WESTERN EUROPE AND THE INF TREATY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M00005R000300070027-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 14, 2011
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: February 2, 1988
• Content Type: MISC

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U.S. Senate Republican Policy Committee
William L. Armstrong, Chairman February 2, 1988
Western Europe and the INF Treaty
[This is the third in a series of papers on the INF Treaty. For an examination of the
issues surrounding the Treaty, please see our December 1, 1987 publication, "The INF
Treaty: Issues to Consider." J
Western European support for the 1NF Treaty is well known. What is less well
recognized are important European concerns about NATO defenses in the post-INF
era. This paper offers a sampling of the broad and diverse reactions to the INF Treaty
in Western Europe.
SUMMARY
? All Western European governments officially support the INF Treaty.
? European (and American) officials agree that the consequences of non-ratification
would be detrimental to the continued well-being of the alliance. This is because the
leadership position of the U.S. would be questioned, while the Soviet Union would
be perceived as the promoter of peace in Europe; NATO would be unable to con-
tinue its INF deployments and may, in fact, be forced to withdraw existing INF
deployments due to strong public pressures; and worst of all, while U.S. systems
would be withdrawn, without an agreement, the Soviet Union would be permitted
to maintain its INF systems.
? A fear expressed by well-informed European (and American) officials is that the
greatly needed modernization of NATO's remaining nuclear forces may be curtailed
by the arms control/detente euphoria produced by the INF Treaty. Will European
politicians be able to support the introduction of new nuclear weapons (not covered
by the INF Treaty) when the U.S. and Soviet Union have just agreed to remove INF
weapons?
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? European leaders are not united as to what the next steps should be. While certain
elements would like to see short-range nuclear systems the subject of negotiation
and reduction, most European heads of state and NATO as a whole believe that the
central focus of future disarmament talks should be on U.S.-Soviet strategic nuclear
systems and NATO-Warsaw Pact conventional and chemical weapons. Western
European public opinion will no doubt impact on future plans for modernization
and/or arms control.
? It is as yet unclear what the implications of Article 14, the non-circumvention clause,
will be for future U.S.-Western European defense cooperation and modernization.
WHERE THE EUROPEANS STAND ON THE INF TREATY
1. Governmental Endorsements.
French Socialist President Francois Mitterrand supports the INF Treaty publical-
ly, and personally feels that it will contribute to western security, especially if it leads
to further disarmament steps. His remarks are indicative of the French Socialist party
as a whole:
"It is the first time that the Soviet Union and United States
have disarmed since World War II and it is the first time that
verification on enemy territory has been accepied. In this sense,
it is an exceptional event which will become historic if it marks
the start of a real peace process, which must be taken much fur-
ther but will not become historic if no further progress is made."
[Le Nouvel Observa ei,r, 18-24 December 1987, pp. 23-26]
French Conservative Prime Minister Jacques Chirac is more reserved in his sup-
port for the treaty, linking it to an agreement reducing U.S.-Soviet strategic nuclear ar-
senals:
'The INF agreement is a positive accord if it is followed by
other agreements which will permit the reinforcement of security
in Europe. This sole accord is not in the nature of reinforceing
security in Europe which remains threatened by considerable ar-
maments ...The strategic armaments of the superpowers should
be the object of an agreement on disarmament. At that moment,
it would be an historic agreement." [December 8, 1987 radio in-
terview in Lille, France, provided by U.S. Embassy, Paris]
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British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher has stated her support for the Treaty:
"That agreement [INF Treaty] will be the reward for years of
constancy in defense and firmness in negotiation. It has Britain's
full support. It is good for our security and is an important step
towards a more peaceful and stable world." [Speech of Novem-
ber 16, 1987, Printed in State Department report, Statements By
World pad rs On The INF Treaty, no date given]
British Foreign Minister Sir Geoffrey Howe and Defense Minister George
Younger have also publically endorsed the treaty, with Howe calling the agreement a
"formidable achievement." j"Allies are wary of defense cost," Washington Times, Sep-
tember 21, 1987, p. A9.]
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl has also endorsed the INF agreement:
"The Summit.. .will go down in history because it has
produced the first real disarmament agreement... All U.S. and
Soviet land-based nuclear intermediate-range missiles with ran-
ges of between 500 and 5,500 km will be abolished worldwide.
Thus the security of millions of people, especially in Europe, will
be improved." [Statement in the Bundestag, December 10, 1987,
Printed in State Department report, op. cit., p. 4]
The Chancellor also pleaded for the creation of a conventional equilibrium at a
low level, a ban on chemical weapons, and the disarmament of short-range nuclear mis-
sile systems. Foreign Minister Genscher not only embraced the INF Treaty, but called
for a "third zero" agreement, removing the short-range nuclear forces (SNF) from
Europe. ["Genscher, Kohl Pleased," DPA German News.Service, November 24, 1987.
