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Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 oca 3743-88 institute for Soviet and East European Studies OCCASIONAL PAPERS SERIES VOLUME II, NO. 4 Reflections On Gorbachev's Policies and East-South Relations by Ambassador Vernon A. Walters University of Miami Graduate School of International Studies Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14 : CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 Institute for Soviet and East European Studies Graduate School of International Studies University of Miami The Institute for Soviet and East European Studies (ISEES) coordinates a multidis- ciplinary program of analytical, policy- relevant studies of the foreign and domestic policies of the Soviet Union and the East European nations. Created in 1986, the In- stitute is designed to promote instruction and advanced research on Soviet and East European policies, with emphasis on the Third World in general and Latin America, the Caribbean, and the Middle East in particular; to coordinate and promote cooperative teach- ing and training endeavors with universities in the Caribbean, Latin America, and other foreign countries; and to disseminate informa- tion and analyses among the academic, busi- ness, and policymaking communities, as well as among a wide public audience in the United States and abroad. Through its studies of specific East-West and East-South issues presented in the Institute's Occasional Papers, the Working Papers series, and ISEES Meeting Reports, the Institute sponsors dialogue and debate on key issues of national security and foreign policy. The Institute for Soviet and East European Studies works in close collaboration with the Institute of Interamerican Studies (HAS) and the Middle East Studies Institute (MESI), both of the Graduate School of Inter- national Studies. Members of the Editorial Board are: Jiri Valenta, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Institute for Soviet and East European Studies, Graduate School of Inter- national Studies, University of Miami. Chair- man of the Editorial Board. Vernon Aspaturian, Evan Pugh Professor of Political Science and Director of the Slavic and Soviet Language and Area Center, Pennsyl- vania State University. Richard Bard, Viewpoint Editor, The Miami Herald. Ralph Clem, Professor of International Rela- tions, Florida International University. Melvin Croan, Professor of Political Science, University of Wisconsin. John Cunningham, Senior Research As- sociate, Institute for Soviet and East European Studies, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Miami. Herbert J. Ellison, Chairman of Russian and East European Studies and Professor of His- tory, University of Washington. Charles Gati, Professor of Political Science, Union College and Columbia University. Jerry Hough, James B. Duke Professor of Political Science and Public Policy Studies, Duke University, and Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution. Andrzej Korbonski, Director, Center for Russian & East European Studies, Professor of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles. Anthony P. Maingot, Professor of Sociol- ogy, Florida International University. Ambassador Ambler H. Moss, Jr., Dean, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Miami. Haim Shaked, Professor of Middle East Studies and Director of the Middle East Studies Institute, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Miami. Jaime Suchlicki, Professor of History and Director of the Institute of Interamerican Studies, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Miami. Jan F. Triska, Professor of Political Science, Stanford University. Virginia Valenta, Senior Research Associate, Institute for Soviet and East European Studies, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Miami. Editorial Consultant: Richard Pipes, Frank B. Baird, Jr. Professor of History, Harvard University and former Director of East European and Soviet Affairs, National Security Council. Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 REFLECTIONS ON GORBACHEV'S POLICIES AND EAST-SOUTH RELATIONS Ambassador Vernon A. Walters Institute for Soviet and East European Studies Occasional Paper Series, Volume II, No. 4 Graduate School of International Studies University of Miami Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 ISEES Major Donor List For the academic year of 1988-1989 PATRONS ? LADY BLANKA ROSENSTIEL BENEFACTORS ? IRVING KERN ? JORGE MAS CANOSA ? NORWEGIAN AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ? TED RUBEL FRIENDS OF ISEES ? HERBERT LEBOYER ? IRVING SCHWARTZ ? ELLEN AND MENDELL SELIG Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14 : CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 A Note from the Editor Gorbachev's internal politics of perestroika and glasnost and his foreign policy dynamism?including strategic arms reduc- tion, a troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, and new initiatives vis-a-vis other regional conflicts in the Third World?call for a serious, comprehensive inquiry by U.S. policymakers and analysts. The relevancy of such discussion is heightened during this year of presidential campaign and election. In the interest of exploring these issues, the Institute for Soviet and East European Studies (ISEES) of the Graduate School of Internation- al Studies has assembled a small, select group of Miami community members prominent in the world of business, opinionmaking and education who are joined by former diplomats, such as Ambassador Ruth Lewis Farkas, Ph.D., and ISEES fellows research as- sistants and Ph.D. students. On January 8, 1988, this group, supported by Mr. Ted Rubel, Mr. Irving Kern, and Mr. Irwin Schwartz, joined together for the first in a series of ISEES luncheons to discuss "Gorbachev's reforms: Challenge or Oppor- tunity". The speaker was The Honorable Ver- non Walters, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. I believe the reader will benefit from Am- bassador Walters' insights into the importance of the Russian historical tradition on Soviet foreign policymaking as well as his intimate knowledge of East-South issues such as Soviet relations with Cuba, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and Cambodia. I was particularly struck by the relevance of Ambassador Walters' observa- tions on Cuba and U.S.-Cuban relations, mind- ful that the Ambassador has probably spent more time with Fidel Castro, than any other senior American official. Ambassador Walters' observations about Mikhail Gorbachev's per- sonal background and politics are equally fas- cinating. Ambassador Walters is one of the nation's most distinguished and respected public ser- vants, a brilliant writer, and an accomplished linguist (with perfect command of several dis- parate languages including Russian), and a leading specialist on communist affairs. His address was instructive, thought-provoking and lively, receiving wide and positive coverage in the local media. A selection of the articles reporting on his address is included here. I am delighted to bring his testimony to publication in an ISEES Occasional Paper. Sincerely, pri Valenta Director, ISEES Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 From left: Dean Ambler H. Moss, Jr., Ambassador Vernon A. Walters, Professorfirt Valenta. Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 Introduction If one tried seriously to give a decent intro- duction of Ambassador Walters, it would take most of an afternoon. It is absolutely an impossible task, because, in addition to utter fluency in several languages, one should men- tion also that he has been a top advisor, negotiator, trouble-shooter, interpreter for at least six presidents that I can name on my fingers, and perhaps even more. He actually began his career as an internationalist during World War II. Of course, the U.S. government works in very mysterious ways, and the very start of Ambassador Walters' career was in Italy during World War II, when he was sent to be liaison officer with the Portuguese detachment because they knew he spoke Spanish. They did not perceive that between Spanish and Portuguese there was some dif- ference; it actually mattered little, since Ver- non Walters learned Portuguese in about two months, and he was off and running. It has been that way ever since. Although he is a great friend of my in-laws and I have been acquainted with him for a long time, I first knew Ambassador Walters professionally when I served as ambassador to Panama. One small incident, I think, will serve to illustrate his inestimable value as a diplomat. Ambassador Ruth Farkas [former ambassador to Luxembourg] is here too, and as a former practicing diplomat, she knows what I mean by the practice of diplomacy. Ver- non Walters is really a role model of what American diplomats should be. We have a long, long way to go to get there, as we all know, and for lots of reasons. But let me tell you an example of why he is a good diplomat In March 1981, just having come back into the government, working for Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Ambassador Walters was in Chile, working his way up the hemisphere, and he was due to make a stop in Panama. I discovered that the whole top command of the Socialist International was meeting in Panama on the very day that Ambassador Walters was going to be there, and I wondered if this might ix create any diplomatic difficulties and any par- ticular problems, so I sent a message to San- tiago to notify him and to ask if he saw any problems in the coincidence of his visit with their meeting. Ambassador Walters shot right back, "absolutely not; see if you can get them together so I can meet with them." So I invited them all to a breakfast in the Em- bassy residence, and the Socialist Internation- al working the way it does, the members convened late at night, argued and wrangled and fought with each other until about five in the morning, and got a couple of hours of sleep. But, believe it or not, they all showed up for breakfast, because they were dying to meet Ambassador Walters. They were all sit- ting around the table because here was a Reagan administration appointee, and they were going to see him for the first time. They had heard about him, they knew the CIA con- nection, they knew all these things. We saw all these eyes peering around the breakfast table, and in about five minutes the crowd was with him, so to speak. I will never forget that he started off by saying, "We don't believe in military governments, because military governments are never a permanent solution, except in certain countries I won't name." And the more he spoke, the more their eyes began popping out. The audience began warming up, and my next worry was that a certain gentleman seated across the table, from a Caribbean country that I won't name, a man who, according to our intelligence files, had formally been what we know in the trade as a card carrier, was going to leap across the table and kiss him. He was so delighted with what Ambassador