LETTER TO B.R. INMAN FROM ROBERT M. GATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90G01359R000200070018-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 17, 2011
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: January 22, 1986
• Content Type: LETTER

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Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence
22 January 1986
Admiral B.R. Inman, USN (Ret.)
)cn
This is the revised text as promised.
I am just as glad you didn't read the earlier
version -- I think this one is better. Would
appreciate any thoughts or comments.
As always, it was a pleasure to talk
with you.
Sincerely,
Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director for Intelligence
STAT
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I welcome this opportunity to come to Harvard and speak
about the relationship between the Central Intelligence Agency,
especially its analytical/research arm, and the academic
community. Recent events here have sparked a broader discussion
of both the propriety and wisdom of university scholars
cooperating or collaborating in any way with American
intelligence. On December 3rd of last year the Boston Globe
stated "The scholar who works for a government intelligence
agency ceases to be an independent spirit, a true scholar."
These are strong words. In my view they are absolutely wrong.
Nonetheless, there are real concerns that should be addressed.
My remarks tonight center on three simple propositions:
-- First, preserving the liberty of this nation is
fundamental to and prerequisite for the preservation of
academic freedom; can there be anyone who believes that
the university community can prosper and protect freedom
of inquiry oblivious to the fortunes of the nation?
-- Second, the Federal Government -- including the
Department of Defense and intelligence agencies -- is
charged with and essential for preserving our national
freedom.
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-- Third, the Federal Government needs to have recourse to
the best minds in the country, including those in the
academic community, to help carry out its charge to
defend the nation. Tensions inevitably accompany the
relationship between defense, intelligence and academe,
but mutual need and benefit require reconciliation or
elimination of such tensions.
The History of CIA-University Relations
In discussing the relationship between the academic
community and American intelligence, and specifically the
research and analysis side of intelligence, it is important to go
back to antecedents which, coincidentally, have important links
to Harvard. In the summer of 1941, William J. Donovan persuaded
President Roosevelt of the need to organize a coordinated foreign
intelligence service to inform the government about fast moving
world events. He proposed that the service "draw on the
universities for experts with long foreign experience and
specialized knowledge of the history, languages and general
conditions of various countries." President Roosevelt agreed and
created the Office of the Coordinator of Information under
Donovan's leadership.
Donovan named James Finney Baxter III, President of Williams
College and an expert on American diplomatic history, as the
chairman of a board of analysts that would draw together
information relevant to the course of the war. Baxter in turn
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recruited the prominent Harvard historian, William L. Langer, as
the Director of Research. The two then set to work to invite
outstanding scholars in the social sciences to join their board
of analysts and enlist additional staff.
A large number of university professors were brought into
the OSS, as the intelligence organization was renamed in 1942.
They included G. T. Robinson, professor of Russian history at
Columbia (who was made chief of the Russian section); Hajo
Holborn, professor of history at Yale; Franz Neumann of the New
School for Social Research; and, interestingly, Herbert
Marcuse. Harvard made no small contribution to this intellectual
talent bank, contributing scholars such as Crane Brinton and H.
Stuart Hughes in history, Carlton Coon in anthropology, John King
Fairbank in oriental studies, Bruce Hopper in government, Henry
Murray in psychology, and others.
This is not the time or place to detail their
contribution. Let us simply say it was significant. And when
the war was over, along with the nation's soldiers, those of the
scholars who were members of OSS team demobilized.
Events in East and West Europe, the Soviet Union and China
between 1945 and 1947 made apparent the need to strengthen the
nation's defenses, and especially the need to be well-informed
about developments around the globe. The result was the National
Security Act of 1947 which created the Department of Defense and
the Central Intelligence Agency. Again, outstanding scholars
were recruited. Langer came back to establish the Board of
National Estimates. Robert Amory of the Harvard Law School
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faculty was named CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence in 1952,
and served in that capacity for nearly ten years. Other
academicians who joined included: historians such as Ludwell
Montague, Sherman Kent, Joseph Strayer and DeForrest Van Slyck;
MIT economist Max Millikan, who organized the economic
intelligence effort; Yale and MIT economist Richard Bissell, who
later headed the clandestine service; and even William Sloane
Coffin who left the Union Theological Seminary to join CIA for
the duration of the Korean War before becoming Chaplain at
Yale. He is quoted by political scientist Richard Harris Smith
as recalling that he joined the Agency because "Stalin made
Hitler look like a Boy Scout." It was a common reason for
academicians to join the Agency in the early years.