Printed in FBIS November 25, 1987, p. 4]
The other Western European governments also heartily endorsed the INF Treaty,
as this statement by Belgian Prime Minister Martens makes plain:
'The INF Treaty is therefore also our triumph. Along with
the other NATO allies, Belgium accordingly hopes that it will be
quickly ratified." [Statement of December 9, 1987, Printed in
State Department report, op. cit., p. 2]
Every major Western European political and security organization has lent its sup-
port for the INF Treaty. This includes the North Atlantic Council, which is composed
of Western European, American, and Canadian Members of Parliament [See "North
-Atlantic Council Ministerial Communique," December 11, 1987]; the NATO Nuclear
Planning Group, composed of NATO Defense Ministers, who endorsed the Treaty in
their November 1987 meeting in Monterey California; and the Western European
Union which resolved, on December 2, the following:
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'The Assembly... urges the Senate of the United States to
give its advice and consent to the Treaty on Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces as expeditiously as possible." [WEU Assembly
Resolution of December 2, 1987, Printed in State Department
report, op. cit, p. 10]
2. Reservations held by Prominent Government Oi cials.
It would be a mistake to assume that the INF Treaty has been greeted by all
Europeans with the same enthusiasm that the above quotes would suggest. Govern-
ment officials, primarily those in the Ministries of Defense, are troubled by what the
INF Treaty may portend for NATO strategy and future NATO modernization plans,
as well as future disarmament steps. The central fear is that the arms control euphoria
created by the agreement will weaken NATO's consensus for a strong defense. One
example of this viewpoint is the following statement by Alain Peyrefittee, former
French Justice Minister and now a Member of Parliament: "Deployment of the Persh-
ings had consolidated a new consensus around firm defense of the West ...Their
withdrawal will shake this consensus and boost neutralism." [Reported in "West
Europeans Concerned About Conventional Arms," Washington Post, December 10,
1987, p. A32]
Emphasizing that the elimination of the INF category of weapon does little to en-
hance NATO security without consumate reductions in Soviet strategic nuclear
weapons that are also capable of targeting Western Europe, the French Foreign Min-
ister, Jean-Bernard Raimond stated:
"...In the absence of a ceiling on strategic systems, an INF
accord would lose much of its effect since, hypothetically, the fact
that one could get around it by higher systems would be assured.
It would be fruitless, in effect, to celebrate the elimination of 810
SS-20 warheads, in part aimed at Western Europe, if, simul-
taneously, the same number of arms are capable, hypothetically,
of hitting the same targets in Europe, and are part of so-called
strategic systems, like, for example the new Soviet SS-25."
[November 5, 1987 Speech to National Assembly]
A chief aid on arms control for German Chancellor Kohl, Horst Teltschick, charac-
terized the concern of those conservative elements in Germany that are uneasy about
the INF Treaty. The central point he raises is that without the Pershing II and GLCM,
the U.S. may become decoupled from the defense of Western Europe because the U.S.
would hesitate to use its strategic nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union on behalf
of Western European defense:
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"If the double-zero option becomes reality... the alliance will
lose its ability to reach Soviet territory from European soil with
U.S. nuclear missiles. That certainly means the renunciation of
one of the most efficient instruments of war prevention. On the
other hand, the Soviet Union is keeping all its nuclear options
toward Western Europe open, even if it has to reduce three times
as many nuclear intermediate-range missiles ...The European al-
liance will have to rely for their security essentially on U.S.
nuclear systems that can reach the Soviet Union from U.S. soil or
from the sea. Thus the alliance is confronted with the revival of
a discussion that we had in the sixties and seventies: Is the U.S.
also prepared to use those systems for the survival of Europe?"
[Article in Die Welt , December 4, 1987, p. 6. FBIS, December
9, 1987, p. 10]
Manfred Woerner, the German Defense Minister, has expressed concern regard-
ing the disparities in the conventional balance, which are accentuated by the removal
of NATO INF weapons from Europe. When Minister Woerner takes up his new pos-
tion as NATO Secretary-General this summer, his Stated goal will be to maintain the
West's option on modernizing its tactical or short-range nuclear weapons [Interview
with Defense Minister Woerner by David Marsh, Financial Times (London), Decem-
ber 17, 1987].
