SENATOR NUNN'S WEHRKUNDE REMARKS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M00005R000700130051-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 30, 2012
• Sequence Number: 51
• Publication Date: February 8, 1988
• Content Type: CABLE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP90M00005R000700130051-0
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UNCLAS MUNICH 00543
GENEVA FOR NST/ACDA, USVIENNA FOR MBFR, VIENNA FOR CSCE/PAA
E.O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: SENATOR NUNN'S WEHRKUNDE REMARKS
BELOW IS THE TEXT, AS DELIVERED, OF SENATOR SAM NUNN'S
REMARKS BEFORE THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY MEETING OF THE
ANNUAL WEHRKUNDE CONFERENCE, HELD ON SUNDAY, FEBRUARY
7, 1988, IN MUNICH, WEST GERMANY.
(BEGIN TEXT.) FROM ONE PERSPECTIVE, THE INF TREATY,
WHICH OF COURSE IS OUR FOCUS IN THE ALLIANCE TODAY,
REPRESENTS THE SUCCESSFUL CULMINATION OF A LONG AND
ARDUOUS JOURNEY. THE TREATY IS A TRIUMPH OF ALLIANCE
COHESION AND DETERMINATION IN WHICH THE NATO ALLIANCE
CAN JUSTIFIABLY. TAKE PRIDE. IT IS A TRIBUTE TO THE
GOVERNMENTS PARTICULARLY IN THE BASING COUNTRIES,
WHICH DISPLAYED SUCH RESOLVE AND COURAGE IN
IMPLEMENTING THE DEPLOYMENTS IN FACE OF WIDESPREAD
DOMESTIC OPPOSTION AND CONSIDERABLE SOVIET
PROPAGANDA. THE TREATY ALSO REFLECTS THE CONTINUITY-
IN THE UNITED STATES BETWEEN TWO SUCCESSIVE
ADMINISTRATIONS -- ONE DEMOCRATIC AND ONE REPUBLICAN
-- WHICH, WITH BIPARTISAN SUPPORT IN CONGRESS, STOOD
TOGETHER IN SUPPORT OF NATO'S "TWO-TRACK" POLICY.
FINALLY, SPECIAL CREDIT MUST BE GIVEN TO OUR ABLE
NEGOTIATORS, INCLUDING SOME HERE TODAY -- AMBASADORS
UNCLASSIFIED
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NITZE, KAMPELMAN AND GLITMANN, AND OF COURSE I THINK
THEY HAVE REPRESENTED OUR COUNTRY VERY WELL, AND THEY
HAVE REPRESENTED OUR ALLIANCE VERY WELL.
WHILE THE TREATY CODIFIES IMPORTANT ACHIEVEMENTS, WE
MUST NOW VIEW THE AGREEMENT THROUGH A WIDER LENS. TO
ASSESS THE FULL IMPLICATIONS OF THE INF TREATY FOR
NATO SECURITY, WE MUST CONSIDER THE BROADER FRAMEWORK
WITHIN WHICH IT WILL BE IMPLEMENTED, AND I BELIEVE
THAT WHAT CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT SAID ABOUT SALT II IN HIS
IISS SPEECH ABOUT TEN YEARS AGO APPLIES EVEN MORE SO
TODAY REGARDING INF: THE MORE WE STABILIZE STRATEGIC
NUCLEAR PARITY BETWEEN EAST AND WEST . . . THE GREATER
WILL BE THE NECESSITY TO ACHIEVE A CONVENTIONAL.
EQUILIBRIUM AS WELL."
WHEN CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT MADE THAT SPEECH, THE SOVIET
UNION WAS ONLY BEGINNING TO DEPLOY THE SS-20, AND NATO
OF COURSE HAD NO PERSHING II OR GROUND LAUNCHED CRUISE
MISSILES. IF THE INF TREATY IS FULLY IMPLEMENTED WE
WILL RETURN TO THAT SAME ZERO/ZERO SITUATION IN TERMS
OF THOSE SPECIFIC SYSTEMS. HOWEVER, AS PHIL KARBER
HAS POINTED OUT, WE MUST CONSIDER WHAT THE SOVIET
UNION AND THE WARSAW PACT HAVE ADDED IN CONVENTIONAL
AND BATTLEFIELD NUCLEAR POWER IN CENTRAL EUROPE DURING
THE LAST TEN YEARS.
