SHULTZ SPEAKS OUT AGAINST LIE DETECTOR TESTS FOR EMPLOYEES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90G01353R001700070070-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 9, 2012
• Sequence Number: 70
• Publication Date: June 17, 1988
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

6 .
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2012/11/09
CIA-RDP90G01353R001700070070-4 MOM* S
e%75
THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Evaluation Office 17 June 1988
DCI
DDCI
FYI: Article in June State Newsletter
quoting Secretary Shultz on the DCI Security
Evaluation Office (see red outline, page 9)
in a positive and favorable way. Quite a
contrast with the way that his Bureau of
Diplomatic Security views it.
Most of the article is devoted to the
polygraph, Moscow embassy, and C awareness.
L
STA
pc,
Eke?
AE-G
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/09: CIA-RDP90G01353R001700070070-4
News Highlights
Shultz speaks out against lie detector tests for employees
He says 'voluntary' tests will be given under three conditions
EMPLOYING STRONG LANGUAGE
on Capitol Hill, Secretary Shultz on
April 28 emphasized his distaste for poly-
graph examinations of State Department
employees, while outlining three narrow
circumstances under which the tests would
be permitted?"with the voluntary consent
of the individual."
Mr. Shultz spoke out in an appearance
before the Senate Appropriations Commit-
tee, at which he also reviewed progress on
several fronts in the Department's security
program, and in addition urged funding for
the projected new foreign affairs training
center that is to replace the Foreign Service
Institute.
On the lie detector issue, Mr. Shultz
said regulations had been drafted allowing
him to authorize testing of any consenting
Department employee:
1. When warranted during the course
of a criminal, counterintelligence or person-
nel security investigation after all other rea-
sonable investigative steps have been taken.
"2. When an employee requests to
take such a test for the purpose of exculpa-
tion.
"3. When a State Department em-
ployee volunteers to work in an intelligence
agency that requires polygraph tests, or vol-
unteers to participate in certain special
access programs?specifically designated
Examination on the polygraph. (FBI photo)
by me?which involve joint programs with
the intelligence community where the com-
munity requires a lie detector test."
Directive from Congress
The Secretary's testimony came in
response to a provision in last year's For-
eign Relations Authorization Act (Section
163) that required him to "implement a pro-
gram of counterintelligence polygraph
examinations for members of the Diplo-
matic Security Service during fiscal years
1988 and 1989."
"When the President signed the act,"
Mr. Shultz recalled, "he noted that with
respect to this provision he was interpreting
it 'consistent with my position concerning
the discretion of agency heads to determine
when polygraph examinations will be con-
ducted in specific cases.'"
'No secret'
The Secretary continued: "It is no
secret to the Congress or to this committee
that I have consistently opposed the use of
'lie detector' tests as a tool for screening or
managing people. Nor do I believe that we
can single out one class of State Department
employees for special treatment just because
they are called a security service. If our
security objectives are to he met, then our
security program and whatever use there is
of lie detector tests in that program, should
apply to all employees."
Asserting that the Department is com-
plying with the requirements of Section
163. the Secretary added that the new reg-
ulations "arc modeled on those in use by
the Department of Defense and, as required
by our authorization act, incorporate all
provisions concerning scope and conduct of
examinations and rights of individuals sub-
ject to such examinations.
"I believe these regulations are good.
because they are clear, circumspect in
scope, and protect individual rights. But I
am deeply concerned about the attitudes and
atmosphere in this town at present regarding
these so-called 'lie detectors.'
'Lack of science'
Take a look at the science?or rather
the lack of science?in these tests. I don't
even like to use the phrase "polygraph"
because it implies precision where precision
does not exist. We all know what they pre-
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STATE
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tend to be?lie detectors. But the truth is, as
the Congress' own Office of Technology
Assessment has pointed out, that those
machines can not detect lies in a scien-
tifically reliable manner.
"Congress's Office of Technology
Assessment found meaningful scientific evi-
dence of polygraph validity only in the area
of criminal investigations. Even there,
results ranged from 17% to 100% for cor-
rect guilty detections. But consider this
striking fact. In screening situations (where
one in 1,000 may be guilty) the office
pointed out that, even if one assumed that
the polygraph is 99% accurate, the laws of
probability indicate that one guilty person
would be correctly identified as deceptive.
but 10 persons would be incorrectly identi-
fied as deceptive (false positives). An
accuracy rate of something less than 100%
may be acceptable in attempting to forecast
the weather. It should never be acceptable
in matters affecting the reputations and the
livelihoods of individuals.
