BREAKFAST WITH SENATOR MALCOLM WALLOP AND WILLIAM GEIMER, PRESIDENT, JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M00005R000400060009-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 26, 2013
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: April 25, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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WA HU
Vol "I
OCA 88-1280
25 April 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director
FROM: John Helgerson
Director of Congressional Affairs
SUBJECT: Breakfast with Senator Malcolm Wallop (R., WY) and
William Geimer, President, Jamestown Foundation
1. You will host Senator Wallop and Mr. Geimer for breakfast at
0800 hours on 26 April. Bob Gates, Dick Stolz and I will join you.
This breakfast is at Senator Wallop's initiative. According to
Senator Wallop's staff, the principal purpose is to discuss defector
resettlement issues and support for the Jamestown Foundation's
work. Bob Gates has met with Mr. Geimer several times and Dick
Stolz is familiar with the defector resettlement programs and
issues.
2. Mr. Geimer is an attorney who established the
Jamestown Foundation in 1984. The nonprofit Foundation assists
"high level" East Bloc defectors who can provide in-sights into their
former countries and governments. It provides a variety of free
services, including legal aid and assistance for defectors writing
books and articles.
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3. During 1986,'Mr. Geimer was highly critical of the Agency's
handling of defectors. For example, a December 1986 New York Times
article quotes him as stating, "They say a guy who defects is a
traitor, no matter how you look at it. And they treat them like
dirt." Mr. Geimer has apparently changed his views. In 1987 Senate
testimony he said, "...the CIA seems to have resolved the problems
which affected its performance in the past. It has been quite some
time since we have heard the type of horror story which used to be
commonplace. We are inclined to give the credit for this to CIA
Deputy Director Bob Gates, who has a sincere interest in the welfare
of defectors." 25X1
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CONFIDENTIAL
4. You may wish to draw on the following general description of
the organizational changes we made in the wake of the
5. During the 1987 Senate hearings, Mr. Geimer made several
recommendations which he may well repeat at the breakfast including:
-- Endowing a federally financed fund to help high level
defectors acquire educational and other credentials
necessary to "...establish themselves as full members
of the American academic and policy-influencing
sector,"
-- Reducing the waiting period for American citizenship
from ten years to three years for certain highly
desirable individuals,
-- Informing defectors about the existence of
organizations like the Jamestown Foundation and
arranging a meeting with the organization early in the
.debriefing process,
-- Using Agency authorities to support nonintelligence
defectors.
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', i
-- We always welcome suggestions about how to improve our
work with defectors.
-- Most of the defectors we work with want minimal
exposure and quiet resettlement. We are well aware of
the excellent work of the Jamestown Foundation and
other organizations aiding defectors. We will
certainly give most careful consideration to referring
defectors in appropriate cases.
Intelligence Community.
6. Senator Wallop, a former Member of the Intelligence
Committee, maintains an active interest in intelligence and national
security issues. Although we expect the breakfast to focus on
Jamestown Foundation issues, Senator Wallop is particularly active
now on arms control and the INF Treaty. One of his recent Senate
speeches concerning the INF Treaty is attached. In the last
paragraphs he alleges that "...there has been an effort to
strong-arm members of the intelligence community by high-ranking US
officials to change their assessments of the number of
treaty-limited items." He also cites "...the DCI's failure to
provide a consensus figure on the number of SS-20's" as evidence
that verification of INF has had a "perfidious effect" on the
-- We may want to talk about the details of this
issue at another time.
-- On occasion, agencies of the Intelligence Community do
not agree on specific issues--that is a strength in
our system, not a weakness. We can give policymakers
a clear understanding of the ambiguities of evidence
in a particular case. We don't bury our differences.
-- The SS-20 case is an important issue but not atypical.
We are working with little data for reasons you know
well. The analysts involved use different
methodologies to make their estimates. They all do a
responsible, professional job and I do not have the
evidence to dismiss any of these estimates.
7. Senator Wallop has strongly opposed the Intelligence
Oversight bill that passed the Senate last month by a margin of
71-19. He believes the bill was poorly drafted and is concerned
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CONFIDENTIAL
that the requirement to notify the Intelligence Committees or the
leadership of Congress of a covert action no later than 48 hours
after Presidential approval of theFinding will make it more
difficult to obtain the cooperation of other countries in
implementing a covert action. Senator Wallop was also concerned
about the definition of special activities contained in the bill.
Senator Wallop was successful in obtaining Senate approval of two
amendments to the oversight bill. The first amendment strengthens
your authority to withhold the identity of other countries assisting
the Agency in carrying out a covert action. The second amendment
clarifies a provision of the bill so as to permit the Agency to
carry out activities in other countries that would violate U.S. law
if performed in the U.S.
-- I appreciate your effort on the Senate floor to clarify
my authority to protect the identity of countries assisting
the Agency in carrying out covert action and to clarify the
authority of the Agency to carry out activities in other
countries that would violate U.S. law if performed in the
-- I agree with you that the definition of special
activities contained in the bill can be improved, and I
understand that the House Intelligence Committee is working
on a companion bill that will attempt to clarify the
definition of special activities.
-- Given the climate today in Congress on the issue of
Congressional notification of special activities, it is
likely the Administration will face the same difficulty in
the House as it did in the Senate in persuading a majority
of Members to accept a provision in the Intelligence
Oversight bill recognizing the President's power to delay
notification of a Finding beyond 48 hours.
-- I understand the President will probably veto the bill
if it is presented to him with a provision requiring
mandatory notice of a Finding within 48 hours.
Unfortunately, the prospects do not appear bright at this
moment that the veto can be sustained. (U)
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Name (including party/state:) Malcolm Wallop (R., WY.)
First elected: 1976 Up for re-election: 1988 Winning%: 57
Past service on intelligence committee: Yes: X No:
Current service on intelligence committee: Yes: No: X
Term on intelligence committee expires:
Other committee assignments: Energy and Natural Resources
Finance
Small Business
Major legislative interests: Arms Control
Energy
Key votes: February Vote on Contra Aid--Yes
Cohen-Boren Bill--No
Intelligence interests: Soviet Strategic Programs
Counterintelligence
Visits to CIA facilities:
Last contact with DCI/DDCI: OCA has no record of contact in the
last year
Recent correspondence: None in the last six months
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April 12,-1988 - CONGI ESSIONAZ, REGY)Rb+-ANA`I"E
If you look .at the unified budget you can
think that by a combination of good eco-
nomic growth and moderate expenditure re-
straint you can ooze into budget balance in
five years. or if not five, then six or seven.
But if you are looking at the budget exclud-
ing the Social Security accounts, balance by
this route looks discouragingly far off.
THE "POLITICAL QUESTION"
The economics is pretty clear. We can
achieve high employment with a unified
budget surplus equal to the Social Security
surplus. Doing this, as compared with bal-
anchig the unified budget, will mean more
national saving, more national investment
and higher future national income out of
which to support the growing number of re-
tired people.
The "political" question is more difficult.