THE NET INCREASE DURING THIS PERIOD IN WARSAW PACT
CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN THE CENTRAL REGION EXCEEDS THE
TOTAL INVENTORY OF SUCH SYSTEMS IN THE
FIVE-AND-A-THIRD DIVISIONS IN SEVENTH U.S. ARMY
TODAY. OVERALL, THE WARSAW PACT/NATO CONVENTIONAL
FIREPOWER ADVANTAGE HAS GROWN FROM 1.8-TO-1 TEN YEARS
AGO TO 2.2-TO-1 TODAY, AN INCREASE OF ALMOST 25
PERCENT. OF COURSE ALL OF US REALIZE, AS SENATOR
LEVIN HAS RECENTLY REMINDED US, THAT WE CAN'T COUNT
BEANS ALONE, BUT CERTAINLY THIS IS A VERY IMPORTANT
INDICATOR OF OVERALL POWER.
VIEWED FROM THIS PERSPECTIVE, THE INF TREATY MUST BE
REGARDED NOT AS AN ENDING, BUT AS A BEGINNING.
DETERRING WAR AND PRESERVING FREEDOM IS NOT LIKE
BUILDING A DAM. IT IS NOT SOMETHING THAT STAYS PUT
ONCE YOU DO IT. WHAT. THEN ARE THE CONSEQUENCES FOR
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 06 MUNICH 00543
GENEVA FOR NST/ACDA, USVIENNA FOR MBFR, VIENNA FOR CSCE/PAA
E.O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: SENATOR NUNN'S WEHRKUNDE REMARKS
NATO OF THE INF TREATY?
I AM REMINDED OF THE STORY OF THE MAN WHO HELD A SMALL
BIRD BEHIND HIS BACK WITH HIS FINGERS GRIPPED TIGHTLY
AROUND THE BIRD'S NECK. AS THE MAN PREPARED TO
SQUEEZE THE LIFE OUT OF THE BIRD, HE TURNED TO A YOUNG
BOY AND ASKED, "SON, TELL ME, IS THE BIRD ALIVE OR IS
IT DEAD?" THE YOUNG MAN, DISPLAYING WISDOM BEYOND HIS
YEARS, REPLIED, "SIR, IT'S IN YOUR HAN S."
WHETHER HISTORY JUDGES THE INF TREATY TO HAVE MADE A
POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEFENSE OF
EUROPE WILL DEPEND ULTIMATELY ON WHICH ROAD THE
ALLIANCE CHOOSES TO TRAVEL AT THIS CRITICAL JUNCTURE.
ONE NATO RDA" LEADS BACKWARDS DOWN A SLIPPERY SLOPE TO
EUROPEAN DENUCLEARIZATION, AMERICAN DISENGAGEMENT, AND
SOVIET DOMINATION. THE OTHER NATO ROAD, HOWEVER,
UNCLASSIFIED
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LEADS FORWARD THE SOLID GROUND OF SOLIDARITY,
STABILITY, AND SECURITY. TO PARAPHRASE THE YOUNG LAD,
THE CHOICE IS DUPE IT'S TN OUP HANDS.
THERE ARE SEVERAL WARNING SIGNALS ON THE ROAD THAT I
CALL THE "SLIPPERY SLOPE ROAD."
THE FIRST WARNING SIGNAL THAT WE SHOULD ALL BE AWARE
OF IS A GROWING NUCLEAR ALLERGY IN THE WEST. THE
REJECTION BY MANY OF OUR CITIZENS OF THE BASIC
PRINCIPLE OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IS THE PRODUCT NOT
ONLY OF NATO'S FAILURE TO EDUCATE OUR PUBLICS
CONCERNING THE REALITY OF THE ALLIANCE'S DECLARED
STRATEGY BUT ALSO OF CONSIDERABLE RECKLESS RHETORIC AS
TO THE ALLEGED IMMORALITY OF THIS DOCTRINE -- AND I
WOULD SAY THAT THIS TALK HAS COME FROM THE RIGHT AS
WELL AS THE LEFT.
