THE CIA AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90G01353R000500600003-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 5, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 5, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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DELIVER DIRECT - AM Tuesday, 10 Nov
The Honorable Morton I. Abramowitz
Director, State/INR
Rm. 6531 New State
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FOREIGN AFFAIRS
THE CIA AND FOREIGN POLICY 0.5
98
I
Robert M. Gates
THE CIA
AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
ver the years, public views of the Central Intelligence
Agency and its role in American foreign policy have been
shaped primarily by movies, television, novels, newspapers,
books by journalists, headlines growing out of congressional
inquiries, exposes by former intelligence officers, and essays by
"experts" who either have never served in American intelli-
gence, or have served and still not understood its role. The-CIA
is said to be an "invisible government," yet it is the -most visible,
most externally scrutinized and most publicized intelligence
service in the world. While the CIA sometimes is able to refute
publicly allegations and criticism, usually it must remain silent.
The result is a contradictory melange of images of the CIA and
very little understanding of its real role in American govern-
ment.
Because of a general lack of understanding of the CIA's role,
a significant controversy such as the Iran-contra affair period-
ically brings to the surface broad questions of the proper
relationship between the intelligence service and policymakers.
It raises questions of whether the CIA slants or "cooks" its
intelligence analysis to support covert actions or policy, and of
the degree to which policymakers (or their staffs) selectively
use-and abuse-intelligence to persuade superiors, Congress
or the public. Beyond this, recent developments, such as the
massive daily flow of intelligence information to Congress, have
complicated the CIA's relationships with the rest of the execu-
tive branch in ways not at all understood by most observers-
including those most directly involved. These questions and
issues merit scrutiny..
The CIA's role in the foreign policy process is threefold. First,
the CIA is responsible for the collection and analysis of intelli-
the spring of 1974 until December 1979.
Central Intelligence. He served on the National Security Council staff from
Robert M. Gates, a career intelligence officer, is Deputy Director of
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2 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
gence and its distribution to policymakers-principally to the
president, the National Security Council (Nsc) and the Depart-
ments of State and Defense, although in recent years many
other departments and agencies have become major users of
intelligence as well. This is a well-known area, and I will address
it only summarily.
Second, the Cu is charged with the conduct of covert action,
the one area in which it implements policy. This is a subject so
complex and so controversial as to require separate treatment
-elsewhere. Because of the media's focus on covert action,
however, it is worth pointing out in passing that over 95 percent
of the national intelligence budget is devoted to the collection
and analysis of information. Only about three percent of the
m's people are involved in covert action. By citing those
figures, I do not pretend that covert action is not an important
aspect of the CIA's activities. It certainly attracts the most
attention and controversy. However, it is useful to -have some
perspective on its relative importance in terms of resources and
the overall scope of the agency's activities.
Third, and most significant, the CIA's role is -played out in
the interaction, primarily in Washington, between the intelli-
gence community and the policymaking community. It is in
the dynamics of this relationship that the influence and role of
the ciA are determined. The agency's effectiveness depends on
whether its assessments are heeded, whether its information is
considered relevant and timely enough to be useful, and
whether the CIA's relationship with policymakers, from issue to
issue and problem to problem, is supportive or adversarial. It
is this dynamic interaction of intelligence and policy that is the
least well understood, and it is this area that I will examine
here.
The director of central intelligence serves both as director
of the Central Intelligence Agency and head of the U.S. Intel-
ligence community. This community includes the CIA, the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Security
Agency, the Fsi and the intelligence components of the De-
partments of State, Treasury, Energy and the four military
services. Of these, only the m is completely independent of
any policy department or agency, and only it accepts requests
for intelligence support from throughout the executive branch.
The director of central intelligence and the. CIA serve as the
principal conduits of intelligence to the president and the
members of the National Security Council.
