LETTER TO FRANK C. CARLUCCI FROM WILLIAM H. WEBSTER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M00004R000200030023-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 2, 2011
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: July 31, 1987
• Content Type: LETTER

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~ t~ET ~~ ~'~~
THE DIRECTOR OF ~`
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council
NOTE FOR: D/OCA
FR01~1: C/NIC
Dave,
~/CON~ESS1~1~ ~~
87-3600/1
4 August 1987
Attached are items on "integrity and
objectivity" of the estimative process which
you may find useful. I'm sending these plus
two items you've already seen--background on
the Iran estimate and memo of '85--to Bill
Baker. Our latest "uncongenial" estimate to
policy was on the Persian Gulf last month--
with more to come!
nk B. Horton III
Major General, USAF
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iiM"w~,,,,~+t '
The Dlrectof of Central Inteiligcncc ~i~~
The Honorable Frank C. Carlucci
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Frank,
31 July 1987
This report is in response to the President's instruction in NSDD 266 to
review the established procedures for producing national foreign intelli-
gence estimates. These procedures were reviewed to determine if we were
achieving our goal of maintaining the integrity and objectivity of the
process and the products.
We believe the national intelligence estimates process does achieve
objectivity in the many interagency products issued by the Intelligence
Community. We find that there is integrity and independence on the part of
the people and the process. Nonetheless, we have taken steps to reinforce
the safeguards already built into the system. These include
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reemphasized with the National Intelligence Officers their
responsibilities to assist me in maintaining the integrity of the
process
held special meetings with NFIB Principals and their
representatives reviewing and reaffirming the requirements of
objectivity, integrity, and quality of the estimates
initiated a revision of the Intelligence Community's guidelines for
interagency production to bring currency and more clarity to the
guidelines for process
made changes in the DCI role to assure myself that the independence
of the intelligence process is maintained at several key points and
to foster full discussion of national estimates by the members of
the National Foreign Intelligence Board.
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The attached report lays out in greater detail the results of the review
directed by the President. The review included solicitation of the views of
each National Foreign Intelligence Board member on the issues of integrity
and objectivity in the production of our national foreign intelligence
estimates. The NFIB members provided thoughtful responses, including
consideration of the relationships between their intelligence organizations
and the policy community. These responses were included in the review
conducted by the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council and the
National Intelligence Officers who manage the interagency production on my
behalf. The review also included a special session of the National Foreign
Intelligence Board where the members discussed their views and
recommendations for strengthening the independence of the intelligence
process in order to preserve the integrity and independence of the product.
Sincerely yours,
William H. Webster
Enclosure
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THE INTEGRITY AND OBJECTIVITY OF THE ESTIMATIVE PROCESS
SUMMARY
We believe the current practices of the Intelligence Community do
preserve the integrity, objectivity and independence of the process for the
production of national foreign intelligence estimates. The integrity,
quality, and objectivity of the personnel involved in estimative work is at
least as important as the process itself. Some further changes in the DCI's
role have been made to reinforce further the independence of the process.
The guidelines for the process of interagency production are under NFIB and
DCI review and will be republished.
The integrity of Estimates is safeguarded principally through:
-- Careful selection and orientation for each of the key people in the
process.
-- The broadening of the scope of key policy questions to provide a
context beyond that suggested by policymakers.
-- The exclusion of policymakers from the analytic and coordination
process, ensuring Intelligence Community independence.
-- The participation by all elements of the Intelligence Community in
the development and coordination of estimates from concept through
final drafting.
-- The development of most likely and alternative outcomes in
recognition of uncertainty on some evidence and the
unpredictability of some events.
Explicit recognition in estimates of differing views within the
Intelligence Community on particular judgments.
The right of any community member to explicity dissent from any or
all parts of estimates.
Numerous levels of review within each Agency throughout the process.
The use of outside specialists and consultants for independent
views on selected issues.
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-- Evaluation of completed estimates and feedback to the preparation
of new ones as the cycle continues.
