REFLECTIONS ON GORBACHEV'S POLICIES AND EAST-SOUTH RELATIONS BY AMBASSADOR VERNON A. WALTERS

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090012-3
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• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2012
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oca 3743-88
institute for
Soviet
and East European
Studies
OCCASIONAL PAPERS SERIES
VOLUME II, NO. 4
Reflections On Gorbachev's Policies
and East-South Relations
by
Ambassador Vernon A. Walters
University of Miami
Graduate School
of International Studies
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Institute for Soviet and
East European Studies
Graduate School of International Studies
University of Miami
The Institute for Soviet and East European
Studies (ISEES) coordinates a multidis-
ciplinary program of analytical, policy-
relevant studies of the foreign and domestic
policies of the Soviet Union and the East
European nations. Created in 1986, the In-
stitute is designed to promote instruction and
advanced research on Soviet and East
European policies, with emphasis on the
Third World in general and Latin America, the
Caribbean, and the Middle East in particular;
to coordinate and promote cooperative teach-
ing and training endeavors with universities in
the Caribbean, Latin America, and other
foreign countries; and to disseminate informa-
tion and analyses among the academic, busi-
ness, and policymaking communities, as well
as among a wide public audience in the
United States and abroad. Through its studies
of specific East-West and East-South issues
presented in the Institute's Occasional Papers,
the Working Papers series, and ISEES Meeting
Reports, the Institute sponsors dialogue and
debate on key issues of national security and
foreign policy. The Institute for Soviet and East
European Studies works in close collaboration
with the Institute of Interamerican Studies
(HAS) and the Middle East Studies Institute
(MESI), both of the Graduate School of Inter-
national Studies.
Members of the Editorial Board are:
Jiri Valenta, Professor of Political Science
and Director of the Institute for Soviet and East
European Studies, Graduate School of Inter-
national Studies, University of Miami. Chair-
man of the Editorial Board.
Vernon Aspaturian, Evan Pugh Professor of
Political Science and Director of the Slavic and
Soviet Language and Area Center, Pennsyl-
vania State University.
Richard Bard, Viewpoint Editor, The Miami
Herald.
Ralph Clem, Professor of International Rela-
tions, Florida International University.
Melvin Croan, Professor of Political
Science, University of Wisconsin.
John Cunningham, Senior Research As-
sociate, Institute for Soviet and East European
Studies, Graduate School of International
Studies, University of Miami.
Herbert J. Ellison, Chairman of Russian and
East European Studies and Professor of His-
tory, University of Washington.
Charles Gati, Professor of Political Science,
Union College and Columbia University.
Jerry Hough, James B. Duke Professor of
Political Science and Public Policy Studies,
Duke University, and Senior Fellow, The
Brookings Institution.
Andrzej Korbonski, Director, Center for
Russian & East European Studies, Professor of
Political Science, University of California, Los
Angeles.
Anthony P. Maingot, Professor of Sociol-
ogy, Florida International University.
Ambassador Ambler H. Moss, Jr., Dean,
Graduate School of International Studies,
University of Miami.
Haim Shaked, Professor of Middle East
Studies and Director of the Middle East Studies
Institute, Graduate School of International
Studies, University of Miami.
Jaime Suchlicki, Professor of History and
Director of the Institute of Interamerican
Studies, Graduate School of International
Studies, University of Miami.
Jan F. Triska, Professor of Political Science,
Stanford University.
Virginia Valenta, Senior Research Associate,
Institute for Soviet and East European Studies,
Graduate School of International Studies,
University of Miami.
Editorial Consultant:
Richard Pipes, Frank B. Baird, Jr. Professor
of History, Harvard University and former
Director of East European and Soviet Affairs,
National Security Council.
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REFLECTIONS ON GORBACHEV'S POLICIES
AND EAST-SOUTH RELATIONS
Ambassador Vernon A. Walters
Institute for
Soviet and East European Studies
Occasional Paper Series, Volume II, No. 4
Graduate School of International Studies
University of Miami
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ISEES Major Donor List
For the academic year of 1988-1989
PATRONS
? LADY BLANKA ROSENSTIEL
BENEFACTORS
? IRVING KERN
? JORGE MAS CANOSA
? NORWEGIAN AMERICAN CHAMBER
OF COMMERCE
? TED RUBEL
FRIENDS OF ISEES
? HERBERT LEBOYER
? IRVING SCHWARTZ
? ELLEN AND MENDELL SELIG
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A Note from the Editor
Gorbachev's internal politics of perestroika
and glasnost and his foreign policy
dynamism?including strategic arms reduc-
tion, a troop withdrawal from Afghanistan,
and new initiatives vis-a-vis other regional
conflicts in the Third World?call for a serious,
comprehensive inquiry by U.S. policymakers
and analysts. The relevancy of such discussion
is heightened during this year of presidential
campaign and election.
In the interest of exploring these issues, the
Institute for Soviet and East European Studies
(ISEES) of the Graduate School of Internation-
al Studies has assembled a small, select group
of Miami community members prominent in
the world of business, opinionmaking and
education who are joined by former
diplomats, such as Ambassador Ruth Lewis
Farkas, Ph.D., and ISEES fellows research as-
sistants and Ph.D. students.
On January 8, 1988, this group, supported
by Mr. Ted Rubel, Mr. Irving Kern, and Mr.
Irwin Schwartz, joined together for the first in
a series of ISEES luncheons to discuss
"Gorbachev's reforms: Challenge or Oppor-
tunity". The speaker was The Honorable Ver-
non Walters, U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations.
I believe the reader will benefit from Am-
bassador Walters' insights into the importance
of the Russian historical tradition on Soviet
foreign policymaking as well as his intimate
knowledge of East-South issues such as Soviet
relations with Cuba, Afghanistan, Nicaragua,
and Cambodia. I was particularly struck by the
relevance of Ambassador Walters' observa-
tions on Cuba and U.S.-Cuban relations, mind-
ful that the Ambassador has probably spent
more time with Fidel Castro, than any other
senior American official. Ambassador Walters'
observations about Mikhail Gorbachev's per-
sonal background and politics are equally fas-
cinating.
Ambassador Walters is one of the nation's
most distinguished and respected public ser-
vants, a brilliant writer, and an accomplished
linguist (with perfect command of several dis-
parate languages including Russian), and a
leading specialist on communist affairs. His
address was instructive, thought-provoking
and lively, receiving wide and positive
coverage in the local media. A selection of the
articles reporting on his address is included
here. I am delighted to bring his testimony to
publication in an ISEES Occasional Paper.
Sincerely,
pri Valenta
Director, ISEES
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From left: Dean Ambler H. Moss, Jr., Ambassador Vernon A. Walters, Professorfirt Valenta.
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Introduction
If one tried seriously to give a decent intro-
duction of Ambassador Walters, it would
take most of an afternoon. It is absolutely an
impossible task, because, in addition to utter
fluency in several languages, one should men-
tion also that he has been a top advisor,
negotiator, trouble-shooter, interpreter for at
least six presidents that I can name on my
fingers, and perhaps even more. He actually
began his career as an internationalist during
World War II. Of course, the U.S. government
works in very mysterious ways, and the very
start of Ambassador Walters' career was in
Italy during World War II, when he was sent
to be liaison officer with the Portuguese
detachment because they knew he spoke
Spanish. They did not perceive that between
Spanish and Portuguese there was some dif-
ference; it actually mattered little, since Ver-
non Walters learned Portuguese in about two
months, and he was off and running. It has
been that way ever since.
Although he is a great friend of my in-laws
and I have been acquainted with him for a
long time, I first knew Ambassador Walters
professionally when I served as ambassador
to Panama. One small incident, I think, will
serve to illustrate his inestimable value as a
diplomat. Ambassador Ruth Farkas [former
ambassador to Luxembourg] is here too, and
as a former practicing diplomat, she knows
what I mean by the practice of diplomacy. Ver-
non Walters is really a role model of what
American diplomats should be. We have a
long, long way to go to get there, as we all
know, and for lots of reasons. But let me tell
you an example of why he is a good diplomat
In March 1981, just having come back into the
government, working for Secretary of State
Alexander Haig, Ambassador Walters was in
Chile, working his way up the hemisphere,
and he was due to make a stop in Panama. I
discovered that the whole top command of the
Socialist International was meeting in Panama
on the very day that Ambassador Walters was
going to be there, and I wondered if this might
ix
create any diplomatic difficulties and any par-
ticular problems, so I sent a message to San-
tiago to notify him and to ask if he saw any
problems in the coincidence of his visit with
their meeting. Ambassador Walters shot right
back, "absolutely not; see if you can get them
together so I can meet with them."
So I invited them all to a breakfast in the Em-
bassy residence, and the Socialist Internation-
al working the way it does, the members
convened late at night, argued and wrangled
and fought with each other until about five in
the morning, and got a couple of hours of
sleep. But, believe it or not, they all showed
up for breakfast, because they were dying to
meet Ambassador Walters. They were all sit-
ting around the table because here was a
Reagan administration appointee, and they
were going to see him for the first time. They
had heard about him, they knew the CIA con-
nection, they knew all these things. We saw all
these eyes peering around the breakfast table,
and in about five minutes the crowd was with
him, so to speak. I will never forget that he
started off by saying, "We don't believe in
military governments, because military
governments are never a permanent solution,
except in certain countries I won't name." And
the more he spoke, the more their eyes began
popping out. The audience began warming
up, and my next worry was that a certain
gentleman seated across the table, from a
Caribbean country that I won't name, a man
who, according to our intelligence files, had
formally been what we know in the trade as a
card carrier, was going to leap across the table
and kiss him.