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THE CIA AND FOREIGN POLICY 3
The "m devotes the overwhelming preponderance of its
resources to the collection and analysis of information in order
to learn the capabilities and intentions of adversaries of the
United States, to forewarn of hostile actions against this coun-
try from whatever quarter, and to forecast and monitor polit-
ical, economic and military developments worldwide that have
potential to affect American interests or security. The CIA also
endeavors to determine and respond to policymakers' longer-
range requirements for information and analysis.
What is intelligence information and how is it used by the
policymaker? The cix's information comes from satellites, from
newspapers, periodicals, radio and television worldwide, from
diplomats and military attaches overseas and, of course, from
secret agents. All of this information, billions of bits and pieces
of data on global developments and issues of interest to the
United States, flows to Washington, where analysts with exper-
tise in scores of disciplines sift through, examine, collate and
try to make sense of it. The CIA then reports its findings to
policy officials and to the military services.
What clearly distinguishes information as suitable for intel-
ligence exploitation is its relevance to U.S. policy and interests.
It is the comprehensiveness of the CIA's collection and analysis,
the agency's focus on the national security interests of the
United States and the advantage of its having knowledge before
anyone else that make the CIA's intelligence valuable to the
policymaker. Furthermore, the CIA often makes a contribution
simply by organizing facts in a clear and concise way, by
providing the same facts to a range of different organizations,
by identifying the important questions-and by trying to an-
swer them.
This information finds its way to the policymaker in several
ways. First, intelligence on day-to-day events and developments
around the world is provided to senior officials daily or even
several times a day. Early each morning a written briefing is
delivered to the White House for the president. As directed by
President Reagan in 1981, officers of the ciA's analysis direc-
torate also fan out across Washington each morning to share
copies of the president's briefing with the vice president, the
secretaries of state and defense, the national security adviser
and the chairman of the joint Chiefs of Staff. During crises,
situation reports are provided every few hours.
Second, the ciA contributes analysis to policy papers, by
describing both current events and potential opportunities or
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4 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
problems for the United States. Nearly all Nsc and sub-cabinet
meetings begin with a briefing by the director of central
intelligence or a subordinate expert.
Third, national intelligence estimates can play an important
role in the making of policy. An estimate provides a factual
review of a subject and forecasts future developments. Consen-
sus among contributing analysts is welcome where it is genuine,
but it is not sought at the expense of clarity or the airing of
disagreements. Analytical mush is helpful to no one. In recent
years a high premium has been placed on the presentation of
diverse points of view and alternative scenarios-the different
ways events may play out, and with what likely consequences.
But, always, a "best estimate" is offered; the intelligence com-
munity owes the policymaker that.
These estimates-more, than a hundred were done last
year-are prepared by analysts from different intelligence
agencies under the supervision of the senior substantive expert
in the intelligence community, known as the national intelli-
gence officer. Estimates are the most formal expression of the
intelligence community's views. All of the intelligence agencies
of the government both contribute to and coordinate what is
written in national estimates. The best known of these are the
annual estimates on Soviet strategic military forces.
Fourth, policymakers receive specialized assessments by in-
dividual agencies. The cin's assessments and research papers
are the products of the largest intelligence analysis organization
in the world. The range of issues is breathtaking-from stra-
tegic weapons to food supplies, epidemiology to space, water
and climate to Third World political instability, mineral and
energy resources to international finance, Soviet laser weapons
to remote tribal demographics, chemical and biological weap-
ons proliferation to commodity supplies, and many, many
more. I should note also that other intelligence agencies, such
as the DIA, the military service intelligence organizations and
the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
prepare an extraordinary array of assessments for their respec-
tive departments and organizations.