Walters was saying. This is the mark of a good diplomat. Without ever compromising what is important and fundamental to the interests of the United States, without ever compromising what is the policy of the administration which he serving?and he has served many?at the same time, immediately, he can establish that human contact because of the language, be- cause of knowing the culture, because of Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14 : CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 knowing the position, the shoes in which the other person stands. By knowing those things, he establishes that bond of communication which, I am sorry to say, few American diplomats are able to achieve because of an insufficient knowledge of the cultures, the lan- guages and the backgrounds of the countries with which they are dealing. That is why I say that he is a role model, and when he was named Ambassador to the United Nations, I really stood up and cheered because I can just picture him in New York, off having lunch with some ambassador from a Third World country who gets up and rants and raves against the United States, but who will go out to lunch with Ambassador Walters and be charmed, because this is what happens. Little by little, chipping away at these kinds of attitudes, over and over again, day after day, with patience, with fortitude, with good humor, with all of these things, he wins friends for the United States. He is precisely the sort of person who should teach in the school of diplomacy and bring up a whole new genera- tion of diplomats, and, if ever he retires from the government, which I earnestly hope will never be the case, I am sure that Professor Valenta and I and the people of the University of Miami will make him an offer he cannot refuse so that he will start such a school. It is my enormous pleasure and great honor to introduce the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Vernon Walters. Ambler H. Moss, Jr., Dean, Graduate School of International Studies University of Miami January 8, 1988 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 Reflections on Gorbachev's Policies Thank you very much, Ambler, Mr. Rubel, Dr. Valenta, and other distinguished guests here today. I am delighted to be here. I must tell you that what Ambler was talking about is the fact that, if you have been a general and you get into diplomacy and you don't bang your fist on the table, as they ex- pect you to do, you get several `brownie points' for it. When I got into the United Na- tions, they said that they knew the military connection and the fact that I had been deputy director of the CIA, and they said, "You know, when you did not bang your fist on the table and call everybody to attention, we thought: This is a pretty good guy." Now that is a cheap way to get to be a good guy. I also recall another story, about the difference between the diplomats and the military. Now, this story was obviously told by a businessman. He said that there is none: Both of them do nothing, but the military gets up very early in the morn- ing to do it with great discipline, and the diplomats do it late in the afternoon in utter confusion. It is false in both cases, as you know. I am happy to have this opportunity to talk a little bit about the recent summit and its impact on regional differences between the Soviet Union and the United States. Attention was focused enormously on the arms control agreement. Of course, that agreement was reached and prepared long before the summit. In fact, on the night of the White House din- ner they exchanged bound, printed copies of the treaty, each of which was about as thick as the Palm Beach phone directory. I was rather startled to see how many clauses there were in it. That captivated the attention of most people. That, in a sense, was the chief Soviet interest:obtaining an agreement on arms. Why did they want such an agreement.? Some people said that Ronald Reagan needed the agreement more than Mikhail S. Gorbachev did. Absolutely not! Ronald Reagan is guaran- 1 teed to be president of the United States until January 20, 1989. Mikhail Gorbachev will probably be there on that date, but he does not have a similar guarantee. If you look at Soviet history, you will see that, with the ex- ception of Malenkov, who was an aberration, all Soviet leaders have died in power except Khrushchev, the reformer. So I think that Gorbachev had a greater need to produce something that would be palatable to the Soviet people. I think that with the greater exchange that Khrushchev al- lowed and made possible, there was a grow- ing realization in the Soviet Union that it is not really a modern industrial state in all areas. In the area of space and the area of weaponry, it is, but in some of the other areas it is not. When I was in the Soviet Union last year, I was told this anecdote. A Soviet citizen is notified of the date on which he could take delivery of the car for which he had been paying for the last three years. So, he asks what that date is. They tell him the 7th of December of 1992, and he asks whether it will be ready in the morning or in the afternoon. They ask why he needs to know, and he says, because the plumber is coming in the morning. This anecdote illustrates the fact that the Soviets have an enormous problem in provid- ing consumer goods and services. If you travel in the Soviet Union, you will see these so-call remote installations, which are fix-it stations. They fix everything from the pressure cooker?if one is lucky enough to have one? to the automobile, to the washer, to anything else. I think that Mr. Gorbachev is aware of these deficiencies, and he feels he has to change them. However, the difficulty is to change within the basic framework of an economic system that is, theoretically, noble and altruistic, that is the socialist system, but does not work. And he has decided to try something that he has not tried before, and that is decentralization of decisions in economic areas. But he needed something to Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 establish himself. The Russians are very proud people, and they are always suspicious that foreigners look on them as barbarians. It is curious that, at about the same time that Alexis De Tocqueville wrote his book about the United States, another Frenchman, the Mar- quis de Custine, was writing an absolutely fas- cinating book about Russia. It was written in 1849, during the reign of Tsar Nicholas I. Custine described that, while in Europe there was no such thing as a passport, a traveler had to get one to go to Russia. He was taken off the ship at the fortress called Kronstadt, which is an island on the approach to St. Petersburg. There, he was asked these questions: What is the purpose of your visit to this country? Do you intend to write a book or an article about your experiences here? Do you have any letters of recommendation to people in this country? Where else do you ex- pect to travel outside of St. Petersburg? Are you on a secret mission for your country, your government or private organization? Do you intend to publish any magazine articles about your experiences in this country? When Custine finally got ashore, he decided to go to the Schlusselburg Fortress near St. Petersburg to see the tomb of Tsar Ivan VI, a young tsar who had died in suspicious circumstances about two hundred years before. So he hired a boat and he went down to Schlusselburg and when he pulled up to the dock, an officer leaned out and asked him the purpose of his visit. When he replied that he wished to see the tomb of Ivan VI, the officer asked Custine how he knew that Ivan VI was buried there. Custine showed him a guide book published in France, whereupon the of- ficer replied that Custine never should have brought that book into Russia because it con- tained classified information. In Russia, Custine witnessed the reconstruction of the Mikhailovskii cathedral, which had been badly burned in a fire. Nicholas I had ordered the rebuilding to be completed in twelve months. The work was almost finished by that deadline but there was trouble getting the frescoes on the interior walls to dry. Someone suggested that it was necessary to heat the building to fifty degrees 2 centigrade. So they heated it to that tempera- ture, which is the equivalent of 110 to 120 degrees Fahrenheit, and every now and then some of the workmen would come out of this heat and into the forty-degree-below-zero streets of St. Petersburg. Many of them would drop dead. Custine asked the master builder, "Why are you doing this?" The man looked at him and replied, "You Europeans think that we Russians are a bunch of oriental savages. We are not barbarians, we are a cultured people and we can do things just as well as you can." That inferiority complex lingers to this day. The Soviets have it with us and they have it with the Chinese: the feeling that we regard them as being the savages of the steppes. So they have a very great need to show us how good they are. And they have shown us in some areas. But they have not shown us in the area of their economy, which is a disaster. They have three times as much farm land as we do, and yet they are unable to feed a population only slightly larger than ours. It is true that they have had seventy years of 'bad harvest' or bad weather,' and not many people have experienced that kind of 'misfor- tune.' So Mr. Gorbachev decided that the Soviet Union should catch up. How does the Soviet Union go about this? For a while, the Soviets thought that they could do it through espionage, through buying, through smug- gling and other things. For example, seven years ago, they acquired the manual of a U.S. reconnaissance satellite that operated on a dif- ferent principle than the previous ones did. It took them seven years to set up a crude prototype. Retro-engineering is not easy; so they apparently have decided that the only way that technology can be acquired on a scale significant enough to change the whole economy is to lessen tension with the United States and with China. Therefore, we got the beginnings of glasnost' and perestroika. I do not know how long they will last. My guess would be somewhere between three and seven years, during which Gorbachev thinks that they will scoop up all this technology in Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 an open atmosphere of cultural exchanges, ballets, folk dances, and everything else. However, this period of openness will also affect the Soviet Union more than he thinks it will. If any of you saw those pictures of Billy Joel in Leningrad, with Soviet teenagers leap- ing up and down waving Soviet and American flags and tearing off their teeshirts, you may wonder what their reaction will be when their young Komsomol leader comes to them and says, "Now we must resolutely apply the resolutions of the Twenty-seventh Party Con- gress." Perhaps they will not be as attentive as they ought to be. We have seen this idea of having a period of lessened tension with the West materialize, and the most visible evidence of this is an arms control agreement, which would also have an impact on the Soviet economy. The Soviets are spending seventeen per cent of their gross national product on arms, out of an economy that is less than half the size of ours. We are spend- ing seven percent. Under President Kennedy, against a much weaker Soviet Union, we were spending nine per cent. What will we see from this? The first visible evidence would be the Intermediate Nuclear Forces agreement to do away with an entire weapons system, signed in Washington in December 1987. That arrangement should greatly alleviate the Soviets' financial burden because such systems are very expensive, even in a socialist state. Many people forget that the first person to suggest a zero option on theater nuclear weapons was President Reagan. They are ac- ting as though the clever Gorbachev has foisted this idea on a poor, stupid President Reagan. That isn't the way it happened. Presi- dent Reagan is the one who developed the zero-zero option, and, when he did, the Soviets absolutely refused it. They broke up the Geneva negotiations because of it. They said that if we deployed our missiles in answer to those in Europe, they would never negotiate. We deployed them, and they did negotiate. So I think that much of this talk about the wily Mikhail Gorbachev, and how he has outwitted our president, has been politically inspired. 