Fleming's talent for
entertaining people.
;o, when the Senators on the Committee
)end their time looking at the
-ocedures by which finished intelligence
produced, and assessing the quality
So, we are not setting out -to write
our own comprehensive intelligence
analyses of complex events.
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Instead, we are simply examining
the basic procedures and the
methodology by which the rpoduct is
written. When the Committee issues
reports -- whether classified or
public -- those reports reflect
what we have learned from
professional analysts.
This means that answers to
some very fundamental questions
are assumed in oversight.
First, we operate from the
premise that senators themselves
-- whether they serve on the
committee or not -- are
senior poicy-makers and
legitimate recipients of
intelligence information.
As director Casey had made
clear, however, first priority
n -roviding finished intellignce
is to support the President in
his capacities as Chief of State,
Chief of Government, and
Commander-in-Chief.
This means that if Senators
are simply listed as addresses
on an intelligence product which
was written to answer questions
asked the President, we won't
necessarily get answers to questions
asked by Senators.
So, in our capacity as
as a service organization in
support of the Senate, we
want to examine the procedures
by which reports are drafted
and distributed.
Second, in our capacity as an
oversight organization, we
look at the procedures
by which anlysis is generated
for the same reason that the
president's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board does: to be
satisfied that the system works
as well as it should.
In particular, we want to make
sure that a final intelliaence
report has not been negotiated
down to mush, ignoring important
points ~..r v-e, simply
because they are controversial.
And, third, since the committee
serves as a custodian of
sensitive information which
we hold on behalf of other
Senators, we occasionally
must synthesize existing
intelligence and provide
it to our colleagues.
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In rare instances, when
vital matters of public
interest dictate, the committee
may vote to re-write its
reports in an unclassified
version and release them to the
public -- a course of action
we selected when we released
a report on Soviet intelligence
penetrations at the United
Nations and when we released
out report on an increasinly
critical situation in the
Philippines.
Although it has not yet
been decided whether to make
them public, the Committee will
produce several more reports
this year . . on the political
ir.._ act of falling oil prices;
security and counter-intelligence;
technology transfer; and the
state of American intelligence.
At all times, our new
emphasis on overseeing the
quality of analysis has been
conducted in close
cooperation with the
intelligence agencies.
Not long ago, for instance,
we completed a number of
in-depth case studies of the
intelligence product, which
could not have been conducted
without the assistance and
support of the intelligence
agencies.
As in the case of the National
Intelligence Strategy,
Director Casey and others have
recognized that overisght which
is affirmative -- and not simply
shooting the wounded --
can benefit the public.
Over the past ten years, this
country has taken a major step
toward building public trust
by substantially strengthening
the process of Congressional
oversight through the Intelligence
Committees of the House and Senate.
Meeting the challenges of the coming
decades will require continued
strengthening and support for
that process.
Our responsibilities to
national security -- and to
the values of a democratic
society -- require nothing less.
Thank you again for this
opportunity to be with you
here today. I'll now be happy
to use my remaining time to
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