Obviously the preceding review is a textbook description of
the role of intelligence. It is neat, unambiguous, clinical, non-
controversial, even commendable-and highly misleading. It
does not address central questions such as whether certain
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THE CIA AND FOREIGN POLICY 5
users of intelligence seek, not data or understanding, but
support for decisions already made; whether they selectively
use or misstate intelligence to influence public debate over
policy; whether they disingenuously label intelligence -they
dislike-as too soft, too hard or "cooked"; whether some intel-
ligence officers are addressing personal agendas or biases. It
does not reveal the implications for intelligence and policy of
a cu .director who is held at too great a distance from the
president, or of one who is too closely associated. It does not
treat policymakers' frustration with constantly changing eval-
uations or with analysis that is just plain wrong, or the use of
intelligence as a political football in struggles between govern-
ment departments or between the executive and legislative
branches. The attitudes and actions of QA officials and policy-
makers that lie behind these and many similar issues, and the
interaction among them, comprise the dynamic of the relation-
ship-what Professor Yehoshafat Harkabi of the Hebrew Uni-
versity 0 erusalem describes as "the intelligence-policymaker
tangle." -
Sherman Kent, a professor of history at Yale who became a
senior analyst in the Office of Strategic Services and was later
director of the CIA's Office of National Estimates, wrote in
1949:
There is no phase of the intelligence business which is more important than
the proper relationship between intelligence itself and the people who use
its product. Oddly enough, this relationship, ich one would expect to
establish itself automatically, does not do this./
The fact is that, over the years, the policymaker and the
intelligence officer have consistently (and with frighteningly
few exceptions) come together hugely ignorant of the realities
and -complexities of each other's worlds-process, technique,
form and culture. CIA officers can describe in excruciating
detail how foreign policy is made in every country in the world
save one-the United States. By the same token, as suggested
by Professor Harkabi, the unhappiness of intelligence people
"swells when they compare the sophistication and advanced
methods employed in collection of the information and the
' Yehoshafat Harkabi, "The Intelligence-Policymaker Tangle." in Tie Jenualem Quarterit
Winter 1984, pp. 125-131.
7 Sherman Kent. Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, Hamden (Conn.): Archon
Books, 1965 edition, p. 180.
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6 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
production 'of intelligence against the cavalier fashion or im-
provisation/with which policy decisions are many a time
reached."Y/
Bookshelves groan under the literature of proposed rules of
engagement to be followed when these two worlds collide. In
1956, for example, Roger Hilsman wrote that intelligence
producers must `orient themselves frankly and consciously
toward policy and action ... adapting tools expressly to the
needs of policy." VA more recent intelligence monograph ar-
gued that "the intelligence producer should initiate no direct
interaction with his consumers, Jut rather should respond to
requests for data and analysis."
5J
Sherman Kent was perhaps the first of the early intelligence
commentators to make the case for a more direct and intensive
interaction between policymaker and intelligence officer, even
while arguing that a firm line must exist between the roles of
each. Warning that overprotecting the objectivity of the intel-
ligence analyst could be likened to piling armor on a medieval
knight until he was absolutely safe but completely useless, Kent
concluded that too much distance posed the greater danger to
effective analysis. Even so, he foresaw a troubled relationship-
that intelligence officers' skepticism of the -objectivity of poli=
cymakers, and the latter group's consequent resentment, would
stultify any free give-and-take between them; that policymakers
would see the very existence of CIA assessments as an insult to
their intellectual capabilities; that the security co/ccerns of each
party would encourage wariness and reticence.' And, in truth,
these and other difficulties still greatly influence the cI's role
in foreign policy process.
The institutional autonomy of the American intelligence
service-of the CIA-is unique in the world (with perhaps the
single exception of the Soviet KGB).. While this confers. certain
advantages, above all independence, such autonomy also im-
bues the cIA-policy community relationship with a significant
' Harkabi, op. dt, p. 130.
' Roger Hillman, Strategic Intelligence and National Decision, Glencoe, (111.): The Free Press,
1956, p. 182.
? Center for the Study of Intelligence, The Impact of Intelligence on the Policy Review and
Decision Process, part two, Central Intelligence Agency, March 1980, p. 7.
? Kent, op. cit., pp. 167, 193-95.
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THE CIA AND FOREIGN POLICY 7.
adversarial as well as supportive content. The policymaker has
a long list of grievances, many legitimate, some not.
Policymakers legitimately want intelligence information that
will inform and guide their tactical day-to-day decision-making.