HERE IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC, THERE IS OF COURSE A
VERY SPECIAL SENSITIVITY TO THE NATURE OF THE NUCLEAR
WEAPONS WHICH WILL REMAIN AFTER INF IS FULLY
IMPLEMENTED. AND I UNDERSTAND THAT VERY WELL. AS ONE
WHO HAS LONG QUESTIONED THE PRACTICALITY OF MANY OF
OUR SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR SYSTSMS, I UNDERSTAND THE
SALIENCE OF THIS ISSUE HERE IN WEST GERMANY.
I BELIEVE THAT THE MODERNIZATION OF OUR REMAINING
BATTLEFIELD AND THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES IS AN ABSOLUTE
NECESSITY. I WANT TO MAKE THAT ABUNDANTLY CLEAR.
HOWEVER, WE MUST RESIST THE TEMPTATION TO USE THE INF
TREATY AS THE PRETEXT FOR REVIVING PROPOSALS FOR
NUCLEAR SYSTEMS WHICH COULD NOT PASS MUSTER BEFORE.
AS WE CONDUCT OUR NEEDED MODERNIZATION IN THESE
FORCES, WE MUST NOT GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT A NUCLEAR
"FIX" IS THE ANSWER TO ALL OF NATO'S DETERRENT WOES.
LET ME EMPHASIZE THIS POINT - OUR GOAL IS TO RAISE THE
NUCLEAR THRESHOLD IN EUROPE, NOT TO LOWER IT. OUR
GOAL IS TO MAKE ANY WAY IN EUROPE LESS LIKELY.
THE SECOND WARNING SIGN ON "SLIPPERY SLOPE ROAD":
CHANGED PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD THE UNITED STATES AND
THE SOVIET UNION. THE POLLS PORTRAY A GROWING
SKEPTICISM IN EUROPE OF THE CREDIBILITY OF THE U.S.
NUCLEAR GUARANTEE TO NATO, WE ALL KNOW THAT ALSO.
WHEN THE UNITED STATES PUTS NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO
EUROPE -- AS SECRETARY CARLUCCI HAS SAID, MANY
EUROPEANS FEAR THAT OUR INTENTION IS TO CONFINE A
UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 06 MUNICH 00543.
GENEVA FOR NST/ACDA, USVIENNA FOR MBFR, VIENNA FOR CSCE/PAA
E.O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: SENATOR NUNN'S WEHRKUNDE REMARKS
NUCLEAR WAR TO EUROPEAN SOIL AND THEREBY INCREASE THE
LIKELIHOOD THAT OUR CENTRAL STRATEGIC FORCES WILL
NEVER BE EMPLOYED. WHEN THE UNITED STATES TAKES
NUCLEAR WEAPONS OUT OF EUROPE, MANY'EUROPEANS FEAR
THAT OUR INTENTION IS TO AVOID A U.S. NUCLEAR RESPONSE
TO SOVIET AGRESSION AND THEREBY DECREASE THE
LIKELIHOOD THAT OUR CENTRAL STRATEGIC FORCES WOULD
EVER BE EMPLOYED. SOME PUNDITS HAVE SUGGESTED THAT
WHETHER WE ARE PUTTING OUR NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN OR
TAKING OUR NUCLEAR WEAPONS OUT, EUROPEAN MINISTRIES
WOULD SAVE A LOT OF MONEY BY SIMPLY INSTALLING A TAPE
RECORDING THAT SAYS: "THE AMERICANS ARE DECOUPLING!"
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OVER THE YEARS, EUROPEAN APPREHENSION OVER AMERICAN
NUCLEAR INTENTIONS HAS PROVIDED A GROWTH INDUSTRY FOR
EUROPEAN PSYCHIATRISTS. BUT FOR EVERY PSYCHIATRIST
EMPLOYED IN EUROPE, THERE IS ANOTHER HARD AT WORK IN
AMERICA ANALYZING OUR APPREHENSION OVER WHETHER OUR
ALLIES ARE COMMITTED TO THE CONVENTIONAL COMPONENT OF
FLEXIBLE RESPONSE. OCCASIONALLY, BOTH GROUPS OF
PSYCHIATRISTS ARE DEALING WITH THE SAME PROBLEM, SUCH
AS THE STATE OF SHOCK MANY OF US WERE IN AFTER~THE
REYKJAVIK SUMMIT.