The ability of member agencies of the Intelligence Community to
publish their own estimates and bring them to the attention of
policymakers whenever they feel that a new line of analysis needs
to be taken which may be at odds with the Intelligence Community's
consensus views.
The independence of the estimative process from policymaker preference,
however, is not an absolute end in itself but rather involves a number of
trade-offs:
NIO's must maintain close contact with the policy community to
ensure they are aware of US policy goals and the details of its
implementation. Analysis conducted without knowledge of the US
role on the international scene will inevitably be skewed.
There inevitably exist areas in which policy and intelligence
cannot and should not be surgically separated--each has something
to offer the other in insight; nearly all participants in both the
policy and intelligence communities are engaged in some facet of
the other's work at some time.
Senior review within the Intelligence Community should bring
advantages of wisdom, experience and perspective to the
analysis--but is also possibly open to the charge of "politicizing"
analysis written at the working level.
Consensus cannot be allowed to eliminate sharpness of judgment.
Evidence can serve to buttress Community judgment, but the relative
absence of evidence cannot be allowed to stifle creative insight
where evidence may not be immediately available.
Recent changes in the OCI's role in the process should serve to
reinforce further the objectivity of his key role:
-- The DCI will no longer approve draft estimates prior to
coordination by NFIB representatives, but will review them to
ensure that they conform to goals set in the Terms of Reference.
-- The DCI will no longer approve post-coordination drafts, but will
bring his own comments and any suggestions for change to the NFIB
table.
-- The DCI will seek the judgment and advice of NFIB members before
deciding on the disposition of draft estimates.
Further, the DCI has directed the revision of the 1981 guidelines for
interagency production in order to provide currency and clarity to this
process.
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1. As the President has stated, it is an important goal of the United
States intelligence effort that the integrity and objectivity of the
intelligence process be maintained. demanding critical differentiation
between foreign intelligence and policy advocacy. This is a particularly
important and sensitive goal as applied to the production of national
estimates. It requires critical and constant attention especially by the
Intelligence Community but also by the Policy Community. This must be
considered side by side with another important goal, emphasized by the SSCI
in a draft report last year, that the utility and relevance of the
intelligence product be sustained, demanding cognizance of policy concerns
in the production of foreign intelligence. This dual objective of assuring
policy relevance while assuring against policy prescription makes two basic
demands.
First. while input to the estimative process is to be sought from
the Policy Community, it should be as to the questions asked, and
not as to the answers provided. And the Policy Community should
not be the only source of these questions.
Second, while the output of the estimative process should outline
the general implications of the Intelligence Community's judgments
for US interests, it should not cross the line to the advocacy of
particular policy proposals. That must be deferred to the
consumers in the Policy Community.
It should be recognized that the search for perfection in the estimative
process inevitably involves a process of tradeoffs between faithful
observance of the full bureaucratic process and the intellectual vigor of
the final product. As more people and more opinions become involved, aany
of the sharp edges of insight can be lost; process can be observed but the
product can be pallid, and the message to the policymaker can be
unenlightening. The Intelligence Community must strive to strike a balance
between often conflicting goals of timeliness and deliberation, between
crispness of 3udgment and full consideration of alternative views, between
safe consensus and boldness of insight, between policy relevance and policy
neutrality.
2. The estimators must interact with policymakers, but maintain their
independence from them. They must provide not only what the policymaker
wants to know, but also what he needs to know. While the estimators need to
focus on a policymaker's topic, they need to place it in proper context,
which may well provide an estimate not anticipated by the policymaker. An
estimate must examine the conventional wisdom on an issue, but also
challenge it. Estimators must examine all the evidence on an issue, but,
when evidence is lacking, they must not shrink from offering the insights
the Community may nonetheless be able to offer. Complicating the process is
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the impact of US activity on the event to be analysed while the outcome of
an estimate may influence future choices of action. The estimators must
assess both risks and opportunities for the US, and here they will march up
to the fine line short of policy prescription. They owe 1t to their readers
to engage in prediction, including which outcomes are most likely. But they
owe it also to their readers to make their uncertainties clear and to
provide alternative scenarios.