In short, in the Office of Strategic Services in World War
II and in the early days of CIA, prominent scholars from
America's greatest universities played a key role in the
establishment of the Agency itself and in particular its research
and analysis branch.
Relations between the scholarly community and CIA were
cordial throughout the 1950s. The cold war was at its height and
the nation's need for the Agency and its activities were seldom
questioned by faculty or students. Some of the most noted
university professors of the time served on a regular basis as
unpaid consultants, helping CIA to form its estimates of probable
trends in world politics.
These halcyon days were soon to change. There was some
criticism on campuses over CIA's involvement in the Bay of Pigs
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expedition in 1961 and criticism increased as the Agency, along
with the Department of Defense and the rest of the government,
was increasingly attacked as the war in Vietnam continued.
Despite continuing academic cooperation with the Directorate of
Intelligence, relationships between the CIA, the Department of
Defense and other agencies and academia generally deteriorated in
the mid-1960s with the breakup of foreign policy consensus. The
decline in CIA-academia ties was given impetus in February 1967
by the disclosure in Ramparts magazine that CIA had been funding
the National Student Association for a number of years.
Sensational allegations of wrongdoing by CIA became more
frequent in the media in the early 1970s, culminating in the
establishment of the Rockefeller Commission and subsequently both
the Church Committee in the Senate and the Pike Committee in the
House of Representatives. The Congress and the media
concentrated primarily on CIA's covert actions, although there
also was some discussion of CIA's contacts with academia --
particularly in the Church Committee, which tended to lump
schools with the media and religious organizations in discussing
appropriate CIA relationships.
The Church Committee recognized that CIA "must have
unfettered access to the best advice and judgment our
universities can produce." At the same time, the Committee
recommended that academic advice and judgment of academics be
openly sought. The Committee concluded that the principal
responsibility for setting the terms of the relationship between
CIA and academe should rest with college administrators and other
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academic officials. "The Committee believes that it is the
responsibility of ... the American academic community to set the
professional and ethical standards of its members."
This paralleled considerable debate within academic ranks
and led to numerous articles about the relationship between the
universities and CIA. In response to a letter from the President
of the American Association of University Professors, theCIA
Director George Bush replied that the Agency sought "only the
voluntary and witting cooperation of individuals who can help the
foreign policy processes of the United States." The Director
stated that where relationships are confidential they are usually
so at the request of the scholars, rather than the Agency, and he
refused to isolate the Agency from "the good counsel of the best
scholars in our country."
This approach was adopted and enlarged upon by Director
Stansfield Turner who engaged in a long and eventually
unsuccessful effort to reach agreement with President Bok of
Harvard on relations between this university and the Agency.
(Ironically, at this time, another Harvard professor, Robert
Bowie, headed the analytical element of the Agency.) Some
academic institutions adopted guidelines similar to the stringent
regulations established at Harvard; in most cases less severe
guidelines were proposed. In a great majority of schools where
the issue arose, however, the faculty and administration rejected
any guidelines, usually on the grounds that existing regulations
or practices were adequate to protect both the institution and
individuals.
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Relations between the Agency and the academic world have
improved since 1977 for a variety of reasons, including
recognition in the academic community that CIA, together with the
Departments of State and Defense, has been an important and
useful supporter of area and regional studies and foreign
language studies in the United States.
IThe agencies of
the American intelligence community as well as the Department of
State have long been a primary source of employment for
specialists in these areas. The academic community also
consulted closely with senior officials of the intelligence
community in their successful campaign to win support for a
Congressional-approved endowment of Soviet studies. Intelligence
agencies informally strongly supported this endeavor.
I have reviewed this history because it is important to
understand that issues about CIA and the university that are
being raised today are not new. In some areas of research, such
as on the Soviet Union, our cooperation for nearly 40 years has
remained both close and constant. This also has been the case
often in the fields of economics and science. On the other hand,
there have been much more pronounced ups and downs in our
relationships with political scientists allied social
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sciences, particularly among those with expertise in the Third
Why CIA Needs Academe
There are, however, other constants in the history of this
relationship and in its future as well. These include our need
for your help, and the opportunity you have to contribute to a
better informed policymaking process by cooperating with us. Let
me describe how and why.