"Lie detector tests have a limited place
in our security program, to a different
extent in different agencies. But they must
not become an excuse or a substitute for a
real security program. There are both physi-
cal and psychological dimensions to such a
program. That is, we must have physically
secure places in which to work and every-
one doing the work must be security con-
scious. It's like safety in the workplace. It
can be done very effectively through per-
sistent and continuous effort with everyone
lending a hand.
Other aspects of security
"Over the last several years, we have
acted on numerous recommendations to put
such a program in place. Our efforts to
improve State. Department security reflect
both our own ideas and those of special
study groups. such as the Inman panel and
the Laird Commission. Congress approved
a S2.5-billion program based on the Inman
panel's proposals in 1985. That same year,
we established the Diplomatic Security
Service and elevated its chief to the assist-
ant secretary level.
"Throughout. the State Department's
security program has been at the top of my
personal list of priorities. Of course, we
cannot go over everything we have done in
open session, but let me cite a few exam-
ples in the areas of greatest need.
Espionage
?"All of the Foreign Service
nationals in Moscow have been eliminated.
After some initial problems in screening and
sorting out what kind of employees we
need, we have a system there that seems to
be working.
?"We arc now going to apply those
lessons to other posts in eastern Europe. In
the near future, we expect to replace other
FSNs in eastern bloc countries.
?"In eastern Europe, we are estab-
lishing core areas of the embassies where no
one but cleared Americans will be allowed.
Our aim is to ensure that classified material
is processed in areas free from all foreign
nationals or other uncleared personnel.
?"The typewriter bugging in Moscow
led us to increased rigor in protecting our
office equipment. The new PTPE (plain text
processing equipment] facility?which we
have set up jointly with the CIA?allows us
tight control over the office equipment that
may be subject to tampering. Purchase,
shipping and maintenance are all handled by
trained American personnel.
?"Embassy construction is now done
by cleared American firms. Construction
sites are guarded by cleared Americans.
Construction security programs are in place
at 14 new office buildings and will be part
of all such future projects. Materials are
screened and protected from the time of
purchase until final disposal.
Counterintelligence
?"We have gotten help from the FBI
with our counterintelligence program. The
new chief of our counterintelligence shop is
on loan from the FBI. We also have a pro-
fessional trainer from the bureau to help us
build Up our own talent in this area.
?"Our program is oriented towards
the protection of classified information.
Consequently, the program emphasis is on
training, security awareness, employee
screening (over 7(X) applicants were denied
security clearances last year) and selection.
?"We pursue an active program to
insure that our employees comply with the
applicable regulations regarding their con-
duct. If they do not, we take the appropriate
steps. Last year. 40 employees had their
clearances suspended, downgraded or re-
voked because of personal security issues.
We conducted over 1,200 update investiga-
tions on our current employees.
?"We have worked to raise the level
of awareness in the Foreign Service of es-
pionage. Each ambassador has been told to
establish a counterintelligence working
group to focus attention on counterin-
telligence matters at a high level at each
post. And each ambassador has been made
personally accountable for security at his
mission. All personnel being assigned dur-
ing the summer cycle to the bloc countries
are required to attend a one-week counterin-
telligence training program jointly spon-
sored by State and the CIA.
?"We have instituted a more inten-
sive use of counterintelligence debriefing.
and are developing a new program of
screening to use before selecting individuals
for such assignments.
Security standards
?"Last fall we put out strict new
physical and procedural security standards
for any embassy that is to handle classified
information. Posts are being brought into
compliance. We have reduced the level of
classified material authorized at several
posts. and have decertified dozens of facili-
ties from the storage of any classified mate-
rial until the new standards are met. This is
a painful process for many posts in the short
run. But in the long run it will improve their
abiliv nut) their
?"I have talked to Bill Webster (U.S.
director of central intelligence) about how
the intelligence community can help us to
make sure our standards arc what they
should be?especially in areas like technical
security, where there are very kw qualified
experts. We will be establishing an organi-
zation which can give me an independent
look at our technical security standards.
without building up a big new bureaucracy
and without tangling the lines of respon-
sibility.
'Destructive alternative'
"Our job will never be finished. There
is more to be done and we are trying to do
it. But what we are doing is the best way to
achieve our objectives. To divert our re-
sources and attention from these con-
structive activities to the destructive
alternative of lie detector tests would be a
serious blow, not just to morale but to
security itself. -
"In August 1986. Congress passed and
the President signed the Omnibus Diplo-
matic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act.
This landmark legislation, carefully crafted
by Congress. gave us the authority, and a
major start on the resources we needed, to
implement the recommendations of the
advisory panel on overseas security chaired
by Admiral Bobby Inman.
"This legislation authorized a world-
wide diplomatic security effort. Subse-
quently. we began a multi-year program to
replace and upgrade facilities at our most
June 1988
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NEWS HIGHLIGHTS
vulnerable posts overseas. The Inman panel
found that buildings at 134 of our 263 posts
were substantially below minimum security
standards. We began the most extensive
construction program in the Department's
history. We also started making improve-
ments in security operations and organiza-
tions.