3 Obviously, getting that treaty was the Soviets' major interest in the Washington sum- mit. We had another interest. We had an inter- est in regional problems, specifically in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Cuba, Nicaragua and other areas. These issues are more sensitive to Gorbachev, and to the internal situation that he is trying to change. You see, I think that there is general agreement among the Soviet leadership about the need for change, but there is a difference of opinion as to how far to progress and at what speed. They live al- ways in the fear that if they open the door too far, the worst of all nightmares will occur: the loss of the control of the state by the Com- munist Party, the one party. And that even- tuality they regard as a catastrophe of the first magnitude. Thus, Gorbachev knew that the arms agree- ment would go over well at home, but he may have been less sure about radical change on other sensitive issues. Soviet losses in Af- ghanistan have had on internal impact upon the Soviet Union. But the Russians are quite different from us; they will always proudly an- nounce how many losses they have incurred, and the more losses they have, the prouder they are, whereas in America the loss of even one life is a great source of disturbance to us. Sometimes we lose perspective. When I was in Vietnam, one of the young soldiers was tell- ing me what a terrible war it was, and I said, "You know, in the thirteen days of the Battle of the Bulge, we lost more men than we have lost here in five years." World War II was a dif- ferent kind of war, fought on a different scale than the Vietnam War. In Vietnam, I was out one night in a rice paddy when a helicopter came in with breakfast and I was asked whether I wanted my eggs over easy or scrambled. My experience in Vietnam was dif- ferent from anything I had experienced before. The great problem we have to contend with in the area of regional conflicts is that the prin- cipal objective in Soviet foreign policy since the immediate post-war period has been to divide us from our allies. How do they do that? They tell our allies that they are leaning on a broken reed, because the United States is a Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 paper tiger. They say, "The Americans will bug out on you as they bugged out on the Viet- namese, and that led to two million boat people; they will bug out on you as they bugged out on the Cambodians, and that led to the genocide of three million people; they will bug out on you as they bugged out on the Laotians; they will bug out on you as they bugged out on the Shah, and on Haile Selas- sie." Here is the reason why Nicaragua is so im- portant to us. It is not a question of Soviet bases in Nicaragua or anything like that. It is the fact that, if it is proven that the United States is unable to prevent the establishment of a Soviet-client state a thousand miles from Houston or Miami, the Soviets will be in a splendid position to go to our allies like the West Germans or the Japanese and say, "Why don't you accommodate us while there is still time?" And that is why, for us, Nicaragua is not a regional problem, it is a problem of global proportions in which the credibility of the United States is at stake. Afghanistan has been the source of great disturbance to the Soviets in the United Na- tions, where I work. Normally, they whip their so-called nonaligned friends together, and eighty-two percent of the time, these non- aligned states vote with the Soviet Union. In fact, it is quite interesting to recall that there are nineteen members of the United Na- tions?including Angola, Algeria, and India? that vote against the United States more often than the Soviet Union does. However, the fact is that Afghanistan has poisoned the Soviets' relationship with forty-four Muslim countries and, in fact, each year since I have been there, we have had a much larger majority voting to condemn their occupation of Afghanistan. This year, it was something like 124 to nineteen. Nineteen represents the hard-core Soviet bloc. I think that the Soviets made a political decision that this is one of the areas in which there must be movement. However, I must confess that I was a little disappointed that not much of this aspect was emphasized in the immediate aftermath of the summit; but, in my opinion at least, clearly there had been understandings reached that the Soviet Union 4 and the United States would work further on the solution of these matters. Now the Soviets have begun to leave Af- ghanistan. For the first time, they have ap- parently have given up the goal of establishing a government of national reconciliation around Mr. Najibullah [President of Afghanis- tan], who has been their puppet. That idea is a little bit like asking the French, after World War II, to form a government of national reconciliation around Pierre Laval. The idea did not have a bright future, and they seem discreetly to have prepared to drop it. Now, the problem is, what will they do about their friends? One of the young Soviets asked me about this question at the United Nations, and I said, "Well, I would charter seven or eight 747s, and take them all with you when you leave." But they cannot do that; it is not enough. They have thirty thousand people in the Afghan secret service that they will have to do something about. The Soviets do have some excuses to justify their withdrawal. Originally, they said that they went into Afghanistan to foil the evil machinations of the United States, which was attempting to convert Afghanistan into a base. An agreement on a neutral Afghanistan, belonging to no bloc, with its own armed for- ces and without the military presence of any other people, can permit the Soviets to withdraw and still claim victory, and they could pretty much sell that to Soviet public opinion. I remember that, when I was in the Soviet Union recently, a Soviet deputy foreign minister said tome, "You must understand that now, with glasnost', we also have a press problem." I said, "You do? Well, when Pravda writes an editorial with a headline saying 'The Soviet Government Is Wrong,' as one ap- peared in a prominent New York newspaper not long ago about the U.S. government, I will begin to believe that you have some of the same problems that we do." Under the Brezhnev Doctrine, the chief Soviet interest was to make sure that no com- munist regime was removed once it had achieved power. In fact, there was only one such reversal of which I know, when the Romanian army invaded Hungary in 1921 and Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 ejected the government of Bela Kun. The Soviets want to give an impression of irre- versibility to the establishment of communist governments. Therefore, I watch what is hap- pening in Nicaragua with hope, hope that we will see a miracle because I know of no case in which a Marxist-Leninist regime has ever decommunized itself, or really accepted either the sharing of power with any other non-com- munist group or?the ultimate heresy?alter- nation in power. I watch with some interest but I am not very optimistic that we will see this development; if we do, it certainly will be a first. The one thing that was made clear to the Soviets at the summit was our interest in these areas, and the message was conveyed that what happens in Afghanistan, in Cam- bodia, in Nicaragua, in Cuba and elsewhere is important to the overall context of the Soviet- American relationship. Now, the Soviets have been slow to digest that message, but I think that it is beginning to sink in, and I think that what we have seen in Afghanistan is the first fruit. In the case of Cuba, as you know, the Soviets have always refused Castro what he most wanted, which was a defense treaty, and they have not given it to the Nicaraguans either. How much ballast the Soviet Union is prepared to let off now, I do not know. In Af- ghanistan, we have seen what seems to be a fairly major step, because it will not only remove them from there, but also destroy the myth that a communist government, once es- tablished, can never be removed. As we look at the world, we see that the authoritarian, right-wing, personalistic dictatorships have all been replaced by democracies. However, the collegial types of dictatorship, supported by huge single parties, have not yet been replaced anywhere of which I know. So this withdrawal will be a very important event. I think that the Soviet people have a greater understanding of what is happening in the world around them than they have had before. For example, I was talking to one of my Soviet colleagues the other day, and we were discussing the war between Iran and Iraq. He said, "I suppose that, when this war is over, you will say," and he slipped into Arabic, "Glory to Allah." I replied, "No, per- 5 sonally I will say," and I slipped into Russian, "Our Father Who art in Heaven, hallowed be Thy Name..." When I did so, he picked me up and went right on to the end. I looked at him in mock astonishment and said, "So you know that prayer?" He responded quickly, "General, everybody in Russia knows that prayer!!" On my latest trip to the Soviet Union, I went out to Zagorsk Monastery, where I had lunch with the archbishop. We ate caviar and drank vodka. That occasion was the first time I had seen vodka at any Soviet establishment in a long time, and I said to the archbishop, "Ah, here you have vodka." He said, "This is the Church, not the State." He added, "You know, the Church needs the State, but there are also times when the State needs the Church." I said, "Do you mean, for instance, during the war, when millions were dying, and Holy Mother Russia