CIA and the American government need your help today more
than ever before. If you joined CIA, or as a professor dealt
with CIA, during the first quarter century of its existence, the
odds are that you would have worked on the Soviet Union, China,
or in the latter part of that period, Southeast Asia. But just
in the last dozen years, we have been confronted with new issues
and developments and also have had to pay attention to some
problems too long neglected. The oil embargo of 1973 and
subsequent skyrocketing of oil prices; the related dramatic
changes in the international economic system and growth of debt
in Third World countries; revolutions in Iran, Ethiopia, and
Nicaragua; the final passage of European colonialism from Africa;
a more aggressive Soviet Union (with its Cuban and other allies)
in the Third World; changing patterns STAT
in international trade; and the growth of technology transfer,
international narcotics networks and terrorism have demonstrated
vividly that our national security is greatly affected by
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developments and events in addition to the number and
capabilities of Soviet strategic weapons.
Accordingly, the subjects we deal with today are staggering
in their diversity. They include problems such as the
implications of the enormous indebtedness of key Third World
countries; problems of political, economic and social instability
and how to forecast them; human rights; narcotics; the illicit
arms market; the implications of immigration flows in various
regions of the world; population trends and their political and
security implications; the global food supply; water resources;
energy, technology transfer; terrorism; proliferation of
chemical/biological and nuclear weapons; changing commodity
markets and their implications for Third World countries; and
others too numerous to recount. In each of these there are
subsets of problems. Take, for example, our knowledge of Shia
Islam and its roots in the twelfth century and the importance of
that for understanding problems in the Middle East and Southwest
Asia in the 1970s and 1980s. The problems of developing
economies in the third world and how they go awry and what
opportunities there are for the United States to play a
constructive role are all difficult.
But nearly all of these problems have something in common:
while CIA has experts in
reservoir of expertise, experience, and insight in the community
of university scholars that can help us, and through us, the
American government, better understand these problems and their
implications for us and for international stability.
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With this diversity of issues and problems in mind, the
Directorate of Intelligence several years ago initiated an
intensified effort to reach out to the academic community, think
tanks of every stripe, for
information, analysis, advice and counsel.
" +V44.' 'I,,&% dwak?A :
specific steps/
-- Senior managers in charge of each of our substantive
areas were directed to undertake an expanded program of
sponsorship of conferences on substantive issues of
concern to us and to encourage participation of our
analysts in such conferences sponsored by the private
sector. Since 1982, CIA has sponsored more than 300
conferences, nearly all of them involving considerable
participation by the academic community and touching on
many of the issues I noted. In addition, our analysts
as overt CIA officers have attended more than 1500
conferences sponsored by others on such problems.
-- We have increasingly turned to the academic community to
test our own assessments in ways consistent with
protecting intelligence sources and methods. We have
helped scholars get security clearances so that they
could examine the actual drafts of our studies. A
growing percentage of our work is reviewed by
specialists in the academic community (as well as by
those in various think tanks, retired senior military
officers, independent specialists, and others).
v~e~c~t ~e w~i~r
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-- We have established panels of cleared specialists from
business and the academic community to meet with us
regularly not only to help improve specific research
papers but to help develop new methodologies, review
performance, and help us test new approaches and
hypotheses.
-- Our analysts are required to refresh their own
substantive credentials and expand their horizons by
obtaining outside training at least every two years.
This requirement can be met through taking university
courses, participating in business or other outside
sponsored seminars and conferences, attending military
training courses, and so forth.
Our involvement with the academic community is as follows:
-- Consulting: This can be formal, under a contractual
arrangement in which the individual is paid a set
government rate, or informal and unpaid -- an exchange
of views between interested specialists. We are
particularly interested in ideas that challenge
conventional wisdom or orthodoxy. We know what we
think, but need to know what others think also.
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-- Sponsorship of conferences: We generally organize our
own, but occasionally we contract with others to
organize a conference for us. And, of course, our
analysts attend conferences sponsored by business, think
tanks, and universities.