The question is not about "politicians" or
about "inside the Beltway." It is about us. It
is about how we bring ourselves collectively
to make decisions for the sake of our collec-
tive future. That is a question that applies
to a lot more than Social Security. And I
don't know how to answer it except by talk-
ing about it.
Mr. PROXMIRE. I yield the floor.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. The Senator from Wyoming is
recognized.
Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, I
thank the Chair.
THE INF TREATY'S
VERIFICATION PROVISIONS
Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, in a
closed session of the Senate last
month we took a detailed look at the
capability to and likelihood that the
Soviet Union would maintain a covert
deployment -of SS-20 intermediate-
range nuclear missiles. The total un-
verifiability of such a covert force,
combined with strong incentives to
cheat, especially in a post-START stra-
tegic environment, make that problem
a crucial verification concern.
It is not, however, the only verifica-
tion concern. I would like this morning
to review some of the other verifica-
tion deficiencies of the INF Treaty
and offer some suggestions on how the
verification regime might be improved.
From a verification standpoint, the
Soviet acceptance of the United States
zero option position made verification
easier than it would be in an agree-
ment that merely placed limits on cer-
tain types of weapon systems. Indeed,
Soviet acceptance of that position has
been used to justify some fairly sub-
stantial last minute changes in United
States verification positions, such as
falling off the requirement for suspect
site verification.
The inadequacy of the INF verifica-
tion -regime to monitor numerical
limits, as opposed to total elimination,
has been recognized by the Intelli-
gence Committee. It laid down a
strong marker that the INF Treaty
verification procedures would be
wholly inadequate to the task of veri-
fying limits of a START agreement.
Mr. President, the zero option, in
theory, creates what might be called a
"binary situation." Compliance or non-
compliance are made clear cut, If a
single 88-20 is seen after the reduc-
tions to zero, it Is a violation. What
concerns me, Mr. President, is that the
INF Treaty contains important excep-
tions to this clear cut, binary situa-
tion.
Such exceptions will increase what
our intelligence analysts call the
"background noise" in the Soviet
Union with respect to this treaty. This
noise will make it much harder for the
United States to render judgments
about Soviet activities and might also
create compliance problems needless-
ly, with no easy solutions.
What are the treaty provisions that
muddy the waters of the verification
picture, denying us clear evidence of
violations? First, Mr. President, is the
problem with data.
Not only is there a large discrepancy
between United States intelligence es-
timates and Soviet data provided in
the treaty, but the data provided up
front, last December, Is totally mean-
ingless as far as the treaty is con-
cerned because it is not the data that
will be used to verify compliance with
the treaty; 30 days after the treaty is
signed the United States and the
Soviet Union will exchange new data
for that purpose.
If any changes have occurred in the
data from the original memorandum
of understanding, the United States
will have no right to inspect, via the
treaty's agreed procedures, whether
the destruction of Soviet missiles and
launchers that are no longer in the da-
tabase were actually eliminated. More-
over, the INF Treaty is silent on -the
rights of the parties if a discrepancy
between the two data exchanges
emerges.
Mr. President, administration offi-
cials have assured the Senate that
large discrepancies would "send a
shock wave from Moscow to Washing-
ton," This Senator is not confident
that after the Senate has given con-
sent to the INF Treaty and it has been
ratified by the President, that we
would do anything about such a data
discrepancy.
We have seen before that the Sovi-
ets have falsified data with respect to
arms control negotiations in order to
maintain a unilateral advantage over
the United States; there is no reason
to believe that this could not happen
again. We have in effect handed them
an already signed treaty with a blank
for them to fill In whatever numbers
they please after ratification.
Second, Mr. President, the INF
Treaty allows the Soviet Union to con-
tinue production of the first stage of
the SS-20 and, due to a drafting error,
the second stage as well. Although the
SS-20 per se is banned, this allowance
for production of missile stages that
are similar to the SS-20 will make it
virtually impossible to monitor wheth-
er these components are being pro-
duced and then assembled outside of
areas where the United States has in-
spection rights. In the hearings, one
administration official was asked if an
`?'3747
SS-25, which can be produced legally,
was seen leaving the production facili-
ty at Votkinsk with only two stages
whether that would be a violation of
the treaty. The answer was no, but
again we were assured that it would
send a shock wave from Votkinsk to
Washington.
Mr. President, shockwaves were sent
back to Washington in 1974 when the
Soviet Union began flight-testing two
new heavy ICBM's contrary to and in
circumvention -of the United States
understanding of the SALT I agree-
ment. Nothing was done then, and I
am far less sanguine than administra-
tion officials that something would be
done today.
Third, Mr. President, the Soviets are
allowed to keep -intact hundreds of
their mobile missile launchers for al-
leged civilian use. This could make it
increasingly difficult to determine if
those launchers, when seen, are for
military or the civilian purposes the
Soviet say they are for. If we were to
challenge the Soviets, they could
always claim that they were for civil-
ian use.
This problem is further exacerbated
by the similarity between the SS-20
launcher and the SS-25 launcher. The
quality of our intelligence data would
make it extremely difficult to render a
firm judgment on this question. Addi-
tionally, the Soviets have the right to
maintain SS-25 bases which have an
infrastructure similar to and compati-
ble with former SS-20 bases.
This will further raise the back-
ground noise that the intelligence
community must filter through.
Fourth, the Soviets could potentially
maintain a force of ground-launched
cruise missiles because of the allow-
ances in the treaty for nonarmed
cruise missiles.
Remotely piloted vehicles, such as
those used for reconnaissance behind
enemy lines, could in fact be armed
with warheads in time of war. Under
the treaty, we have absolutely no in-
spection rights with regard to these
forces.
The INF Treaty does not define
what constitutes a different type of
cruise missile other than those present-
ly in the Soviet inventory, nor does it
establish what criteria will permit us
to determine if a cruise missile is un-
armed. As a practical matter, it is im-
possible for us to determine whether
Soviet cruise missiles have ranges that
fall within the prohibited limits.
As a matter of fact, as we have seen
with Iraqi scub missiles, we have no
practical means of determining ballis-
tic missiles ranges either.
This points out a problem inherent
to the arms control process since its
inception. We can count on the Soviet
Union stressing to its limits-and
beyond-its rights to modernize its
forces, in this case, all manner of
cruise missiles.
We can also count on the United
States unilaterally limiting itself not
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S 3748 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE April 12, 1988
just in the cruise missile area, but in RECOGNITION OF THE CONCLUSION OF MORNING
cruise missiles, such as remotely pilot-
ed vehicles and target drones. I have
heard stories of contractors already
beginning to pull back on programs
that are functionally similar to the
cruise missiles limited in the INF
Treaty.
BUSINESS
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- Mr. BYRD. Is morning business
pore. The Republican leader is recog- closed?
nized. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Morning business is closed.
BICENTENNIAL MINUTE
tions. The INF Treaty is heralded as
having the most intrusive inspection
rights ever negotiated with the Sovi-
ets. That is true, especially since we
have never had any inspection rights
beyond national technical- means. The
more important question is, "How
useful are they?"