WHILE CONCEDING THAT REYKJAVIK JUSTIFIED AT LEAST A
FEW SESSIONS ON THE PSYCHIATRIST'S COUCH, I WOULD
COUNSEL OUR EUROPEAN FRIENDS THAT THEY SHOULD TRY TO
BE A BIT MORE REASSURED AND RELAXED ABOUT U.S..
WILLINGNESS TO SHOULDER NUCLEAR RESPONSIBILITIES. TO
THOSE WHO REMAIN SKEPTICAL, I WOULD POINT TO ARTICEL
XI OF THE INF TREATY, WHICH PROVIDES FOR THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF A U.S. INSPECTION CAMP RIGHT OUTSIDE
THE GATE OF VOTKINSK MOBILE MISSILE FINAL ASSEMBLY
FACILITY RIGHT IN THE MIDDLE OF THE SOVIET UNION. THE
POINT OF THIS INSPECTION, I WOULD REMIND MY EUROPEAN
FRIENDS, IS TO ENSURE THAT ANY MISSILES COMING OUT OF
THAT GATE ARE NOT SS-20S CAPABLE OF HITTING PARIS,
BONN OR LONDON, BUT RATHER 22-255 CAPABLE OF HITTING
NEW YORK OR WASHINGTON OR ATLANTA.
MY POINT IS THIS: THE UNITED STATES IS COMMITTED TO
THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE. AS PRESIDENT REAGAN SAID IN
1981-, "EUROPE'S SHORES ARE OUR SHORES; EUROPE'S
BORDERS ARE OUR BORDERS." IN THE ERA OF GORBACHEV,
NATO CANNOT. AFFORD PUBLIC CONFUSION AND MISTRUST OVER
THIS FUNDAMENTAL PREMISE. IT'S NOT ENOUGH FOR NATO TO
BE SURE OF OUR POLICIES AND OUR GOALS. WE MUST BE
SURE OF OURSELVES.
THE THIRD WARNING ON "SLIPPERY SLOPE ROAD" RELATES TO
U.S. AND EUROPEAN FISCAL AND BUDGET REALITIES.
CURRENT ECONOMIC TRENDS, INCLUDING THE CHRONIC U.S.
BUDGET DEFICIT, INDICATE THAT NATO WILL MOST LIKELY
HAVE TO IMPROVE ITS DEFENSE CAPABILITIES WITHOUT
SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASING THE AMOUNT OF MONEY AVAILABLE
FOR THIS PURPOSE. IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE, OF COURSE,
THAT MISPLACED EUPHORIA IN THE WAKE OF INF COULD ERODE
FURTHER PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR ESSENTIAL FORCE
IMPROVEMENTS IN EUROPE.
IF THE U.S. CONGRESS PERCEIVES THAT THE ALLIES ARE
GOING BACKWARD RATHER THAN FORWARD IN CORRECTING
GLARING CONVENTIONAL DEFICIENCIES (WHAT I HAVE OFTEN
TERMED "AUTOMATIC ESCALATORS");.THEN THE DEBATE OVER
U.S. TROOP LEVELS IN EUROPE WILL INEVITABLY BE
REVIVED. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, THE FUTURE OF THIS
UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 06 MUNICH 00543
GENEVA FOR NST/ACDA, USVIENNA FOR MBFR, VIENNA FOR CSCE/PAA
E.O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: SENATOR NUNN'S WEHRKUNDE REMARKS
ISSUE DEPENDS ON THE PERCEPTION THAT WE ARE ALL
EQUALLY COMMITTED TO A CREDIBLE CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE
IN ACCORDANCE WITH NATO'S OWN.FLEXIBLE RESPONSE
STRATEGY. THAT WAS THE MEASURING STICK WHEN I
INTRODUCED WHAT IN EUROPE IS KNOWN AS THE "BAD NUNN
AMENDMENT" IN 1984, AND THAT REMAINS THE MEASURING
STICK TODAY.