He was so delighted with what Ambassador
Walters was saying. This is the mark of a good
diplomat. Without ever compromising what is
important and fundamental to the interests of
the United States, without ever compromising
what is the policy of the administration which
he serving?and he has served many?at the
same time, immediately, he can establish that
human contact because of the language, be-
cause of knowing the culture, because of
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knowing the position, the shoes in which the
other person stands. By knowing those things,
he establishes that bond of communication
which, I am sorry to say, few American
diplomats are able to achieve because of an
insufficient knowledge of the cultures, the lan-
guages and the backgrounds of the countries
with which they are dealing. That is why I say
that he is a role model, and when he was
named Ambassador to the United Nations, I
really stood up and cheered because I can just
picture him in New York, off having lunch
with some ambassador from a Third World
country who gets up and rants and raves
against the United States, but who will go out
to lunch with Ambassador Walters and be
charmed, because this is what happens.
Little by little, chipping away at these kinds
of attitudes, over and over again, day after day,
with patience, with fortitude, with good
humor, with all of these things, he wins friends
for the United States. He is precisely the sort
of person who should teach in the school of
diplomacy and bring up a whole new genera-
tion of diplomats, and, if ever he retires from
the government, which I earnestly hope will
never be the case, I am sure that Professor
Valenta and I and the people of the University
of Miami will make him an offer he cannot
refuse so that he will start such a school.
It is my enormous pleasure and great honor
to introduce the United States Ambassador to
the United Nations, Vernon Walters.
Ambler H. Moss, Jr.,
Dean, Graduate School
of International Studies
University of Miami
January 8, 1988
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Reflections on
Gorbachev's Policies
Thank you very much, Ambler, Mr. Rubel,
Dr. Valenta, and other distinguished
guests here today. I am delighted to be here. I
must tell you that what Ambler was talking
about is the fact that, if you have been a
general and you get into diplomacy and you
don't bang your fist on the table, as they ex-
pect you to do, you get several `brownie
points' for it. When I got into the United Na-
tions, they said that they knew the military
connection and the fact that I had been deputy
director of the CIA, and they said, "You know,
when you did not bang your fist on the table
and call everybody to attention, we thought:
This is a pretty good guy." Now that is a cheap
way to get to be a good guy. I also recall
another story, about the difference between
the diplomats and the military. Now, this story
was obviously told by a businessman. He said
that there is none: Both of them do nothing,
but the military gets up very early in the morn-
ing to do it with great discipline, and the
diplomats do it late in the afternoon in utter
confusion. It is false in both cases, as you
know. I am happy to have this opportunity to
talk a little bit about the recent summit and its
impact on regional differences between the
Soviet Union and the United States. Attention
was focused enormously on the arms control
agreement. Of course, that agreement was
reached and prepared long before the summit.
In fact, on the night of the White House din-
ner they exchanged bound, printed copies of
the treaty, each of which was about as thick as
the Palm Beach phone directory. I was rather
startled to see how many clauses there were
in it. That captivated the attention of most
people. That, in a sense, was the chief Soviet
interest:obtaining an agreement on arms. Why
did they want such an agreement.? Some
people said that Ronald Reagan needed the
agreement more than Mikhail S. Gorbachev
did. Absolutely not! Ronald Reagan is guaran-
1
teed to be president of the United States until
January 20, 1989. Mikhail Gorbachev will
probably be there on that date, but he does
not have a similar guarantee. If you look at
Soviet history, you will see that, with the ex-
ception of Malenkov, who was an aberration,
all Soviet leaders have died in power except
Khrushchev, the reformer.
So I think that Gorbachev had a greater
need to produce something that would be
palatable to the Soviet people. I think that with
the greater exchange that Khrushchev al-
lowed and made possible, there was a grow-
ing realization in the Soviet Union that it is not
really a modern industrial state in all areas. In
the area of space and the area of weaponry, it
is, but in some of the other areas it is not. When
I was in the Soviet Union last year, I was told
this anecdote. A Soviet citizen is notified of the
date on which he could take delivery of the
car for which he had been paying for the last
three years. So, he asks what that date is. They
tell him the 7th of December of 1992, and he
asks whether it will be ready in the morning
or in the afternoon. They ask why he needs to
know, and he says, because the plumber is
coming in the morning.
This anecdote illustrates the fact that the
Soviets have an enormous problem in provid-
ing consumer goods and services. If you travel
in the Soviet Union, you will see these so-call
remote installations, which are fix-it stations.
They fix everything from the pressure
cooker?if one is lucky enough to have one?
to the automobile, to the washer, to anything
else. I think that Mr. Gorbachev is aware of
these deficiencies, and he feels he has to
change them. However, the difficulty is to
change within the basic framework of an
economic system that is, theoretically, noble
and altruistic, that is the socialist system, but
does not work. And he has decided to try
something that he has not tried before, and
that is decentralization of decisions in
economic areas. But he needed something to
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establish himself. The Russians are very proud
people, and they are always suspicious that
foreigners look on them as barbarians. It is
curious that, at about the same time that Alexis
De Tocqueville wrote his book about the
United States, another Frenchman, the Mar-
quis de Custine, was writing an absolutely fas-
cinating book about Russia. It was written in
1849, during the reign of Tsar Nicholas I.
Custine described that, while in Europe
there was no such thing as a passport, a
traveler had to get one to go to Russia. He was
taken off the ship at the fortress called
Kronstadt, which is an island on the approach
to St. Petersburg. There, he was asked these
questions: What is the purpose of your visit to
this country? Do you intend to write a book or
an article about your experiences here? Do
you have any letters of recommendation to
people in this country? Where else do you ex-
pect to travel outside of St. Petersburg? Are you
on a secret mission for your country, your
government or private organization? Do you
intend to publish any magazine articles about
your experiences in this country?
When Custine finally got ashore, he
decided to go to the Schlusselburg Fortress
near St. Petersburg to see the tomb of Tsar Ivan
VI, a young tsar who had died in suspicious
circumstances about two hundred years
before. So he hired a boat and he went down
to Schlusselburg and when he pulled up to the
dock, an officer leaned out and asked him the
purpose of his visit. When he replied that he
wished to see the tomb of Ivan VI, the officer
asked Custine how he knew that Ivan VI was
buried there. Custine showed him a guide
book published in France, whereupon the of-
ficer replied that Custine never should have
brought that book into Russia because it con-
tained classified information.
In Russia, Custine witnessed the
reconstruction of the Mikhailovskii cathedral,
which had been badly burned in a fire.
Nicholas I had ordered the rebuilding to be
completed in twelve months. The work was
almost finished by that deadline but there was
trouble getting the frescoes on the interior
walls to dry. Someone suggested that it was
necessary to heat the building to fifty degrees
2
centigrade. So they heated it to that tempera-
ture, which is the equivalent of 110 to 120
degrees Fahrenheit, and every now and then
some of the workmen would come out of this
heat and into the forty-degree-below-zero
streets of St. Petersburg. Many of them would
drop dead. Custine asked the master builder,
"Why are you doing this?" The man looked at
him and replied, "You Europeans think that
we Russians are a bunch of oriental savages.
We are not barbarians, we are a cultured
people and we can do things just as well as
you can."
That inferiority complex lingers to this day.
The Soviets have it with us and they have it
with the Chinese: the feeling that we regard
them as being the savages of the steppes. So
they have a very great need to show us how
good they are. And they have shown us in
some areas. But they have not shown us in the
area of their economy, which is a disaster.
They have three times as much farm land as
we do, and yet they are unable to feed a
population only slightly larger than ours. It is
true that they have had seventy years of 'bad
harvest' or bad weather,' and not many
people have experienced that kind of 'misfor-
tune.'
So Mr. Gorbachev decided that the Soviet
Union should catch up. How does the Soviet
Union go about this? For a while, the Soviets
thought that they could do it through
espionage, through buying, through smug-
gling and other things. For example, seven
years ago, they acquired the manual of a U.S.
reconnaissance satellite that operated on a dif-
ferent principle than the previous ones did. It
took them seven years to set up a crude
prototype. Retro-engineering is not easy; so
they apparently have decided that the only
way that technology can be acquired on a
scale significant enough to change the whole
economy is to lessen tension with the United
States and with China. Therefore, we got the
beginnings of glasnost' and perestroika. I do
not know how long they will last. My guess
would be somewhere between three and
seven years, during which Gorbachev thinks
that they will scoop up all this technology in
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an open atmosphere of cultural exchanges,
ballets, folk dances, and everything else.
However, this period of openness will also
affect the Soviet Union more than he thinks it
will. If any of you saw those pictures of Billy
Joel in Leningrad, with Soviet teenagers leap-
ing up and down waving Soviet and American
flags and tearing off their teeshirts, you may
wonder what their reaction will be when their
young Komsomol leader comes to them and
says, "Now we must resolutely apply the
resolutions of the Twenty-seventh Party Con-
gress." Perhaps they will not be as attentive as
they ought to be. We have seen this idea of
having a period of lessened tension with the
West materialize, and the most visible
evidence of this is an arms control agreement,
which would also have an impact on the
Soviet economy. The Soviets are spending
seventeen per cent of their gross national
product on arms, out of an economy that is
less than half the size of ours. We are spend-
ing seven percent. Under President Kennedy,
against a much weaker Soviet Union, we were
spending nine per cent.