3. We have reviewed the national estimates process in terms of three
basic elements--personnel, process, and products. This facilitates
highlighting areas where vulnerabilities exist and safeguards help,
especially noting where senior officers directly affect the process.
Personnel
4. The most critical element in ensuring the integrity and objectivity
of the estimative process is people. Without individual integrity and
objectivity at all levels, particularly at the top, no process will work;
with it, nearly any process will be successful.
-- The National Intelligence Officer system is designed to select
experienced, skilled officers who will manage the estimates process
on behalf of the DCI. These NIOs are assigned to the Office of the
DCI where they can be relatively free of pressures from the policy
arms of government: The NIOs, selected from different parent
agencies and backgrounds, also bring a variety of Intelligence
Community perspectives to the estimates.
-- Additionally, Assistant NIOs, drafters, and Agency repre-
sentatives--themselves representing different parent agencies and
backgrounds--bring additional range of perspective. to the analytic
process. If the NFIB agencies fail to provide their best talent,
the process will not provide the best product.
-- There are balances that each of these players must strike. The
NIOs manage the production of estimates for the DCI and serve as
guardians of the Community process. Drafters need to be able to
utili2e their agency background and at the same time rise above it
and take on the community mantle. Representatives need to
represent their agencies ably and responsibly, while being capable
of setting aside parochialism in the interest of producing the best
possible Community product.
-- And finally there are the intelligence principals, who need to be
involved throughout the process, initially through their
representatives and ultimately at the National Foreign Intelligence
Board, to bring to bear their broader perspective and to help
protect the intelligence process against undue policy pressures. A
key to the success of this endeavor is the NIOs keeping the
representatives informed, so that they in turn can keep their
principals informed and involved.
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The Process
5. The Request for the Estimate. Any executive office can request an
estimate, but most are generated by State, DoD, or NSC. The DCI also calls
for estimates, as do other senior intelligence officers, although the
greatest number of nominations come from the NIOs. The NIOs usually suggest
that an Estimate be written because they have learned--from their contact
with the policymakers and their knowledge of the intelligence--that such an
estimate will be timely and relevant to a policy decision; sometimes one
that has not yet captured the policymakers' attention.
The N10 is routinely in contact with other members of the
Intelligence and Policy Community in his area of expertise. Ne
needs to be well aware of current US policy to anticipate both the
intelligence needs that the policy might spark as well as the
foreign policy repercussions of prospective US action. Those
contacts are a constant and common source of ideas for new
estimates--a boon for policy relevance and legitimate support to
the policy process. but carrying with it the danger of skewing
production to topics formulated only to support, and not to
illuminate, policy.
To guard against this, the NIOs, and other intelligence officials
generate estimates where policy attention is needed, to tell the
policymaker what the Intelligence Community feels the policymaker
needs to hear, not necessarily what he wants to hear. And second,
each request for an estimate is reviewed by the NIO with the
Chairman of the National Intelligence Council and must be approved
by the DCI. Disapproval is infrequent--never because of
uncongeniality to the Policy Community--and only because of limited
resources, conflicting priorities, or appropriateness--especially
if a topic appears to be of a limited interest or too narrow or
parochial in its focus for a national level estimate. The NFIB
members' periodic review of the interagency production plan assures
that they are well informed and can advise the DCI. The NIOs also
maintain a continuing dialogue within the Intelligence Community
and with the DCI to ensure that the production plan remains up to
date and relevant.
6. Preparation and Coordination of TORS. In conjunction with the
proposal for an estimate, the NIO presents a Concept Paper and Terms of
Reference (TOR), drawing on suggestions from the Intelligence Community and
the relevant policy people to define the scope and mayor themes of the
estimate.
