LETTER TO KENNETH ADELMAN FROM JESSE HELMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01390R000700780047-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 21, 2011
• Sequence Number: 47
• Publication Date: July 8, 1986
• Content Type: LETTER

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I Ez~utiye Registry
RICHARD D. UX" SRRAAW CNAMMAN as. 3070X
JS$U H LM& NORTH CAROLINA CLMIORNE FELL RHODE MAW
CNA 1S MCC. MATHI. JP MARYLAND JOSEPH R SREN. JI_ OEUIWAR[
NANCY .. KASSERAUM. KANSAS I-AM S. SARSANES. MARYLAND - i
RUDY SOSCMNTTZ. MINNESOTA EDWARD ZORINSKY. NESRASKA
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FRANK IRY PRESSLER SOUTH DAKOTA ALAN CRANSTON. CAL04ORINA ?r
PAUL S. TIKAS. JR. VIRGI IA THOMAS P. LAOLETOIL MISSOURI
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DANIEL S. IIVAN$. SH ALASKA JOHN F. KEltl1Y. MASSACHUSETTS 1tmted ~tates
JEFFREY T. sLRONUI STAR DIRECTOR COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS'',
OERriO L CRNSsrw"ON. Mmom STAR ONIKTON July . V s4IN 1986 oRDC 20510
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OCA FILE
REM # r;cc . ord
The Honorable Kenneth Adelman
Director
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agancy
U.S. Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
As you know, after eight years of being deferred, issues
related to the non-ratification of the fatally flawed,
unequal SALT II Treaty are now once again the, primary order
of business before the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations. SALT II Treaty compliance issues such as
legislated compliance with the MIRV/ALCM sub limits will also
be on the Senate Floor in mid-July, when the FY 1987 Defense
Authorization Bill is up for consideration. The President
has stated that the Soviets are already quite close to the
MIRV/ALCM sublimits of SALT II. They may indeed be above
these sublimits, as the following questions suggest.
The Director of ACDA is the only senior,U.S. Governmant
official responsible for verification judgments, and such
judgments will necessarily play a crucial role in the Senate
SALT II debates, both in the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee and on the Floor. Accordingly, there is an urgent
need for unclassified verification judgments 'from you on the
following SALT II questions, all of which are derived from
the Defense Departments's series Soviet Military Power, and
other entirely unclassified sources:
1. Verification Crisis
To what extent has the U.S. loss of the Space Shuttle and
several other launch vehicles and payloads, and the
indefinite space launch stand-down, created a crisis in U.S.
capabilities for SALT monitoring and National Technical Means
of verification?
a. Was there a gap in U.S. coverage by National
Technical Means after the Soviet Chernobyl nuclear
reactor accident, as has been reported?,
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b. Please provide confidence levels for pre-stand-down
NTM verification and monitoring capabilities, and
current NTM capabilities.
c. Has the U.S. ever faced such a verification crisis
before?
2. Maskirovka
Is Soviet Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception
("Maskirovka") of strategic forces deliberate interference
with U.S. National Technical Means of SALT verification, and
therefore a Soviet SALT I and SALT II violation?
a. If so, why-has this not been stated in Presidential
Reports to Congress on Soviet SALT Violations as a
general, broad violation? (Only Soviet encryption of
telemetry and camouflage of missile/launcher
relationships have been reported.)
b. Has the Soviet Union used radio-electronic warfare to
try to jam U.S. NTMs?
c. When and how successful was the jamming?
3. D Requires Worst Case Estimates
The CIA has stated in unclasssified form recently that:
"Since the SALT I Agreement of 1972, Soviet encryption and
concealment activities have become more extensive and
disturbing... the Soviet Program (i.e. of strategic
Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception--Maskirovka] is
extensive ans pervasive... [it] makes detection of
non-compliance considerably more difficult ...much of the
ambiguity [i.e. in U.S. Intelligence about Soviet SALT
violations] is a direct result of data denial...these two
Soviet activities (i.e. concealment and encryption, and
deception] impede our ability to verify the Soviet Union's
compliance with its political commitments to SALT II..."
Does the Soviet CCD program specifically impede U.S.
ability to detect and monitor Soviet:
a. deployment of rail-mobile SS-24 MIRVed ICBM
launchers,
c. Soviet initiation of sea trials for SLBM
submarines?
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d. Has Soviet CCD ever led to U.S. miscounts of Soviet
ICBM and SLBM levels, and were these miscounts
under-estimative?
e. Has Soviet CCD ever caused the U.S. to fail to detect
Soviet mobile missile deployment, submarine launches,
and submarine sea trials?
f. Does the Soviet CCD program require conservative or
worst case estimates of Soviet non-compliance activity,
due to U.S. Intelligence uncertainties? Please give
confidence levels in each case.
4. Possibility of Currently Unlocated MIRVed ICBM Launchers
On page 27 of the -Soviet Military Power 6th edition of April
1986, the Defense-9epartment states: "The SS-X-24 deployment
in a rail-mobile mode could begin as early as late 1986...