-- Research: There are cases in which basic research can
be carried out for us by scholars in universities who
have experience and expertise in areas in which we are
interested. Basic demographic and economic research are
examples of the kind of work for which we contract.
-- Scholars in Residence: We have had a scholars-in-
residence program for a number of years under which
individuals from the academic world can spend a year or
two working with us, with full security clearances, on
topics of interest to them. The individuals who have
participated in this program have found it an
intellectually enriching experience, as well as a
uniquely valuable way to observe the real workings of
government. For our part, it has given us the
opportunity to debate alternate views and
interpretations in a depth that simply is not possible
when those with whom we are discussing things do not
have access to the full range of information available.
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-- Information: Finally, we are interested in talking with
scholars who volunteer to share with us their
impressions after traveling to places of interest or
participating in events of interest abroad.
A principal factor in our pursuit of contact with scholars
is our perception that quality analysis on the incredible range
of issues with which we must cope requires not only dogged
research but also imagination, creativity, and insight. Large
organizations, and particularly government bureaucracies, are not
famous for their encouragement of these characteristics--although
there is surprisingly more than you might think. Similarly, to
rely solely on intelligence sources or on information funneled
through government channels inevitably would constrict the range
of views and information needed. We are looking for people to
challenge our views, to argue with us, to criticize our
assessments constructively, to make us think and defend and go
back to the drawing board when we have missed something
important. In short, the last thing we want from a scholar is
for him or her to tell us what they think we want to hear. That
would make our entire effort pointless.
Finally, this relationship is not necessarily a one-way
street. Just as we are conscious of our need for the injection
of ideas and information from outside government channels, I
think you should concede that there is at least the possibility
that you might learn something from discussions with us.
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Your Concerns
Let me now address some of the major concerns that have been
raised by scholars, deans, and institutions about dealing with
us. I would note that certain of these concerns reach well
beyond just CIA and involve the entire question of relations
between government, business and academe.
1. Doesn't/esearch or analysis under CIA auspices of events
abroad inevitably compromise academic freedom and the
honesty of academic research?
-- First of all, when we contract for research, we insist
on honest work. We do not permit our analysts to cook
the books and we would never consult or contract with a
scholar a second time who did that. Our research must
stand up to close scrutiny, not only by other
intelligence agencies, but by other elements of the
executive branch, the oversight committees of the
Congress, the Congress as a whole, the President's
Foreign Intellience Advisory Board, and a variety of
other panels and organizations that have access to our
information. While we acknowledge we can be and have
been wrong in the past, our very existence depends on
our reputation for integrity and for reliable and
objective assessments. Any research we use should have
the same qualities.
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-- As I noted earlier, the whole purpose of our effort is
defeated if the scholar tells us what he or she thinks
we want to hear. Indeed, there is consistent pressure
in our organization to seek out people whom we know
disagree with us and against whom to can test our ideas
to make sure we have seriously considered all the
possibilities.
-- Third, we assume, unless shown differently, the
integrity of the scholars with whom we deal. We expect
that scholars with whom we deal will be straightforward
both with us and with their colleagues.
-- Fourth, it seems to me that academic freedom depends on
a scholar not being beholden to any outside influence or
rigid ideological conceptions but only to the pursuit of
truth. The scholar should be free to search where he or
she wishes and should not be constrained by any
influences, including the preferences of colleagues or
prevailing cultural winds. Actually, improper influence
potentially can be exerted on a scholar by any source of
funding: contracts and consultantships with business,
foundations and foreign governments. Indeed, American
academics have long consulted with officials of foreign
governments, including authoritarian regimes at both
ends of the political spectrum. In light of this,
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singling out a US government agency as a particular
threat to honest inquiry seems to me to represent a
double standard. If a university requires public
exposure of any relationship with CIA, then surely logic
and equity require a similar practice for relationships
with foreign governments and, in fact, all other outside
relationships. You are rightly proud of your ability to
do objective research. CIA does not threaten it.
-- Finally, I agree with the proposition that it is the
responsibility of the university itself to establish and
monitor the rules governing all these relationships.