First of all, the United States is lim-
ited to very few onsite inspections, ini-
tially 20, then declining to 15 and later
10. What is more, the United States
for practical purposes may not use
more than half of those in the Soviet
Union. That means that we are really
limited to-10, 8, and then 5 inspections
per year.
Another more crucial problem is the
lack of inspections for suspect sites.
Only those sites identified in the
memorandum of understanding are
subject to inspection. There are facili-
ties that have been identified by the
intelligence community as SS-20 facili-
ties that are not on the Soviet list.
Moreover, in the rush to complete
the treaty prior to the summit many
of the actual procedures for inspection
were left vague or simply were not
worked out. General Lajoie, the head
of the U.S. inspection team, is having
to negotiate those details even as we in
the Senate head toward a vote on con-
sent to ratification. Right now, today,
Mr. President, these details remain to
be negotiated. Yet the administration
is asking the Senate to proceed.
Mr. President, there is one other
aspect of the verification problem that
troubles me, and that is the already
perfidious effect this agreement has
had on the U.S. intelligence communi-
ty. The first evidence of this, revealed
in the closed session, was the DCI's
failure to provide a consensus figure
on the number of SS-20's produced.
Even more troublesome, I am told, is
that there has been an effort to
strong-arm members of the intelli-
gence community by high-ranking
U.S. officials to change their assess-
ments of the number of treaty-limited
items. Reports in the Washington
Times indicate that General Perroots
was raked over the coals by the Chair-
man of the JCS and the Secretary of
Defense for his agency's position on
the number of SS-20's.
If there is indeed an attempt to
suborn the intelligence community, it
will not be the first time. Senators
who were here in 1979 and 1980 will
remember well the pressure placed on
the intelligence community to revise
its estimates of the Soviet threat prior
to the SALT II debate.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, on April
12, 1945, 43 years ago today, Vice
President Harry S. Truman sat in the
Presiding Officer's chair and per-
formed his functions as President of
the Senate for the last time, unaware
that President Franklin D. Roosevelt
had died that afternoon in Warm
Springs, GA.
Harry Truman had spent "the hap-
piest 10 years" of his life in the Senate
before he was unexpectedly chosen to
run for Vice President with Franklin
Roosevelt in 1944. During the first 3
months of his new responsibilities,
Truman dutifully presided over Senate
debates-as Vice Presidents did rou-
tinely in those days. "I enjoyed my
new position as Vice President," he re-
ported, "but it took me a while to get
used to the fact that I no longer had
the voting privileges I had enjoyed for
10 years as a Senator."
That afternoon, while Truman lis-
tened to a "windy Senator making a
speech on a subject with which he is
in no way familiar," he spent his time
writing a letter to his mother and
sister back in Missouri. When the
Senate adjourned, the Vice President
sauntered over to the House side of
the Capitol to join Speaker Sam-Ray-
burn and other congressional friends
in the "board of education" room, as
Rayburn called it, for a little bourbon
and political talk. But when Truman
arrived he received an urgent message.
The voice on the phone told him to
come directly to the White House. No
explanation was given, but Truman
sensed the urgency of the request.
Darting past his Secret Service agent,
Harry Truman ran the length of the
Capitol back to his limousine on the
Senate side, and raced downtown.
As he entered the White House Elea-
nor Roosevelt took him aside and told
him, "Harry, the President is dead."
"Is there anything I can do for you?"
he asked. "Is there anything we can do
for you?" she replied. "For you are the
one in trouble now."
I reserve the remainder of my time.
Mr. President, I suggest the absence
of a quorum.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk- proceeded to call the
roll.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Without objection, it is so or-
dered.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
RESOLUTION FOR 1989
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Under the previous order, the
Senate will now resume consideration
of Senate Concurrent Resolution 113,
which the clerk will report.
The bill clerk read as follows:
A concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 113)
setting forth the congressional budget for
the United States Government for the fiscal
years 1989, 1990, and 1991.
The Senate resumed consideration
of the concurrent resolution.
ORDER OF PROCEDURE
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, how
much time remains on the resolution?
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Forty hours.
Mr. BYRD. Forty hours.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the time for the recess today
be charged against both sides equally
on the resolution.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Without objection, it is so or-
dered.
The Senator from New Mexico.
Mr. DOMENICI. Let the record re-
flect that I am present and I have no
objection.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Without objection, the record
shall so reflect.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank
the distinguished Senator. I suggest
the absence of a quorum. I ask the
time be charged equally against both
sides.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Without objection, it is so or-
dered.
The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the
roll.
Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Without objection, it is so or-
dered. The Senator from Iowa is recog-
nized.
Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent to speak as if
in morning business for a period of
time of 5 minutes or until the manag-
ers of the budget want the floor, but
for no longer than 10 minutes.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Without objection, it is so or-
dered.
Mr. BYRD addressed the Chair.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. The majority leader.
Mr.- BYRD. ' Would the Senator
agree to charge the time that he uses
against his side or equally against
both sides? It is only 5 or 10 minutes.
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April 12, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
If you look at the unified budget you can
think that by a combination of good eco-
nomic growth and moderate expenditure re-
straint you can ooze into budget balance in
five years, or if not five, then six or seven.
But if you are looking at the budget exclud-
ing the Social Security accounts, balance by
this route looks discouragingly far off.
THE "POLITICAL QUESTION"
The economics is pretty clear. We can
achieve high employment with a unified
budget surplus equal to the Social Security
surplus. Doing this, as compared with bal-
ancing the unified budget, will mean more
national saving, more national investment
and higher future national income out of
which to support the growing number of re-
tired people.
The "political" question is more difficult.
The question is not about "politicians" or
about "inside the Beltway." It is about us. It
is about how we bring ourselves collectively
to make decisions for the sake of our collec-
tive future. That is a question that applies
to a lot more than Social Security. And I
don't know how to answer it except by talk-
ing about it.
Mr. PROXMIRE. I yield the floor.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. The Senator from Wyoming is
recognized.
Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, I
thank the Chair.
THE INF TREATY'S
VERIFICATION PROVISIONS
Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, in a
closed session of the Senate last
month we took a detailed look at the
capability to and likelihood that the
Soviet Union would maintain a covert
deployment - of SS-20 intermediate-
range nuclear missiles. The total un-
verifiability of such a covert force,
combined with strong incentives to
cheat, especially in a post-START stra-
tegic environment, make that problem
a crucial verification concern.
It is not, however, the only verifica-
tion concern. I would like this morning
to review some of the other verifica-
tion deficiencies of the INF Treaty
and offer some suggestions on how the
verification regime might be improved.
From a verification standpoint, the
Soviet acceptance of the United States
zero option position made verification
easier than it would be in an agree-
ment that merely placed limits on cer-
tain types of weapon systems. Indeed,
Soviet acceptance of that position has
been used to justify some fairly sub-
stantial last minute changes in United
States verification positions, such as
falling off the requirement for suspect
site verification.
The inadequacy of the INF verifica-
tion regime to monitor numerical
limits, as opposed to total elimination,
has been recognized by the Intelli-
gence Committee. It laid down a
strong marker that the INF Treaty
verification procedures would be
wholly inadequate to the task of veri-
fying limits of a START agreement.