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SO THERE CAN BE MORE THAN ONE KIND OF SLIPPERY SLOPE.
THERE IS A SLIPPERY SLOPE THAT LEADS TO
DENUCLEA_PT7ATION. THERE TC ANOTHER SLIPPFRV SLOPE
THAT LEADS TO A DISILLUSIONED AMERICA BECAUSE OF THE
ABSENCE OF LONG-OVERDUE IMPROVEMENTS IN NATO'S
CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE CAPABILITIES. THE CHALLENGE FOR
ALL OF US IS TO AVOID BOTH OF THESE SLIPPERY SLOPES
AND SEEK HIGHER AND FIRMER GROUND.
THE FOURTH WARNING SIGN ON "SLIPPERY SLOPE ROAD"
RELATES TO NATO'S RELUCTANCE TO THINK BOLDLY IN THE
AREA OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL. THERE ARE SOME
RECENT INDICATIONS THAT VARIOUS ALLIED POSITIONS ON
THE NEW CONVENTIONAL STABILITY TALKS HAVE BEGUN TO
CONVERGE. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN, HOWEVER, WHETHER THE
ALLIANCE IS CAPABLE OF UNITING BEHIND A BOLD AND
INNOVATIVE PROPOSAL.
THE FIFTH WARNING SIGN (IS) A CONTINUED FAILURE OF
POLITICAL WILL IN GETTING THE MOST OUT OF OUR
COLLECTIVE RESOURCES. ALL OF YOU HAVE HEARD THIS OVER
AND OVER AGAIN. I WON'T GO INTO DETAIL TODAY, BUT
.THAT IN NO WAY DIMINISHES THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS
ISSUE. THIS PROBLEM HAS BEEN COMPOUNDED BY OUR
INABILTITY TO TRANSLATE INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGICAL
ADVANTAGES TO THE CONVENTIONAL BATTLEFIELD. AS ONE
CYNIC OBSERVED, IF WE CAN CONFINE THE BATTLEFIELD IN
THE NEXT WAR TO THE LABORATORIES, WE ARE BOUND TO WIN.
WE ARE PERHAPS FORTUNATE THAT ALL OF THESE WARNING
SIGNS ARE SO CLEAR TO US TODAY. IF WE VIEW THESE
WARNINGS AS TRENDS THAT NEED TO BE REVERSED RATHER
THAN MILESTONES ON A ONE-WAY ROAD TO OUR ULTIMATE
DEMISE, NATO CAN PERSEVERE.
I BELIEVE THAT THE ROADMAP TO FIRM, LEVEL GROUND
REQUIRES A "THREE TRACK" APPROACH:
(2) BOLD AND INNOVATIVE CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL
PROPOSALS;
(3) VIGOROUS PUBLIC EDUCATION, INCLUDING CLEAR
EXPLANATIONS OF OUR MILITARY NEEDS AND OUR ARMS
CONTROL RATIONALE.
TRACK ONE -- IMPROVEMENTS IN CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE
CAPABILITIES: WE MUST ELIMINATE THE AUTOMATIC
ESCALATORS -- THAT IS, THE CRITICAL DEFICIENCIES IN
NATO'S CONVENTIONAL WARFIGHTING POSTURE WHICH COULD
FORCE AN EARLY USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. OF COURSE THE
SUSTAINABILITY OF AMMUNITION IS ONE OF THOSE; IF WE
DON'T HAVE ENOUGH AMMUNITION SUPPLIES IN EUROPE TO
LAST UNTIL THE AMERICAN FORCES, FOR WHICH WE SPEND
HUGE AMOUNTS OF MONEY EACH YEAR, CAN ARRIVE ON THE
SCENE AND BE PUT IN PLACE, THEN OF COURSE AMERICA IS
WASTING ENORMOUS RESOURCES EACH YEAR, AND WE MIGHT AS
WELL SAVE OUR MONEY. SO THAT IS A VERY IMPORTANT
UNCLAS SECTION 05 OF 06 MUNICH 00543
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E.O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: SENATOR NUNN'S WEHRKUNDE REMARKS
POINT.
