LETTER TO GEORGE SHULTZ FROM PATRICK LEAHY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90G01353R001400110008-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 5, 2012
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: July 12, 1988
• Content Type: LETTER

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PATRICK J. LEAHY, VERMONT. CHAIRMAN
JOHN MELCHER. MONTANA
DAVID H. PRYOR, ARKANSAS
DAVID L. BOREN, OKLAHOMA
HOWELL HEFLIN. ALABAMA
TOM HARKIN. IOWA
KENT CONRAD. NORTH DAKOTA
VVYCHE FOWLER. JR. GEORGIA
THOMAS A_ DASCHLE.
SOUTH DAKOTA
JOHN B. BREAUX. LOUISIANA
RICHARD G. LUGAR. INDIANA
ROBERT DOLE. KANSAS
JESSE HELMS. NORTH CAROLINA
THAD COCHRAN, MISSISSIPPI
RUDY BOSCHWITZ. MINNESOTA
MITCH McCONNELL, KENTUCKY
CHRISTOPHER S. "KIT" BOND,
MISSOURI
PETE WILSON. CALIFORNIA
DAVID K. KARNES. NEBRASKA
United Stats cenate
COMMITTEE ON
AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6000
July 12, 1988
The Honorable George Shultz
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. Secretary:
I plan to lead a delegation to the People's Republic of
China between August 14 - August 31. My delegation will be
interested in all facets of U.S.-China relations, China's
relations with the Soviet Union, Japan, and other Pacific
nations, as well as political, cultural, economic, human
rights and other developments in China. We will also pursue
a range of agriculture, trade, environment and education
issues.
To make our visit as productive as possible, I would
appreciate the assistance of the State Department in the
preparation of a substantive briefing book. My delegation
would benefit from unclassified briefing materials the
Department could provide concerning the topics, issues and
questions described on the attached list.
The responses would be most useful if they could rep-
resent the contributions of Defense, Agriculture, the CIA
and other appropriate agencies.
So that my delegation has time to study these
materials, I request that they be received by August 3.
Thank you for your assistance.
PJL/edn
cc: The Honorable Richard Lyng
Secretary of Agriculture
4-411t>
PATRICK LEIHY
Chairman
The Honorable William Webster
Director of Central Intelligence
- 2- 3 1
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?
CODEL LEAHY VISIT TO CHINA
ECONOMIC REFORM:
o How important is wage/price reform for future
Chinese economic progress? What are the main reasons for going
slow in this area? What effect will that have on overall
Chinese development?
o What is the attitude of the party and central
government bureaucracy to economic reform? How far can or does
the leadership plan to go in decentralization of economic
decisionmaking and the introduction of incentives for greater
efficiency and management rationalization?
o What are the prospects for major increases in
economic production? How successful is the economic reform in
meeting consumer needs? Are expectations being raised faster
than the capacity of the economy to deliver?
? AGRICULTURE:
o What are the prospects for Chinese agriculture?
Will there continue to be a slowdown in the rapid rate of
growth of the past decade? Will China once again become a
major importer of grain and agricultural products?
o How extensive has decollectivization-been?
What are the modernization needs of Chinese agriculture,
such as technology, expertise, better farming practices,
improved fertilizers, different patterns of crop production,
mechanization, and so forth? To what extent can the United
States supply those needs?
o What are the prospects for US farm exports to
China as agricultural modernization proceeds? Is US
agriculture geared to take advantage of market possibilities in
China?
"OPEN DOOR POLICY":
o How committed is the Chinese leadership to the
so-called "open door policy" of increasing economic interaction
with the international economy? Has China truly put aside its
past emphasis on economic "self-reliance?"
o Is the leadership prepared to tolerate the
political-social values that often accompany economic
interchange with Western oriented countries?
o What role does the Soviet bloc play in the Open
Door policy?
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o How important are the United States, Japan, and
other Western-oriented developed countries to China's
development plans?
o What role do they play as a market for Chinese
goods and as a source of finance, technology, training, and
aid?
o What are the main economic and trade issues in
U.S.-Chinese relations? How does the US propose to resolve or
otherwise deal with these issues?
o What are the conditions for US investment in
China at present? What are the trends in US investment in
China and what are the prospects for growth over the next
decade?
o What are the trends in US-Chinese trade? What
are the prospects for increases in US exports to China over the
next decade, and in what sectors?
o Why is there such a large difference between U.S.
and Chinese figures on the bilateral flow of U.S.-China trade?
o How important are international financial
institutions like the International Monetary Fund and World
Bank to Chinese development?
o _Why is China interested in joining the GATT?
What are the main issues involved in China joining the GATT?
LEADERSHIP UNITY:
o What are the main issues in dispute among senior
Chinese leaders? Will these differences likely lead to
significant changes in the make-up of the Chinese leadership
following the passing of Deng Xioping?
o What are the aims of the leadership in pursuing
modernization and political/economic reform? What is driving
them and how far and how fast are they willing to go?
o What effect will anticipated leadership changes
have on the course of future Chinese internal and external
policies?
o Do divisions among the leadership pose any
serious threat to the future of political and economic reform?