In some areas, the cu can and does meet their needs. For
example, in 1980, thanks to a very brave man, the agency was
able to provide policymakers with knowledge of the step-by-
step preparations for the imposition of martial law in Poland.
In early 1986 it was able to document, in extraordinary detail,
electoral cheating in the Philippines. There are even some
areas where CIA intelligence is so good that it reduces policy-
makers' flexibility and room for maneuver.
Yet I would have to acknowledge that there are countries
and issues important to the United States for which tactical
intelligence remains sorely deficient, and here the complaints
of policymakers are justified. The CaA's capabilities have im-
proved much in recent years, but they are still uneven in
quality. And no matter how good CIA intelligence is, there will
still be surprises or gaps.
It is no surprise that few policymakers welcome cu infor-
mation or analysis that directly or by implication challenges the
adequacy of their chosen policies or the accuracy of their
pronouncements. Indeed, during the Vietnam War, this was a
constant issue. On the other hand, I concede that on more
than a few occasions, policymakers have analyzed or forecast
developments better than intelligence analysts. And, truth be
known, analysts have sometimes gone overboard to prove a
policymaker wrong. When Secretary of State Alexander Haig
asserted that the Soviets were behind international terrorism,
intelligence analysts initially set out, not to address the issue in
all its aspects, but rather to prove the secretary wrong-to
prove simply that the Soviets do not orchestrate all interna-
tional terrorism. But in so doing they went too far themselves
and failed in early drafts to describe extensive and well-docu-
mented indirect Soviet support for terrorist groups and their
sponsors. Far from kowtowing to policymakers, there is some-
times a strong impulse on the part of intelligence officers to
show that a policy or decision is misguided or wrong, to poke
an analytical finger in the policy eye. Policymakers know this
and understandably resent it. To protect the independence of
the analyst while keeping such impulses in check is one of the
toughest jobs of intelligence agency managers.
In this connection the policymaker sometimes has the sense
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8 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
that the CIA is attempting, at least by inference, to "grade" his
performance. Further, the policymaker is often suspicious that
when the cu's analysis suggests his policy is failing or in
difficulty, these conclusions are widely circulated by the agency,
with malice, for -use as ammunition by critics of the policy in
the executive branch, in Congress or among the public. These
suspicions are magnified by leaks that pit the policymaker
against the ciA in a contest for political advantage. And the
policymaker often believes the cu itself is a source of these
leaks.
Often - policymakers, facing a situation of extreme delicacy
with another country, especially where U.S. law or political
sensitivities may be involved, will caution analysts as they write
or brief: "Now, you have to be careful -what you say about
this-let's work it out together beforehand." And the cu,
while protecting its independence, does try to be careful and
to take the legitimate concerns of policymakers into account.
But that is little solace to a policymaker who is politically at the
mercy of any CIA briefer who goes to Capitol Hill.
Many policymakers believe the caA allows its biases to domi-
nate its reporting. Who would disagree that the CIA officers
have views and biases, and that they try to promote them? But
the cu is not monolithic; there is a wide range of views inside
on virtually every issue. Indeed, internal debates are fierce and
sometimes brutal-after all, the stakes are very high. A classic
example was the debate over the validity of the Sino-Soviet
split in the early 1960s. A more recent one was the bitter
internal disagreement over who was behind the attempted
assassination of Pope John Paul II. The cu is not a place for
the fainthearted. The agency has elaborate procedures for
reviewing assessments to filter out individual bias and make its
reporting as objective as possible. And when the cu sends out
a provocative analysis by an individual, it tries always to identify
the analysis as a personal view so that a reader will know it has
not been through the above-mentioned review process or given
a seal of approval by the agency.
More serious is the accusation that an institutional. bias affects
the cu's work. I believe there probably is bias in some areas,
in a broad sense. Although the agency was severely criticized
for underestimating Soviet missile deployments in the late
1960s and early 1970s, it is probably regarded today as more
skeptical than most observers of Soviet intentions, as more
cynical about the public posture of other governments when
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THE CIA AND FOREIGN POLICY 9
contrasted to their overt and covert actions, as more doubtful
about the ease and speed with which the United States can
usually affect developments overseas, and,- fairly consistently,
as tending to see perils and difficulty where others do not. This
was the case during the Vietnam War, when it was a source of
great bitterness.
