AN EVALUATION OF DI REPORTING ON IRAN'S ACCEPTANCE OF A CEASE-FIRE IN THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90G01353R001200090002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 5, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 17, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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17 August 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: An Evaluation of DI Reporting on Iran's Acceptance of a
Cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq War
1. Action: None, for your information.
2. Attached is an evaluation by the Product Evaluation Staff of the
Directorate of Intelligence's analysis of Iranian determination to continue
the war. I thought it would be useful to see how well we did in assessing the
pressures on Iran to end the war before its acceptance of the UN resolution in
July. I think this is a pretty good assessment. If anything, it relies a bit
too much on the clarity of hindsight. We did not have a clear enough insight
into the factional debate that must have been going on in Iran before the
acceptance of the resolution. But I would guess that the outcome of that
debate was not all that certain. I found the short extracts in the Annex to
be very useful in understanding the evolution of our analysis.
3. One thing that did confuse us was the downing of the Iranian
airliner. We assessed that this incident would cause the Iranians to take a
harder line against the US and in the war itself. The shootdown clearly did
not have that effect. In fact, it probably was a relatively minor incident
from the Iranian perspective.
4. I would be interested in any comments you might have.
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Attachment:
This memo is classified SECRET when
separated from TCS attachment.
Cl By Signer
DECL OADR
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IRANIAN ACCEPTANCE OF A CEASE-FIRE IN THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR
AN ASSESSMENT
Product Evaluation Staff
August 1988
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KEY FINDINGS
DT analysts did not predict that the Iranian government
would accept an unconditional cease-fire. What they did,
between 1 January and 20 July 1988, in numerous intelligence
assessments, NID and PDB pieces, typescripts and research
papers, was to document clearly Iran's declining fortunes in
its war with Iraq. They showed how military setbacks,
economic problems, and diplomatic failures had combined, by
July, to place Tehran under considerable pressure and to
reduce its options significantly.
In addition, beginning in April, analysts began to deal
with the possibility of change in Iranian thinking about the
war. Though a majority continued to believe that only a
threat to the regime's survival could bring Iran to the
negotiating table, a minority view was put forward in May
and June that Tehran was ready to talk if its conditions
were addressed. These competing views were probably
mirrored in discussions taking place among the Iranian
leadership throughout the period.
In the end, we acknowledge the difficulty--perhaps the
impossibility--of forecasting when the Ayatollah Khomeini
might be persuaded, in his own words, to "take poison."
More attention, we feel, might have been paid to the role of
Rafsanjani, about whom enough was probably known to
speculate that he was both willing and able to change the
Ayatollah's mind. Also, DI analysis seemed to us at times
to imply an almost limitless ability of the Iranians to
endure suffering and to assume that adversity builds
resistance rather than resignation.
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SCOPE OF THE STUDY
For this study, we assessed DI products--current
intelligence, intelligence assessments, research papers,
typescript memoranda, serial publications, and the talking
points and background papers that served as the basis for
oral briefings. We also reviewed appropriate Interagency
Intelligence Memoranda. The period under review was 1
January 1988 through 20 July 1988.
The annex is a chronology of significant intelligence
judgments contained in DI production.
THE ISSUES
In reviewing the material we focused on the following:
--What were the key analytical themes and were the
judgments effectively and consistently presented?
--Was the DI generally correct in its interpretation of
events and its assessments?
--How timely and complete was the DI analysis?
--How well did we predict future developments,
specifically Iran's decision to accept the cease-fire?
COVERAGE
Analysts working on Iran and Iraq provided extensive
coverage during the reporting period. Finished intelligence
was produced primarily by the Office of Near East and South
Asian Analysis (NESA), but the Office of Leadership Analysis
(LDA) and the Office of Global Issues made significant
contributions.
--The NID and the PDB published articles frequently
throughout the period and situation reports during the
important phases of the war. Seventeen "special analyses"
treated significant analytic themes.