3. Other European critics and concerns.
While the majority of Western European citizens and politicians support the INF
Treaty, statements by various arms control and defense experts, politicians, and
newspapers in Western Europe reveal some concerns about the impact of the treaty on
Western European security. A partial sampling:
French Presidential Candidate Raymond Barre during an interview on French
Television on the eve of the Summit:
(It is) "absolutely necessary to engage in an arms control
process and to reduce arsenals," (but) "to begin by intermediate-
range nuclear forces is to create a hole in deterrence." (The treaty
will) "put Europe in a situation of inferiority." [December 7, 1987
interview, Printed in State Department report, op. cit., p. 5]
.French defense expert, Pierre Lellouche:
'The truth needs to be told. Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher and President Francois Mitterrand, for example, ex-
press enthusiastic support for the INF Treaty in public but speak
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differently in private; they know better. Europeans need to be
told that there is no alternative to the policy that has successful-
ly maintained European peace for forty years, namely a mixture
of nuclear deterrence and a robust conventional defense." [Ar-
ticle in International Herald Tribune, January 11, 1988]
Din Welt (German Newpaper):
"Nuclear weapons are an essential element of deterrence. A
conventional war is more likely to break out again if our deter-
rence potential lacks the nuclear component. The complete
withdrawal of Pershing II and cruise missiles as provided in the
INF arms control treaty will have a decisive impact on the Soviet
Union's assessment of the risks it will encounter when attacking
Western Europe." [Editorial of December 10, 1987]
Seventy-three European political, military, and intellectual leaders signed an ap-
peal to link the INF agreement to substantial reductions in the Soviet Union's superior
conventional and chemical forces. They wrote:
"Far from enhancing Western security, we believe (the INF
agreement) would shift the military balance in favor of the War-
saw Pact and assist the Soviet Union in seeking to induce politi-
cal changes in the West favorable to its interests... We are also
fearful that it would weaken the credibility of the U.S. nuclear
guarantee to Europe, sow discord within the Alliance, and
seriously erode the reputation and influence of the U.S. upon
which free societies remain crucially dependent." (The appeal,
entitled "Western Interests in the Arms Talks," was run in the
Washington Post, November 17, 1987]
ISSUES FOR CONGRESS
Next Steps: Modernization or arms control?
Even as they await U.S. ratification of the INF Treaty, Western Europeans have
begun to debate the next course of action. The central themes of this debate involve
the choice between continuing with already established guidelines for NATO nuclear
force modernization, or initiatives for further reductions in long-range strategic nuclear
weapons, short-range nuclear forces in Europe, conventional forces, and chemical
weapons.
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Modernization. NATO's plans for nuclear modernization were promulgated at
the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) ministerial meeting at Montebello,
Canada, in October 1983. The "Montebello Decision": a) reaffirmed NATO's com-
mitment to the dual-track decision and its implementation; b) noted the completion
of an earlier decision to unilaterally withdraw 1,000 nuclear weapons from NATO's
stockpiles; c) called for the further withdrawal of 1,400 nuclear weapons from the
stockpile during the next few years; and, most importantly, d) identified a range of pos-
sible improvements to NATO's nuclear force posture and conventional forces.
The main elements of NATO's theater nuclear modernization program include:
1) The development of a Follow-on to the LANCE surface-to-surface missile
with increased range, improved accuracy, and improved operating charac-
teristics;
2) The development of a standoff Tactical Air-to-Surface Missile (TASM);
3) The modernization of NATO's Artillery-Fired Projectiles (AFAPs); and
4) The continued modernization of NATO's dual-capable (nuclear-conven-
tional) aircraft and associated nuclear bombs.
[See the Defense Department's recent report to Congress, Support of
NATO Strategy in the 1990's, printed in the Congressional Record of
January 27, 1988, pp. S 125-S 137]
Arms Control. At the June 1987 Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Coun-
cil at Reykjavik, Iceland, the alliance stated its comprehensive concept of arms control,
which, in addition to an INF agreement, includes:
? A 50 percent reduction in the strategic offensive nuclear weapons of the U.S.
and U.S.S.R.;
? The global elimination of chemical weapons;
? The establishment of a stable and secure level of conventional forces in the
whole of Europe; and
? In conjunction with the establishment of a conventional balance and global
elimination of chemical weapons, tangible and verifiable reductions of
American and Soviet land-based nuclear missile systems of shorter range,
leading to equal ceilings.
[Statement on the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council at
Reykjavik, Iceland (11-12 June 1987)]
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Contrary to NATO's emphasis on reductions in strategic nuclear systems and con-
ventional forces, some elements in Europe have called on the alliance to deal with the
short-range nuclear systems immediately after signing the INF Treaty. This is heard
most prominently by German Foreign Minister Hans-Deitrich Genscher, who has ar-
gued that NATO should pursue a "triple zero" agreement eliminating short-range and
tactical nuclear weapons. Genscher's position appeals to many Germans who are un-
easy about the fact that most of NATO's short-range nuclear weapons are based, and
would be employed, on German territory. Conservative elements in Western Europe,
and Germany in particular, also support the concept of reducing short-range missiles
to some lower level, but reject a zero option. Their central concern is the vast 15:1
Soviet superiority in the short-range missile category.