-- Usually the office requesting the estimate will set forth the main
questions which it hopes to see answered. The NIO views any
intelligence questions posed as legitimate and will respond to
them. The NIO and his Intelligence Community colleagues will not
necessarily limit the scope of a proposed estimate strictly to the
questions and issues posed by the requester, however. Answering
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only those questions posed by the requester, without considering
the broader context could give a misleading impression regarding
policy implications.
The NIO maintains contact with the requester to insure that he
understands the specific interests and purposes of the questions
posed in an estimate, and to insure that the requester's
intelligence needs are met. Although this is a practice long
followed, it is worth noting that the SSCI in a September 1986
draft study also urged that NIOs remain in close contact with
policymakers during the estimative process to ensure that relevant
issues are addressed.
A critical part of the TOR is the Key Questions. This section sets
forth the few central questions which the NIO believes to represent
the heart of the intelligence problem.
The TOR also should clearly highlight the specific policy-related
questions posed by the requester. Responses to these should also
be highlighted in the estimate itself to catch policymaker
attention.
The TOR also includes a retrosaective look at previous estimates on
the same subject. This process helps remind the Community of past
discussions on the topic and provides opportunity for minority or
alternative views to be tested against subsequent events.
The draft TOR also is seen by the Senior Review Panel (SRP> for its
independent comment to the DCI and the NIO. The SRP is made up of
retired senior diplomats, military officers, and scholars and
reports directly to the DCI. Other independent DCI or NIO
consultants or panels may also be asked to comment.
The NIO then will make changes in the Concept Paper/Terms of
Reference as he believes are necessary. The TOR is then sent to
the DCI with a cover memo indicating how informal Community inputs
and SRP comments were or were not accommodated.
The DCI views the proper formulation of the TOR as a key element in
developing a good estimate. Further, he uses the TOR as the first
step in his personal supervision of the process to ensure
objectivity and integrity of the product.
The Intelligence Community representatives then meet with the NIO
to review the TOR, suggest changes for content, clarity, and
comprehensiveness, and coordinate for their agencies. The revised
TOR is sent to the DCI and Community principals as the formal,
coordinated TOR for the Estimate.
This process of TOR review almost invariably adds to the scope of
the paper. Rarely, if ever, are questions or issues dropped in the
course of such review, except when deemed outside the purview of
intelligence.
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7. The Drafting Process. The NIO will select a drafter for the
estimate, from within the Intelligence Community. The drafter thereafter is
responsible to the NIO for the estimate. The drafter seeks ideas and
contributions from the Intelligence Community and outside experts as he
develops the estimate.
The drafting process. however, is sometimes influenced by the
drafter's parent organization biases. The drafter--whatever his
parent organization--will usually submit his draft for review at
least to his own immediate superior and possibly higher reviewing
officials before the draft goes to the NIO. This is not always the
case, and usually is prompted by a desire to improve the writing
through peer review.
This review by the drafter's parent organization usually does
contribute in terms of clarity, style and accuracy, but it also can
affect the aosition taken by the drafter. In the real world,
however, any drafter will be~in part influenced by his own
bureaucratic culture whether he undergoes his own in-house review
or not.
The NIO will review the draft closely and critically. He has
license to make any changes he feels are necessary in the interest
of clarity, style, length, comprehensiveness, focus, sharpness and
accuracy of judgment. Initial drafts often require extensive work
to insure that they are terse and estimative in character. The
NIO's changes in the draft reflect a balance of his own best
substantive judgment and an awareness that he will have to
coordinate the text with the Intelligence Community and that he has
an obligation to reflect their significant views in the main or
alternative text.
The draft estimate will then go to the SRP for independent review
and comment. The NIO will accommodate as much of the SRP
suggestions as he believes is appropriate. In most cases, SRP
suggestions for change and improvement are incorporated. The
revised draft is then sent to the DDCI and the DCI with a cover
memo indicating how the SRP comments were accommodated. In a "fast
track," this may occur after initial DCI review and simultaneous
with informing the DCI and NFIB principals of the results of
Communlty draft coordinatlon.