Mr. President, the zero option, in
theory, creates what might be called a
"binary situation." Compliance or non-
compliance are made clear cut. If a
single SS-20 is seen after the reduc-
tions to zero, it is a violation. What
concerns me, Mr. President, is that the
INF Treaty contains important excep-
tions to this clear cut, binary situa-
tion.
Such exceptions will increase what
our intelligence analysts call the
"background noise" in the Soviet
Union with respect to this treaty. This
noise will make it much harder for the
United States to render judgments
about Soviet activities and might also
create compliance problems needless-
ly, with no easy solutions.
What are the treaty provisions that
muddy the waters of the verification
picture, denying us clear evidence of
violations? First, Mr. President, is the
problem with data.
Not only is there a large discrepancy
between United States intelligence es-
timates and Soviet data provided in
the treaty, but the data provided up
front, last December, is totally mean-
ingless as far as the treaty is con-
cerned because it is.not the data that
will be used to verify compliance with
the treaty; 30 days after the treaty is
signed the United States and the
Soviet Union will exchange new data
for that purpose.
If any changes have occurred in the
data from the original memorandum
of understanding, the United States
will have no right to inspect, via the
treaty's agreed procedures, whether
the destruction of Soviet missiles and
launchers that are no longer in the da-
tabase were actually eliminated. More-
over, the INF Treaty is silent on the
rights of the parties if a discrepancy
between the two data exchanges
emerges.
Mr. President, administration offi-
cials have assured the Senate that
large discrepancies would "send a
shock wave from Moscow to Washing-
ton," This Senator is not confident
that after the Senate has given con-
sent to the INF Treaty and it has been
ratified by the President, that we
would do anything about such a data
discrepancy.
We have seen before that the Sovi-
ets have falsified data with respect to
arms control negotiations in order to
maintain a unilateral advantage over
the United. States; there is no reason
to believe that this could not happen
again. We have in effect handed them
an already signed treaty with a blank
for them to fill in whatever numbers
they please after ratification.
Second, Mr. President, the INF
Treaty allows the Soviet Union to con-
tinue production of the first stage of
the SS-20 and, due to a drafting error,
the second stage as well. Although the
SS-20 per se is banned, this allowance
for production of missile stages that
are similar to the SS-20 will make it
virtually impossible to monitor wheth-
er these components are being pro-
duced and then assembled outside of
areas where the United States has in-
spection rights. In the hearings, one
administration official was asked if an
S 3747
SS-25, which can be produced legally,
was seen leaving the production facili-
ty at Votkinsk with only two stages
whether that would be a violation of
the treaty. The answer was no, but
again we were assured that it would
send a shock wave from Votkinsk to
Washington.
Mr. President, shockwaves were sent
back to Washington in 1974 when the
Soviet Union began flight-testing two
new heavy ICBM's contrary to and in
circumvention of the United States
understanding of the SALT I agree-
ment. Nothing was done then, and I
am far less sanguine than administra-
tion officials that something would be
done today.
Third, Mr. President, the Soviets are
allowed to keep intact hundreds of
their mobile missile launchers for al-
leged civilian use. This could make it
increasingly difficult to determine if
those launchers, when seen, are for
military or the civilian purposes the
Soviet say they are for. If we were to
challenge the Soviets, they . could
always claim that they were for civil-
ian use.
This problem is further exacerbated
by the similarity between the SS-20
launcher and the SS-25 launcher. The
quality of our intelligence data would
make it extremely difficult to render a
firm judgment on this question. Addi-
tionally, the Soviets have the right to
maintain SS-25 bases which have an
infrastructure similar to and compati-
ble with former SS-20 bases.
This will further raise the back-
ground noise that the intelligence
community must filter through.
Fourth, the Soviets could potentially
maintain a force of ground-launched.
cruise missiles because of the allow-
ances in the treaty for nonarmed
cruise missiles.
Remotely piloted vehicles, such as
those used for reconnaissance behind
enemy lines, could in fact be armed
with warheads in time of war. Under
the treaty, we have absolutely no in-
spection rights with regard to these
forces.
The INF Treaty does not define
what constitutes a different type of
cruise missile other than those present-
ly in the Soviet inventory, nor does it
establish what criteria will permit us
to determine if a cruise missile is un-
armed. As a practical matter, it is im-
possible for us to determine whether
Soviet cruise missiles have ranges that
fall within the prohibited limits.
As a matter of fact, as we have seen
with Iraqi scub missiles, we have no
practical means of determining ballis-
tic missiles ranges either.
This points out a problem inherent
to the arms control process since its
inception. We can count on the Soviet
Union stressing to its limits-and
beyond-its rights to modernize its
forces, in this case, all manner of
cruise missiles.
We can also count on the United
States unilaterally limiting itself not
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Malcolm Wallop (R)
Of Big Horn - Elected 1976
Born: Feb. 27, 1933, New York, N.Y.
Education: Yale U., B.A. 1954.
Military Career. Army, 1955-57.
Occupation: Rancher; meatpacking executive.
Family: Wife. French Carter Gamble; four children, one
stepchild.
Religion: Episcopalian.
Political Career. Wyo. House. 1969-73: Wyo. Senate.
1973-77; sought Republican nomination for Wyo.
governor, 1974.
Capitol Office: 237 Russell Bldg. 20510: 224-6441.
In Washington: After spending much of
his career in the shadow of his fast-rising junior
colleague from Wyoming, GOP whip Alan K.
Simpson. Wallop has emerged in recent years
as a sharp-tongued spokesman for the Republi-
can right on foreign policy.
In the 100th Congress, with his party out-
numbered and many conservatives feeling de-
fensive even within the Reagan administration,
Wallop's aggressive stance seems well-suited to
a leadership role among his ideological breth-
ren. If he lacks notable skill in oratory or
legislative maneuvering, he has a knack for
voicing, with an acid sarcasm, the feelings and
frustrations of a sizable group of hard-liners.
Wallop's acerbic stance has not made him
one of the more popular members. He is a man
who frequently appears edgy and frustrated at
Senate life even when it seems to be going well
for him. He does not derive much evident
satisfaction from the exchange of opposing
views; often, he leaves the impression that he
believes those who disagree with him are igno-
rant.
Sometimes, he seems to suggest that his
opponents are worse than ignorant. His harsh
tone has been most evident toward those who
have been on the other side in debates over
Central America policy, in which he has been
one of Reagan's most militant defenders.
Early in 1987, Wallop told the Senate that
consideration of continued aid for the Nicara-
guan contra rebels offered a stark choice. To
vote to cut off aid, he said, "cannot be inter-
preted as anything other than a vote in favor of
the Sandinista regime.... It is a vote for com-
munism in Central America."
Wallop's comment brought an angry retort
from Connecticut Republican Lowell P.
Weicker Jr.. who was outraged by the implica-
tion that he supported expansion of Soviet
power. Although he said he was not questioning
Weicker's patriotism. Wallop not only refused
to withdraw his statement, but expanded it.