A central concern for the U.S., therefore, is what impact the INF treaty will have
on the existing NATO defense consensus to modernize conventional forces and nuclear
forces not prohibited by the INF Treaty? Senior Western European diplomatic sour-
ces seem to indicate that many European leaders are now convinced that the way ahead
is to negotiate the elimination or reduction of the remaining short-range or battlefield
nuclear weapons. [Based on interviews in Western Europe, December 1987. See also,
"Europeans aren't sure about value of nuclear arms jreaty, Chicago Tribune, Decem-
ber 3, 1987] In such a climate it would be politically impossible to launch into a spend-
ing spree on modernizing NATO's conventional and nuclear weapons. According to
Dominique Moisi, associate director of the French Institute for International Rela-
tions, there was "naivete in the NATO [modernization] program because there is no
money to finance it and public opinion is against it." ["Europeans aren't sure about
value of nuclear arms treaty," Chicago Tribune December 3, 1987, p. 1]
The INF agreement, and the arms control environment it will engender, may also
have the adverse effect of polarizing European and American arms control interests,
thus deepening the rift between American and European perceptions of security. One
of the paradoxes borne out of the INF Agreement is that the more the United States
emphasizes strategic nuclear arms reductions, the more the Western Europeans will
want to emphasize reductions in the short range nuclear force category. This is because
Europeans will feel that the United States, by pressing for START reductions, will be
reducing the nuclear threat to the superpowers while magnifying the dangers of limited
nuclear warfare on the European continent.
Article XIV: Noncircumvention Clause
Related to the modernization issue is Article XIV of the treaty, which, though it
does not say so explicit?- may be used by the Soviet Union and the European left to
proscribe future U.S. anu Western European nuclear modernization efforts. The ar-
ticle reads:
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"The Parties shall comply with this Treaty and shall not as-
sume any international obligations or undertakings which would
conflict with its provisions."
While administration officials have testified that nothing in the INF Treaty can be
construed so as to interfere with planned NATO nuclear and conventional force mod-
ernization, or with U.S. and allied joint cooperative weapons development programs,
the phrase "shall not assume any international obligations or undertakings which would
conflict with its provisions," is just ambiguous and vague enough to give the Soviet
Union a basis for complaining about future NATO modernization efforts.
Already the Soviet Union has indicated that it would view any NATO nuclear mod-
ernization as being inconsistent with the purpose of the Treaty. During his visit to Bonn
on January 19, 1988, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze warned that western
proposals to deploy new nuclear weapons as substitutes for those being scrapped by the
INF Treaty would "scuttle" all of the recent progress in disarmament. Shevardnadze
went on to strongly criticize NATO's nuclear force modernization proposals, specifi-
cally urging West Germany and other NATO allies to drop plans to deploy a new, mod-
ernized version of the battlefield-range LANCE missile. ["Shevardnadze Hits NATO
Arms Plans," Washington Post, January 20, 1988]
Soviet calls for denuclearization will sound attractive to a Western European
public that is already opposed to further deployments of nuclear weapons, and which
is always in favor of disarmament. The practical result of this is that each time NATO
decides to deploy a weapon system that, while not prohibited by the INF Treaty, comes
close to the range limitations defined by the Treaty, the Soviets and the European left
will cry "circumvention." A long and difficult debate could then ensue in the west as
we decide whether or not we are violating the "spirit of the agreement."
Conclusion: NATO After The INF Treaty
The INF Treaty ratification process leads NATO to once again reexamine the
viability of its strategic concepts for deterrence and defense. It is not a subject the al-
liance happily deals with, for such discussions threaten to expose the different security
predicaments and hence, perceptions, of the various alliance partners. At heart of the
debate (at least for the Western Europeans) is whether the U.S. strategic nuclear
guarantee remains credible after the Pershing II and GLCMs are removed. This ques-
tion was considered before the weapons were deployed in Europe and is sure to be
reconsidered upon their removal. The alliance will have to face squarely a number of
important arms control, modernization, and doctrinal issues that have the potential for
causing tensions within the alliance if they are not handled adroitly.
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In the late 1970's, and primarily as a result of the neutron bomb debacle, the
European allies had lost confidence in the ability of the U.S. to lead the alliance. Under
the Reagan administration, confidence in the U.S. has been restored and, as the suc-
cess of the dual-track decision illustrates, alliance resolve and cohesion has been
strengthened. It would be tragically ironic if a treaty meant to strengthen the alliance
had the opposite effect by creating doubts in the minds of the Europeans as to the ef-
ficacy of the American security guarantee to Western Europe. Bearing in mind the
potentially divisive impact of the INF Treaty, the countries of NATO must be prepared
to address, with careful thought and planning, the important defense issues prompted
by the INF Treaty.
Staff contact: Robert Soofer, 224-2946.
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