TAKING ADVANTAGE OF SOVIET WEAKNESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90G01359R000200110013-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: March 14, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/08: CIA-RDP90GO1359R000200110013-2
NOTE TO: The Secretary of State
17 April 1986
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/08: CIA-RDP90GO1359R000200110013-2
you would find of interest two thinkpieces
prepared for the Director by Graham Fuller, the
'
In your letter to the Director forwarding a
list of issues of particular concern to you,
you expressed particular interest in any work we
might have done on exploiting Soviet troubles in
the Middle East. We are continuing to examine
these opportunities, but in the meantime I believe
NIO for the Near East, and his assistant
any further.
Because they were prepared strictly for the
DCI, I would appreciate your not circulating them
Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence
Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Attachments:
NIC 01317-86, dtd 14Mar86
NIC 01369-86, dtd 14Mar86
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/08: CIA-RDP90GO1359R000200110013-2
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC 01317-86
14 March 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Graham E. Fuller
Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council
SUBJECT: Taking Advantage of Soviet Weaknesses in the Middle East
_ I. The chief Soviet weaknesses in the Middle East derive from the
fact that they have little to offer except:
Plentiful arms at reasonable or low cost.
A time-tested Leninist system of regime control, enhancing the
ability of rulers to stay in power longer.
-- A modest system of supporting states that can help out in times
of stress: the East Bloc and Soviet clients such as Cuba, North
Korea, Syria, Libya, Ethiopia, etc. They can provide weapons,
advisors--sometimes even troops--and diplomatic support.
2. Soviet weaknesses are the obverse:
-- Considerable rigidity in dealing with most states.
-- Inability to provide meaningful financial aid on a regular basis.
-- Lack of ties to any international economic or cultural support
system, banking system, and marketing system to benefit its
clients--all of which the West can provide.
-- A distinct Soviet preference that the client
It state maintain its
revolutionary character"--and preserve its ties with the
USSR--through limitation of corrupting ties with the moderate
state systems around the world--resulting in a de facto
isolation.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/08: CIA-RDP90GO1359R000200110013-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/08: CIA-RDP90GO1359R000200110013-2
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC 01369-86
14 March 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM:
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for NESA
SUBJECT: Asad's Departure and US Interests
2. His death will be a relief to many who, quite rightly, see him
exercising unusual skill in undermining US efforts in the Middle East at
every juncture, but a caution: His departure will also open the door for
possible very negative developments that would be major setbacks for US
interests in the region:
His successor may be unable to keep the Soviets at bay as Asad
has, Soviet influence over Syria could increase, and Moscow
could even end up gaining basing rights at Tartus, giving the
Soviet Union a major base on the Mediterranean.
Syrian terrorism--currently measured and aimed at sending
political messages--might become more indiscriminate, frequent,
and bloody.
Asad's successor could stumble into a war with Israel or launch
one to legitimize his government.
Syria could slip back into a period of successive coups, chronic
instability, and mercurial leadership, rendering impossible US
and Israeli efforts to deal with Syria as a peace partner, but
not eliminating Syria's ability to play the spoiler.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/08: CIA-RDP90GO1359R000200110013-2