became important?" He said, "Like during the war when millions were dying, and Holy Mother Russia became important." There is in the fiber of the Soviet people a deep sense of patriotism, and it is important in our rela- tions with them that we do not seem to be trying to humiliate them or bleed them. At the United Nations, I have said to them many times, "We are not trying to bleed you or humiliate you, we just want you to get out and let the Afghan people choose whatever government they want." And that is our policy not only in Afghanistan, but elsewhere as well: in Ethiopia where there is a Soviet Brigade, and in Cuba where there is a Soviet brigade. In Nicaragua there is no Soviet Brigade, but there is a regular zoo of Libyans, PLO and other odd characters assembled there. I walked out on Mr. Ortega when he was at the United Nations in September 1987, an ac- tion for which I was criticized harshly by The New York Times and by The Boston Globe. They are not aware that, in the United Nations, an ambassador has the right to reply to any speaker except a chief of state. Therefore, when Mr. Ortega criticized the United States and its policies, it did not bother me. When he criticized the U.S. government, that did not bother me, either. However, when he said that Ronald Reagan was responsible for the deaths of 42,000 Nicaraguans, had destroyed the Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 people of Grenada, and was a senile old fool who did not know what he was reading at his desk, I simply did not feel like I could stay there. So, I got up and I walked out. 713e Boston Globe chided me, saying that I should steady my nerves. I resisted the temptation to tell them that my nerves had seen me through four wars, and that I thought they should steady theirs instead, but I did not send that telegram. I regret it now, but it is a little too late to do anything about it. I think it is an interesting time for us because we are going to have a lot more of this atmos- phere of peace, love, flowers, honey, milk, and cultural exchanges, and, as Kipling said, "The bear is most dangerous when he is hug- ging you." I think that we would be well-ad- vised to remember that saying. It is a time that is going to require extreme vigilance on our part. Yet it is a time of great opportunity for us, an opportunity to make the Soviets under- stand that there is a life other than the one they have been living; that they can have a better life; and that they can live with more freedom without the loss of their national rights, or their national interests, or anything else. For in- stance, when we get into this question of human rights, they say that that is an internal affair. It is not an internal affair. The Soviet Union signed the Helsinki convention, as the United States did, and that agreement went into these issues in very specific detail. It is our affair and we intend to pursue it, just as we in- tend, next month in Geneva, to pursue the resolution on human rights in Cuba. One hears a great deal about Chile. Chile is a military dictatorship that has the same popula- tion as Cuba. Last year, there were two thousand Chileans and fifteen million Cubans in exile, and to repeat my famous phrase?I don't know whether it is really famous, 'al- though I hear it come back to me now and then?no one has really given Castro credit for his greatest achievement, making Cuba the largest country in the world: the administra- tion is in Havana, the government is in Mos- cow, the army is in Africa, and the population is in Florida and we welcome them. Granma [the official newspaper of the Cuban Com- munist Party] has just reported that there are 6 now forty thousand Cuban troops in Angola. Cuba has about one-twentieth of the popula- tion of the United States, and so their military presence in Angola is the equivalent of the United States having 800,000 troops some- where. That is a rather large commitment, about twice as large as the United States' in- volvement in Vietnam. So, we intend to pursue these regional items, getting the Soviets out of Afghanistan, getting the Vietnamese out of Cambodia, ef- fecting some basic change in the archaic way in which the Cuban government handles human rights. The whole of Central America is now governed by democracies, and now only Nicaragua is moving further into the grip of a dictatorship. I devoutly hope that Mr. Arias's plan works, but, as I say, I have yet to see a Marxist-Leninist regime decommunize itself. Maybe we will yet see that miracle. I hope so. It is vital that we continue to make the Soviets understand that all of these matters have a very, very great impact on the overall shape of Soviet-American relations. And I think that they do understand that now. We spoke about that in great detail to them while they were here. I cannot tell you exactly how big a price they are prepared to pay for this atmosphere of peace, love, honey, butter and sugar, and only constant pressure will bring this about. If we want to get real results, we must persuade them fairly skillfully, and in a way that does not humiliate them. They have been coopera- tive for the first time in the Iran-Iraq war. Last February, they seemed very upset by the pos- sibility that Basra might fall. After all, in the nineteenth century, Russia took an awful lot of territory from Iran, including the Baku oil fields, Bokara and Samarkand, and other areas. The idea of Iran, fifty million people tri- umphant, placing territorial demands on the Soviet Union, is not something to which the Soviets are looking forward. Thus, they have become more cooperative. I went to both Moscow and Beijing and obtained a promise of a vote in favor of the resolution calling for the cessation of hostilities in the Iran-Iraq war, and the promise, from both of them, that they would vote for the enforcement actions Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 foreseen in Article 7 of the United Nations Charter if one or both parties did not accept that resolution. At present, Iraq has accepted it and Iran has not, and we are moving to the time when we have to call in these promises, and see whether they are serious and whether they will live up to their agreement to vote for enforcement actions. For the first time, the United Nations has had a serious opportunity to do what it was created to do, put an end to war. It is important to understand, however, that if we have an ability to influence the Soviet Union, it is because in the years since Mr. Reagan came to power, we have created a dif- ferent military balance than the one he found when he came to Washington. Then, we were in a state of provocative weakness, which is the greatest of all dangers. I do not think that the Soviets intended to start a war, but if it looked so easy, they might have been tempted in that direction. That is no longer the case, and now, we have a real opportunity to pick up this challenge between the two systems and the two ways of life. In this atmosphere of greater interchange, we have the opportunity to show the Russian people what it is like to live without the system to which they are ac- customed. The video cassette has been very helpful, illustrating that it is very difficult to prevent the infiltration of information. Many things are mitigating in our favor and I think we should not underestimate them. I think that the Soviets are moving in many areas. For instance, they want to improve rela- tions with China, which is why I believe that they will eventually get out of Vietnam. They know that the Vietnamese occupation of Cam- bodia is an outrage to the Chinese. Moreover, now that they have built a second trans- Siberan railway 300 miles north of the old one, it will not be difficult for the Soviets to move some of those fifty-odd divisions along the Chinese border further back into the Soviet Union. The third obstacle to the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations has been Afghanistan; as we have seen, the Soviets will be moving on that one. It is a time of great challenge for us, a time when we can either make terrible mistakes 7 and sustain further losses, or create extraordi- nary opportunities to go forward. It was my interesting job to sit next to Mrs. Gorbachev at the White House State Dinner because I was one of the few people in the Cabinet who spoke some Russian. I had always been very interested in knowing whether her husband had stayed in his native town of Stavropol when the Germans occupied it during World War II, and no one had been able to tell me. I asked her, and she said that he did remain in Stavropol, but he was hidden in the house of friends. I then asked her where she met him, and she replied that she met him at Lomonosov University in Moscow, to which they had both been admitted without entrance examinations. I asked her how they both managed to avoid that requirement, and she said that he had won the silver medal in his high school and she had won the gold medal in her high school. I replied that I did not know that anyone had ever outdone the General Secretary, and she replied that she received the higher award because she agreed to study German, and he didn't. These kinds of conversations are refresh- ingly novel, and reflective of the opportunities and challenges presented to the United States by the new leadership. I hope that we will be able to meet them with some degree of unity, typified by the old saying that "partisanship stops at the water's edge." It would be well if each party does not perceive this situation as an opportunity to make 'brownie points' against the other party. The greatest problem that we have in the United Nations is American credibility, and the ability of the United States to stick with a decision once it has been made. I don't know whether it is true, but I have been told that someone once said that it is very dif- ficult to deal with the Americans, because one has to deal with three governments: the presi- dent who wants to do something, the Con- gress, which does not want him to do it, and the Supreme Court, which wonders whether the whole thing is unconstitutional. Therefore, we have a credibility problem, which is why I hope that the INF treaty is ratified. Failure to do so will aggravate that problem. It has been said that the West Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 European governments are uneasy, but those states, without exception, endorsed the decision to sign that agreement. We kept peace in Europe for forty years before any of those theater missiles were deployed. However, at some point there has to be a balance between the conventional forces deployed there. There remain some 140 War- saw Pact divisions facing forty-four NATO divisions, 45,000 tanks facing 18,000 tanks, 6,000 first-line aircraft facing 3,000 first-line 8 aircraft. Creating a balance here is going to re- quire a lot of will and ability. Unfortunately, in our country there are two tragic disasters: too few people study languages and too few people study history. If you don't know where you have been or where you are, it becomes very difficult to know where you are going. Thank you very much. Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 Questions You spoke earlier about the consequences of "glasnost" and 'perestroika" extending beyond those intended by Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership. Would you elaborate on that point and on the question of what, if any- thing, the United States can or should do to facilitate Gorbachev's leadership and in- crease the chances of success of those cam- paigns? Well, the first story I told, about the Mik- hailovskii cathedral, was intended to show the continuity in Russian life. There are political changes, but there is a certain continuity. I have always wondered why the statue of Nicholas I, who was one of the most autocratic of all the tsars, and who sent Alexander Her- zen into exile, was never torn down by the Bolsheviks. Later, when I heard that he was the author of the statement, "Where once the Russian flag is flown, it will never be hauled down," the reason suddenly dawned on me: Nicholas was their kind of guy. I think the Soviet Union will change large- ly as a result of outside contacts, but I also think that there is considerable resistance within the system. I personally think that Gor- bachev has about an even chance to win the day. There will be changes, from the contact with the West and its open societies. There is now some freer discussion in the Soviet press, and there will be more. Religious tolerance is an area that is very difficult, and I think that this question of human rights is important if we want to bring the standards of Jewish emigration up to levels close to those under Khrushchev, which hit 79,000 in one year. Last year there were 7,000 Jewish emigres, which is better than the year before; but that number is still very small. We do have an opportunity to influence them. I notice that the Poles have stopped jam- ming the Voice of America. One of our difficul- ties is that, for better or worse, through patriotism, schooling, the media, and other factors, probably a majority of the Soviet people have come to regard their government 9 as legitimate. I do not think that that is true in any of the satellite countries, which makes glasnost so much more difficult. There, if you open the door, the plunge through that door is going to be much greater. If one reads the discussions of people like the East Germans, one notes a marked coolness to the whole business. An old story illustrates the reason: Two East German border guards are walking along the side of the Berlin wall. One says to the other, "What are you thinking? The other says, "I am thinking the same thing you are." The first replies, "In that case, I arrest you for treason to the German Democratic Republic." So openness is more of a problem in the satel- lites than it is at home, in the Soviet Union. How can we affect the course of reform? The first and most important thing that we must not do is drown the Soviets in American holy water, and if anybody thinks that Time's choosing Gorbachev as its 'Man of the Year' is going to help the situation, he is mistaken. To be sure, it is going to help him with some Soviet citizens to whom it will be a matter of national pride, but I am not sure how much good it will do for Americans to think that he is such a great guy. Actually, we have to be very prudent about how we exert influence in this matter. We have got to work carefully at it, weighing the facts regarding the most ad- vantageous moves on our part. We must be realistic, and keep in mind that the millennium has not arrived, and that peace is not guaran- teed for all eternity, simply because Gor- bachev is here. In Russia, nothing is guaranteed for all eternity. So it is going to re- quire a lot of statesmanship on our part, and I mean bipartisan statesmanship. We must rebuild the old bipartisan foreign policy, of which the NATO alliance is the only remain- ing fragment. We must be careful not to give the impression that we are a state that is in- capable of having a central government that makes decisions. Any country with 535 secretaries of state?that's often the way con- gress acts? is in big trouble. We have got to try to present a face toward them which is the Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14 : CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 face of all the American people, the last, the biggest and the strongest defender of freedom. I could not venture right now an exact policy; that is something that should be studied very carefully, and when that study is ready it should be brought to the attention of the policymakers. Do you see a new era of detente, similar to the one that followed the Vietnam conflict, as a possible evolution of Soviet-American rela- tions in the near future? If so, what will change in the two superpowers' relations with the People's Republic of China? First of all, the previous period of detente did not come after the Vietnam War; it came during the Vietnam War. At the very time when Mr. Nixon decided to resume the bombing of Hanoi and the mining of the harbor of Haiphong, the Soviets renewed the invitation to Mr. Nixon to come to Moscow. The Soviets understand the kind of language that Nixon was speaking. If a new period of detente arises, it will depend on whether the Soviets really want this peace in order to improve the living stand- ard of their own people. After all, they have the largest country in the world and unlimited resources, and they should be living better than anybody else. As I have said, the present is a time requiring great prudence on our part. With regard to the superpowers' relation- ship to the People's Republic of China, I don't think that very much is going to change. I think that the U.S. government is intelligent enough to realize that China is not a card we can play against the Soviet Union or the Soviet Union against China. In fact, China has more people than the United States and the Soviet Union put together by a factor of two. Nor do I think that the Chinese strategy will greatly change. There is an old Chinese proverb: "Against the Far Barbarians, use the Near Bar- barians; against the Near Barbarians, use the Far Barbarians." The Chinese certainly will welcome the evacuation of the Soviets from Afghanistan, they will be delighted with the removal of the Vietnamese from Cambodia, and they will not be displeased by the limited withdrawal of the Soviet forces in the Far East. 10 But you will notice that in the intermediate range missile negotiations it was we who in- sisted that none of these weapons would be redeployed to the Far East, and that the whole series of weapons was to be destroyed. At the beginning, the Soviets offered to take them out of Europe and leave one hundred in East Asia, an indication of their continued wariness regarding China. We said no, the whole sys- tem must go. Gorbachev has advocated 'perestroika 'f? restructuring?for the Soviet economy. The Soviets also have a plan for international 'perestroika", which they refer to as a System for Comprehensive International Security. Is the Soviet proposal winning any support in the United Nations? Also, how does the U.S. boycott of this past summer's United Nations Conference on Disarmament and Develop- ment help us to meet this Soviet challenge? I think that the United States regards the United Nations Charter as providing all the facilities necessary to both of those projects. We are trying to get a reduction in the UN budget and reform and we don't see the need to set up new structures within the United Na- tions requiring more people and more money when the UN charter already provides all the means for discussing these things. In fact, we have a meeting of the Disarmament Commit- tee very soon, and we just don't want to see duplication of effort within the United Na- tions. But is the Soviet program winning any sup- port? Well, the United States doesn't have much support internationally, because if one acts against the United States it rarely retaliates. If one does something against the Soviet Union, one's life may become more unpleasant. When we bombed Libya, all of the Arab countries banded together and denounced us with the other so-called "nonaligned" countries?I don't believe they are non- aligned?to condemn us. Later, nearly all of the same diplomats came by my office to con- gratulate me for what the United States had done. There are really two standards at the Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 UN, the public standard and the private stand- ard. As a matter of fact, that action was great- ly criticized within the United States. But the fact is that it bombed Mr. Qadaffi out of the ter- rorist business. Other people are running it now. He has been very, very quiet since then. Isn't a United States strategy of "being tough" with the Soviet Union a counterproductive approach, both in the sense that it is a condescending effort to im- pose conditions on Soviet behavior, and like- ly to lead to a conservative backlash? That's a good question. As you know, there is a Soviet law that deals with criticism of the government, calling it anti-Soviet activity and providing that offenders go to jail for it. It's hard to say whether increased scrutiny from foreigners, as part of this new atmosphere, will lead to a change in this. The best way we can encourage change is not to try to do it publicly, and outdo the Soviets in debates, but rather, in private talks with them. Occasional- ly, I talk to the Soviet military in that way. One of them recently said to me, "I am so tired of being asked 'what are you going to do about Afghanistan?' or 'what are you going to do about Cam Ranh Bay?' or -'what are you going to do about the Gulf war?" Another said to me, "I am up to here with these little regional wars." So I think the best policy we can adopt here is one that is not terribly visible. The more the Soviets get out into the rest of the world, the better it will be, because they will see how other people live. You know, they talk to us about our home- less and our other domestic problems. But the unemployment benefit in the United States is higher than the minimum wage of the Soviet worker and will buy a hell of a lot more. If you were to get involved in an open hassle with them, and were to use that fact acrimonious- ly, you would humiliate them. I think you have to say it in a gentle way. Many of them did not select this system, they were born into it; and there is a growing understanding that it doesn't work, or it doesn't work as well it should. If the Soviet Union were not the big- gest country in the world with the greatest resources in the world, it would be a colossal 11 disaster. It is a disaster anyway, and it is that disaster and the knowledge of it that has moved a large group of the Politburo to sup- port the new policies. So it is again a question of how to do it in the right way. That needs a lot of study, a lot of care and a lot of knowledge of Russian and Soviet history and culture. Unfortunately, opportunities for such study