UNCLASSIFIED
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AND OF COURSE SHELTER FOR OUR AIRCRAFT IS ANOTHER
IMPORTANT POINT, SHELTER AND MINIMUM ESSENTIAL
FACILITIES. SECOND, WE MUST CONTINUE TO PURSUE THE
BALANCED TECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE, WHICH SEEKS WAYS TO
EXPLOIT THE WEST'S ADVANTAGE IN TECHNOLOGY TO RENDER
SOVIET TANK ARMIES OBSOLETE. AND I'M CONVINCED OVER A
PERIOD OF TIME WITH A DEDICATED EFFORT THAT CAN BE
DONE.
THIRD, WE MUST EXPAND EXISTING PROGRAMS OF COOPERATIVE
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. THESE PROGRAMS, TOGETHER
WITH SIDE-BY-SIDE TESTING OF U.S. AND ALLIED WEAPON
SYSTEMS, CAN BE A TURNING POINT IN REVERSING THE TREND
TOWARD STRUCTURAL DISARMAMENT AND IN REDRESSING THE
CONVENTIONL IMBALANCE.
AMBASSADOR DAVE ABSHIRE HAS A RECENT SWING AROUND
EUROPE AND TALKED ABOUT A NUMBER OF ITEMS THAT CAN BE
PURSUED WITHOUT SPENDING A HUGE AMOUNT OF ADDITIONAL
RESOURCES. PHIL KARBER HAS RECENTLY SAID THAT NATO'S
CHALLENGE IS TO "THINK SMARTER, NOT RICHER," AND I
AGREE WITH THAT.
THE SECOND TRACK (IS) BOLD AND INNOVATIVE CONVENTIONAL
ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS. I BELIEVE THE GOAL OF A
STABLE, NON-THREATENING CONVENTIONAL BALANCE WOULD BE
PROMOTED BY THE NEGOTIATED WITHDRAWAL OF ABOUT
ONE-HALF OF U.S. AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN THE NATO
GUIDELINES AREAS OR BY REDUCTIONS BY BOTH NATO AND THE
WARSAW PACT TO COMMON CEILINGS. UNDER EITHER
APPROACH, AND WE'VE GOT TO STUDY WHAT APPROACH MAKES
THE MOST SENSE HERE, WE SHOULD BE GUIDED BY THE
FOLLOWING OBJECTIVES:
- WITHDRAWAL AS COMPLETE COMBAT UNITS, INCLUDING THE
APPROPRIATE SLICE OF HELICOPTER AVIATION ASSETS;
- WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES TO BEYOND THE "ATLANTIC TO THE
URALS" REGION;
- WITHDRAWAL OF EQUIPMENT TO DISTANCES THAT WOULD
EQUALIZE REINFORCEMENT TIMES; AND
- ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTRUSIVE VERIFICATION REGIME TO
INSURE THAT THOSE WITHDRAWN UNITS REMAIN WITHDRAWN,
AND TO PROVIDE EARLY WARNING OF SOVIET MOBILIZATION OF
ITS GROUND FORCES.
OF COURSE, ANOTHER ELEMENT BEYOND THE STRUCTURAL
DISARMAMENT WHICH IS A KEY CHALLENGE RELATES TO WHAT I
HAVE CALLED AND OTHER HAVE CALLED "OPERATIONAL
STEPS." THESE STEPS SHOULD, IN MY OPINION, BE
COMPLEMENTED BY FAR-REACHING CONFIDENCE AND
SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES (CSBMS) TO INSURE AND
INCREASE. THE TRANSPARENCY OF THE WARSAW PACT'S
MILITARY POSTURE, INCREASE THE AMOUNT OF WARNING
AVAIABLE TO NATO PRIOR TO A SOVIET ATTACK, AND REDUCE
THE POSSIBILTY OF AN INADVERTENT WAR SHOULD BOTH SIDES
DECIDE TO MOBILIZE IN A CRISIS. NATO'S OBJECTIVE IN
THE SO-CALLED CDE II NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE TO BUY
TIME FOR ALLIED LEADERS TO DECIDE TO REACT AND TO
ACCOMPLISH THAT REACTION.