What will we see from this? The first visible
evidence would be the Intermediate Nuclear
Forces agreement to do away with an entire
weapons system, signed in Washington in
December 1987. That arrangement should
greatly alleviate the Soviets' financial burden
because such systems are very expensive,
even in a socialist state.
Many people forget that the first person to
suggest a zero option on theater nuclear
weapons was President Reagan. They are ac-
ting as though the clever Gorbachev has
foisted this idea on a poor, stupid President
Reagan. That isn't the way it happened. Presi-
dent Reagan is the one who developed the
zero-zero option, and, when he did, the
Soviets absolutely refused it. They broke up
the Geneva negotiations because of it. They
said that if we deployed our missiles in answer
to those in Europe, they would never
negotiate. We deployed them, and they did
negotiate. So I think that much of this talk
about the wily Mikhail Gorbachev, and how
he has outwitted our president, has been
politically inspired.
3
Obviously, getting that treaty was the
Soviets' major interest in the Washington sum-
mit. We had another interest. We had an inter-
est in regional problems, specifically in
Afghanistan, Cambodia, Cuba, Nicaragua and
other areas. These issues are more sensitive to
Gorbachev, and to the internal situation that
he is trying to change. You see, I think that
there is general agreement among the Soviet
leadership about the need for change, but
there is a difference of opinion as to how far
to progress and at what speed. They live al-
ways in the fear that if they open the door too
far, the worst of all nightmares will occur: the
loss of the control of the state by the Com-
munist Party, the one party. And that even-
tuality they regard as a catastrophe of the first
magnitude.
Thus, Gorbachev knew that the arms agree-
ment would go over well at home, but he may
have been less sure about radical change on
other sensitive issues. Soviet losses in Af-
ghanistan have had on internal impact upon
the Soviet Union. But the Russians are quite
different from us; they will always proudly an-
nounce how many losses they have incurred,
and the more losses they have, the prouder
they are, whereas in America the loss of even
one life is a great source of disturbance to us.
Sometimes we lose perspective. When I was
in Vietnam, one of the young soldiers was tell-
ing me what a terrible war it was, and I said,
"You know, in the thirteen days of the Battle
of the Bulge, we lost more men than we have
lost here in five years." World War II was a dif-
ferent kind of war, fought on a different scale
than the Vietnam War. In Vietnam, I was out
one night in a rice paddy when a helicopter
came in with breakfast and I was asked
whether I wanted my eggs over easy or
scrambled. My experience in Vietnam was dif-
ferent from anything I had experienced
before.
The great problem we have to contend with
in the area of regional conflicts is that the prin-
cipal objective in Soviet foreign policy since
the immediate post-war period has been to
divide us from our allies. How do they do that?
They tell our allies that they are leaning on a
broken reed, because the United States is a
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paper tiger. They say, "The Americans will bug
out on you as they bugged out on the Viet-
namese, and that led to two million boat
people; they will bug out on you as they
bugged out on the Cambodians, and that led
to the genocide of three million people; they
will bug out on you as they bugged out on the
Laotians; they will bug out on you as they
bugged out on the Shah, and on Haile Selas-
sie."
Here is the reason why Nicaragua is so im-
portant to us. It is not a question of Soviet
bases in Nicaragua or anything like that. It is
the fact that, if it is proven that the United
States is unable to prevent the establishment
of a Soviet-client state a thousand miles from
Houston or Miami, the Soviets will be in a
splendid position to go to our allies like the
West Germans or the Japanese and say, "Why
don't you accommodate us while there is still
time?" And that is why, for us, Nicaragua is not
a regional problem, it is a problem of global
proportions in which the credibility of the
United States is at stake.
Afghanistan has been the source of great
disturbance to the Soviets in the United Na-
tions, where I work. Normally, they whip their
so-called nonaligned friends together, and
eighty-two percent of the time, these non-
aligned states vote with the Soviet Union. In
fact, it is quite interesting to recall that there
are nineteen members of the United Na-
tions?including Angola, Algeria, and India?
that vote against the United States more often
than the Soviet Union does. However, the fact
is that Afghanistan has poisoned the Soviets'
relationship with forty-four Muslim countries
and, in fact, each year since I have been there,
we have had a much larger majority voting to
condemn their occupation of Afghanistan.
This year, it was something like 124 to
nineteen. Nineteen represents the hard-core
Soviet bloc. I think that the Soviets made a
political decision that this is one of the areas
in which there must be movement. However,
I must confess that I was a little disappointed
that not much of this aspect was emphasized
in the immediate aftermath of the summit; but,
in my opinion at least, clearly there had been
understandings reached that the Soviet Union
4
and the United States would work further on
the solution of these matters.
Now the Soviets have begun to leave Af-
ghanistan. For the first time, they have ap-
parently have given up the goal of establishing
a government of national reconciliation
around Mr. Najibullah [President of Afghanis-
tan], who has been their puppet. That idea is
a little bit like asking the French, after World
War II, to form a government of national
reconciliation around Pierre Laval. The idea
did not have a bright future, and they seem
discreetly to have prepared to drop it. Now,
the problem is, what will they do about their
friends? One of the young Soviets asked me
about this question at the United Nations, and
I said, "Well, I would charter seven or eight
747s, and take them all with you when you
leave." But they cannot do that; it is not
enough. They have thirty thousand people in
the Afghan secret service that they will have
to do something about.
The Soviets do have some excuses to justify
their withdrawal. Originally, they said that
they went into Afghanistan to foil the evil
machinations of the United States, which was
attempting to convert Afghanistan into a base.
An agreement on a neutral Afghanistan,
belonging to no bloc, with its own armed for-
ces and without the military presence of any
other people, can permit the Soviets to
withdraw and still claim victory, and they
could pretty much sell that to Soviet public
opinion. I remember that, when I was in the
Soviet Union recently, a Soviet deputy foreign
minister said tome, "You must understand that
now, with glasnost', we also have a press
problem." I said, "You do? Well, when Pravda
writes an editorial with a headline saying 'The
Soviet Government Is Wrong,' as one ap-
peared in a prominent New York newspaper
not long ago about the U.S. government, I will
begin to believe that you have some of the
same problems that we do."
Under the Brezhnev Doctrine, the chief
Soviet interest was to make sure that no com-
munist regime was removed once it had
achieved power. In fact, there was only one
such reversal of which I know, when the
Romanian army invaded Hungary in 1921 and
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ejected the government of Bela Kun. The
Soviets want to give an impression of irre-
versibility to the establishment of communist
governments. Therefore, I watch what is hap-
pening in Nicaragua with hope, hope that we
will see a miracle because I know of no case
in which a Marxist-Leninist regime has ever
decommunized itself, or really accepted either
the sharing of power with any other non-com-
munist group or?the ultimate heresy?alter-
nation in power. I watch with some interest
but I am not very optimistic that we will see
this development; if we do, it certainly will be
a first. The one thing that was made clear to
the Soviets at the summit was our interest in
these areas, and the message was conveyed
that what happens in Afghanistan, in Cam-
bodia, in Nicaragua, in Cuba and elsewhere is
important to the overall context of the Soviet-
American relationship. Now, the Soviets have
been slow to digest that message, but I think
that it is beginning to sink in, and I think that
what we have seen in Afghanistan is the first
fruit. In the case of Cuba, as you know, the
Soviets have always refused Castro what he
most wanted, which was a defense treaty, and
they have not given it to the Nicaraguans
either. How much ballast the Soviet Union is
prepared to let off now, I do not know. In Af-
ghanistan, we have seen what seems to be a
fairly major step, because it will not only
remove them from there, but also destroy the
myth that a communist government, once es-
tablished, can never be removed. As we look
at the world, we see that the authoritarian,
right-wing, personalistic dictatorships have all
been replaced by democracies. However, the
collegial types of dictatorship, supported by
huge single parties, have not yet been
replaced anywhere of which I know.
So this withdrawal will be a very important
event. I think that the Soviet people have a
greater understanding of what is happening in
the world around them than they have had
before. For example, I was talking to one of
my Soviet colleagues the other day, and we
were discussing the war between Iran and
Iraq. He said, "I suppose that, when this war
is over, you will say," and he slipped into
Arabic, "Glory to Allah." I replied, "No, per-
5
sonally I will say," and I slipped into Russian,
"Our Father Who art in Heaven, hallowed be
Thy Name..." When I did so, he picked me up
and went right on to the end. I looked at him
in mock astonishment and said, "So you know
that prayer?" He responded quickly, "General,
everybody in Russia knows that prayer!!"
On my latest trip to the Soviet Union, I went
out to Zagorsk Monastery, where I had lunch
with the archbishop. We ate caviar and drank
vodka. That occasion was the first time I had
seen vodka at any Soviet establishment in a
long time, and I said to the archbishop, "Ah,
here you have vodka." He said, "This is the
Church, not the State." He added, "You know,
the Church needs the State, but there are also
times when the State needs the Church." I said,
"Do you mean, for instance, during the war,
when millions were dying, and Holy Mother
Russia became important?" He said, "Like
during the war when millions were dying, and
Holy Mother Russia became important." There
is in the fiber of the Soviet people a deep sense
of patriotism, and it is important in our rela-
tions with them that we do not seem to be
trying to humiliate them or bleed them. At the
United Nations, I have said to them many
times, "We are not trying to bleed you or
humiliate you, we just want you to get out and
let the Afghan people choose whatever
government they want." And that is our policy
not only in Afghanistan, but elsewhere as well:
in Ethiopia where there is a Soviet Brigade,
and in Cuba where there is a Soviet brigade.