DCI review at this point is intended primarily to ensure that the
draft meets the goals set forth in the TOR and to ensure sharpness
of judgment. The DCI may offer comment on substance as well but
prefers to reserve his comments until after he has heard from the
NFIB principals. Simultaneous with DCI review (this does not imply
his approval yet), the paper is sent to NFIB representatives for
review and staffing.
The NIO and the NFIB representatives take care throughout to ensure
that the policy community should not have impact on the conclusions
of the draft estimate. Policymakers do not attend the coordination
process.
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8. Draft Coordination. The role of the NIO at the coordination meeting
is a crucial one. Ne is responsible to the DCI to produce the best possible
estimate he can along the lines agreed upon in the TOR, and is responsible
to the Intelligence Community to assure that alternative views are
adequately expressed.
-- The estimate must reflect the best Community judgments but must not
be allowed to deteriorate into the "lowest common denominator"
consensus. It must reflect important alternative views while
avoiding the pitfalls of becoming a Christmas tree of endless
possibilities that destroy clarity of the judgment.
-- The NIO cannot simply be an "honest broker" among contending
parties; his role involves a greater degree of leadership--more
akin to that of fudge and manager who must ultimately arbitrate
conflicts of view and serve as catalyst to ensure judgments are
considered and far-reaching. The NIO must avoid foreclosure of
debate or refection of certain viewpoints by having recourse to
statements such as "the DCI has special interest in this issue," or
"the Secretary of wants," which can serve to
intimidate some representatives. The NIO should encourage
expression from all representatives of the Community, avoiding
dominance of the process by any one element or person.
-- Organizations and their representatives presenting dissenting
viewpoints have a special obligation to present a coherent and
significant alternative view that enriches the document--rather
than simply noting dissent or blurring the judgment.
9. Final DCI Review. The DCI receives an information copy of the
post-coordination draft as it is forwarded to all NFIB principals for review.
-- DCI comments or criticisms of the paper usually will be withheld
until after full discussion at NFIB with the principals. This is a
change from previous practice, in which DCI-proposed changes
usually were inserted prior to NFIB. This change is meant to
encourage a more free-flowing and active discussion of alternative
views at NFIB.
10. Final Review in the Intelligence Community. Following distribution
to NFIB principals, most agencies will submit the estimate to further
in-house review. Certain problems can arise 1n the course of this process.
-- Some Intelligence Community working level representatives may not
fully represent their agency and their principal at coordination
meetings--because of unresolved differences within the agency.
inability to get the view of the agency's principal, or lack of
empowerment. As a result, a commitment by a working level
representative at the pre-NFIB coordination meetings may not be
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supported by the NFIB principal, sometimes over lesser issues.
Getting the NFIB principals Into discussions at the table is a
positive development in oast cases. but sometimes the discussion is
over issues that could have been more efficiently handled by
effective representatives working with the NIO at pre-NFIB meetings.
-- Intelligence organizations attached to departments with
policymaking responsibility face other complications. Their
working level Intelligence representatives sometimes commit their
NFIB principal to an intelligence judgment in the estimate that is
seen as unwelcome by the policy side of the department. This
places a special responsibility on the heads of INR, DIA, and the
Service intelligence organizations to insulate the intelligence
process from undue policy influence.
-- For whatever reason, we find that even after completion of working
level coordination and pre-NFIB distribution, representatives
sometime report back to the NIO that new changes are being sought
by their Agencies. This part of the process is vulnerable to
charges of politicization. These issues can be resolved,
however--pre-NFIB brokering for routine adjustments, and deferral
to NFIB hearing for those of greater significance.
11. NFIB. The National Foreign Intelligence Board represents the final
forum for adjudication of estimates. The DCI and the principals are free to
propose changes in the work of the Community representatives. It falls to
the DCI to stimulate discussion, to elicit explanations of disagreements, to
accept footnotes or alternative language, or to remand the estimate for
further work. The dissent procedure at NFIB 1s one of the important
mechanisms available to ensure that each intelligence agency has an
opportunity to express its views if they have not already been adequately
reflected earlier. Finally, it is the DCI who approves the document.