'Budget realities'
"Unfortunately, today's budget real-
ities are forcing us to slow the program
down. In both fiscal years 1988 and 1989.
there will be no newly-authorized starts in
the security buildint! program. In addition.
we propose to hold the diplomatic security
salaries and expenses to the 1988 level.
Because this does not compensate for infla-
tion, this means a real decrease in opera-
tions.
"1 accept the need to hold down
expenditures in the interest of the nation's
economic and financial health. The State
Department is doing its part in that effort.
But I also fear that if we continue to con-
strain diplomatic security expenditures in
future years, the momentum toward improv-
ing the security of our operations will be
lost. In short, it is critical that the levels
requested for security he viewed as part of
the Department 'S response to the budget
process?not as a reduced commitment to
security by the administration or Congress.
Moscow chancery
?'With specific respect to the Moscow
chancery, a subject in which this committee
has expressed a particular interest, we con-
tinue to make good progress on rehabilita-
ting the existing chancery. At the same
time. we are moving ahead with planning
on how to achieve a new secure chancery
facility in Moscow.
?The Department has worked closely
with other agencies represented in Moscow.
to reach a consensus on the most feasible
long-terni solution to our needs in Moscow.
Before expending significant additional
funds to a specific approach, we want to be
certain that the design and logistics of fully
securing a building are feasible in the harsh
security environment of the USSR. To get
those answers, we have awarded a contract
for an engineering and security survey of
the new building to determine options for
the present structure and development of a
fully secure building. Concurrently. the sur-
vey will also look at the feasibility of
restructuring the present chancery into a
totally secure facility?a much less desir-
able option. in my view.
10
?We will have the results of the survey
in hand by late summer, and will then pre-
pare a proposed course of action for the
consideration of the Congress. We expect to
be able to present a package complete with
funding requirements before the end of the
fiscal year. In this regard. I should note that
we believe no new funding for reconstruc-
tion of a new office building will be re-
quired prior to fiscal year 1990.
Training center
"In difficult times such as these, there
is a temptation to put off badly needed pro-
grams and projects. Inevitably, several
years later, it will be painfully evident that
such a response to budget constraints was
extremely shortsighted.
"The construction of an up-to-date for-
eign affairs training center is a high priority
for me. I urge the committee to approve this
project. The ?issue is simple: ensuring the
professional excellence and effectiveness of
the men and women who represent our
country abroad. 1 am convinjed that the
ability of the United States to effectively
carry out its diplomatic functions is directly
related to the skills of our professional staff.
At a time of declining numbers in our work
force. it is particularly important that the
quality of our personnel he the highest that
is possible. Hie ne?% foreign affairs training
center will provide oi adequate facility to
address this need.
-.We must press ahead with skill de-
velopment through training and the use ot
current technology. We must take action
now to ensure the tuture.?
Security people reply
to complaints on
building access
The new security system for entering
the Main State building is operating effec-
tively. according to the Bureau of Diplo-
matic Security. though it has prompted a
number of complaints. particularly from
retirees.
"We understand why some people feel
put out, and we're sympathetic with their
concerns, but the fact is we really have no
feasible alternatives if we want a system of
maximum effectiveness,? said the bureau's
Kenneth E. Lopez. who is in charge of the
project.
Under the new arrangement, employ-
ees and some contractors have been issued
computer-readable building passes which.
when inserted into card-readers, activate
automated access control facilities. Other
lir,._
- i
ftI
categories of persons seeking entry into the
building?news media people. employees
of other federal agencies (unless they con-
duct frequent official business at State) and
State Department retirees are among these
others?have not been issued the building
passes. They must go to the reception desks
at the building entrances to obtain a \ isitor's
pass to conduct their business. Retirees who
present their gold retirement cards are
issued a visitor pass immediately: the recep-
tionist need not telephone for authori/ation
for a retiree to enter.
Reasons for restrictions
''There are several reasons for these
restriction,. ? Mr. Lope/. said. first. we
need to I liii huilding passg,I currcnt
employee, hecause this gives u, inure eifec-
live contro; over the passes ihat ;ire iiit-
`tandin. I ct tile cmPlovce? "Ito
Hsi :I 1)a,?? iir have one stolen Ii iii ilk-itt tic
going to reali/e almost immediately that the
pass is missing. Ihey'll need it the scry
next day to enter the building and report tor
skork. So they're going to call us v,ithout
delay to report the loss or the thett. As soon
as we get that call. we cancel that pass out
on our computer_ and it do no good to
whoever is in possession of it. When that
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