are not as abundant as they should be in this country. That is why what Professor Valenta is doing here is extraordinarily important. You cannot deal with a people if you do not under- stand their language, their history, or the things that are important to them. If you un- derstand those things, you have an extraordi- nary ability to reach them on a personal level. A high-ranking Soviet official based in New York called me up the other day to wish me a happy birthday. That would not have hap- pened a couple of years ago. You spoke earlier about NATO as the last remainingfragment of the foreign policy con- sensus formed by the Western democracies after World War II. I would say that that isper- haps a too-generous assessment of the relationship between the United States and its West European allies, who seem more ap- preciative of US. protection than they are of their own obligations. Would you care to com- ment on this assessment? To be sure, our allies have differed with us, but that is the difference between allies and satellites. Allies often differ with one another, and besides, they are 6,000 miles closer to the problem than we are. During the 'sixties and 'seventies, all the Europeans said to us, "Get out of Vietnam!! Get out of Vietnam!!" When we got out of Vietnam, they said, "My God, you were bad, how can we trust you anymore?" You know, with our European al- lies, we have two problems. If we show any flexibility with the Soviet Union they say, "My God! This is another Yalta, they are going to sell us out;" if we show any firmness, they say, "The mad cowboys are going to set off World War III." The other problem is that they are al- ways telling us, "You know, you Americans really have no sense of historic perspective Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 like we older nations do." To that, I always respond, "Yes, and when you older nations with great perspective were running the world, between World War I and World War II, you gave us twenty-one years of peace. Since we naive, credulous stumble-bum Americans have participated, we have had forty-two years of peace." The fact that there are differences in the al- liance is perfectly normal. For instance, there are a number of countries that have painted themselves into a position of support for the Sandinistas when they thought that the government of Nicaragua was really a democratic regime, and now it is a difficult thing for them to recant. Armando Valladares' wife went to see a prominent Swedish official, and she said to him, "You understand that Cuba is no paradise," to which he replied, "All Europeans know that Cuba is no paradise. "She said to him, "Well, why don't you say so?" "Oh!" he said, "That would help the Americans." Again, there is a little bit of this David and Goliath nonsense: Nicaraguans are being persecuted by the big, bad United States. There is also political involvement. The majority of the Democratic Party in our country opposes aid to the Contras, and it is perceived abroad that, if the Americans are divided on this issue, it is safe to take a posi- tion against the U.S. government. The totalitarian regime is capable of performing aerodynamically impossible turns. You know that for three years after Hitler came to power the German air force was still training in Rus- sia. Is that the reason why the FSLN has been successful in portraying Itself as a nationalist revolution with socialist overtones? Not really. Everybody that knows the FSLN government also knows that it is a communist regime. But it isn't presented like that in the media, and for saying so, one is likely to get into trouble with the media. That's a fact. There is the opinion that the authoritarian aspect of the FSLN regime, and its reliance upon the Soviet Union, are the results of pres- 12 sure by the United States. Would you care to comment? Well, the United States tried everything not to pressure the FSLN. We received the coman- dantes in the White House, we gave them 289 million dollars in aid in the first three years that they were in power, and we did everything we could to help them. We may be still the largest donors in economic aid. The idea that we pushed them into the arms of the Soviets is nonsensical. We didn't. That is where they in- tended to go from the beginning. You know, the 289 million dollars that we gave them in three years is twice as much as we gave Somoza in the preceding fifteen years. The idea that we pushed them into the arms of the other side is ludicrous. I once asked Fidel Castro if we pushed him into the arms of the Soviets. He emphatically denied this, claiming that no one pushed him anywhere. Yet some of us keep up this fiction with Nicaragua, that it was a cruel, harsh Reagan administration that drove these fine, upstanding democrats into the arms of the Soviet Union. To me, that is putting party interest before the national in- terest. What will be the outcome of the vote next month on the U.S.-sponsored U.N. resolution regarding Cuba's violations of human rights? I certainly hope that we will be successful. We have tried this kind of thing before, and a number of countries had various stories about how their delegations did not get the right message, and so forth. This year we are making it plain. You know, I told the United Nations in October that we were going to bring this up in February, and yet a number of Latin countries said, "Oh, we were taken by surprise; we did not know that the Americans were going to bring this up. They suddenly rushed this onto the agenda." We did not rush anything onto the agenda. They had several months' notice, and, this time, it will be har- der to use that kind of excuse. This time, we will see who will stand up on behalf of the silent prisoners in Cuba and who won't. It has been noted that the Cuban govern- ment is quite reluctant to adopt any of the Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 Gorbachev-style reforms, and that the Soviet Union is reevaluating its financial commit- ments to its Third World allies. Do these two facts provide any clues at all to the future course of Soviet-Cuban relations? Well, I know that the Vice President of Cuba wrote an article saying that glasnost and perestroika were not for use in Cuba. We shall see some difference there, but I think that Castro has always found it difficult to take direction from elsewhere, and so it will be in- teresting to watch that. If the Soviets are will- ing to throw Najibullah overboard, there may be some hope that they may be willing to throw Castro overboard. Three billion dollars a year is a lot of money in anybody's counting, even in rubles. Is there room there for a warming of rela- tions between Cuba and the United States? Perhaps, but I am inclined to be pessimistic about that development. We've got diplomatic relations with Nicaragua, but we don't have diplomatic relations with Cuba. In the United Nations, the Cuban ambassador hardly ever talks to me. In view of your experience with Cuban af- fairs, I was sulprised to read in The Miami Herald that you were not consulted in regard to the US. government's recent negotiations with Cuba on the issue of emigration from that country. Can you say anything about this.? To be sure, in a bureaucracy as big as ours, that happens. For instance, I often find that im- portant telegrams are not slugged "U.S.-U.N.," but the fact that we are not in Washington makes it somewhat understandable. An occur- ? rence like this is an exceptional and not a habitual thing, and I do not want to belabor it. I was asked specifically if! had known about it, and I said I hadn't. That is the only reason I brought it up. I do not want to continue. I do not think it is a live issue. I think I made my point and I do not think they will forget about me easily the next time. 13 Has the United States made any kind offor- mal reaction, or specific plans, regarding Castro's statements on migration of Cuban nationals? Well, our position is well known. We have taken more Cuban emigres than anybody else. We would like to see a situation where there would be no requirements for emigres, and those emigres could go home without fear for their lives, their safety, or their property. We would also like to see guarantees of rights of opposition, so that the Cuban people would have a choice in determining what kind of government they wanted. You know, any country from which fifteen per cent of the population has fled, especially when it's an is- land and it is difficult to leave, has a serious problem with its people. We would like to see that pressure taken off, and the Cuban people, like most of the other people in the Americas, given a chance to decide who they want to rule them, and not have one ruler imposed on them indefinitely. Of course, if you look around you here you will see that the Cubans in Florida have added greatly to our culture, to our life, to our busi- ness and everything else. And it is just not the American position to turn the back on people who are fleeing for their lives. So we ought to maintain our policy of welcoming the victims of oppression. We don't welcome all victims of oppression. The Haitians come to mind as an example of an exception. Well, we let more people in than anyone else. I always tell my Soviet colleagues that their problem is how to keep their people from getting out; ours is how to prevent the millions who want to come in from coming in. After all, last year the United States amnestied twelve million immigrants, more than the whole population of Cuba. What are the Soviets' expectations regard- ing the outcome of the Iran-Iraq war? I cannot think for the Soviets, and it would not be fair for me to express a Soviet point of view. Let me put it this way: they would be Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14 : CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 more alarmed by an Iranian victory than an Iraqi victory, since Iran has territorial claims on them. Mr. Gorbachev has been in power since 1985, and there are the same number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan as before; the Soviets are still supporting one-party states or movements in Africa; the Syrians were recent- ly furnished with two million dollars worth of Soviet arms; and the flow of oil and arms to Nicaragua continues. Given these con- tinuities, on what grounds is your confidence regarding change based? If I radiated confidence to you, you misunderstood what I said. I said that it is a possibility. I do not have any confidence. I was the one who said they have been capable of having British and French military talks in one room while signing a pact with Hitler in the other. So if I gave you the impression that I have great confidence in them, I misspoke. I know who they are. I know what they are doing. I have been in Syria, and I've seen the Soviet equipment there. But there may come a point when they figure that a different policy is to their greater advantage. One of the primary measures is Jewish emmigration. Brezhnev let 79,000 people out in one year. Gorbachev let 7,000 out