In Nicaragua there is no Soviet Brigade, but
there is a regular zoo of Libyans, PLO and
other odd characters assembled there.
I walked out on Mr. Ortega when he was at
the United Nations in September 1987, an ac-
tion for which I was criticized harshly by The
New York Times and by The Boston Globe.
They are not aware that, in the United Nations,
an ambassador has the right to reply to any
speaker except a chief of state. Therefore,
when Mr. Ortega criticized the United States
and its policies, it did not bother me. When he
criticized the U.S. government, that did not
bother me, either. However, when he said that
Ronald Reagan was responsible for the deaths
of 42,000 Nicaraguans, had destroyed the
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people of Grenada, and was a senile old fool
who did not know what he was reading at his
desk, I simply did not feel like I could stay
there. So, I got up and I walked out.
713e Boston Globe chided me, saying that I
should steady my nerves. I resisted the
temptation to tell them that my nerves had
seen me through four wars, and that I thought
they should steady theirs instead, but I did not
send that telegram. I regret it now, but it is a
little too late to do anything about it.
I think it is an interesting time for us because
we are going to have a lot more of this atmos-
phere of peace, love, flowers, honey, milk,
and cultural exchanges, and, as Kipling said,
"The bear is most dangerous when he is hug-
ging you." I think that we would be well-ad-
vised to remember that saying. It is a time that
is going to require extreme vigilance on our
part. Yet it is a time of great opportunity for us,
an opportunity to make the Soviets under-
stand that there is a life other than the one they
have been living; that they can have a better
life; and that they can live with more freedom
without the loss of their national rights, or their
national interests, or anything else. For in-
stance, when we get into this question of
human rights, they say that that is an internal
affair. It is not an internal affair. The Soviet
Union signed the Helsinki convention, as the
United States did, and that agreement went
into these issues in very specific detail. It is our
affair and we intend to pursue it, just as we in-
tend, next month in Geneva, to pursue the
resolution on human rights in Cuba. One
hears a great deal about Chile. Chile is a
military dictatorship that has the same popula-
tion as Cuba. Last year, there were two
thousand Chileans and fifteen million Cubans
in exile, and to repeat my famous phrase?I
don't know whether it is really famous, 'al-
though I hear it come back to me now and
then?no one has really given Castro credit for
his greatest achievement, making Cuba the
largest country in the world: the administra-
tion is in Havana, the government is in Mos-
cow, the army is in Africa, and the population
is in Florida and we welcome them. Granma
[the official newspaper of the Cuban Com-
munist Party] has just reported that there are
6
now forty thousand Cuban troops in Angola.
Cuba has about one-twentieth of the popula-
tion of the United States, and so their military
presence in Angola is the equivalent of the
United States having 800,000 troops some-
where. That is a rather large commitment,
about twice as large as the United States' in-
volvement in Vietnam.
So, we intend to pursue these regional
items, getting the Soviets out of Afghanistan,
getting the Vietnamese out of Cambodia, ef-
fecting some basic change in the archaic way
in which the Cuban government handles
human rights. The whole of Central America
is now governed by democracies, and now
only Nicaragua is moving further into the grip
of a dictatorship. I devoutly hope that Mr.
Arias's plan works, but, as I say, I have yet to
see a Marxist-Leninist regime decommunize
itself. Maybe we will yet see that miracle. I
hope so. It is vital that we continue to make
the Soviets understand that all of these matters
have a very, very great impact on the overall
shape of Soviet-American relations. And I
think that they do understand that now. We
spoke about that in great detail to them while
they were here.
I cannot tell you exactly how big a price
they are prepared to pay for this atmosphere
of peace, love, honey, butter and sugar, and
only constant pressure will bring this about. If
we want to get real results, we must persuade
them fairly skillfully, and in a way that does
not humiliate them. They have been coopera-
tive for the first time in the Iran-Iraq war. Last
February, they seemed very upset by the pos-
sibility that Basra might fall. After all, in the
nineteenth century, Russia took an awful lot
of territory from Iran, including the Baku oil
fields, Bokara and Samarkand, and other
areas. The idea of Iran, fifty million people tri-
umphant, placing territorial demands on the
Soviet Union, is not something to which the
Soviets are looking forward. Thus, they have
become more cooperative. I went to both
Moscow and Beijing and obtained a promise
of a vote in favor of the resolution calling for
the cessation of hostilities in the Iran-Iraq war,
and the promise, from both of them, that they
would vote for the enforcement actions
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foreseen in Article 7 of the United Nations
Charter if one or both parties did not accept
that resolution. At present, Iraq has accepted
it and Iran has not, and we are moving to the
time when we have to call in these promises,
and see whether they are serious and whether
they will live up to their agreement to vote for
enforcement actions. For the first time, the
United Nations has had a serious opportunity
to do what it was created to do, put an end to
war.
It is important to understand, however, that
if we have an ability to influence the Soviet
Union, it is because in the years since Mr.
Reagan came to power, we have created a dif-
ferent military balance than the one he found
when he came to Washington. Then, we were
in a state of provocative weakness, which is
the greatest of all dangers. I do not think that
the Soviets intended to start a war, but if it
looked so easy, they might have been tempted
in that direction. That is no longer the case,
and now, we have a real opportunity to pick
up this challenge between the two systems
and the two ways of life. In this atmosphere of
greater interchange, we have the opportunity
to show the Russian people what it is like to
live without the system to which they are ac-
customed. The video cassette has been very
helpful, illustrating that it is very difficult to
prevent the infiltration of information. Many
things are mitigating in our favor and I think
we should not underestimate them.
I think that the Soviets are moving in many
areas. For instance, they want to improve rela-
tions with China, which is why I believe that
they will eventually get out of Vietnam. They
know that the Vietnamese occupation of Cam-
bodia is an outrage to the Chinese. Moreover,
now that they have built a second trans-
Siberan railway 300 miles north of the old one,
it will not be difficult for the Soviets to move
some of those fifty-odd divisions along the
Chinese border further back into the Soviet
Union. The third obstacle to the improvement
of Sino-Soviet relations has been Afghanistan;
as we have seen, the Soviets will be moving
on that one.
It is a time of great challenge for us, a time
when we can either make terrible mistakes
7
and sustain further losses, or create extraordi-
nary opportunities to go forward. It was my
interesting job to sit next to Mrs. Gorbachev at
the White House State Dinner because I was
one of the few people in the Cabinet who
spoke some Russian. I had always been very
interested in knowing whether her husband
had stayed in his native town of Stavropol
when the Germans occupied it during World
War II, and no one had been able to tell me. I
asked her, and she said that he did remain in
Stavropol, but he was hidden in the house of
friends. I then asked her where she met him,
and she replied that she met him at
Lomonosov University in Moscow, to which
they had both been admitted without entrance
examinations. I asked her how they both
managed to avoid that requirement, and she
said that he had won the silver medal in his
high school and she had won the gold medal
in her high school. I replied that I did not know
that anyone had ever outdone the General
Secretary, and she replied that she received
the higher award because she agreed to study
German, and he didn't.
These kinds of conversations are refresh-
ingly novel, and reflective of the opportunities
and challenges presented to the United States
by the new leadership. I hope that we will be
able to meet them with some degree of unity,
typified by the old saying that "partisanship
stops at the water's edge." It would be well if
each party does not perceive this situation as
an opportunity to make 'brownie points'
against the other party. The greatest problem
that we have in the United Nations is American
credibility, and the ability of the United States
to stick with a decision once it has been made.
I don't know whether it is true, but I have been
told that someone once said that it is very dif-
ficult to deal with the Americans, because one
has to deal with three governments: the presi-
dent who wants to do something, the Con-
gress, which does not want him to do it, and
the Supreme Court, which wonders whether
the whole thing is unconstitutional.
Therefore, we have a credibility problem,
which is why I hope that the INF treaty is
ratified. Failure to do so will aggravate that
problem. It has been said that the West
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European governments are uneasy, but those
states, without exception, endorsed the
decision to sign that agreement. We kept
peace in Europe for forty years before any of
those theater missiles were deployed.
However, at some point there has to be a
balance between the conventional forces
deployed there. There remain some 140 War-
saw Pact divisions facing forty-four NATO
divisions, 45,000 tanks facing 18,000 tanks,
6,000 first-line aircraft facing 3,000 first-line
8
aircraft. Creating a balance here is going to re-
quire a lot of will and ability. Unfortunately, in
our country there are two tragic disasters: too
few people study languages and too few
people study history. If you don't know where
you have been or where you are, it becomes
very difficult to know where you are going.
Thank you very much.
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Questions
You spoke earlier about the consequences
of "glasnost" and 'perestroika" extending
beyond those intended by Gorbachev and the
Soviet leadership. Would you elaborate on
that point and on the question of what, if any-
thing, the United States can or should do to
facilitate Gorbachev's leadership and in-
crease the chances of success of those cam-
paigns?
Well, the first story I told, about the Mik-
hailovskii cathedral, was intended to show the
continuity in Russian life. There are political
changes, but there is a certain continuity. I
have always wondered why the statue of
Nicholas I, who was one of the most autocratic
of all the tsars, and who sent Alexander Her-
zen into exile, was never torn down by the
Bolsheviks. Later, when I heard that he was
the author of the statement, "Where once the
Russian flag is flown, it will never be hauled
down," the reason suddenly dawned on me:
Nicholas was their kind of guy.