12. After NFIB. The NIO and the drafter accommodate changes directed
by the DCI as a result of NFIB deliberations. Usually, these changes will
be coordinated only by the NFIB representatives but any agency can request
further NFIB principal review depending on the nature of the changes.
13. Feedback. There is a feedback process that enables the DCI to
determine customer satisfaction. The DCI meets frequently with his senior
readers; the President and the Cabinet-level consumers. The NIOs meet with
sub-cabinet consumers on a daily or weekly basis. The interaction of senior
intelligence officers with intelligence consumers in the interagency
meetings occurs on a daily basis. All of these contacts afford the DCI the
opportunity to gauge consumer satisfaction with the product.
14. Competitive Analysis. While the community has no formal mechanism
to force competitive analysis, it does in fact exist. In addition to the
expression of alternative views in the estimates themselves, each agency in
the Intelligence Community is free to--and usually does--provide its own
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in-house and contract studies and estimates which usually gain broad
dissemination. These (sometimes) alternative views are brought to bear in
coordination of National Intelligence Estimates or even after publication.
These individual Agency studies keep competitive analysis available to
policymakers.
15. The Problem of Evidence. Uncertainty needs to be clearly
identified in the text whenever judgments are made that are based more on
informed insight than abundant evidence. Appendices tan buttress arguments
for positions taken in the text but meager evidence also cannot be allowed
automatically to bar a judgment. A judgment on an issue can sometimes be
sustained by insight into and experience with an area even when intelligence
is skimpy or ambiguous. This is especially true in areas involving
clandestine or covert activity by another party. In short, the drafter and
the Community likewise must not be so mesmerized by absence of indicators.
or by a misplaced faith in the most likely outcomes that it leads to
automatic refection of judgments based on intuitive feel for behavior of the
players. Thus, on the evidentiary problem the Community is called to walk a
fine line between establishing a legal brief and accepting a position based
on circumstantial evidence and intuition in the absence of any certain
knowledge.
16. The Dilemma of Senior Level Review. The review of draft estimates
by the DCI and NFIB principals and their suggestions for changes can evoke
charges of politicization of the intelligence process. These individuals,
and their subordinate senior managers in particular, are closer to the
policy process than are the intelligence analysts who draft the estimates
and they bring a different outlook to the intelligence process. Differing
senses of international realities can be identified mistakenly as a
politically partisan view. The benefit of senior level review of estimates
is that it often brings to bear a broader view of the international order
and the character of international conflict. These views inevitably
influence the assessment of the likelihood of certain events. It is
important for all parties involved to distinguish between a legitimate
critique of a narrow, ill-formed or naive conception of politics or the
international order, and the advocacy of preferred political views on how to
deal with the nature of the international conflict. In short, the higher
the level of generalization about how certain situations will evolve, the
more one's own unspoken philosophical sense of how the world works is
Involved. Searching critiques of Community estimative views by senior
officials need not represent "politicization" of the process. But, the
senior reviewer must be careful that his critique is not in fact politically
driven or broadly perceived by the Community as such.
Products
17. Out of this process come four types of formal estimative products.
-- National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence
Estimates, or NIEs and SNIEs, go through all steps of the process
dust outlined. As they bear the NFIB imprimatur and DCI signature,
they have the greatest weight. As a general rule NIEs deal with
broader subjects than SNIEs, deal with anticipated events, look
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further ahead, and more time is given to their preparation. The
SNIE usually treats with unanticipated events, more narrow
questions, and over a shorter period. SNIEs further differ from
NIEs in that they go through some of the steps in parallel rather
than in series. to expedite production of high priority and
time-sensitive requirements, but they still involve the key
players, the NFIB is still the final forum for adjudication, and
the DCI is still the final approval authority.
Interagency Intelligence Memoranda and Interagency Intelligence
Assessments, or IIMs and IIAs, differ from NIEs and SNIEs in that
they are less estimative in nature and do not necessarily go
through NFIB or bear the DCI's signature. But all agencies