A WORD OF CAUTION IS IN ORDER: CONFIDENCE AND
SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES ARE NOT A PANACEA. UNLESS
COUPLED WITH MEASURE TO SHORTEN NATO'S REACTION TO
UNCLAS SECTION 06 OF 06 MUNICH 00543
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E.O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: SENATOR NUNN'S WEHRKUNDE REMARKS
WARNING TIME, ITS MOBILIZATION TIME, AND ITS
REINFORCEMENT TIME, IMPROVED WARNING TIME IS OF
MARGINAL VALUE. IN OTHER WORDS, IF YOU DON'T KNOW
WHAT TO DO WITH IT ONCE YOU GET IT, IT DOESN'T DO MUCH
GOOD.
.THE WELL-ESTABLISHED RULE THAT THE DEFENSE SHOULD
PREVAIL EVEN IF THE ATTACK-TO-DEFENSE RATIO IS ABOUT
3:1 ONLY WORKS IF THE DEFENDING SIDE DETECTS THE
ATTACKER'S PREPARATIONS, MAKES THE CORRECT DECISIONS,
GETS ITS UNITS TO THEIR CORRECT WARTIME LOCATIONS AND
DIGS IN.
IF THE SOVIET UNION IS PREPARED UNDER THE TERMS OF THE
INF TREATY TO ALLOW AMERICANS AT VOTKINSK AND TO OPEN
ITS SS-25 GARAGES TO OVERHEAD U.S. RECONNAISSANCE SIX
TIMES A YEAR, THEN WE SHOULD NOT SHIRK FROM PROPOSING
INNOVATIVE SCHEMES FOR ON-SITE ACCESS TO MILITARILY
SIGNIFICANT NODES IN THE WARSAW PACT'S MOBILIZATION
INFRASTRUCTURE. I SUGGEST THESE INCLUDE AIRFIELDS,
RAILROAD YARDS OR EVEN HEADQUARTERS.
THE OBJECTIVE OF EFFORTS BOTH ON THE ARMS CONTROL
TRACK AND THE FORCE IMPROVEMENT TRACK OUGHT TO BE A
STABLE, NON-THREATENING BALANCE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES
IN EUROPE.
SO, IN SUMMARY, FORCE IMPROVEMENTS, CONVENTIONAL ARMS
CONTROL, AND PUBLIC EDUCATION MUST EACH BE ON THE
AGENDA FOR THE FORTHCOMING NATO SUMMIT. THE NATO
SUMMIT SHOULD BE THE OCCASION FOR A SOLEMN
REAFFIRMATION OF THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO THE ALLIANCE
IN BOTH ITS NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL COMPONENTS. IT
SHOULD ALSO BE THE OCCASION FOR A SOLEMN REAFFIRMATION
ON THE PART OF OUR ALLIES TO TAKE CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE
SERIOUSLY AND TO SHARE EQUITABLY THE BURDEN OF
COLLECTIVE DEFENSES.
IN ADDITION, THE HEADS OF STATE SHOULD CONSIDER HOW
THE FREE WORLD'S ECONOMIC POWER AND TECHNOLOGIACL
PROWESS, INCLUDING THAT OF OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES IN
THE PACIFIC, CAN BEST COMPLEMENT AND STRENGHTEN NATO'S
MILITARY STRATEGY IN ENSURING ALLIED SECURITY IN THE
DECADES AHEAD.
THE ALLIANCE HAS KEPT THE PEACE FOR FORTY YEARS
BECAUSE WE HAVE HAD LEADERS OF VISION. THE ALLIED
HEADS OF STATE WHO WILL GATHER AT THE SUMMIT THIS
SPRING WILL BE JUDGED AGAINST THIS VERY HIGH
HISTORICAL STANDARD. WHILE OUR VALUES AND OUR GOALS
ARE CONSTANT, OUR CHALLENGES ARE NEW AND WE MUST THINK
ANEW. THE FUTURE OF NATO IS IN OUR HANDS. (END
TEXT.) FISCHER
UNCLASSIFIED
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/30: CIA-RDP90M00005R000700130051-0