I think the Soviet Union will change large-
ly as a result of outside contacts, but I also
think that there is considerable resistance
within the system. I personally think that Gor-
bachev has about an even chance to win the
day. There will be changes, from the contact
with the West and its open societies. There is
now some freer discussion in the Soviet press,
and there will be more. Religious tolerance is
an area that is very difficult, and I think that
this question of human rights is important if
we want to bring the standards of Jewish
emigration up to levels close to those under
Khrushchev, which hit 79,000 in one year. Last
year there were 7,000 Jewish emigres, which
is better than the year before; but that number
is still very small.
We do have an opportunity to influence
them. I notice that the Poles have stopped jam-
ming the Voice of America. One of our difficul-
ties is that, for better or worse, through
patriotism, schooling, the media, and other
factors, probably a majority of the Soviet
people have come to regard their government
9
as legitimate. I do not think that that is true in
any of the satellite countries, which makes
glasnost so much more difficult. There, if you
open the door, the plunge through that door
is going to be much greater. If one reads the
discussions of people like the East Germans,
one notes a marked coolness to the whole
business. An old story illustrates the reason:
Two East German border guards are walking
along the side of the Berlin wall. One says to
the other, "What are you thinking? The other
says, "I am thinking the same thing you are."
The first replies, "In that case, I arrest you for
treason to the German Democratic Republic."
So openness is more of a problem in the satel-
lites than it is at home, in the Soviet Union.
How can we affect the course of reform?
The first and most important thing that we
must not do is drown the Soviets in American
holy water, and if anybody thinks that Time's
choosing Gorbachev as its 'Man of the Year' is
going to help the situation, he is mistaken. To
be sure, it is going to help him with some
Soviet citizens to whom it will be a matter of
national pride, but I am not sure how much
good it will do for Americans to think that he
is such a great guy. Actually, we have to be
very prudent about how we exert influence in
this matter. We have got to work carefully at
it, weighing the facts regarding the most ad-
vantageous moves on our part. We must be
realistic, and keep in mind that the millennium
has not arrived, and that peace is not guaran-
teed for all eternity, simply because Gor-
bachev is here. In Russia, nothing is
guaranteed for all eternity. So it is going to re-
quire a lot of statesmanship on our part, and I
mean bipartisan statesmanship. We must
rebuild the old bipartisan foreign policy, of
which the NATO alliance is the only remain-
ing fragment. We must be careful not to give
the impression that we are a state that is in-
capable of having a central government that
makes decisions. Any country with 535
secretaries of state?that's often the way con-
gress acts? is in big trouble. We have got to
try to present a face toward them which is the
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face of all the American people, the last, the
biggest and the strongest defender of
freedom. I could not venture right now an
exact policy; that is something that should be
studied very carefully, and when that study is
ready it should be brought to the attention of
the policymakers.
Do you see a new era of detente, similar to
the one that followed the Vietnam conflict, as
a possible evolution of Soviet-American rela-
tions in the near future? If so, what will
change in the two superpowers' relations with
the People's Republic of China?
First of all, the previous period of detente
did not come after the Vietnam War; it came
during the Vietnam War. At the very time when
Mr. Nixon decided to resume the bombing of
Hanoi and the mining of the harbor of
Haiphong, the Soviets renewed the invitation
to Mr. Nixon to come to Moscow. The Soviets
understand the kind of language that Nixon
was speaking.
If a new period of detente arises, it will
depend on whether the Soviets really want
this peace in order to improve the living stand-
ard of their own people. After all, they have
the largest country in the world and unlimited
resources, and they should be living better
than anybody else. As I have said, the present
is a time requiring great prudence on our part.
With regard to the superpowers' relation-
ship to the People's Republic of China, I don't
think that very much is going to change. I
think that the U.S. government is intelligent
enough to realize that China is not a card we
can play against the Soviet Union or the Soviet
Union against China. In fact, China has more
people than the United States and the Soviet
Union put together by a factor of two. Nor do
I think that the Chinese strategy will greatly
change. There is an old Chinese proverb:
"Against the Far Barbarians, use the Near Bar-
barians; against the Near Barbarians, use the
Far Barbarians." The Chinese certainly will
welcome the evacuation of the Soviets from
Afghanistan, they will be delighted with the
removal of the Vietnamese from Cambodia,
and they will not be displeased by the limited
withdrawal of the Soviet forces in the Far East.
10
But you will notice that in the intermediate
range missile negotiations it was we who in-
sisted that none of these weapons would be
redeployed to the Far East, and that the whole
series of weapons was to be destroyed. At the
beginning, the Soviets offered to take them
out of Europe and leave one hundred in East
Asia, an indication of their continued wariness
regarding China. We said no, the whole sys-
tem must go.
Gorbachev has advocated 'perestroika 'f?
restructuring?for the Soviet economy. The
Soviets also have a plan for international
'perestroika", which they refer to as a System
for Comprehensive International Security. Is
the Soviet proposal winning any support in the
United Nations? Also, how does the U.S.
boycott of this past summer's United Nations
Conference on Disarmament and Develop-
ment help us to meet this Soviet challenge?
I think that the United States regards the
United Nations Charter as providing all the
facilities necessary to both of those projects.
We are trying to get a reduction in the UN
budget and reform and we don't see the need
to set up new structures within the United Na-
tions requiring more people and more money
when the UN charter already provides all the
means for discussing these things. In fact, we
have a meeting of the Disarmament Commit-
tee very soon, and we just don't want to see
duplication of effort within the United Na-
tions.
But is the Soviet program winning any sup-
port?
Well, the United States doesn't have much
support internationally, because if one acts
against the United States it rarely retaliates. If
one does something against the Soviet Union,
one's life may become more unpleasant.
When we bombed Libya, all of the Arab
countries banded together and denounced us
with the other so-called "nonaligned"
countries?I don't believe they are non-
aligned?to condemn us. Later, nearly all of
the same diplomats came by my office to con-
gratulate me for what the United States had
done. There are really two standards at the
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UN, the public standard and the private stand-
ard. As a matter of fact, that action was great-
ly criticized within the United States. But the
fact is that it bombed Mr. Qadaffi out of the ter-
rorist business. Other people are running it
now. He has been very, very quiet since then.
Isn't a United States strategy of "being
tough" with the Soviet Union a
counterproductive approach, both in the
sense that it is a condescending effort to im-
pose conditions on Soviet behavior, and like-
ly to lead to a conservative backlash?
That's a good question. As you know, there
is a Soviet law that deals with criticism of the
government, calling it anti-Soviet activity and
providing that offenders go to jail for it. It's
hard to say whether increased scrutiny from
foreigners, as part of this new atmosphere,
will lead to a change in this. The best way we
can encourage change is not to try to do it
publicly, and outdo the Soviets in debates, but
rather, in private talks with them. Occasional-
ly, I talk to the Soviet military in that way. One
of them recently said to me, "I am so tired of
being asked 'what are you going to do about
Afghanistan?' or 'what are you going to do
about Cam Ranh Bay?' or -'what are you going
to do about the Gulf war?" Another said to me,
"I am up to here with these little regional
wars." So I think the best policy we can adopt
here is one that is not terribly visible. The more
the Soviets get out into the rest of the world,
the better it will be, because they will see how
other people live.
You know, they talk to us about our home-
less and our other domestic problems. But the
unemployment benefit in the United States is
higher than the minimum wage of the Soviet
worker and will buy a hell of a lot more. If you
were to get involved in an open hassle with
them, and were to use that fact acrimonious-
ly, you would humiliate them. I think you have
to say it in a gentle way. Many of them did not
select this system, they were born into it; and
there is a growing understanding that it
doesn't work, or it doesn't work as well it
should. If the Soviet Union were not the big-
gest country in the world with the greatest
resources in the world, it would be a colossal
11
disaster. It is a disaster anyway, and it is that
disaster and the knowledge of it that has
moved a large group of the Politburo to sup-
port the new policies. So it is again a question
of how to do it in the right way. That needs a
lot of study, a lot of care and a lot of
knowledge of Russian and Soviet history and
culture.
Unfortunately, opportunities for such study
are not as abundant as they should be in this
country. That is why what Professor Valenta is
doing here is extraordinarily important. You
cannot deal with a people if you do not under-
stand their language, their history, or the
things that are important to them. If you un-
derstand those things, you have an extraordi-
nary ability to reach them on a personal level.
A high-ranking Soviet official based in New
York called me up the other day to wish me a
happy birthday. That would not have hap-
pened a couple of years ago.
You spoke earlier about NATO as the last
remainingfragment of the foreign policy con-
sensus formed by the Western democracies
after World War II. I would say that that isper-
haps a too-generous assessment of the
relationship between the United States and its
West European allies, who seem more ap-
preciative of US. protection than they are of
their own obligations. Would you care to com-
ment on this assessment?
To be sure, our allies have differed with us,
but that is the difference between allies and
satellites. Allies often differ with one another,
and besides, they are 6,000 miles closer to the
problem than we are. During the 'sixties and
'seventies, all the Europeans said to us, "Get
out of Vietnam!! Get out of Vietnam!!" When
we got out of Vietnam, they said, "My God,
you were bad, how can we trust you
anymore?" You know, with our European al-
lies, we have two problems. If we show any
flexibility with the Soviet Union they say, "My
God! This is another Yalta, they are going to
sell us out;" if we show any firmness, they say,
"The mad cowboys are going to set off World
War III." The other problem is that they are al-
ways telling us, "You know, you Americans
really have no sense of historic perspective
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like we older nations do." To that, I always
respond, "Yes, and when you older nations
with great perspective were running the
world, between World War I and World War II,
you gave us twenty-one years of peace. Since
we naive, credulous stumble-bum Americans
have participated, we have had forty-two
years of peace."