--The offices produced 17 typescript memoranda.
--Eleven articles appeared in the serial publications,
primarily the NESA Review.
--Two intelligence assessments, one intelligence report
and one reference aid were published; an additional
intelligence assessment will be published shortly.
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--With LDA in the lead, a considerable effort was made
to describe key Iranian players, assess how they were likely
to behave, and to predict how changes in Iran might affect
their prospects.
--An interagency intelligence memorandum was produced
in April.
--Numerous talking points and background papers were
provided.
We judge that this ample coverage provided key
decisionmakers with a clear view of the day-to-day events of
the war and insights into how the contending parties were
likely to interpret and react to them. In our view, the
analysts provided especially useful material on developments
affecting US interests in the region.
ANALYSIS AND PREDICTION
It goes almost without saying that we did not predict
that the Iranian government would change an "article of
faith" it had clung to for eight years and accept an
unconditional cease-fire. It was a bitter pill for Teheran,
and especially the Ayatollah Khomeini, to swallow, as he
made clear when he stated that he "would sooner take
poison." As with most ideas whose time has come, it
probably simmered for a considerable period as an opposing
view, was rejected at every turn, and, finally, found
acceptance by the sheer weight of necessity. Only a source
within Iran's inner circle would likely have been able to
provide us with warning of the change and probably only by a
matter of days.
What DI analysts showed clearly in the publications was
how the pendulum swung from a tolerable situation for Iran
at the beginning of the year to a very difficult one by
July.
The Ground War: DI analysts clearly described the various
successful Iraqi offensives this year and assessed the
impact on Iranian forces. They noted frequently the low
morale, interforce frictions, lack of equipment and
supplies, difficulty in recruiting, and poor training and
leadership. These negative factors were effectively
contrasted with the growing esprit of Iraqi forces. A
particularly useful effort was made to focus on the
employment of chemical warfare by the Iraqis and its impact
on the conduct of the conflict.
The Persian Gulf and the US: The publications chronicled
Iran's futile efforts to force the US and its allies out of
the Gulf both by diplomatic and military means.
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The Economy: At the beginning of the year, it appeared that
the Iranians would be capable of muddling through for the
indefinite future. But in the ensuing six months, DI
analysis focused on the increasingly serious economic
problems confronting the regime. Among these were the
impact of the declining dollar on oil revenues, the oil
glut, the failure of Iran to refurbish its oil industry, the
damage caused by Iraq, and the increasing difficulty the
regime was having in funding the war.
The War of the Cities: The publications detailed both the
economic damage caused by Iraqi missiles and aircraft and
the impact the attacks were having on Iranian morale. In
particular, DI analysts noted that anti-government
demonstrations, apparently provoked by fear caused by the
raids, and the inability of the regime to respond in kind
were a source of increasing concern to the Iranian
government.
Failure on the Diplomatic Front: DI analysts pointed out
the continuing inability of Iran to promote its view of Iraq
as the aggressor.
ANALYTICAL THEMES
DI analysis on the war proceeded on the (correct)
assumption that Iran would not/could not change policy
unless Khomeini blessed the new approach. Nevertheless, as
the "war of the cities," the Iraqi victories, humiliation in
the Gulf, and economic difficulties began to tell, analysts
began to deal with the possibility of change.
In April, analysts had stated that:
--Iran will be more revenge-minded than cowed
(typescript, DCI talking points).
--The regime is unlikely to change its policies unless
popular discontent increases to the point that it begins to
threaten the clerics' survival (PDB/NID special analysis).
--Iran will be able to cope with its economic problems
(typescript, NESA Review).
By the beginning of May, however, a majority view in a
research paper noted that:
--Costly defeats in the ground fighting, such as the
loss of Al Faw in April, would be the scenario most likely
to cause serious movement toward negotiations.
And a minority argued that:
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--Iran has already reached the stage where it is ready
to negotiate a settlement.