What leadership changes would be necessary to reverse or
radically alter the reforms?
MILITARY:
o What is the role of the military in Chinese
modernization? What is the attitude of the senior Chinese
military leadershio to modernization and refoLm?
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o Does the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) actually
receive lower priority than other areas of the so-called four
modernizations (i.e., agriculture, industry, science,
technology, and defense)?
o What are the reasons behind the streamlining and
restructuring of the PLA and what progress has been made?
INTELLECTUALS/STUDENTS:
o What is the role of the intellectuals in China's
modernization? What is the attitude of the intellectuals
towards political and economic reform? Is there a significant
alienation of the intellectuals from the existing political
system and the control of power by the Communist Party?
o What are the sources of discontent seen in
student demonstrations in recent years?
o How serious are repeated complaints by students
and intellectuals about corruption and nepotism in Chinese
hiring and advancement practices?
HUMAN RIGHTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS DEMOCRACY
o What is the human rights situation in China at
present, in light of the political reforms? Is there any
significant trend toward-greater legal protections from
arbitrary state or party power?
o Are there specific human rights cases of concern
to the United States? Have we made any representations to the
Chinese government on behalf of any specific human rights
cases?
o Are there still significant numbers of political
prisoners in China? How many and under what conditions are
they held?
o Are private human rights monitoring or protection
organizations allowed to function inside China?, What
restrictions are placed on their activities?
TIBET:
o What are the main trends in China's policy toward
Tibet? What does Beijing believe to be China's minimum role in
Tibet? Is the Chinese leadership prepared to consider any
outcome in Tibet short of ultimate control from Beijing?
o Has there been a loosening or hardening in
Chinese control of Tibet, especially since the beginning of
protests and demonstrations?
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o Has China devoted more resources recent years to
develop the material standard of living in Tibet? Have the
Chinese initiated political, economic, cultural and social
changes in Tibet aimed at altering the traditional Tibetan way
of life?
o Is there an inherent contradiction between such
Chinese government efforts and Tibetan demands to preserve
their unique culture and way of life?
SOVIET-U.S.-CHINESE RELATIONS:
o Inasmuch as rivalry with and hostility to the
Soviet Union has represented a center piece of Chinese
international security policy for 20 years, what is the impact
on China of the changes in Soviet poliCy under Gorbachev?
o Is there a linkage between the changes in Soviet
policy and the decline in Chinese defense spending and the
cutback in Chinese military personnel over the past few years?
o Could the decline in Soviet pressure lead to a
Sino-Soviet reconciliation? How far might reconciliation go?
o What effect would Sino-Soviet rapprochement have
on U.S.-PRC security cooperation and overall US-Chinese
relations??
o What,- if any, concerns do the Chinese have about
a possible substantial improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations
over the next few years, including a significant easing of
military tensions?
o What are specific bilateral foreign policy issues
between China and the United States? What steps are underway
to resolve or otherwise address these issues?
o How do the Chinese leaders perceive the United
States. as a world power? Is there any significant evidence
they share alleged Japanese views of the US as a declining
political, economic and military power? If so, how do such
perceptions affect long term Chinese policies toward the United
States?
INDOCHINA:
o What is China's current policy on relations with
Vietnam, and possible settlement of the conflict in Cambodia?
o Where do Chinese and U.S. interests differ? Are
the differences signigicant?
TAIWAN, HONG KONG, KOREA:
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o What are the determinants of Beijing's generally
moderate policies toward these areas in recent years?
o Are they likely to continue following the death
of Deng Xioping?
JAPAN:
o How seriously do the Chinese view the alleged
threat of Japanese militarism?
o Is there a linkage between Chinese criticism of
Japanese militarism and Chinese complaints over Japan's trade,
aid and investment policies?
o Where are Sino-Japanese Eiblitical, security and
trade relations heading over the next decade?
ARMS SALES TO THE MIDDLE EAST:
o What are the motivations for the recently
publicized Chinese arms sales to the Middle East?
o Is U.S. political pressure and international
criticism likely to lead to a change in China's behavior?
o Should we anticipate further significant Chinese
arms sales, including advanced weapons like missiles, to the
Middle East, Persian Gulf or Southwest Asia? -
ARMS CONTROL, NUCLEAR FREE ZONES, INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS:
o What are the reasons for greater Chinese activism
in these areas in recent years? What are Chinese aims?
o Are Chinese positions in these areas more
compatible with U.S. or Soviet interests?
o Do they reflect Chinese interest to be associated
with an independent posture in world affairs, or do they
represent some other Chinese motives?
o What effect does Chinese opposition to SDI and
its support for various nuclear-free zones have on the U.S.
interests?
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