The fact that there are differences in the al-
liance is perfectly normal. For instance, there
are a number of countries that have painted
themselves into a position of support for the
Sandinistas when they thought that the
government of Nicaragua was really a
democratic regime, and now it is a difficult
thing for them to recant. Armando Valladares'
wife went to see a prominent Swedish official,
and she said to him, "You understand that
Cuba is no paradise," to which he replied, "All
Europeans know that Cuba is no paradise.
"She said to him, "Well, why don't you say so?"
"Oh!" he said, "That would help the
Americans." Again, there is a little bit of this
David and Goliath nonsense: Nicaraguans are
being persecuted by the big, bad United
States. There is also political involvement. The
majority of the Democratic Party in our
country opposes aid to the Contras, and it is
perceived abroad that, if the Americans are
divided on this issue, it is safe to take a posi-
tion against the U.S. government. The
totalitarian regime is capable of performing
aerodynamically impossible turns. You know
that for three years after Hitler came to power
the German air force was still training in Rus-
sia.
Is that the reason why the FSLN has been
successful in portraying Itself as a nationalist
revolution with socialist overtones?
Not really. Everybody that knows the FSLN
government also knows that it is a communist
regime. But it isn't presented like that in the
media, and for saying so, one is likely to get
into trouble with the media. That's a fact.
There is the opinion that the authoritarian
aspect of the FSLN regime, and its reliance
upon the Soviet Union, are the results of pres-
12
sure by the United States. Would you care to
comment?
Well, the United States tried everything not
to pressure the FSLN. We received the coman-
dantes in the White House, we gave them 289
million dollars in aid in the first three years that
they were in power, and we did everything we
could to help them. We may be still the largest
donors in economic aid. The idea that we
pushed them into the arms of the Soviets is
nonsensical. We didn't. That is where they in-
tended to go from the beginning. You know,
the 289 million dollars that we gave them in
three years is twice as much as we gave
Somoza in the preceding fifteen years. The
idea that we pushed them into the arms of the
other side is ludicrous. I once asked Fidel
Castro if we pushed him into the arms of the
Soviets. He emphatically denied this, claiming
that no one pushed him anywhere. Yet some
of us keep up this fiction with Nicaragua, that
it was a cruel, harsh Reagan administration
that drove these fine, upstanding democrats
into the arms of the Soviet Union. To me, that
is putting party interest before the national in-
terest.
What will be the outcome of the vote next
month on the U.S.-sponsored U.N. resolution
regarding Cuba's violations of human rights?
I certainly hope that we will be successful.
We have tried this kind of thing before, and a
number of countries had various stories about
how their delegations did not get the right
message, and so forth. This year we are
making it plain. You know, I told the United
Nations in October that we were going to
bring this up in February, and yet a number of
Latin countries said, "Oh, we were taken by
surprise; we did not know that the Americans
were going to bring this up. They suddenly
rushed this onto the agenda." We did not rush
anything onto the agenda. They had several
months' notice, and, this time, it will be har-
der to use that kind of excuse. This time, we
will see who will stand up on behalf of the
silent prisoners in Cuba and who won't.
It has been noted that the Cuban govern-
ment is quite reluctant to adopt any of the
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Gorbachev-style reforms, and that the Soviet
Union is reevaluating its financial commit-
ments to its Third World allies. Do these two
facts provide any clues at all to the future
course of Soviet-Cuban relations?
Well, I know that the Vice President of Cuba
wrote an article saying that glasnost and
perestroika were not for use in Cuba. We shall
see some difference there, but I think that
Castro has always found it difficult to take
direction from elsewhere, and so it will be in-
teresting to watch that. If the Soviets are will-
ing to throw Najibullah overboard, there may
be some hope that they may be willing to
throw Castro overboard. Three billion dollars
a year is a lot of money in anybody's counting,
even in rubles.
Is there room there for a warming of rela-
tions between Cuba and the United States?
Perhaps, but I am inclined to be pessimistic
about that development. We've got diplomatic
relations with Nicaragua, but we don't have
diplomatic relations with Cuba. In the United
Nations, the Cuban ambassador hardly ever
talks to me.
In view of your experience with Cuban af-
fairs, I was sulprised to read in The Miami
Herald that you were not consulted in regard
to the US. government's recent negotiations
with Cuba on the issue of emigration from
that country. Can you say anything about
this.?
To be sure, in a bureaucracy as big as ours,
that happens. For instance, I often find that im-
portant telegrams are not slugged "U.S.-U.N.,"
but the fact that we are not in Washington
makes it somewhat understandable. An occur- ?
rence like this is an exceptional and not a
habitual thing, and I do not want to belabor it.
I was asked specifically if! had known about
it, and I said I hadn't. That is the only reason I
brought it up. I do not want to continue. I do
not think it is a live issue. I think I made my
point and I do not think they will forget about
me easily the next time.
13
Has the United States made any kind offor-
mal reaction, or specific plans, regarding
Castro's statements on migration of Cuban
nationals?
Well, our position is well known. We have
taken more Cuban emigres than anybody else.
We would like to see a situation where there
would be no requirements for emigres, and
those emigres could go home without fear for
their lives, their safety, or their property. We
would also like to see guarantees of rights of
opposition, so that the Cuban people would
have a choice in determining what kind of
government they wanted. You know, any
country from which fifteen per cent of the
population has fled, especially when it's an is-
land and it is difficult to leave, has a serious
problem with its people. We would like to see
that pressure taken off, and the Cuban people,
like most of the other people in the Americas,
given a chance to decide who they want to
rule them, and not have one ruler imposed on
them indefinitely.
Of course, if you look around you here you
will see that the Cubans in Florida have added
greatly to our culture, to our life, to our busi-
ness and everything else. And it is just not the
American position to turn the back on people
who are fleeing for their lives. So we ought to
maintain our policy of welcoming the victims
of oppression.
We don't welcome all victims of oppression.
The Haitians come to mind as an example of
an exception.
Well, we let more people in than anyone
else. I always tell my Soviet colleagues that
their problem is how to keep their people
from getting out; ours is how to prevent the
millions who want to come in from coming in.
After all, last year the United States amnestied
twelve million immigrants, more than the
whole population of Cuba.
What are the Soviets' expectations regard-
ing the outcome of the Iran-Iraq war?
I cannot think for the Soviets, and it would
not be fair for me to express a Soviet point of
view. Let me put it this way: they would be
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more alarmed by an Iranian victory than an
Iraqi victory, since Iran has territorial claims
on them.
Mr. Gorbachev has been in power since
1985, and there are the same number of
Soviet troops in Afghanistan as before; the
Soviets are still supporting one-party states or
movements in Africa; the Syrians were recent-
ly furnished with two million dollars worth of
Soviet arms; and the flow of oil and arms to
Nicaragua continues. Given these con-
tinuities, on what grounds is your confidence
regarding change based?
If I radiated confidence to you, you
misunderstood what I said. I said that it is a
possibility. I do not have any confidence. I was
the one who said they have been capable of
having British and French military talks in one
room while signing a pact with Hitler in the
other. So if I gave you the impression that I
have great confidence in them, I misspoke. I
know who they are. I know what they are
doing. I have been in Syria, and I've seen the
Soviet equipment there. But there may come
a point when they figure that a different policy
is to their greater advantage. One of the
primary measures is Jewish emmigration.
Brezhnev let 79,000 people out in one year.
Gorbachev let 7,000 out last year. Now, they
understand that this a matter of vital interest to
us and that, unless their performance is better,
they are not going to get further at bewitching
us. And we know what they are doing in
Nicaragua. We know what they are doing else-
where, and, in fact, we have publicized it.
What safeguards is our new Secretary of
Commerce adopting to ensure that technology
transfer remains consistent with US. nation-
al security interests?
I am not familiar enough with Mr. Verity; he
has only been a member of the Cabinet a short
time. There does exist, however, a NATO-
wide organization called COCOM [Coordinat-
ing Committee on Export Controls], which
selects very carefully what technology can be
passed and what technology cannot be, and
we are founding members of COCOM. I think
that Gorbachev will continue to try to obtain
14
high-level military technology through the
same means as before. What we have to en-
sure is that the other kinds of technology do
not go out in a completely uncontrolled
fashion. In fact, we have had very serious
problems with some of our allies like Norway
and Japan on this issue and we have made
them feel our displeasure, economically as
well as verbally.
Will the verification procedures stipulated
in the INF Treaty really enable the United
States to monitor Soviet commitment to the
treaty?
We will have verification groups inside the
Soviet Union at the factories where these
things are built, and that is a degree of access
that no one else has ever had before. They will
have access to us, but, then again, they have
had access all along. In the treaty, there are
large chapters on verification, and as Mr.
Reagan said to Mr. Gorbachev, "Trust, but
verify."
You know, the idea that we do not under-
stand who these people are is ridiculous; we
do understand them. We want to see if we can
change them more than they can change us,
and it should be easier in the near future.
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For the Record
"Miami: Exciting Hub of
Foreign-affairs Studies"
Carlos Verdecia
Viewpoints, Editorial Board
The Miami Herald
January 14, 1988
Vernon Walters, U.S. Ambassador to the
United Nations, came to Miami last week
and spoke his mind on every international
topic under the sun. He blasted Fidel Castro's
human-rights record; expressed skepticism
about Daniel Ortega's "democratization";
questioned Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika,
and celebrated Moammar Gadhafi's silence
since the U.S. air raid on Tripoli. The
diplomat's sharp, polyglot tongue spoke at
ease; his gigantic international persona
seemed right at home.