Suspicion that the CIA's assessments are biased is especially
great in areas where the CIA is involved in covert action. There
are several reasons, however, why such suspicion is greatly
overdrawn. First, analysis and operations are carried out by
two completely separate elements (or directorates) within the
cu. There are longstanding cultural as well as bureaucratic
differences between the two branches. There is-unfortu-
nately, in my view-little flow of people serving in one direc-
torate to positions in the other. Thus the analysis of develop-
ments in countries where covert activities are under- way is
done by people with no role or stake in the operations. Contrary
to the case in earlier days senior officials in the =analysis direc-
torate review and-comment on covert action proposals, but few
subordinate analysts are involved and no one doing the analysis
feels -compelled to defend the success of .a covert program. A
common source of tension is an analysis that is far less optimistic
than the director or operations people would wish-but, by
policy, the analysis stands. Another safeguard of objectivity
where covert action is involved is the recognition inside the cu
that intelligence work in these areas is bound to be scrutinized
for signs of bias with special care by readers in the executive
branch and especially. in the Congress.
The impatience of policymakers with intelligence-with the
OA-is intensified by the fact that analyses and forecasts, often
based on incomplete or ambiguous information, are sometimes
wrong, and often change or are revised to take account of new
information or new analytical techniques. CIA assessments of
Warsaw Pact strength have changed on several occasions, com-
plicating the task of U.S. negotiators in the Mutual and Bal-
anced Force Reductions talks in Vienna. Similarly, the agency
often revises its assessments of Soviet strategic weapons as new
information becomes available. The cIA does not acknowledge
error gracefully, and often does not forewarn policymakers of
revised views before the information is published. A policy-
maker who has made decisions or developed a negotiating
strategy based on one assessment, only to see it change or to
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10 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
find that it was wrong, will not- think fondly of the CIA or soon
wish.again to proceed on its assurances or assessments.
As I suggested. earlier, a special criticism by policymakers is
that the ciA is too frequently. a voice of gloom and doom. For
policymakers who must try to find solutions to intractable
-problems or a- way out of a no-win situation-for example,
various conflicts in the Middle East-the cu's forebodings and
pointing out of perils and dangers are of little help and may be
highly irritating.
The cm's relationship with Congress also is a special problem
for policymakers, for several reasons, and it profoundly influ-
ences the agency's role. Virtually all cu assessments go to the
two congressional intelligence committees. Most go also to the
appropriations, foreign relations and armed services commit-
tees. Eight congressional committees get the ciA's daily national
intelligence report. In 1986 the ciA sent some 5,000 intelli-
gence reports to Congress and gave many hundreds of brief-
ings. All this is new, having developed over the last decade or
so. As a result, and thanks to their staffs, many senators and
representatives are often as well if not better informed about
the cia's information and assessments on a given subject than
concerned policymakers. Moreover, this intelligence is often
used to criticize and challenge policy, to set one executive -
agency against another, and to expose disagreements within
the administration.
Imagine the reaction of the Ford Administration in the mid-
1970s when it went to Congress to get additional military aid
for Cambodia, only to be confronted by the legislators with a
new intelligence assessment that the situation was hopeless.
Imagine-President Carter seeking a U.S. troop cut in South
Korea only to find Congress aware of a new intelligence esti-
mate that concluded that there were more North Korean
divisions than was previously estimated. Imagine the reaction
of a secretary of defense, seeking funds for-a new weapon, only
to be told on the Hill of intelligence that the Soviets could
neutralize the weapon.
Most specialists writing about the.change in recent years in
the balance of power between the executive and Congress on
national security policy cite Watergate and Vietnam as primary
causes. I believe there was a third principal factor: the obtain-
ing, by Congress in the mid-1970s, of access to intelligence
information essentially equal to that of the executive branch.