His opponents. he said. were "meekly" accept-
ing the Soviet "Brezhnev Doctrine." which is
said to hold that a country that has adopted
communism cannot be allowed to renounce it.
There is an apocalyptic quality to Wallop's
foreign policy views. Other conservatives. in-
cluding Reagan. voice frequent optimism about
restoring American supremacy in the world.
Wallop seems to portray the spread of totalitar-
ianism as inexorable. and himself as a voice in
the wilderness struggling in vain to fight it.
Wallop is well-known in the conservative
movement as an early advocate of Reagan's
strategic defense initiative missile defense sys-
tem. Working with a small group of defense
scientists. he pushed construction of laser-
armed space satellites long before such ideas
were taken seriously. Wallop's isolation ended
in 1983, when Reagan announced his support
for a space defense system.
But Wallop takes a dim view of the direc-
tion in which the administration has pushed
SDI since then. He argues that Pentagon plan-
ners have mistakenly pursued exotic. futuristic
weapons instead of what could be put into
place within a few years. "The drive for anti-
missile defense was hijacked by the Reagan
administration's incompetent and unfaithful
crew." he said on the fourth anniversary of
Reagan's SDI speech.
Wallop and a group of conservative allies
favor rapid deployment of a more basic system
designed to knock out Soviet missiles before
they reach their targets. While acknowledging
that the system would not provide the leak-
proof -umbrella- sometimes depicted by Rea-
gan. they argue that it would make a Soviet
attack too difficult to he attempted.
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Despite Wallop's preoccupation with for-
eign policy, his most significant role in the 99th
Congress was in support of another of Reagan's
prime initiatives - tax overhaul.
A strong advocate of reductions in individ-
ual tax rates. Wallop was skeptical of the tax
proposal that emerged from the administration
in 1985. By the time Finance markup had
begun in the spring of 1986, he was even more
doubtful, warning that "none of us are commit-
ted to tax reform." and questioning whether it
was worth the effort to attack special-interest
tax breaks if marginal rates were still to be
above the 25 percent level he favored.
When committee Chairman Bob Packwood
came up with his last-minute effort to save the
bill by dramatically lowering rates, however.
Wallop became one of his key allies. More
importantly. his backing gave the bill a conser-
vative seal of approval that helped ensure sup-
port from others on the right who had been
wavering.
Wallop grew disenchanted with the bill as
it progressed past Finance. By the conclusion of
conference negotiations with the House. he was
unhappy enough with the loss of certain busi-
ness deductions that he voted against it. "I
have seen us fritter away the opportunity of a
lifetime on the altar of convenience," he com-
plained. But that late criticism did not matter
much; the important thing was that he had
supported the bill at the crucial time.
Along with his conservative crusades, Wal-
lop also maintained an important role on the
energy and public-lands issues that had domi-
nated the first part of his Senate career. As
chairman of the Public Lands and Reserved
Water Subcommittee at Energy and Natural
Resources. Wallop had a key position defend-
ing Wyoming's interests. With nearly half of
Wyoming's land federally owned, and with wa-
ter rights a vital issue, he was able to monitor
every bill that would affect those subjects.
Wilderness issues dominated Wallop's
work on the subcommittee in the 98th Con-
gress. The panel was extremely busy reporting
more than a score of bills setting up wilderness
areas in most Western states. including Wyo-
ming. Along with Energy Chairman James A.
McClure of Idaho, Wallop helped clear the way
for passage of the bills by working out. a com-
promise with House Democrats. on the fate of
areas that might be designated as wilderness.
Wallop also was active in legislation facili-
tating the development of coal slurry pipelines.
The issue was a potentially difficult one for
him. Wyoming is a coal state, and coal produc-
ers are eager to have the pipelines, but they
would use large quantities of the state's scarce
water, diverting it from farmers and rand
Wallop and McClure developed a compromto the 1983 coal slurry bill that sought 14
protect arid Western states from having their
water taken for pipelines without their ap
proval. The bill was not enacted.
Wallop was never enthusiastic about 6
coming Ethics Committee chairman in the 9r tt,
Congress. His two years in the position weft
marked by only modest success.
Wallop took over at Ethics with strong
criticisms of the Senate's existing ethics code
"It is bad for the morality of the Senate." be
said. "and bad for the public's perception of the
Senate." He said he would seek to end the
" diddly little rules that serve no public purpow
and keep those that do."
Wallop's greatest challenge as committee
chairman came when the Senate held its trial of
New Jersey Democrat Harrison A. Williams Jr.
on Abscam bribery charges. The Wyoming sen.
ator guided Williams' expulsion resolution,
through the Ethics Committee, but took a back
seat to the Democratic vice chairman of the
panel. Howell Heflin of Alabama, when the
resolution reached the Senate floor. That re
fleeted Wallop's desire to avoid the appearance
of a partisan campaign against Williams.
It also made for a more effective presenta.
tion of the case on the floor. Wallop has a
stilted speaking style and he often seems to be
mumbling inaudibly under his breath; Heflin, a
polished orator, gave an eloquent recounting of
the evidence against Williams.
In 1985, Wallop ran for chairman of the
National Republican Senatorial Committee.
losing by one vote to John Heinz of Pennsylva-
nia. While he had the support of most of the
GOP's conservative wing. Wallop was unable to
overcome the reluctance of many senators to
have two Wyoming senators in the leadership
at the same time.
At Home: Wallop's Senate performance
has erased differences he had earlier in his
career with the more conservative wing of the
Wyoming GOP.
Campaigning for the 1974 Republican gu-
bernatorial nomination. Wallop was viewed as a,
moderate and drew some of his support from
voters sympathetic to environmental causes.
Coming from far behind, he wound up second
among four candidates who finished in a virtual
tie, separated by fewer than 1,500 votes.
Interesting as a statistical oddity, the pri-
mary was disastrous for Republicans. since all
four contenders felt they should have been the
winner. When Wallop did not assist the even-
tual nominee, conservative rancher Dick Jones.
many party loyalists were displeased.
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But Wallop solved that problem remark-
8N. easily in 1976. campaigning from the right
against three-term Democratic Sen. Gale W.
McGee. Although oil companies and other busi-
ness interests were somewhat leery about baF'k-
inc him. Wallop got valuable help from na-
tional conservative organizations. He depicted
McGee as supporting big government and criti-
cized him for infrequent visits to the state.
The challenger's television commercials
were especially effective. Wallop saddled up a
horse. donned a cowboy hat and urged voters to
join the "Wallop Senate drive." He ridiculed
environmental regulations by portraying a cow-
boy forced to hitch a portable toilet to his
horse. The ads helped Wallop overcome a per-
sonal background that might have been a prob-
lem. Although he was a third-generation Wyo-
ming resident and an eight-year veteran of the
state Legislature, he was born in New York
;City. educated at Yale. and had a grandfather
who once sat in the House of Lords.