And at home he was. Honored in a lunch-
eon by the University of Miami's Institute for
Soviet and East European Studies (ISEES),
Walters spoke on "Summit HI: Implications for
Cuba and Nicaragua." As he spoke and
answered questions, it became clear that per-
haps no other U.S. city could have welcomed
Walters with an audience as alert and inter-
ested in his topic as Miami.
Dr. jiri Valenta, director of ISEES, knows
this. He smiles impishly when people run to
share their discovery of what an ideal place for
foreign-affairs academia our international city
is.
"Miami is favored by its multiracial and mul-
tinational environment," says Dr. Valenta.
"Our students represent Miami's unique melt-
ing pot, which has a great deal to offer in in-
creasing understanding of the tensions and
conflicts among countries and their political
and ethnic groups."
The ISEES functions under the aegis of the
Graduate School of International Studies
(GSIS). Eight of its 15 students have published
books or articles on carefully researched inter-
national topics. To expand his student body,
15
Dr. Valenta is appealing to local private groups
and institutions for help with fellowship
funds.
We receive from prestigious national foun-
dations of different political persuasions, and
from the U.S. Government, help which we use
to publish influential books and essays and or-
ganize international conferences." Dr. Valenta
says. "It's the fellowships that we're trying to
increase."
The ISEES was created in October 1986.
Ambassador Ambler Moss, GSIS dean, an-
nounced it on the occasion of Zbigniew
Brzezinski's lecture on "Game Plan: How to
Conduct the U.S.-Soviet Contest." In little over
a year, the ISEES has held seminars and con-
ferences whose participants could well make
the pages of a foreign-policy Who's Who.
Three months ago, the ISEES sponsored a
one-day conference on "Soviet Policies in Af-
ghanistan and Iran." High-ranking U.S.
military officers and two Afghan mujahedeen
rebels participated.
The specialized institute couldn't have been
place in more-expert hands. Jiri Valenta ranks
among the more-respected "Sovietologists" in
the United States. A member of the Council on
Foreign Relations?a selective intellectual
club of foreign-affairs specialists?Dr. Valenta
is frequently consulted by Washington policy
makers on issues ranging from Eastern Europe
to Central America. His books include Soviet
Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968:
Anatomy of a Decision; Grenada and Soviet-
Cuban Policy; and Conflict in Nicaragua: A
Multidimensional Perspective. His wife, Vir-
ginia, coauthors some of his work.
Under Valenta's direction, the ISEES
focuses on what he calls "East-South issues,"
which relate to Soviet-bloc involvement in
Third World countries.
"Most universities concentrate on plain
East-West issues, such as arms-control and
other security matters," Valenta says. "They
neglect the East-South relationships, forget-
ting that the use of Soviet force in Latin
America, Africa, and Asia can seriously jeop-
ardize U.S.-Soviet relations."
One of Valenta's more-pressing priorities
these days is to watch changes inside the
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Soviet Union and the repercussions of Mikhail
Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika in Cuba
and Nicaragua. The ISEES is privileged to do
this research work in a city such as Miami. We
Miamians are even more privileged?and
should be proud to be the site of such excel-
lent, high-level academic accomplishment.
"A good word for glasnost, there and
here"
Louis Salome
Editorial Page Editor
The Miami News
January 11, 1988
They don't come more real than Vernon
Walters. A burly, florid man who can tell
spy stories in eight languages, Walters is
tailored for the larger-than-life role he has
played in the cellars, attics and front rooms of
U.S. military intelligence and diplomatic his-
tory for 47 years.
Before being named the U.S. ambassador
to the United Nations almost three years ago,
Walters was ambassador-at-large under Presi-
dent Reagan, senior adviser to Secretary of
State Alexander Haig, deputy director of the
Central Intelligence Agency from 1972 until
1976, and from 1941 until 1976 he served in
the U.S. Army, retiring as a lieutenant general.
Walters didn't learn eight languages for
nothing. He talks a lot, although like all good
intelligence officers and diplomats, he doesn't
always say a lot.
When the opportunity came last Friday to
hear Walters speak at a luncheon sponsored
by the University of Miami's Institute for Soviet
and East European Studies, I showed up
hungry in many respects. I had interviewed
Walters on a television show previously, but
that format is more structured than revealing.
In a freewheeling speech, Walters proved
that if anyone talks enough, the implications
are broader than the words themselves.
Walters said the Soviet Union under Mikhail
Gorbachev would change largely as a result of
16
the broader contacts the people would have
with the outside world.
True enough. But the flip side of that state-
ment applies to Americans, and it is just as im-
portant. The United States will change, too,
largely as a result of the contacts Americans
have with Soviets and other peoples.
Walters noted that too few Americans study
languages and history: "If you don't know
where you've been, how are you going to
know where you're going?"
Americans are actually afraid of learning
other languages, even afraid of people who
know them. And we don't teach history
anymore, we teach civics, which is what we
used to teach to kids who supposedly couldn't
learn history. What geography most of us
know centers around how to get from Miami
to Fort Lauderdale on 1-95.
Walters' comment touches on a deeper
problem. While the rest of the world is learn-
ing more about us all the time, Americans are
becoming more insular. We know even less
about the history of other countries than we
know about our own. That ignorance is show-
ing up in industry, trade, marketing and in-
genuity.
"Fervent anti-communist" is Walters' mid-
dle name. Yet his fervor is tempered by reality
when he discusses the changes occurring in
the Soviet Union under Gorbachev and glas-
nost.
"I personally think he (Gorbachev) has a
better than even chance of winning the day,"
Walters said. He also noted that Nikita Khrush-
chev, another reformer, is the only Soviet
leader who did not die in office.
The Soviets generally agree with glasnost
and perestroika, or economic restructuring, he
said, and the only debate concerns how far the
reforms go and at what speed they occur. "I
don't know how long it will last," he added. "I
expect he (Gorbachev) wants it to last three to
seven years."
The most critical aspect of glasnost is not so
much what the Soviet leaders are willing to
give, but what the Soviet people try to take as
the lid is lifted. Walters believes the reforms
will affect the Soviet Union more than Gor-
bachev thinks they will.
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He referred to Billy _Joel's concerts in the
Soviet Union last year, suggesting that as
Soviet society opens up, young people may
not be as attentive to government as they used
to be. That's human nature. The more noises
the Soviet people hear, the more mixed the
message, the more diluted the official line.
Quoting Rudyard Kipling, Walters said,
"The bear is most dangerous when he's hug-
ging you." Still, he added, this is "a time of
extra opportunity, a time of extra challenge,
and I hope we can meet it" in a nonpartisan
way. "All of the factors mitigating in our favor
we should not underestimate."
I would add this thought. While the Soviets
can profit collectively and individually from
more exposure to the rest of the world,
Americans can do the same.
"Lessons from Afghanistan?for U.S.,
too"
Louis Salome
Editorial Page Editor
The Miami News
January 12, 1988
In his speech here last Friday, Vernon Wal-
ters slipped once and said Vietnam when he
meant to say Afghanistan. Many Americans
have made that mistake, probably many
Soviets, too. When the U.S. ambassador to the
United Nations trips on the similarity, it sug-
gests he understands more than he admits.
Walters, speaking at a luncheon sponsored
by the University of Miami's Institute for Soviet
and East European Studies, noted that the
Soviets are on the verge of pulling out of Af-
ghanistan. If they do and leave behind a
neutral Afghanistan, Walters said the Soviets
will proclaim their eight-year disaster a vic-
tory.
Sounds as if the Soviets are taking a form of
the advice given by the late Vermont Senator
George Aiken who suggested in 1966 that the
17
United States declare a victory in Vietnam and
get out.
But Walters said the Soviets look with pride
on their casualties in Afghanistan, while
Americans view such losses as disastrous. Tell
that to the Soviets who don't see their children
alive after they leave for Afghanistan. And if
the Soviets love casualties, why don't they stay
another eight years?
Listening to Walters, I wondered why U.S.
officials often try to rewrite reality, and he
provided some answers. One reason is be-
cause we are unwilling to learn from our own
mistakes even if another country makes the
point for us, and thus we can try again to alter
the lessons of history.
Walters could have emphasized the limits
of military power against a tough, proud,
nationalistic people. He could have noted
how difficult it is even for a superpower to
subjugate a poor, underdeveloped, barren
neighbor. He did, in fact, point out that "Af-
ghanistan has poisoned their (the Soviets)
relationship with 44 Moslem countries."
He could have said that when the Soviets
invaded Afghanistan in 1979, many Americans
believed the Soviets would triumph quickly
because they would not be bound by moral or
political restrictions as the United States was
in Vietnam. And he could have noted that the
Soviet failure contains lessons for others.
But Walters is not the Reagan
administration's U.N. ambassador for nothing.
Walters doesn't see Afghanistan as the
Soviet failure it is, but he does see Nicaragua
as a potential failure for U.S. policy. He doesn't
see a loss of credibility for the Soviets in Af-
ghanistan, but he does see a loss of U.S.
credibility if this country cannot thwart the
Sandinistas. Sure, the two situations are dif-
ferent, but Walters is selective and myopic in
pointing out the differences and the
similarities.