At the end of May (in a typescript) analysts noted that
political and military events had turned the course of the
war against Iran but still concluded that:
--Iran is unlikely to agree to negotiations to end the
war while Iraq appears to have the initiative in the ground
war and Iran is on the defensive.
A day later (in another typescript) the emphasis was on the
many difficulties facing the regime, with the judgment that:
--A prolonged renewal of the Iraqi missile strikes
against Iranian cities--especially given recent military
setbacks--could combine with economic stress and erode
popular support sufficient to cause the regime to think more
seriously about moderating its war policy.
In a June typescript, we dealt directly with the
question of Iranian acceptance of UN Resolution 598. Noting
the majority view among analysts that apparent Iranian
flexibility on the issue was really a stalling tactic, it
advanced a minority view that:
--Iran is willing to accept a cease-fire if its
conditions are addressed.
The US downing of an Iranian airliner in early July put
a temporary halt to the evolving line that change was
possible. On 5 July, in a typescript, we said that:
--The shootdown almost certainly will lessen Iranian
willingness in the near term to show further flexibility
regarding the terms for a cease-fire in the war under UN
Resolution 598.
And on 13 July, after more Iraqi military victories, we
judged in DCI talking points that:
--Iran probably is even less willing than previously to
enter negotiations because of its weakened negotiating
position.
In a typescript dealing with Khomeini's leadership on
15 July, however, we returned to the prospect of change by
saying that:
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--Should Iran's leadership conclude that the revolution
itself was being endangered by continuing the war,
Rafsanjani and his radical allies might be willing to wind
down the conflict, despite Khomeini's preferences, in order
to preserve the Islamic government.
The conflicting themes in our analysis--increasing
incentive for Iran to change and steadfast reluctance to do
so--in their own way probably conveyed an accurate
reflection of the corporate schizophrenia among Iranian
leaders, with various factions apportioning different weight
to one theme or another.
TWENTY-TWENTY HINDSIGHT--THE CLEAREST VIEW
Whether it was possible, in these circumstances, to
forecast that Khomeini would be persuaded to agree to
negotiations--and specifically Resolution 598--is arguable.
Clearly, it is hard to predict how bad things have to get
before a man will take poison. In this regard, DI analysis
sometimes seemed to us to imply an almost limitless ability
of the Iranians to endure suffering, and to assume that
adversity builds anger and resistance (as it did in London
during the Blitz) rather than resignation.
In retrospect, more attention might have been given to
Rafsanjani's remarkable accumulation of power (culminating
with the official announcement on 2 June that he had been
made commander-in-chief of the armed forces and given
authority over war industries, the judicial system, and the
mass media as well) and the implications of this in light of
all that was known--and had been duly reported--about
Rafsanjani. The more so, given Khomeini's deteriorating
health and susceptibility to manipulation--also duly
reported.
DI analysts had documented Rafsanjani's ascendance to
"number-two" status. We were aware that he was not as
"radical"--at least on the issue of ending the war--as the
"radical allies" with whom DI production almost invariably
associated him. LDA had described him in a 1987 assessment
as a man who was pragmatic, clever, and an acknowledged
master at gaining and keeping power. An OGI report in May
portrayed him as a multimillionaire with a clear stake in
the regime's survival. His ties to Khomeini's son were also
well documented. And in his speech after the downing of the
Iranian airliner, he took a surprisingly cautious attitude
on how to respond.
Rafsanjani just might have been seen, in this context,
as not only willing but able to change the mind of the
increasingly feeble and vulnerable Ayatollah. Maybe.
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RECOMMENDATIONS/ SUGGESTIONS
--Managers and analysts can still do a better job of
stepping back from day-to-day events to view the "big
picture."
--An effort should be made to draw all of the
appropriate offices together as key players on difficult
analytical problems.
--Well reasoned minority views should
reflected in publications, such as the PDB
directly to policymakers.
N
more often be
and NID, that
go0
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