The 1982 election presented a mirror im-
age of Wallop's earlier campaigns for statewide
:office. He found himself under fire from envi-
ronmentalists who claimed he had foresaken
their cause, and criticized by his Democratic
Committees
Voting Studies
Energy and Natural Resources (5th of 9 Republicans)
Public Lands. National Parks and Forests (ranking): Mineral Re-
Presidential
Party
Conservative
sources Development and Production: Water and Power.
Support
Unity
Coalition
finance (7th of 9 Republicans)
Year
S
0
S 0
S
0
Energy and Agricultural Taxation (ranking): International Trade:
1986
93
5
94
3
95
1
Taxation and Debt Management.
1985
73
14
88
5
83
5
1984
86
4
91
1
94
0
Small Business (7th of 9 Republicans)
1983
72
22
83
9
82
9
Competition and Antitrust Enforcement (ranking): Export Ex-
1982
71
18
82
10
86
5
pansion
1981
85
9
91
3
93
1
1982 General
Malcolm Wallop (R)
94,725
(57%)
Key Votes
Produce MX missiles (1985)
Weaken gun control laws (1985)
y
y
Rodger McDaniel (D)
72.466
(43%)
Reject school prayer (19851
N
1982 Primary
Limit textile imports (1985)
N
Malcolm Wallop (R)
R
h
61,650
(81%)
Amend Constitution to require balanced budget (1986)
Aid Nicaraguan contras (1986)
Y
y
ic
ard Redland Jr. (R)
14,543
(19%)
Block chemical weapons production (1986)
N
Previous Winning Percentage:
1976
(55%)
Impose sanctions on South Africa (1986)
N
Campaign Finance
Interest Group Ratings
Year ADA ACU AFL-CIO
CCUS
Receipts Expend-
Receipts from PACs itures
Wallop (R) $1,115.179 $472,240 (42%) $1.102.046
McDaniel (D) $392.351 $174,483 (45%) $389,511
Wyoming - Senior Senator
opponent for being inaccessible to constituents.
The Democrat was former state Sen. Rodger
McDaniel, a 10-year state legislator whose path
to the Democratic nomination was cleared
when Goy. Ed Herschler announced he would
seek re-election rather than challenge Wallop.
McDaniel painted the incumbent as a ser-
vant of big oil interests and claimed Wallop
had "not had one independent thought on the
economy since Ronald Reagan's inauguration."
But like Wallop in 1974. McDaniel had to be
careful not to alienate more conservative mem-
bers of his own party - some of whom were
hesitant to hack a man who had been state
coordinator for Edward M. Kenned_y's 198(1
presidential campaign.
Wallop played up his support for the presi-
dent - he backed Reagan on 71 percent of the
votes recorded in 1982 - and promised to work
to protect Wyoming water.
McDaniel proved an energetic campaigner
and, buoyed by Herschler's strong guberna-
torial showing. carried several counties along
Wyoming's predominantly Democratic south-
ern tier. But Wallop's $1 million treasury en-
abled him to nail down Republican votes in the
rest of the GOP-dominated state.
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
0
100
0
95
0
95
5
97
5
91
0
76
5
64
13
83
10
74
8
75
10
71
5
100
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STAT
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ACIS 355/88
18 April 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM:
SUBJECT:
A Synopsis of "The Arms Control Delusion"
by Senators Malcolm Wallop and Angelo
Codevilla
Action: For your information as requested by
2. Conclusion: The US must choose between seeking an
illusory safety in a continuation of the arms control
process or providing for that safety by employing a
counterforce offensive capability and anti-missile weapons.
3. Background: It is the authors' view that those
Americans who support arms control do so regardless of what
it has accomplished, and regardless of what it can
realistically be expected to accomplish in the future. The
authors believe that the "arms control process" between the
US and the Soviet Union is a delusion foisted by some
Americans. upon other Americans and perhaps on themselves.
The book does not deal with Soviet arms control violations
except as a peripheral issue.
4. The authors believe that arms control proponents
concludedthat inthe nuclear age, armaments of any kind
produce peril, not safety. These arms control proponents
pointed to "verification" as the ultimate safety net in arms
control and thereby, according to the authors, obscured from.
themselves, as well as from others, the fundamental
question: After. detection, what? In the history of arms
control, the authors assert, violations have been
overlooked, explained away, and have never provoked
punishment or retaliation.
STAT
STAT
STAT
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5. The arms control process is described as being
based both on misinterpretation and on the discounting of
Soviet policy. If the Soviets were working to achieve a
war-winning capability, it would be literally nonsense or
deception for them to enter into a treaty that would deny
them that goal. The authors believe that in the current
arms control process, the elements of treaties become the
things which can be monitored best, not the most threatening
things which must be limited:
"...US negotiators define the parameters
of arms control agreements less for
their military significance than to
conform them to the ability of US
intelligence to gather information. The
only certainty so far as the US
government is concerned,.is that both
military significance and verifiability
are less important than the arms conrol
process itself."
6. The authors contrast what the US expected from arms
control treaties with what, in their view, we actually got:
The US formulated its arms control policy based on the US
concept of Mutually Assured Destruction; the USSR based its
policy on the war-fighting and war-winning capability of its
forces. But arms control failed as a means of constraining
the Soviet Union and instead, succeeded as a means of
constraining the US.
7. Thus, the authors state that "All. of this is to say
that in the 1980's after 20 years of the arms control
process, the US is left with a radically worsened strategic
situation, with an impaired ability to judge military
developments at home and abroad, with a near-total-reliance
on arms conrol for our, safety and independence as well as
with a growing realization that Americans have precisely
zero means.for enforcing the terms of any agreement, good or
bad."
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 25X1
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STAT
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:Malcolm Wallop (R)
Of Big Horn - Elected 1976
Born: Feb. 27. 1933. New York, N.Y.
Education: Yale U.. B.A. 1954.
Military Career. Army. 1955-57.
Occupation: Rancher: meatpacking executive.
Family: Wife. French Carter Gamble; four children, one
stepchild.
Religion: Episcopalian.
Political Career. Wyo. House. 1969-73; Wyo. Senate.
1973-77,; sought Republican nomination for Wyo.
governor. 1974.
Capitol Office: 237 Russell Bldg. 20510; 224-6441.
In Washington: After spending much of
his career in the shadow of his fast-rising junior
colleague from Wyoming, GOP whip Alan K.
Simpson, Wallop has emerged in recent years
as a sharp-tongued spokesman for the Republi-
can right on foreign policy.
In the 100th Congress. with his party out-
numbered and many conservatives feeling de-
fensive even within the Reagan administration,
Wallop's aggressive stance seems well-suited to
a leadership role among his ideological breth-
ren. If he lacks notable skill in oratory or
legislative maneuvering, he has a knack for
voicing; with an acid sarcasm, the feelings and
frustrations of a sizable group of hard-liners.
Wallop's acerbic stance has not made him
one of the more popular members. He is a man
who frequently appears edgy and frustrated at
Senate life even when it seems to be going well
for him. He does not derive much evident
satisfaction from the exchange of opposing
views; often, he leaves the impression that he
believes those who disagree with him are igno-
rant.