Walters said the Soviets will invite U.S. al-
lies and neutral countries to line up with Mos-
cow if the United States cannot control what
occurs just south of its border, and that others
will do so because the United States will have
lost credibility.
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The Soviet Union, Walters said, wants to
divide the United States and its allies, to ex-
pose the United States as a "paper tiger." And,
he said, "That is why Nicaragua is so impor-
tant to us." That's why Nicaragua is "a global
problem of credibility for the United States."
Why would any country join with another
country that invaded its small, powerless
neighbor and tried to kill anything that moved,
suffered heavy losses despite over-whelming
superiority in every respect except that of the
human spirit, before finally giving up? Why
don't Walters and his White House bosses ask
that question?
If the Soviets pull all the way out of Af-
ghanistan, Walters said, it would destroy the
"myth" that a communist government once es-
tablished can never be removed.
But, he said the real danger in Nicaragua is
that no Marxist-Leninist government has ever
decommunized or shared power.
18
I miss the distinction, but that's not all I
missed.
If U.S. credibility is at stake in Nicaragua, it
is because this administration says it is. Rais-
ing the credibility issue is the administration's
way of seeking support for its actions in
Nicaragua; it is not because of Soviet words.
And most of our allies already disagree with
U.S. policy and conduct in Nicaragua, so what
is there to divide?
Besides, if the administration really believes
U.S. credibility is a stake, why not invade
Nicaragua instead of hiring mercenaries to do
a job they can't do?
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!SEES Publications
Special studies Series
Grenada and Soviet/Cuban Policy: Inter-
nal Crisis and U.S./OECS Intervention
(Westview Press, 1986). Jiri Valenta and Her-
bert J. Ellison, editors. Sponsored in conjunc-
tion with, and published by, the Kennan
Institute for Advanced Russian Studies.
Conflict in Nicaragua: A Multidimensional
Perspective (Allen and Unwin, 1987). Jiri
Valenta and Esperanza Duran, editors. Spon-
sored jointly with The Royal Institute of Inter-
national Affairs, London.
Occasional Papers Series
Volume I:
No. 1. "The Geneva Summit: Implications
for East-West Relations." Sponsored jointly
with the Institute for East-West Security
Studies. F. Stephen Larrabee, Peter Hardi,
Zoran Zic, and Jiri Valenta (January, 1986).
No. 2. "Gorbachev's Party Congress: How
Significant for the United States?" Jerry Hough,
Richard Pipes, and moderator, Jiri Valenta
(March, 1986).
No. 3. "Terrorism: Reagan's Response."
Norman Podhoretz, William Maynes, and
moderator, Jiri Valenta (April, 1986).
No. 4. "Conflict in Nicaragua: National,
Regional and International Dimensions." Con-
tributors included Admiral Sir James Eberle
and Ambassador Ambler H. Moss, Jr., Esperan-
za Duran, Jiri Valenta, Vernon Aspaturian, Mar-
garet Crahan, Arturo Cruz, Jr., Mark Falcoff,
Ottfried Hennig, Ambassador Harry W.
Shlaudeman, and Virginia Valenta. Discus-
sants included Victor Bulmer-Thomas, Julio
Cirino, Alfredo Cesar, Arturo Cruz, Wolf
Grabendorff, Stephen Haseler, Robert Leiken,
Francisco Lopez, Susan Kaufman Purcell,
Wayne Smith, Jaime Suchlicki, Alvaro
Taboada, and Bruce Weinrod. (August, 1986).
No. 5. "Zbigniew Brzezinski Reflects on the
U.S.-Soviet Rivalry." Report on an address by
Zbigniew Brzezinski (January, 1987).
19
No. 6. "U.S.-Soviet Relations at the
Crossroads": Congressman Dante Fascell
Reflects on his Visit to the Kremlin." (May,
1987).
Volume II:
No. 1. "Impressions of Gorbachev: John
Temple Swing on the Council on Foreign Rela-
tions Delegation's Visit to Moscow, 1987."
(October, 1987).
No. 2. "The Strategic Significance of
Afghanistan's Struggle for Freedom." Report
on an address by William E. Odom (February,
1988).
No. 3. "A Conversation With Senator J. Wil-
liam Fulbright: On Soviet Leaders, the 'Ar-
rogance of Superpowers' and the 'Impossible'
U.S. Electoral Process" (June, 1988).
No. 4. "Reflections on Gorbachev's Policies
and East-South Relations." Ambassador Ver-
non A. Walters (July, 1988).
No. 5. "U.S.-Soviet Relations: A View From
Moscow." The Honorable Jack F. Matlock, Jr.,
United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union
(July, 1988).
No. 6. "Summit IV: Arms Control and
Regional Conflicts." Lt. General Edward L.
Rowny, United States Ambassador and Special
Advisor to the President and to the Secretary
of State (July, 1988).
Working Papers Series
No. 1. "Pakistan-Soviet Relations and the Af-
ghan Crisis." Ali Tauqeer Sheikh (August,
1987).
No. 2. "Leninism With An Islamic Face." Jiri
Valenta and Ali Sheikh (September, 1987).
No. 3. "From Ethnicity to Islam: Soviet
Strategies for Political Pacification in the Bor-
derlands." Eden Naby (October, 1987).
No. 4. "The Social and Economic Conse-
quences of Soviet Policies in Afghanistan." M.
S. Noorzoy (October, 1987).
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No. 5. "Elite Strategies of Penetration and
Control in Afghanistan." Ralph Magnus (Oc-
tober, 1987).
No. 6. "Angola's Political Conformity and
Economic Independence." Robin Pekelney
(October, 1987).
No. 7. "Morality and Realism in Foreign
Policy." Andrea Ewart (January, 1988). (An
award-winning essay in the Cato Institute's
1987 competition.)
No. 8. "Aspects of the Evolution of Law in
Sandinista Nicaragua." Alvaro Taboada
(February, 1988).
No. 9. "Neocolonialism and Dependency: A
Study in the Soviet Development of
Afghanistan's Oil and Gas Industry, 1950-
1979." Donald W. Dixon (February, 1988).
No. 10. "Ambivalent Adversaries." Craig
Simon (March, 1988).
No. 11. "Summit III: Not By Arms Control
Alone." Jiri Valenta (March, 1988).
ISEES Reports
Volume I:
No. 1. "Soviet Specialists and Soviet Foreign
Policy." John Campbell (January, 1986).
No. 2. "Gorbachev's Party Congress." Peter
Reddaway (March, 1986).
No. 3. "The Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Forum:
Prelude to Vienna." Warren Zimmermann and
Dante Fascell (September, 1986).
Volume II:
No. 1. "Under the Shadow of Chernobyl':
Gregory Gleason and Jan Dellenbrandt (Oc-
tober 1986).
No. 2. "Research Strategies for Soviet
Studies." Robert Conquest (January, 1987).
No. 3. "Gorbachev and Latin America."
Richard Feinberg (February, 1987).
No. 4. "Problems of Communism." Sonia
Sluzar (February, 1987).
No. 5. "Gorbachev's Uncertain Future."
Wolfgang Leonhard (March, 1987).
20
No. 6. "Soviet and Soviet Proxy Behavior in
the Third World." Tadeusz Kucharski (April,
1987).
No. 7. "Democratization under Gor-
bachev?", Ernst Kux (April, 1987).
No. 8. "Research in the USSR." Janet Martin
(April, 1987).
No. 9. "Political Prisoners in the USSR"
Vladimir Brodsky (April, 1987).
Volume III:
No. 1. "The Soviet Union and Vietnam: The
Strategic Nexus." Thai Quang Trung and M.
Rajaretnam (September, 1987).
No. 2. "Mr. Gorbachev's -`Bleeding
Wound': Is There A Tourniquet?" Louis Dupree
(October 1987).
No. 3. "The Iran/Contra Affair and US
Foreign Policy." R. Spencer Oliver (Novem-
ber, 1987).
No. 4. "Sino-Soviet Relations in the Gor-
bachev Era." Zhongyi Gao and Yuezhao
Huang (November, 1987).
No. 5. "The USSR and the South Pacific."
Vendulka Kubalkova (November, 1987).
No. 6. "Soviet Foreign Policy Decisionmak-
ing in the Gorbachev Era." Vernon V.
Aspaturian (December, 1987).
No. 7. "Perestroika and Eastern Europe."
Vladimir Reisky (February, 1988).
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Publications of the
Institute for Soviet and
East European Studies
(ISEES)
The Institute sponsors the publication and
dissemination of research results in four
categories.
Special Studies Series
Books and monographs on Soviet, East
European, Strategic Studies, and Comparative
Communism.
!SEES Occasional Papers
Dialogues, debates and addresses
delivered by distinguished visiting scholars
and policy-makers at the University of Miami
and designed to bring to the attention of the
public major contributions dealing with Soviet
and East European Affairs and U.S. National
Security.
ISEES Working Papers
Timely reporting of research results on is-
sues of national concern.
ISEES Meeting Reports
Brief summaries of Institute colloquia and
symposia.
For more information about the Institute's
programs or manuscript submission
guidelines, please contact Professor Jiri Valen-
ta, Director, Institute for Soviet and East
European Studies, Graduate School of Inter-
national Studies, University of Miami, 1531
Brescia Avenue, Coral Gables, FL, 33124(305)
284-5411.
Published for the
Institute for Soviet and East European
Studies
by the
North-South Center, University of Miami
Alexander H. McIntire
Director of Publications
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UNIVERSITY OF
A GLOBAL UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI
PO. BOX 248123
CORAL GABLES, FL 33124
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