YOUR MEMORANDUM OF 27 MAY 1988

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90G01353R001700070089-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 9, 2012
• Sequence Number: 89
• Publication Date: June 3, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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Washington. D.C. 20505
Security Evaluation Office
3 June 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert E. Lamb, Assistant Secretary
Bureau of Diplomatic Security
Department of State
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Director, Security Evaluation Office
Your Memorandum of 27 may 1988 (U)
1. Our discussion on the afternoon of 27 May was useful in that you
explained why you intend to move slowly in an orientation program for me on
State security issues and you made clear your reservations about various
aspects of the Security Evaluation Office mission. The 27 May memorandum you
gave me makes some of your reservations even more clear. The memorandum also
raises a point or two that did not arise in our conversation. First, let me
address the items raised in your 27 May memorandum.
2. Your understanding of the Secretary Shultz-Judge Webster conversation
of 25 May differs from mine. Before reciting my understanding let me say that
neither of us should try to parse our respective understandings of that
conversation without going back to the principals. My general understanding
of their conversation is consistent with my concept for the Security
Evaluation Office, however. I believe Secretary Shultz informed Judge Webster
that:
o Some members of the Department were concerned that the Security
Evaluation Office might try to force the polygraph on State;
o that, and some other concerns, was in a letter proposed for
Secretary Shultz's signature;
? Secretary Shultz believed the proposed letter failed to capture
his positions adequately and did not reflect fully his
understandings with Judge Webster; something they could discuss
later;
o Secretary Shultz would ask the Department to proceed with the
orientations I had requested.
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If that is substantially different than your understanding of Secretary
Shultz's views and guidance to Ron Spiers, we should ask the principals to
clarify.
First paragraph of Your 27 May Memorandum
3. The point in your reference to the Shultz-Webster understanding that
the Security Evaluation Office would be ". . . related primarily to technical
security . . ." is not necessarily inconsistent with my concept of the mission
of the Security Evaluation Office if you note the word primarily. First, let
me emphasize my conviction that one cannot counter technical threats with only
technical countermeasures. Physical security factors, the positive control of
the work space, are fundamental to a defense against technical attacks by
hostile intelligence services. One cannot assure physical security without
attention to personnel security issues. We must have adequate personnel,
physical, and technical security standards if our overseas missions are to be
protected against the intelligence threat and the actual intelligence
operations that you and I know to exist. The technical security issues
certainly have been highlighted in the typewriters and the office building
incidents in the USSR but the remedy is not to be found solely in technical
security standards. I defer to the DCI, the Secretary of State, and the
President as to whether they want to ignore the personnel and physical
security issues. That would be a difficult position to defend in the wake of
the next espionage or security problem overseas.
4. You raised another point in your 27 May memorandum, that the Security
Evaluation Office is ". . . to report problems and recommendations to the
Secretary of State . . ." (your added emphasis). Your point is not clear, but
it was raised also by a woman in the Management Council meeting. My response
was and is that the Director, Security Evaluation Office provides his
standards, inspection results, and recommendationsto both the DCI and the
Secretary of State. The Secretary of State receives them for action; he is
responsible for managing embassies and missions abroad. The DCI receives
information at the same time. The DCI and the Secretary will be fully
informed on a timely and equal basis. I plan to keep the Secretary informed
through the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security. My choice is to do
it through you rather than directly to the Secretary. That ensures that you
and your bureau are fully informed and it preserves the integrity of the
complete chain of State management authority. If you are implying that the
Director of the Security Evaluation Office should report directly to the
Secretary, i do not understand why and would wish to discuss that further.
Second Paragraph of Your 27 May Memorandum
5. You assert that the Secretary of State does not consider it acceptable
for the Security Evaluation Office ". . . to establish and monitor personnel
standards." That may be but I was unaware that he objected to personnel
security standards. Allow me a literal interpretation of your language, I
never envisioned any interest in "personnel standards" in terms of whether
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State or anyone else wishes to hire the short or the tall, the quick or the
slow, etc. My mission is to provide standards to protect embassies and
missions from hostile intelligence services. Further, the Security Evaluation
Office mission encompasses standards applicable to all tenants of our overseas
missions, State and other organizations. These are security standards,
minimum standards for all missions, exceptional security standards for high
threat areas or high vulnerability environments. Your citation of "personnel
standards" appears to refer to something different from my concept of
"standards for personnel, physical, and technical security." Consider, if you
will, the case of Sergeant Lonetree. We must have personnel security
standards, and abide by them, if we are to protect the physical area from
pilfering or technical attack by the Soviet intelligence services. Are you
suggesting that the Secretary of State objects to personnel security
standards/security standards for personnel as a function of the Security
Evaluation Office? Should we discuss this further?
6. The second point you make in that paragraph has been dealt with in my
paragraph 4 above. The point is that the DCI will be informed fully on a
timely and equal basis. It is the Secretary of State who must act on the
standards or non-compliance. It is the DCI who must be informed in the event
of non-acceptance or non-compliance because then he, the DCI, is directed to
report to the President and the Congress.
Third Paragraph of Your 27 May Memorandum
7. I look forward to Brian Flanigan's orientation program on State
technical activities.
8. The delay in briefings, delay in our joint visits, and delay in
notifying State's posts and security officers of the Security Evaluation
Office is not well understood. The advantages to the Department of State in
ensuring that I am well informed of your perspectives and the advantages of
being seen by congress and the President as cooperating as both requested
appear to favor doing these things sooner rather than later.
9. I have attached a general description of the duties envisioned for the
three functional groups of the Security Evaluation Office; standards,
intelligence threat and vulnerability assessments, and inspections.
10. A small point on the name; we will avoid the abbreviation SE0 whenever
possible. It would be misleading to add Technical to the office name because
we believe the security problem overseas is broader than that implies. By the
way, the Evaluation in Security Evaluation Office was placed there by the DCI
to ensure there is no misunderstanding that the Secretary of State is
responsible for security; the DCI Security Evaluation Office sets standards
and monitors compliance.
Attachment
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