This situation adds extraordinary stress to the relationship
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THE CIA AND FOREIGN POLICY 11
between the CIA and policy agencies. Policymakers' suspicions
that the CIA uses intelligence to sabotage selected administra-
tion policies are often barely concealed. And more than a few
members of Congress. are willing to exploit this situation by
their own selective use of intelligence that supports their views:
The end result is a strengthening of the congressional hand in
policy debates and a great heightening of the tensions between
the cm and the rest of the executive branch.
The oversight process has also given Congress-especially
the two intelligence committees-far greater knowledge of
and influence over the way the CIA and other intelligence
agencies spend their money than anyone in the executive
branch would dream of exercising; from expenditures in the
billions of dollars to line items in the thousands. Congress has
been immensely supportive and steadfast over the past ten
years in providing the resources to rebuild American intelli-
gence. But I suspect it causes policymakers considerable heart-
burn to know that Congress may actually have more influence
today over the can's priorities and its allocation of resources
than the executive branch.
The result of.these realities is that the CIA today finds itself
-in a remarkable position, involuntarily poised nearly. equidis-
tant between the executive .and legislative branches. The ad-.
-ministration knows that the ciA is in no position to withhold
much information from Congress and is extremely sensitive to
congressional demands; the Congress has enormous influence
and information yet remains suspicious and mistrustful. Such
a central legislative role with respect to an intelligence service
is unique in American history and in the world. And policy-
makers know it.
Now, let me turn to the ca's role and relationship with the
policymaker as seen from the agency's vantage point. In each
of the five administrations in which I have served there have
been a number of senior policymakers (at the level of assistant
secretary . and above) who were avid users and readers of
intelligence and who aggressively sought CIA analysis and views.
These policymakers have dedicated considerable time to dis-
cussing substantive and policy problems with CIA officers. The
agency has had unprecedented access to the Reagan Adminis-
tration, from the president on down, especially when present-
ing analysis, and daily contact with the most senior officials of
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12 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
the government, including the vice president-and the secre-
taries of state and defense. Administration officials have often
directly tasked the CIA and offered reactions to the intelligence
they read-and they have read a great deal. This is true also
of their senior subordinates, with whom the CIA is in constant
contact. This has contributed enormously to improving the
relevance, timing and substance of intelligence analysis and
other CIA support. It is a dynamic, healthy relationship, even
though it is focused primarily on current issues.
This preoccupation with current reporting is, from the CIA's
perspective, a major problem. If, as I have been told, the
average tenure of an assistant secretary in government is 21
months, a short-term focus is understandable; but it is never-
theless lamentable, and ultimately very costly to the country.
One of the CIA's greatest concerns over the years has been the
unwillingness or inability of most policymakers to spend much
time on longer-range issues-looking ahead several steps-or
in helping to guide or direct the agency's long-term efforts.
For many years the CIA has struggled, largely in vain, to get
-policy officials to devote time to intelligence issues other than
those directly related to a crisis. Agency officers work hard to
ascertain what is required of them: what policymakers' priori-
ties are, what issues or problems the cu should address, how
the caA can help the administration. -
One reason Congress has assumed a larger role in these
areas, in my view, is that-policymakers in successive administra-
tions have largely abdicated their intelligence-guidance respon-
sibilities. For many years, trying to get senior policy principals
to attend meetings to discuss longer-range intelligence require-
ments has been an exercise in frustration. Beyond the lack of
help on requirements, the cu gets little feedback on its longer-
range work that might help improve its relevance to policy-
makers' needs. The ciA has been more aggressive in recent
years in trying to engage policymakers on these matters, and
key figures in the Reagan Administration have shown some
interest in selected long-range problems, but such interest
remains exceedingly, dangerously rare,
In part because of insufficient familiarity with intelligence
work, too many policymakers arrive at their posts with an
unrealistic expectation of what the cu can do. When this
expectation is disappointed, it often turns into skepticism that
the agency can do much of anything. The apparent lack of cu
access to Soviet Politburo discussions, for example., leads some
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THE CIA AND FOREIGN POLICY 13
policymakers- to question whether anything the agency says
about Soviet intentions or politics has value, regardless of its
other sources of intelligence. Similarly, the Cu has difficulty
forecasting coups (which, of course, usually come as a surprise
also to the targeted leader) or the results of difficult decisions
not yet made by foreign.governments.