Early preparations for the deployment of the SS-X-24 are
already underway." As the President stated in his January
1985 SDI White Paper, the Soviets are "introducing systems
whose status and characteristics are more difficult to
confirm." Could three or more camouflaged, or concealed
rail-mobile MIRVed SS-24 ICBM launchers even now in mid 1986
be operational?
a. Could three or more rail-mobile MIRVed SS-24 ICBM
launchers even now be operational deceptively housed in
apparent passenger or freight rail cars? Please provide
confidence levels.
b. Would deployment of three MIRVed SS-24 launchers put
the Soviets over the SALT II ceiling of 820 MIRVed
ICBMs?
c. Did it take 11 years, from 1974 to 1985, for the U.S.
to confirm the camouflaged and concealed covert
deployment of the mobile SS-16 ICBM?
d. Did it take over 2 years, from 1975 to 1977, for the
U.S. to detect the camouflaged and concealed covert
initial deployment of the mobile SS-20 IRBM?
e. Have any covert, concealed, or deceptive SS-20 bases
ever been detected by chance?
f. Have some known SS-20 bases not been detected at all
by National Technical Means, or after delays?
g. Why does the Joint Chiefs of Staff Military Posture
Statement for FY 1987 state that the "441" SS-20s
"Includes 36 launchers currently unlocated"?
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h. Can the U.S. rule out with high confidence the
possibility of current or impending rail-mobile
deployment of 3 or more camouflaged, concealed or
deceptively based SS-24 MIRVed ICBM launchers?
i. How long could it take to detect such covert SS-24
rail-mobile ICBM deployments? Again, please provide
confidence levels.
j. The throw-weight of the SS-25 is twice that of the
SS-13, yet the single warhead of the SS-25 is less than
half the throw-weight. The best explanation of this
phenomenon is that the SS-25 may be covertly MIRVed.
Evaluate the liklehood of this assessment in percentage
probability. Please answer these questions assuming
Soviet "altered-practices" --n. camouflage, concealment,
and deception--- and an overt Soviet rail-mobile SS-24
ICBM deployment attempt. Please also answer these
questions assuming the "altered practice" of covert or
disguised "troop training "launches for the SS-24, and
other indicators of deployment which could be concealed
or disguised.
5. Submarine Detection Problems
When did the 3rd Delta IV SLBM submarine become SALT
II-accountable?
a. When will the 4th Delta IV be SALT II-accountable?
b. When will the 5th Soviet Typhoon submarine become
SALT II-accountable?
c. Has the U.S. ever failed to detect Soviet launch of
SLBM submarines?
d. How long will it probably take for the U.S. to detect
these events?
e. Are the Soviets using their CCD program to try to
minimize our monitoring of thier submarine program?
f. Has the SS-N-17 SLBM ever been tested with a MIRV
payload?
g. When the 5th Typhoon goes on sea trials, will the
Soviets be over the 1200 MIRVed ICBM/SLBM launcher
sublimit by 2 MIRVed launchers? Please answer these
same questions assuming Soviet "altered practices" --n4
camouflage, concealment, and deception--for an overt
deployment attempt.
6. SNDV and MIRV/ALCM Tables
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It is essential that I be provided a detailed table showing
as precisely as possible how the Soviets are violating the
Soviet SNDV "ceiling" of SALT II --the 2,504 number of SNDVs
that the Soviets had at the time fo SALT II's signing on June
18, 1979. It is also essential that I be provided with
tables showing possible current Soviet force levels for the
MIRV/ALCM SALT II sublimits.
7. FRODs
Please describe the SALT II Functionally Related Observable
Differences for the following intercontinental bombers:
a. TU-95 Bear D
b. TU-95 Bear F (TU-142)
c. TU-95 Bear H
d. B-1A, as distinguished from B-1B.
e. Are all TU-95 Bear H counted as long range ALCM
carriers, because there are FRODs (widened wing roots)
between other TU-95 Bears, but n FRODs within the
TU-95H sub-Class?
f. Are all 5 Blackjack bombers counted as ALCM carriers,
because long range ALCMs have been tested form the
Blackjack, but there are no FRODs within the Blackjack
class?
g. Are there FRODs such as different wing roots, engine
intakes, and cockpit windows to distinguish B-lAs from
B-lBs? But are there no FRODs to distinguish B-1B ALCM
carriers from B-1B non-ALCM carriers? Does this mean
all B-1Bs should be SALT II-accountable as ALCM
carriers?
8. Backfire As Long Range ALCM-Carrier
What evidence is there that the long-range AS-3 Kangaroo and
new long range ALCMs were flight-tested from the Backfire
bomber in the late 1970s?
9. SS-18 Fractionation
Because the Carter Administration was publicly concerned in
1978-1979 over whether the SS-18 was being tested with 14
warheads, and because reportedly the 1985 National
Intelligence Estimate stated that SS-18s are deployed
currently with 14 warheads, why has the U.S. not challenged
excess fractionation of SS-18s at the SALT SCC, and made this
issue part of the official reports to Congress? Is complete
unanimity within the Intelligence Community required for
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verfication judgments about probably Soviet violations? If
so, could this paralyze U.S. verification judgments?
10. Verification Studies
In 1979, the Carter Administration conducted a systematic
study of the potential verifiability of the proposed SALT II
Treaty, complete with cheating scenarios and confidence
levels. But in 1982, the Director of ACDA notified the
Senate that this SALT II verifiability study had not been
updated and that there.were no plans to update it.
a. How verifiable was SALT II in retrospect?
b. How verifiable is START/Umbrella/INF?
c. Should this study be updated? Please provide us
access to the study and access for cleared staff.
Thank you in advance for your prompt, unclassified
answers to these urgent questions, which we intend to use on
the Senate Floor in mid-July.
Sincerely,
J4.40... OeOrW~-
Helms
Copies to:
National Security Advisor to the President
Director, CIA
Secretary of Defense
Director, DIA
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 'United states ~5tnate
WASHINGTON. DC 20510
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
Ab
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U.S.S.
The Honorable William J. Casey
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
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