And it is both foolish and irresponsible to do so by
isolating the scholar from any outside contact under the
guise of protecting academic freedom.
2. Won't Publicly acknowledged contacts with CIA hinder a
scholar's access and freedom of inquiry overseas? I
acknowledge this might be a problem in some cases. However,
many who have worked with us for years have not had any
difficulty.
q
3. Can'tkolleague's contacts even with the analytical side of
CIA compromise an entire department? I have been asked
before about the danger of one scholar's association with us
involving his or her faculty colleagues through some sort of
guilt by association. I would simply offer two
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observations. First, the university community is a
remarkably diverse one and I am sure that in many
departments there are scholars who are involved in some sort
of activity with which their colleagues disagree or which
they do not support. So, again, this problem is not limited
just to CIA. Some form of reporting to the university on
such relationships that could be kept confidential would
seem to me an appropriate way to minimize this problem. My
second observation, however, is that at some point it seems
to me a little courage is called for. Remember the adage
that "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the
death your right to say it." At some point, the freedom of
those who do wish to consult with us is infringed upon
b.e
of the fears of their colleagues. We do not believe
that working with your government to help bring about better
informed policy is a shameful activity; indeed, it should be
a source of pride and satisfaction. Contributing to a
better understanding of some of the most difficult and
occasionally dangerous problems of the world, in my view,
should satisfy the scholar's highest calling.
4. Isn't prepublication review tantamount to CIA censorship?
No. Our review is to ensure that no classified information
is in a book or article that draws on earlier research
carried out for us. We also want to be certain there are no
revelations of intelligence sources and methods in the
text. We have no interest in altering the substance or
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conclusions of writings we review and take great care to
avoid asking for such changes. Nearly all books and
articles submitted for review by scholars who have worked
with us on unclassified projects emerge with no changes at
all. Indeed, our retirees and former employees seem to
encounter far more frequent difficulty -- especially when
they are writing about sources and methods. Finally, we
leave it to the judgment of the scholar which of his or her
61 O C.CAUA
writings are subject to review -- and we have^~reut challenge,
such judgments in many years.
5. What about the view that CIA engages in covert action as
well as collection and analysis and a variety of "immoral"
acts and therefore association with any part of CIA is
unacceptable? Activities at CIA are carried out within the
law, with the approval of appropriate constitutional
authorities, and with the oversight of the Congress. They
are activities mandated by the decisions of elected
officials in both the Executive and Legislative branches.
As we have seen recently Congress can and does deny funds
for legal intelligence activities thereby terminating such
activities.
-- The Central Intelligence Agency is a foreign policy
instrument of the elected representatives of the
American people, just like the military, USIA or the
Department of State. If you find its activities
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distasteful or incompatible with your personal values,
you can do three things: you can vote for someone else
next time,
or you can decline to have any
association with us at all. But in the latter case, the
decision whether to associate with us should be left to
the individual. One individual's freedom of association
should not be denied because of another's personal point
of view. A university steps on precarious ground and
itself endangers academic freedom if it starts making
arbitrary rules about which organizations a scholar may
participate in or talk with -- and, I would add,
especially if one of those organizations is a branch of
its own democratically chosen government.
Before I close, let me review the rules and policies of the
analytical arm of CIA for dealing with the university community:
-- First, while the Directorate of Intelligence presently
has no contracts for classified research at any academic
institution, the Directorate of Intelligence can and
will let contracts for classified research where
university rules permit and appropriate facilities and
circumstances allow.
STAT
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-- Second, when we contract for research to be done for us,
we spell out explicitly for the scholar the conditions
governing use of that research. In some cases, the
research will be done strictly for us, and we will be
the only recipient. In other cases, once we have
received the research and assured ourselves that the
terms of the contract have been carried out, we will
acquiesce in a scholar's request to publish a book or
article drawing on that research. We do not commission
or contract for books or articles. We are realistic
about pressures on scholars to publish, however, and, in
order to attract some of the best people to work with
us, we try to accommodate their desire to draw on
unclassified research they have done for us for
publication under their own name. And, finally, there
are cases where we even allow research done for us later
to be published under the scholar's name without any
prepublication review on our part.