- It has been my experience over the years that the usual
response of a polirymaker to intelligence with which he disa-
grees or. which he finds unpalatable is to ignore it;- sometimes
he will characterize it as incomplete, too narrowly focused or
incompetent (and sometimes rightly so); and occasionally he
will charge that it is "cooked"-that it reflects a ciA bias. In
my 21 years in intelligence, I have never heard a policymaker
(or anyone else for that matter) characterize as biased or cooked
a CIA assessment with which he agreed. On subjects such as
Vietnam, various aspects of Soviet policy and behavior, Angola,
Lebanon and the -effectiveness of various embargoes or sanc-
tions, as well as on a number of other events and issues, the
QA's analysts have drawn conclusions that have dashed cold
water on the hopes and efforts of policymakers. Sometimes the
CIA analysts have been wrong, more often they have been right;
but on problems both- large and small -the agency has not
flinched from presenting its honest view. -
There is no charge to which those in the CIA are more
sensitive than that of cooking intelligence-of slanting its re-
ports to support policy. Every director since I joined the CIA
has been accused of this at one time or another. Therefore, it
is important to understand the distinction between personal
and institutional views. National intelligence estimates are re-
viewed and coordinated by a dozen-agencies; cu assessments
are widely reviewed inside the agency but almost never even
seen by the director before being published and circulated. As
noted earlier, all go to several committees of Congress, where -
they are scrutinized. -
These formal assessments must be distinguished from per-
sonal views expressed by individuals at all levels of the agency,
from analysts to senior operations officers to the director. More
than once, the late Director William Casey (and probably. his
predecessors) approved an estimate with which he disagreed
personally, and separately conveyed his personal view to poli-
cymakers. I have no doubt that in policy discussions he ex-
pressed his own views, which, on occasion, differed from the
agency analysis. Lest this raise eyebrows, it is worth recalling
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14 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
that in 1962 Director John McCone disagreed with the entire
intelligence community over whether the Soviets might install
missiles in Cuba. He told President Kennedy they would, and
he alone in the executive branch was right. As long as all points
of view are fairly represented and reported, the director of
central intelligence-the president's chief intelligence ad-
viser-is entitled (even obligated) to have and to put forward
his own views. As Professor Henry Rowen of Stanford Univer-
sity recently wrote: "..Al cu director is not supposed to be an
intellectual eunuch. "Sometimes the director's personal view
is insightful and correct-as in McCone's case; sometimes it is
not. -
I must add also at this point that the views of the director of
central intelligence and of the cu are sometimes overshadowed
or set aside by policymakers or their staffs in favor of unana-
lyzed reporting or the assessments of other sources, or of
interpretations of their own that support policy preferences or
actions. I believe this played an important role in the Iran arms
sales affair, as the CIA's formal assessments were misused or
ignored by individuals pursuing their own agenda. For exam-
ple, no analytical expert in the ciA believed in 1985 that Iran
was losing the war, and only one or -two believed Iranian
support for terrorism was waning. And no cu publication
.asserted these things. But this was by no means the first instance
of selective use of raw reporting or assessments. I have seen it
done routinely in five administrations, on large issues such as
Vietnam and the Soviet Union, and on lesser ones as well.
Policymakers have always liked intelligence that supported
what they want to do, and they often try to influence the
analysis to buttress the conclusions they want to reach. They
ask carefully phrased questions; they sometimes withhold in-
formation; they broaden or narrow the issue; on rare occasions
they even try to intimidate. The pressures can be enormous.
