INTERNAL SITUATION IN PAKISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M00005R000400040012-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 29, 2012
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: September 22, 1988
• Content Type: MISC

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Talking Points for the DCI
22 September 1988
Internal Situation in Pakistan
The political situation in Pakistan remains calm, with the political
parties preparing for the 16 November parliamentary elections.
--On 2 October the Supreme Court begins deliberations on Pakistan
People's Party (PPP) leader Benazir Bhutto's petition challenging
President Zia's decision to hold nonparty elections.
--The former ruling Pakistan Muslim League has split into two rival
factions. One faction is headed by former Prime Minister Junejo.
The other is led by Fida Mohammad Khan and includes the current
interim government's caretaker ministers who command their own
personal power bases and wield considerable patronage.
--Benazir, in an effort to assuage the military's suspicions and
attract the Pakistani business community, is burnishing her moderate
credentials by emphasizing the military's legitimate role in
Pakistan's security and disavowing radical economic policies, such
as nationalization of key sectors.
The military is probably content with the situation as it stands; the
Army has the influence it needs but is shielded from criticism arising from
the day-to-day administration of national affairs.
--The military will keep a close eye on the upcoming campaign and
elections. The generals probably prefer nonparty elections--which
would impede the PPP--but will go along if the Supreme Court rules
in favor of party-based polling. General Beg has denounced Bhutto
and the PPP to US diplomats, but we do not believe he will move
against her before the elections
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--The Army would intervene if widespread unrest--especially in the
Punjab--accompanied the elections and their aftermath. 25X1
We believe that the Army would try to work with a PPP government if it
pledged to protect the military's interests and took no action against
officers involved in the execution of Zulfiqar All Bhutto.
--Intelligence Chief Gul took a sounding of Army officers and believes
the Army would initially work with a PPP government
--The generals could be concerned that prohibiting Benazir from taking
office would create unrest.
Islamabad is convinced that the recent spate of cross-border airstrikes
by Afghanistan and the Soviets is part of an effort to intimidate Pakistan
Into curtailing support for the Afghan resistance.
--Three airstrikes against Pakistani villages have occurred this
month, killing five and injuring at least 17.
--The airstrikes were almost certainly deliberate. The villages were
populated by Pakistanis--and not Afghan refugees--and were well
inside Pakistani territory.
--Islamabad has asked Washington to protest the raids to Moscow and
may try to use them as evidence for Pakistan's need for E-3 AWACS
aircraft.
Indo-Pak Relations
We do not expect the nature of Indo-Pakistani relations to change in
the weeks leading up to Pakistani elections in November. Indian officials
are maintaining a wait-and-see attitude and are not likely to initiate any
new confidence-building measures or other bilateral agreements until
Pakistan settles on a new government. Pakistani officials are preoccupied
with the elections.
--New Delhi is probably quietly hoping for a Benezir Bhutto victory.
New Delhi will not take any action that could lead to charges of
interfering in Pakistani internal affairs or prompt the generals
into taking over.
--The Pakistanis have toned down their rhetoric indicating a "foreign
hand" in Zia's plane crash, but we do not rule out the possibility
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that they might raise possible Indian complicity again, perha s t
deflect charges that military incompetence led to the crash.
Afghanistan: Status of the Soviet Withdrawal
Since 15 August the Soviet troop withdrawal process has slowed, but not
stopped.
--Small support units, residual elements of previously-withdrawn
combat units, and small groups of individuals continue to leave
Afghanistan.
--Meanwhile, the Soviets have continued to rotate units and are
continuing to replace rotating conscripts in order to maintain the
manning levels and combat effectiveness of those around force units
still operating in Afghanistan.
While Soviet forces protect convoys and conduct road security
operations, they have given continued support to the Afghan armed forces
since mid-August.
--Except for the Konduz relief operation, most Soviet support has
taken the form of artillery and air support.
--We have no evidence to confirm the persistent rumors that Soviet
troops have been sent to shore up the beleaguered Afghan defenders
of Qandahar.
Status of the Regime
The Kabul regime continues to deteriorate as resistance successes and
the failure of Najibullah's consolidation efforts increases internal
factionalism.
--Najibullah's efforts to placate hardline Khalqis by promoting
several Khalqis within the Defense and Foreign Affairs Ministries
appears instead to have alienated his own following in the party and
improved the Khalqi position for an eventual coup.
--Rumors that Moscow and Najibullah are considering the Cordovez
Plan--in which the regime would surrender power to a neutral interim
government--are Probably untrue. but have further increased regime
nervousness.
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Insurgent Morale
Insurgent morale is at an all-time high following several recent
military victories.
--The
capture of Spin Buldak
Qandahar city. The insurgents
largest city in Afghanistan,
last week completes the isolation
view the fall of Qandahar,
as just a matter of time,
of
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--Over
the past few weeks, insurgents
have captured provincial
capitals in three widely separate areas of the country--Talocian in
the north, Bamian in central Afghanistan, and Zareh Sharan in
Paktika Province in the east--underscoring the insurgency's wide
effectiveness.
--Insurgent attacks have closed the Kabul International Airport twice,
at the end of August and beginning of September, damaging the main
runway and destroying an ammunition depot.
--In August, an insurgent rocket attack destroyed a major Soviet
ammunition depot
at Pol-e Khomri, killing at least 100 Soviets.
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The
attacks serve both
military and psychological ends. Militarily,
successful attacks on ammunition depots and airfields reduces the regime's
ability to fight.
--When the insurgents overrun garrisons, generally they capture large
amounts of supplies and ammunition, which further reduces the
regime's ability
to fight and increases the insurgents'
supply of
weapons and food.
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Psychologically, successful
insurgent attacks and captured
cities
underscores regime ineffectiveness and reduce regime legitimacy and morale.
Successful attacks also boost insurgent morale.
--The insurgents will continue their successful strategy of using
siege and psychological warfare tactics, but will not hesitate to
take
advantage of any opportunities
the crumbling regime forces give
them.
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Impact of Leadership Change in Pakistan
Although President Zia's death could seriously alter Pakistan's Afghan
policy over the long term, we expect little immediate change.
--Acting President Ishaq Khan was closely involved in forming
Pakistan's Afghan policy under Zia, and available evidence suggests
that he believes, as Zia did, that a Soviet withdrawal, followed by
a resistance victory, are essential to Pakistan's security.
--Domestic concerns are, however, likely to limit the attention
Islamabad can give to Afghan affairs. Pakistani efforts to
manipulate resistance politics in favor of the Islamist parties are
likely to decline.
--Zia's personal mediation was often necessary to paper over divisions
within the alliance leadership. Without Zia, resistance political
splits are likely to grow and may lead to the eventual collapse of
the alliance interim government.
--Diplomatic reporting indicates that radical Islamist leader
Gulbuddin Hikmatyar is concerned that Zia's death might endanger his
perceived status as Islamabad's choice for post-Soviet Afghan
leader.
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