But in any of these circumstances, our review is
simply to ensure that the work we contracted to be done
has been done, meets acceptable standards and does not
contain classified information. Taxpayers justifiably
would be outraged if we were not to ensure that we had
received true value for their money.
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We have regulations and policies governing our relationships
with the academic community# we continually review these in the
light of new opportunities, new problems and new issues. For
example, well before the recent controversy here at Harvard, we
decided to revise our policy with respect to prepublication
review, narrowing that review -- which again, is simply to avoid
the compromise of classified information -- to the specific
subject area in which the scholar had access to classified
information.
We have again looked at our rules and policies as a result
of the controversy here at Harvard, and this too has produced
some modifications. For example, we are now stating explicitly
to any organization or individual organizing a conference on our
behalf that the participants in the conference should be informed
in advance of our sponsoring role. Quite frankly, because we
organize the overwhelming majority of our conferences ourselves,
this problem had not arisen before.
We also have looked at the question of whether our original
funding-of research that is subsequently used in a publication by
a scholar should be openly acknowledged, as funding from
foundations and other sources are often acknowledged. We have
concluded for now that such a change would be inadvisable. If we
were to confine our relationships with the academic community to
traditional intelligence subjects such as the Soviet Union and
the Warsaw Pact or other adversaries of the United States, quite
honestly, open acknowledgement would not be a problem for us.
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However, as we increasingly are required by the policy
community to address issues such as instability in Third World
countries, international economic problems, the development of
new technologies overseas, international energy issues, the
implications of Third World debt and others, it occasionally
could be awkward, if not seriously embarrassing for the US
government, to have official confirmation of CIA research or work
on issues that sometimes involve countries that are friendly to
us. Additionally, formal confirmation that CIA was financing
research or was interested in a specific subject, such as the
financial stability of a particular country, could affect the
situation itself. Also, we would confront a situation in which
readers of a publication that officially confirmed it drew on CIA
funded research might believe that the conclusions were in fact
CIA's, that CIA drove the authors to those conclusions, or that
they even represented official US policy. Finallyt.official,
public confirmation of our support likely would be used for
promotional purpos s. All that said, I want to stress that while
r
M.W
V
we cannot Apublic confirmation or acknowledgement of our
support for specific research, our contract support is privileged
MrC
-- not classified -- anddwill always agree to a scholar reporting
our support of research to the university and otherwise meet
university rules and standards.
We expect any scholar or individual who consults or works
with us to abide fully by the rules of his or her home
institution in terms of reporting the relationship with us. But,
in our view, it is the responsibility of the institution to set
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such rules and to enforce them, and the responsibility of the
scholar to comply. CIA cannot and should not monitor or enforce
such compliance.
Conclusions
The world is increasingly complex. The challenges to the
security and well being of the American people are increasingly
diverse and subtle. Director Casey and I, and others in the
Executive Branch and our Congressional oversight committees
believe that contacts with universities and others in the private
sector are imperative if we are properly and effectively to carry
out our mission of informing, improving understanding, and
warning the government about developments around the world -- the
same mission identified by General Donovan and President
Roosevelt. Our ability to carry out our mission, as in the days
of Langer and Donovan, depends on voluntary cooperation between
those of us who carry this responsibility in intelligence, and
those in the university, business, retired military, and others
who can help us understand these challenges better and forecast
them more accurately. The country is the ultimate beneficiary.
Consultation and cooperation with CIA on the p,roblems acing
or v s 01 ..1' e
our world are not threats to academic freedom. QL&.:J&&&,^I believe
that freedom of inquiry is limited, a desire to render public
service sometimes tragically thwarted, and the nation
disadvantaged by those who would deny a scholar's willingness to
work with the national intelligence service in assessing the
world around us.
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As I said at the outset, prerequisite for
academic freedom is preservation of the liberty of the nation.
Those who believe that the university community can prosper and
protect freedom of inquiry and yet be oblivious to the fortunes
of the nation are blind. The government cannot coerce any
scholar to cooperate or work with the Department of Defense,
Department of State or CIA. By the same token, no scholar
"OIL .3.3
so. And none should have to worry that
should be
his reputation will suffer because of a public-spirited,
patriotic willingness to help us better understand and forecast
global developments affecting our national well-being and the
forces that threaten our freedom.
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