last year. Now, they understand that this a matter of vital interest to us and that, unless their performance is better, they are not going to get further at bewitching us. And we know what they are doing in Nicaragua. We know what they are doing else- where, and, in fact, we have publicized it. What safeguards is our new Secretary of Commerce adopting to ensure that technology transfer remains consistent with US. nation- al security interests? I am not familiar enough with Mr. Verity; he has only been a member of the Cabinet a short time. There does exist, however, a NATO- wide organization called COCOM [Coordinat- ing Committee on Export Controls], which selects very carefully what technology can be passed and what technology cannot be, and we are founding members of COCOM. I think that Gorbachev will continue to try to obtain 14 high-level military technology through the same means as before. What we have to en- sure is that the other kinds of technology do not go out in a completely uncontrolled fashion. In fact, we have had very serious problems with some of our allies like Norway and Japan on this issue and we have made them feel our displeasure, economically as well as verbally. Will the verification procedures stipulated in the INF Treaty really enable the United States to monitor Soviet commitment to the treaty? We will have verification groups inside the Soviet Union at the factories where these things are built, and that is a degree of access that no one else has ever had before. They will have access to us, but, then again, they have had access all along. In the treaty, there are large chapters on verification, and as Mr. Reagan said to Mr. Gorbachev, "Trust, but verify." You know, the idea that we do not under- stand who these people are is ridiculous; we do understand them. We want to see if we can change them more than they can change us, and it should be easier in the near future. Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 For the Record "Miami: Exciting Hub of Foreign-affairs Studies" Carlos Verdecia Viewpoints, Editorial Board The Miami Herald January 14, 1988 Vernon Walters, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, came to Miami last week and spoke his mind on every international topic under the sun. He blasted Fidel Castro's human-rights record; expressed skepticism about Daniel Ortega's "democratization"; questioned Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika, and celebrated Moammar Gadhafi's silence since the U.S. air raid on Tripoli. The diplomat's sharp, polyglot tongue spoke at ease; his gigantic international persona seemed right at home. And at home he was. Honored in a lunch- eon by the University of Miami's Institute for Soviet and East European Studies (ISEES), Walters spoke on "Summit HI: Implications for Cuba and Nicaragua." As he spoke and answered questions, it became clear that per- haps no other U.S. city could have welcomed Walters with an audience as alert and inter- ested in his topic as Miami. Dr. jiri Valenta, director of ISEES, knows this. He smiles impishly when people run to share their discovery of what an ideal place for foreign-affairs academia our international city is. "Miami is favored by its multiracial and mul- tinational environment," says Dr. Valenta. "Our students represent Miami's unique melt- ing pot, which has a great deal to offer in in- creasing understanding of the tensions and conflicts among countries and their political and ethnic groups." The ISEES functions under the aegis of the Graduate School of International Studies (GSIS). Eight of its 15 students have published books or articles on carefully researched inter- national topics. To expand his student body, 15 Dr. Valenta is appealing to local private groups and institutions for help with fellowship funds. We receive from prestigious national foun- dations of different political persuasions, and from the U.S. Government, help which we use to publish influential books and essays and or- ganize international conferences." Dr. Valenta says. "It's the fellowships that we're trying to increase." The ISEES was created in October 1986. Ambassador Ambler Moss, GSIS dean, an- nounced it on the occasion of Zbigniew Brzezinski's lecture on "Game Plan: How to Conduct the U.S.-Soviet Contest." In little over a year, the ISEES has held seminars and con- ferences whose participants could well make the pages of a foreign-policy Who's Who. Three months ago, the ISEES sponsored a one-day conference on "Soviet Policies in Af- ghanistan and Iran." High-ranking U.S. military officers and two Afghan mujahedeen rebels participated. The specialized institute couldn't have been place in more-expert hands. Jiri Valenta ranks among the more-respected "Sovietologists" in the United States. A member of the Council on Foreign Relations?a selective intellectual club of foreign-affairs specialists?Dr. Valenta is frequently consulted by Washington policy makers on issues ranging from Eastern Europe to Central America. His books include Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968: Anatomy of a Decision; Grenada and Soviet- Cuban Policy; and Conflict in Nicaragua: A Multidimensional Perspective. His wife, Vir- ginia, coauthors some of his work. Under Valenta's direction, the ISEES focuses on what he calls "East-South issues," which relate to Soviet-bloc involvement in Third World countries. "Most universities concentrate on plain East-West issues, such as arms-control and other security matters," Valenta says. "They neglect the East-South relationships, forget- ting that the use of Soviet force in Latin America, Africa, and Asia can seriously jeop- ardize U.S.-Soviet relations." One of Valenta's more-pressing priorities these days is to watch changes inside the Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 Soviet Union and the repercussions of Mikhail Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika in Cuba and Nicaragua. The ISEES is privileged to do this research work in a city such as Miami. We Miamians are even more privileged?and should be proud to be the site of such excel- lent, high-level academic accomplishment. "A good word for glasnost, there and here" Louis Salome Editorial Page Editor The Miami News January 11, 1988 They don't come more real than Vernon Walters. A burly, florid man who can tell spy stories in eight languages, Walters is tailored for the larger-than-life role he has played in the cellars, attics and front rooms of U.S. military intelligence and diplomatic his- tory for 47 years. Before being named the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations almost three years ago, Walters was ambassador-at-large under Presi- dent Reagan, senior adviser to Secretary of State Alexander Haig, deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency from 1972 until 1976, and from 1941 until 1976 he served in the U.S. Army, retiring as a lieutenant general. Walters didn't learn eight languages for nothing. He talks a lot, although like all good intelligence officers and diplomats, he doesn't always say a lot. When the opportunity came last Friday to hear Walters speak at a luncheon sponsored by the University of Miami's Institute for Soviet and East European Studies, I showed up hungry in many respects. I had interviewed Walters on a television show previously, but that format is more structured than revealing. In a freewheeling speech, Walters proved that if anyone talks enough, the implications are broader than the words themselves. Walters said the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev would change largely as a result of 16 the broader contacts the people would have with the outside world. True enough. But the flip side of that state- ment applies to Americans, and it is just as im- portant. The United States will change, too, largely as a result of the contacts Americans have with Soviets and other peoples. Walters noted that too few Americans study languages and history: "If you don't know where you've been, how are you going to know where you're going?" Americans are actually afraid of learning other languages, even afraid of people who know them. And we don't teach history anymore, we teach civics, which is what we used to teach to kids who supposedly couldn't learn history. What geography most of us know centers around how to get from Miami to Fort Lauderdale on 1-95. Walters' comment touches on a deeper problem. While the rest of the world is learn- ing more about us all the time, Americans are becoming more insular. We know even less about the history of other countries than we know about our own. That ignorance is show- ing up in industry, trade, marketing and in- genuity. "Fervent anti-communist" is Walters' mid- dle name. Yet his fervor is tempered by reality when he discusses the changes occurring in the Soviet Union under Gorbachev and glas- nost. "I personally think he (Gorbachev) has a better than even chance of winning the day," Walters said. He also noted that Nikita Khrush- chev, another reformer, is the only Soviet leader who did not die in office. The Soviets generally agree with glasnost and perestroika, or economic restructuring, he said, and the only debate concerns how far the reforms go and at what speed they occur. "I don't know how long it will last," he added. "I expect he (Gorbachev) wants it to last three to seven years." The most critical aspect of glasnost is not so much what the Soviet leaders are willing to give, but what the Soviet people try to take as the lid is lifted. Walters believes the reforms will affect the Soviet Union more than Gor- bachev thinks they will. Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 He referred to Billy _Joel's concerts in the Soviet Union last year, suggesting that as Soviet society opens up, young people may not be as attentive to government as they used to be. That's human nature. The more noises the Soviet people hear, the more mixed the message, the more diluted the official line. Quoting Rudyard Kipling, Walters said, "The bear is most dangerous when he's hug- ging you." Still, he added, this is "a time of extra opportunity, a time of extra challenge, and I hope we can meet it" in a nonpartisan way. "All of the factors mitigating in our favor we should not underestimate." I would add this thought. While the Soviets can profit collectively and individually from more exposure to the rest of the world, Americans can do the same. "Lessons from Afghanistan?for U.S., too" Louis Salome Editorial Page Editor The Miami News January 12, 1988 In his speech here last Friday, Vernon Wal- ters slipped once and said Vietnam when he meant to say Afghanistan. Many Americans have made that mistake, probably many Soviets, too. When the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations trips on the similarity, it sug- gests he understands more than he admits. Walters, speaking at a luncheon sponsored by the University of Miami's Institute for Soviet and East European Studies, noted that the Soviets are on the verge of pulling out of Af- ghanistan. If they do and leave behind a neutral Afghanistan, Walters said the Soviets will proclaim their eight-year disaster a vic- tory. Sounds as if the Soviets are taking a form of the advice given by the late Vermont Senator George Aiken who suggested in 1966 that the 17 United States declare a victory in Vietnam and get out. But Walters said the Soviets look with pride on their casualties in Afghanistan, while Americans view such losses as disastrous. Tell that to the Soviets who don't see their children alive after they leave for Afghanistan. And if the Soviets love casualties, why don't they stay another eight years? Listening to Walters, I wondered why U.S. officials often try to rewrite reality, and he provided some answers. One reason is be- cause we are unwilling to learn from our own mistakes even if another country makes the point for us, and thus we can try again to alter the lessons of history. Walters could have emphasized the limits of military power against a tough, proud, nationalistic people. He could have noted how difficult it is even for a superpower to subjugate a poor, underdeveloped, barren neighbor. He did, in fact, point out that "Af- ghanistan has poisoned their (the Soviets) relationship with 44 Moslem countries." He could have said that when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, many Americans believed the Soviets would triumph quickly because they would not be bound by moral or political restrictions as the United States was in Vietnam. And he could have noted that the Soviet failure contains lessons for others. But Walters is not the Reagan administration's U.N. ambassador for nothing. Walters doesn't see Afghanistan as the Soviet failure it is, but he does see Nicaragua as a potential failure for U.S. policy. He doesn't see a loss of credibility for the Soviets in Af- ghanistan, but he does see a loss of U.S. credibility if this country cannot thwart the Sandinistas. Sure, the two situations are dif- ferent, but Walters is selective and myopic in pointing out the differences and the similarities. Walters said the Soviets will invite U.S. al- lies and neutral countries to line up with Mos- cow if the United States cannot control what occurs just south of its border, and that others will do so because the United States will have lost credibility. Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14 : CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 The Soviet Union, Walters said, wants to divide the United States and its allies, to ex- pose the United States as a "paper tiger." And, he said, "That is why Nicaragua is so impor- tant to us." That's why Nicaragua is "a global problem of credibility for the United States." Why would any country join with another country that invaded its small, powerless neighbor and tried to kill anything that moved, suffered heavy losses despite over-whelming superiority in every respect except that of the human spirit, before finally giving up? Why don't Walters and his White House bosses ask that question? If the Soviets pull all the way out of Af- ghanistan, Walters said, it would destroy the "myth" that a communist government once es- tablished can never be removed. But, he said the real danger in Nicaragua is that no Marxist-Leninist government has ever decommunized or shared power. 18 I miss the distinction, but that's not all I missed. If U.S. credibility is at stake in Nicaragua, it is because this administration says it is. Rais- ing the credibility issue is the administration's way of seeking support for its actions in Nicaragua; it is not because of Soviet words. And most of our allies already disagree with U.S. policy and conduct in Nicaragua, so what is there to divide? Besides, if the administration really believes U.S. credibility is a stake, why not invade Nicaragua instead of hiring mercenaries to do a job they can't do? Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 !SEES Publications Special studies Series Grenada and Soviet/Cuban Policy: Inter- nal Crisis and U.S./OECS Intervention (Westview Press, 1986). Jiri Valenta and Her- bert J. Ellison, editors. Sponsored in conjunc- tion with, and published by, the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies. Conflict in Nicaragua: A Multidimensional Perspective (Allen and Unwin, 1987). Jiri Valenta and Esperanza Duran, editors. Spon- sored jointly with The Royal Institute of Inter- national Affairs, London. Occasional Papers Series Volume I: No. 1. "The Geneva Summit: Implications for East-West Relations." Sponsored jointly with the Institute for East-West Security Studies. F. Stephen Larrabee, Peter Hardi, Zoran Zic, and Jiri Valenta (January, 1986). No. 2. "Gorbachev's Party Congress: How Significant for the United States?" Jerry Hough, Richard Pipes, and moderator, Jiri Valenta (March, 1986). No. 3. "Terrorism: Reagan's Response." Norman Podhoretz, William Maynes, and moderator, Jiri Valenta (April, 1986). No. 4. "Conflict in Nicaragua: National, Regional and International Dimensions." Con- tributors included Admiral Sir James Eberle and Ambassador Ambler H. Moss, Jr., Esperan- za Duran, Jiri Valenta, Vernon Aspaturian, Mar- garet Crahan, Arturo Cruz, Jr., Mark Falcoff, Ottfried Hennig, Ambassador Harry W. Shlaudeman, and Virginia Valenta. Discus- sants included Victor Bulmer-Thomas, Julio Cirino, Alfredo Cesar, Arturo Cruz, Wolf Grabendorff, Stephen Haseler, Robert Leiken, Francisco Lopez, Susan Kaufman Purcell, Wayne Smith, Jaime Suchlicki, Alvaro Taboada, and Bruce Weinrod. (August, 1986). No. 5. "Zbigniew Brzezinski Reflects on the U.S.-Soviet Rivalry." Report on an address by Zbigniew Brzezinski (January, 1987). 19 No. 6. "U.S.-Soviet Relations at the Crossroads": Congressman Dante Fascell Reflects on his Visit to the Kremlin." (May, 1987). Volume II: No. 1. "Impressions of Gorbachev: John Temple Swing on the Council on Foreign Rela- tions Delegation's Visit to Moscow, 1987." (October, 1987). No. 2. "The Strategic Significance of Afghanistan's Struggle for Freedom." Report on an address by William E. Odom (February, 1988). No. 3. "A Conversation With Senator J. Wil- liam Fulbright: On Soviet Leaders, the 'Ar- rogance of Superpowers' and the 'Impossible' U.S. Electoral Process" (June, 1988). No. 4. "Reflections on Gorbachev's Policies and East-South Relations." Ambassador Ver- non A. Walters (July, 1988). No. 5. "U.S.-Soviet Relations: A View From Moscow." The Honorable Jack F. Matlock, Jr., United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union (July, 1988). No. 6. "Summit IV: Arms Control and Regional Conflicts." Lt. General Edward L. Rowny, United States Ambassador and Special Advisor to the President and to the Secretary of State (July, 1988). Working Papers Series No. 1. "Pakistan-Soviet Relations and the Af- ghan Crisis." Ali Tauqeer Sheikh (August, 1987). No. 2. "Leninism With An Islamic Face." Jiri Valenta and Ali Sheikh (September, 1987). No. 3. "From Ethnicity to Islam: Soviet Strategies for Political Pacification in the Bor- derlands." Eden Naby (October, 1987). No. 4. "The Social and Economic Conse- quences of Soviet Policies in Afghanistan." M. S. Noorzoy (October, 1987). Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 No. 5. "Elite Strategies of Penetration and Control in Afghanistan." Ralph Magnus (Oc- tober, 1987). No. 6. "Angola's Political Conformity and Economic Independence." Robin Pekelney (October, 1987). No. 7. "Morality and Realism in Foreign Policy." Andrea Ewart (January, 1988). (An award-winning essay in the Cato Institute's 1987 competition.) No. 8. "Aspects of the Evolution of Law in Sandinista Nicaragua." Alvaro Taboada (February, 1988). No. 9. "Neocolonialism and Dependency: A Study in the Soviet Development of Afghanistan's Oil and Gas Industry, 1950- 1979." Donald W. Dixon (February, 1988). No. 10. "Ambivalent Adversaries." Craig Simon (March, 1988). No. 11. "Summit III: Not By Arms Control Alone." Jiri Valenta (March, 1988). ISEES Reports Volume I: No. 1. "Soviet Specialists and Soviet Foreign Policy." John Campbell (January, 1986). No. 2. "Gorbachev's Party Congress." Peter Reddaway (March, 1986). No. 3. "The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Forum: Prelude to Vienna." Warren Zimmermann and Dante Fascell (September, 1986). Volume II: No. 1. "Under the Shadow of Chernobyl': Gregory Gleason and Jan Dellenbrandt (Oc- tober 1986). No. 2. "Research Strategies for Soviet Studies." Robert Conquest (January, 1987). No. 3. "Gorbachev and Latin America." Richard Feinberg (February, 1987). No. 4. "Problems of Communism." Sonia Sluzar (February, 1987). No. 5. "Gorbachev's Uncertain Future." Wolfgang Leonhard (March, 1987). 20 No. 6. "Soviet and Soviet Proxy Behavior in the Third World." Tadeusz Kucharski (April, 1987). No. 7. "Democratization under Gor- bachev?", Ernst Kux (April, 1987). No. 8. "Research in the USSR." Janet Martin (April, 1987). No. 9. "Political Prisoners in the USSR" Vladimir Brodsky (April, 1987). Volume III: No. 1. "The Soviet Union and Vietnam: The Strategic Nexus." Thai Quang Trung and M. Rajaretnam (September, 1987). No. 2. "Mr. Gorbachev's -`Bleeding Wound': Is There A Tourniquet?" Louis Dupree (October 1987). No. 3. "The Iran/Contra Affair and US Foreign Policy." R. Spencer Oliver (Novem- ber, 1987). No. 4. "Sino-Soviet Relations in the Gor- bachev Era." Zhongyi Gao and Yuezhao Huang (November, 1987). No. 5. "The USSR and the South Pacific." Vendulka Kubalkova (November, 1987). No. 6. "Soviet Foreign Policy Decisionmak- ing in the Gorbachev Era." Vernon V. Aspaturian (December, 1987). No. 7. "Perestroika and Eastern Europe." Vladimir Reisky (February, 1988). Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 Publications of the Institute for Soviet and East European Studies (ISEES) The Institute sponsors the publication and dissemination of research results in four categories. Special Studies Series Books and monographs on Soviet, East European, Strategic Studies, and Comparative Communism. !SEES Occasional Papers Dialogues, debates and addresses delivered by distinguished visiting scholars and policy-makers at the University of Miami and designed to bring to the attention of the public major contributions dealing with Soviet and East European Affairs and U.S. National Security. ISEES Working Papers Timely reporting of research results on is- sues of national concern. ISEES Meeting Reports Brief summaries of Institute colloquia and symposia. For more information about the Institute's programs or manuscript submission guidelines, please contact Professor Jiri Valen- ta, Director, Institute for Soviet and East European Studies, Graduate School of Inter- national Studies, University of Miami, 1531 Brescia Avenue, Coral Gables, FL, 33124(305) 284-5411. Published for the Institute for Soviet and East European Studies by the North-South Center, University of Miami Alexander H. McIntire Director of Publications Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3 UNIVERSITY OF A GLOBAL UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI PO. BOX 248123 CORAL GABLES, FL 33124 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3