This is where the integrity of intelligence officers, bolstered by
a natural tendency to resist pressure and an often adversarial
bureaucratic relationship, comes into play to protect the inde-
pendence of the agency's assessment.
But, overall, the dialogue between policymakers and intelli-
gence officers is normal and healthy, and it usually improves
the cI's assessments and makes them more useful to policy-
' Henry S. Rowen, letter to the editor, The New York Tines, Sept. 13, 1987, section
p. 34.
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THE CIA AND FOREIGN POLICY . 15
makers-even while objectivity is-preserved. QA officers know
that policymakers are often trying to influence an assessment;
but that does not render their information and insights irrele-
vant or off limits.
A final thought: to attempt to slant intelligence would not
only transgress the single deepest ethical and cultural principle
of the cu, it would also be foolish-it would presuppose a
single point of view in an administration and would ignore the
reality of congressional readership. Indeed, in my opinion, the
sharing of intelligence with Congress-where members of both
parties, with a wide range of views and philosophy all see the
information-is one of the surest guarantees of the can's in-
dependence and objectivity. As Director William Webster has
said:
We intend to "tell it as it is," avoiding bias as much as we can, or the
politicization of our product. Policymakers may not like the message they
hear from us, especially if they have a different point of view. My position
is that in the preparation of intelligence judgments, particularly in national
intelligence estimates, we will provide them for the use of policymakers.
They can be used in whole or in part. They can be ignored, or torn up, or
thrown away, but they may not be changed. - -
vI
The foregoing describes the realities of the CU's role in the
making of American foreign policy. I have tried to-go beyond
the mechanics and the headlines to identify the stresses, ten-
sions, rivalries, enduring complaints and relationships-the
pulling and hauling, day in and day out-that determine the
QA's role and its impact. Some CIA analyses are better than
others; some intelligence experts are better than others; esti-
mates sometimes alleged to be politicized or biased usually are
not at all-sometimes they were just not very well done. But
unevenness of quality should not be confused with politiciza-
tion.
The can's autonomy is unique in our government, and its
relationship with the legislature is unique in the world. The
CIA's relationships with other elements of the executive are a
dynamic blend of support and rivalry, .of cooperation and
conflict. The challenge to intelligence managers is to manage
these relationships so that all interactions-supportive and
adversarial-end up promoting a better understanding of an
ever more complex world around us, and hence contribute to
better-informed decisions and policies.
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1-6 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
The real intelligence. story in recent years is the significant
improvement in the quality, relevance and timeliness of intel-
ligence assistance to policymakers-a story that with- rare an-
ecdotal exceptions cannot be publicly described, in contrast to
the publicity surrounding controversial covert actions, prob-
lems between the CIA and the Congress, and spy scandals. The
cu cannot advertise better collection or intelligence analysis.
Cu officers understand this political reality, but it is imperative
that Americans know that the m's primary -mission remains
the collection and analysis of information. This is the cm's
principal role in the making of American foreign policy. The
president, the policy community and the Congress-albeit
sometimes with clenched teeth-depend upon the CIA, task it
and look to it more each day. The CIA attracts America's most
capable young people, who find their- work with the agency to
be an exceptionally challenging, honorable and consistently
fascinating career. As John Ranelagh observes in his recently
published history of the CIA, "In its moments of achievement
as well as condemnation, the agency was a reminder that it was
a faithful instrument of the most decent and perhaps the
simplest of the great powers, and certainly the-one that even
in its darkest passages practiced most- consistently the virtue of
hope."8
The United States has the finest global intelligence service
in the world. Faithful to the Constitution and the law, it helps
to safeguard our freedom against our adversaries and helps the
policymaker understand and deal with the often dangerous
world around us. The ctA is America's first line of defense-
its eyes and ears. And the agency's deepest commitment, to
borrow a phrase - used by Eric Larrabee to describe George
Marshall, is "to speak truth to power."
' John Ranelagh. The Agency: The Rise and Dedine of the CIA, New York: Simon & Schuster.
1987, p. 733.
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