Sometimes, he seems to suggest that his
opponents are worse than ignorant. His harsh
tone has been most evident toward those who
have been on the other side in debates over
Central America policy, in which he has been
one of Reagan's most militant defenders.
Early in 1987, Wallop told the Senate that
consideration of continued aid for the Nicara.
guan contra rebels offered a stark choice. To
vote to cut off aid, he said, "cannot be inter-
preted as anything other than a'vote in favor of
the Sandinista regime.... It is a vote for com-
munism in Central America."
Wallop's comment brought an angry retort
from Connecticut Republican Lowell P.
Weicker ?Ir.. who was outraged by the implica.
tion that he supported expansion of Soviet
power. Although he said he was not questioning
Weicker's patriotism. Wallop not only refused
to withdraw his statement, but expanded it.
His opponents. he said, were "meekly" accept-
ing the Soviet "Brezhnev Doctrine," which is
said to hold that a country that has adopted
communism cannot be allowed to renounce it.
There is an apocalyptic quality. to Wallop's
foreign policy views. Other conservatives, in-
cluding Reagan. voice frequent optimism about
restoring American supremacy in-the world.
Wallop seems to portray the spread of totalitar-
ianism as inexorable, and himself as a voice in
the wilderness struggling in vain to fight it. _
Wallop is well-known in the conservative':':
movement as an early. advocate of Reagan . s,
strategic defense initiative missile defense sys
tem. Working with a small group of defense
scientists. he pushed construction of laser
armed space satellites .long before such ideas
.were taken seriously. Wallop's, isolation ended
in 1983. when Reagan announced his support
for a space defense system.
But Wallop takes a dim view of the direc-
tion in which the administration has pushed
SDI since then. He argues that Pentagon plan
ners have mistakenly pursued exotic, futuristic
weapons instead of what could be put into.
place within a few years. "The drive for anti-
missile defense was hijacked by the Reagan
administration's incompetent and unfaithful
crew." he said on the fourth anniversary of
-Reagan's SDI speech. -
Wallop and a group of conservative allies
favor rapid deployment of a more basic system
designed to knock out Soviet missiles before
they reach their targets. While acknowledging
that the system would not provide the leak-
proof' "umbrella" sometimes depicted by Rea-
gan. they argue that it would make a Soviet
attack too difficult to he attempted.
1669
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he-I, iie Wall.,p preoccupat,-,n wuh 1?r
eicn pi,.h'-v. his nu t -icnili':utt r. do in I h( !'!it I)
Cnn:rt wa, in -upport of an--ther .,f
prim' initiator- tex ove-rhaol.
A strong advocate of reductions in individ-
ual tax rates. Wallop was skeptical of the tax
proposal that emerged from the administration
in 1985. By the time Finance markup had
begun in the spring of 1986. he was even more
doubtful. warning that "none of us are commit-
ted to tax reform." and questioning whether it
was worth the effort to attack special-interest
tax breaks if marginal rates were still to be
above the 25 percent level he favored.
When committee Chairman Bob Packwood
came up with his last-minute effort to save the
bill by dramatically lowering rates. however.
Wallop - became one of his key allies. More
importantly. his hacking gave the bill a conser-
vative seal of approval that helped ensure sup-
port from others on the right who had been
wavering.
Wallop grew disenchanted with the bill as
it progressed past Finance. By the conclusion of
conference negotiations with the House. he was
unhappy enough with the loss of certain busi-
ness deductions that he voted against it. "I
have seen us fritter away the opportunity of a
lifetime on the altar of convenience," he com-
plained. But that late criticism did not matter
much; the important thing was that he had
supported the bill at. the crucial time.
Along with his conservative crusades. Wal-
lop also maintained an important role on the
energy and public-lands issues that had domi-
nated the first part of his Senate career. As
chairman of the Public Lands and Reserved
Water Subcommittee at Energy and Natural
Resources. Wallop had a key position defend-
ing Wyoming's interests. kkith nearly half of
Wyoming's land federally owned, and with wa-
ter rights a vital issue. he was able to monitor
every bill that would affect those subjects.
Wilderness issues dominated W'allop's
work on the subcommittee in the 98th Con-
gress. The panel was extremely busy reporting
more than a score of bills setting up wilderness
areas in most Western states, including Wyo-
ming. Along with Energy Chairman James A.
McClure of Idaho. Wallop helped clear the way
for passage of the bills by working out a com-
promise with House Democrats on the fate of
areas that might. be designated as wilderness.
Wallop also was active in.legislation facili-
tating the development of coal slurry pipelines.
The issue was a potentially difficult one for
him. Wyoming is a coal state, and coal produc-
ers are eager to have the pipelines. but they
would use large quantities of the state's scarce
water. di%ertinc it from farmer- and ranchers
Vt allop and Mc('Iure developed a compromise
t,, the 19&. coal .lurrv hill that sought to
protect arid Western states front having their
water taken for pipeline- without their ap-
prmal. The bill was not enacted.
Wallop was never enthusiastic about be.
coming Ethics Committee chairman in the 97th
Congress. His two years in the position were
marked by only modest success.
Wallop took over at Ethics with strong
criticisms of the Senate's existing ethics code.
"It is bad for the morality of the Senate." he
said. '-and bad for the public's perception of the
Senate." He said he would seek to end the
"diddly little rules that serve no public purpose
and keep those that do.
Wallop's greatest challenge as committee
chairman came when the Senate held its trial of
New Jersey Democrat Harrison A. Williams Jr.
on Abscam briber- charges. The Wyoming sen-
ator guided Williams' expulsion resolution
through the Ethics Committee, but took a back
seat to the Democratic vice chairman of the
panel, Howell Heflin of Alabama, when the
resolution -reached the Senate floor. That re-
flected Wallop's desire to avoid the appearance
of a partisan campaign against" Williams.
It also made for a more effective presenta.
tion of the case on the floor. Wallop has a
stilted speaking style and he often seems to be
mumbling inaudibly under his breath; Heflin, a
polished orator, gave an eloquent recounting of
the evidence against Williams.
In 1985, Wallop ran for chairman of the
National Republican Senatorial Committee,
losing by one vote to John Heinz of Pennsylva-
nia. While he had the support of most of the
GOP's conservative wing, Wallop was unable to
overcome the reluctance of many senators to
have two Wyoming senators in the leadership
at the same time. . .
At Home: Wallop's Senate performance
has erased differences he had earlier - in his
career with the more conservative wing.of the
Wyoming GOP.
Campaigning for the 1974 Republican gu-
bernatorial nomination, Wallop was viewed as a-
moderate and drew some of his support from
voters sympathetic to environmental causes.
Coming from far behind, he wound up. second
among four candidates who finished in a virtual
tie, separated by fewer than 1.5(X) votes.
Interesting as a statistical oddity, the pri-
mary was disastrous for Republicans, since all
four contenders felt they should have been the
winner. When Wallop did not assist the even-
tual nominee. conservative.rancher Dick Jone
many party loyalists were displeased."
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But Wall,') -.Iced that probiem remark
ahly i?a il~ in 1976. carnpaiuning from the right
against three-terns Dem~,cratic men. Gale W.
Mct;ee. Although nl c rnp.inie+and other busi-
ness interests were somewhat leery about hack-
ing him. Wallop got valuable help from na-
tional conservative rganizations. He depicted
McGee as supporting big government and criti-
cized him for infrequent visits to the :fate.
The challenger's television commercials
were especially effective. Wallop saddled up a
horse. donned a cowboy hat and urged voters to
join the "Wallop Senate drive." He ridiculed
environmental regulations by portraying a cow-
boy forced to hitch a portable toilet to his
horse. The ads helped Wallop overcome a per=
sonal background that might have been a prob-
lem. Although he was a third-generation Wyo-
ming resident and an eight-year veteran of the
state Legislature. he was born in New York
City. educated at Yale. and had a grandfather
who once sat in the House of Lords.
The 1982 election presented a mirror im-
age of Wallop's earlier campaigns for statewide
office. He found himself under fire from envi-
ronmentalists who claimed he had foresaken
their cause, and criticized by his Democratic
.,pp,ment hor being inaccessible to constituents.
The Democrat was former state Sen. Rodger
\lcDaniel, a 10-year state legislator whose path
to the Democratic nomination was cleared
when Gov. Ed Herschler announced he would
.eek re-election rather than challenge Wallop.
McDaniel painted the incumbent as a ser-
vant of big oil interests and claimed Wallop
had "not had one independent thought on the
economy- since Ronald Reagan's inauguration."
But like Wallop in 1974. McDaniel had to be
careful not to alienate more conservative mem-
bers of his own party - some of whom were
hesitant to hack a man who had been state
coordinator for Edward M. Kennedy's 1980
presidential campaign.
Wallop played up his support for the presi-
dent -. he backed Reagan on 71 percent of the
votes recorded in 1982 - and promised to work
to protect Wyoming water.
McDaniel proved an energetic campaigner
and, buoyed by Herschler's strong guberna-
torial showing. carried several counties along
Wyoming's predominantly Democratic south-
ern tier. But Wallop's 31 million treasury en-
abled him to nail down Republican votes in the
rest of the GOP-dominated state.
Committees
Voting Studies
Energy and Natural Resources (5th of 9 Republicans)
Presidential
Party
Conservative
Public Lands. National Parks and Forests (ranking); Mineral Re-
sources Development and Production: Water and Power.
Support
Unity
Coalition
Year
S
0
S
0
S
0
Finance (7th of 9 Republicans)
Energy and Agricultural Taxation (ranking); International: Trade;
1986
93
5
94
- 3
95
1
Taxation and Debt Management. 1
1985
73
14
88
5
83'
5
1984
86
4
91
1
94
0
Small Business 17th of 9 Republicans)
1983
72
22
83
9
82
9
Competition and Antitrust Enforcement (ranking): Export Ex-
1982
71
18
82
10
86
5
pansion.
1981
85
9
91
.3
93
1
Key Votes
1982 General
Produce MX missiles (1985)
Y
Malcolm Wallop (R)
94,725
(57%).
Weaken gun control laws (1985)
Y
Rodger McDaniel (D)
72.466
(43%)
Reject school prayer (1985)
N
1982 Primary
Limit textile imports (1985)
Amend Constitution to require balanced budget (1986)
N
Y
Malcolm Wallop (R)
61.650
(81%)
Aid Nicaraguan contras (1986)
Y
Richard Redland Jr. (R)
14,543
(19%)
Block chemical weapons production (1986)
Impose sanctions on South Africa (1986)
N
N
Interest Group 'Ratings
Campaign Finance
Year ADA ACU AFL-CIO
CCUS
Receipts
1986
Expend- 1985
0
0
100
95
0
5
97
1982
Receipts
from PACs
itures 1984
5
91
0
3
76
83
Wallop (A)
51.115.179
$472.240 t42%)
1983
$1.102.046 1982
5
10
64
74
1
8
75
McDaniel (D)
5392.351
$174.483 (45%.%a)
5389.511 1981
10
71
5
100
95
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Malcolm Wallop
R-Wyoming
Reelection Year: 1988
Began Service: 1977
SR-237 Russell Senate
Office Building
Washington, DC
20510-5001
[phone]
BIOGRAPHICAL
Born: 2/27/33
Home: Big Horn
Educ.: B.A., Yale U.
Prof.: Rancher
Rel.: Episcopalian
KEY STAFF AIDES
Name
Position
Legislative Responsibility
Byra A. Kite
(307-634-0626)
State Rep.
Janis Budge
Press Secy.
Pam Fox-
Office Nlgr.
Lynn Munroe
Legis. Dir.
Energy Committee (Oil, Natural Gas, Coal,
Alternatives)
Jodi E. Brayton
Legis. Asst.
Public Lands. Indian Affairs, Fish and Wildlife,
Endangered Species, Water
Michael J.
Chakarun
Legis. Asst.
Finance Committee (Taxes, Trade)
Jack D. Crouch II
Legis. Asst.
Defense, Foreign Affairs, Intelligence
Michael Hoon
Legis. Asst.
Labor Committee; Government Affairs, Bud-
get, Nuclear Energy, Environment and Public
Works
Bonnie S. Cannon
Legis. Aide
Small Business, Judiciary; Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs
Marian Jacob
Legis. Aide
Veterans. Post Office, Commerce
Kristi Wallin .
Legis. Aide .
Agriculture
Gayle E. Pitts
Pers. Secy.
Kathi Wise
Appts. Secy.
COMMITTEE. ASSIGNMENTS
Committee Subcommittee(s)
Energy and Natural' Public Lands,. National Parks and Forests, Ranking Minority Mem-
Resources ber ? Mineral Resources Development and Production ? Water and
Power
Energy and Agricultural Taxation, Ranking Minority Member
? International Trade ? Taxation and Debt Management
Small Business Competition and Antitrust Enforcement, Ranking Minority Member
? Export Expansion
OTHER POSITIONS
Senate Republican Committee on Committees ? Senate Coal Caucus ? Western State Coalition
? Senate Arms Control Observer Group ? Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
? Congressional Task Force on.Afghanistan
STATE OFFICES
2201 Federal Bldg., Casper, WY 82601 .....................................
(307)
261-5098
2009 Federal Center, Cheyenne, WY 82001 .................................
(307)
634-0626
2515 Foothill Blvd., Rock Springs, WY 82901 ................................
(307)
382-5127
40 So. Main St., Sheridan, WY 82801 .................................. :.....
(307)
672-6456
P.O. Box 1014 (Post Office Bldg.), Lander, WY 82520 .........................
(307)
332-2293
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Angelo Codevilla
Mr. Codevilla was Senator Wallop's designee to the
Staff of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence for
eight years--from about 1976 to 1984. He left that position
and went to the Hoover Institution at Stanford where he
currently is working. For a brief period (about 90 days) in
1980-81, Mr. Codevilla served on President-elect Reagan's
Executive Branch transition team.
Mr. Codevilla has written extensively on national
security issues including arms control. He has another book
in work now, entitled, "Peace and War." It is intended to
be a college text.
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