MEMO TO IVO SPALATIN(SANITIZED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M00005R001100060018-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 2, 2012
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: January 11, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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OCA.88-0048
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Congressional Affairs
O -V
N
Washington, D.C. 20505
Telephone: [phone] January 88
TO:
Mr. No Spalatin
house Foreicn Affairs Committee
2401-A`Rayburn Building
Washington, .
Here! are the reports that were mentioned.
Have a good.trip.
House Branch
Office of Congressional Affairs
Enclosures-
' ?R"` 1533 POBSOLETE R
OR EVIO.86 EDITIONS
DISTRIBUTION.:
Original - Addressee
OCA/HA/~
STAT
STAT
STAT
4
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Weekly since 1V4,9 THE CURRENT .DIGEST
OF
THE SOVIET PRESS
PRIMAKOV CITES NEED TO BALANCE SPENDING ON
ECONOMY, MILITARY ; POLITICAL MEANS (ARMS CUTS),
'COMMON-SENSE' CONCESSIONS ARE IMPORTANT IN
GAINING SECURITY; NO EXPORT OF REVOLUTION
A NEW PHILOSOPHY OF FOREIGN POLICY. (By Academi-
cian Ye. Primakov. Pravda,. July 10p. 4. Complete
text;) I.-One can requen y ear it said: From the first
days of Soviet power, our country has been struggling for
peace among peoples-what kind of new approaches, and,
especially, what kind of new foreign-policy philosophy can
one talk about, when peace remains the main goal of. the
USSR's foreign policy?
The continuity of the Soviet state's foreign-policy line Is
indisputable, of course. But all the same, at present quali-
tatively new conditions, as M. S. Gorbachev, General Sec-
retary of the CPSU Central Committee, has repeatedly em-
phasized, make it necessary-perhaps more insistently nec-
essary than at any earlier time in our history-to treat a
whole series of key problems of International life in an in-
novative way.
As the world approached the 1980s, it was rapidly losing
faith in the incontrovertibility of its long-held perspective.
The problem of survival, which had existed before this as
well, was now posed acutely as the problem of preserving
human civilization from inevitable destruction in the event
of a thermonuclear war.
Relatively recently, we still said-and not only said
but were certain of it-that if the imperialist forces com-
mitted aggression against us, they would be consumed in
the flames of the war they had kindled. In the past, this
conclusion had every right to existence. Its function in giv-
ing warning to a potential aggressor was obvious, but per-
haps the main thing consisted in the -mobilizing power of
such a statement: It pointed to the need for increasing
fighting efficiency as virtually the only means of maintaining
.the country's security at the proper l l vel,
Comparatively recently, we considered peaceful coexis-
tence a respite that would be cut short by those who again
would try to strangle the first country of victorious. social-
ism. This situation also insistently dictated the requirement
for an increase in fighting efficiency, once again as virtu-
ally the only means of ensuring the country's security.
Today such assessments and interpretations are clearly
insufficient and inaccurate. While maintaining the ea
im ortance of im rovin is defens
Union is bringing to the fore political means of ensuring its
securi_ y_e are opera jog in a un amenta y new Si ua-
Volume XXXIX, No. 28 - August 12, 1987
New. `Flexibility'. in Soviet Foreign Policy
Lion: With the accumulation of weapons of mass destruction
in such quantities and of such high quality, there can be no
victors in a thermonuclear- war Thus o aceful coexiqtpncp
Is becoming a vital requirement for the survival of mankind-
al for such a situation to insistently demand
not only new methods of carrying out foreign policy, espe-
cially for the great powers, but also a fundamentall y new
. _.y 1
(1985) plenary session of the .., -A-CA 111C Z1Pr
CPSU Central Committee9; It
must be
agmittee that the experience of preceding develop-
ment, when we sometimes used the epithet "historic" in
vain, is by no means conducive to the setting of new "his-
toric landmarks." However, in this case the matter at hand
is not an artificially designated but a real Rubicon, from
which a radical qualitative change began in the USSR's
domestic and foreign practice alike.
Perhaps the organic link between our country's domestic
policy and its foreign policy has never before been as mani-
fest as it istoday. . After the April plenary session, a
course was set aimed at the acceleration of the economic,
social and political development of the Soviet Union. The
F IN THIS ISSUE
New `Flexibility' in Soviet Foreign Policy........... 1
Restructuring's Strategic Implications ................. 5
Gorbachev Exhorts Media on Restructuring...... 6
Gromyko Reports on Public Discussion Law ..... 9
Law on Public Discussion of Major Issues ......... 13
Kazakh Party Ordered to Fight Nationalism..... 15
Can US Forestall South Korean `Explosion'? .... 17
Copyright 1987 by The Current Digest of the Soviet Press.
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 UV 1
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FBIS-SOV-87-245
22 December 1987
`Reasonable Sufficiency' Concept Assessed
AU181551 Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA. POLITIKA,
IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 12 December 1987
/Signed to Press 18 Nov 87) pp
-FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
[Article by V.V. Zhurkin, S.A. Karaganov, and A.V.
Kortunov: "On a Reasonable Sufficiency"-boldfaced-
passages as published]
[Text] The concept of a reasonable sufficiency, which
represents one of the most important elements in the
new political thinking, is achieving recognition wherever
people attempt to perceive and evaluate the contempo-
rary critical period in the development of international
relations and all human civilization, and to find ways
and means of averting a nuclear catastrophe. This con-
cept is increasingly appearing as the foundation for a
rational approach to halting the arms race, which has
gone beyond all conceivable bounds. Can the accumula-
tion of more than 50,000 nuclear warheads on our
planet, or the total numbers in states' standing armies in
peacetime, which is close to 30,000,000, really be con-
sidered reasonable or sufficient?
Of course, the arms race has its own logic of develop-
ment, its own criteria of rationality. If one works accord-
ing to these principles, one can not only substantiate the
expediency of maintaining present military potentials
but also prove the need for further buildups of them. The
concept of reasonable sufficiency is in fact intended to
break up the closed logic of the arms race, to overcome
the speculative scholastic nature of many contemporary
military doctrines and concepts, and to place the discus-
sion of military problems in a broad political, economic,
and social context.
The concept of reasonable sufficiency is not a possession
monopolized by any one state or political party. The very
fact that similar ideas are simultaneously being voiced
by U.S. antiwar movement activists, by the leaders of a
number of developing countries, by the state and party
leadership of the PRC, and by the governments of
neutral European states, speaks of the fact that the
problem of new approaches to military activity became
ripe long ago and urgently requires a solution. At the
same time, the most significant and radical steps to
assert reasonable sufficiency in the theory and practice
of international relations are being undertaken by the
USSR.
This concept was put forward during CPSU Central
Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev's visit to
France in the fall of 1985 (Footnote 1) (M.S. Gorbachev:
"Selected Speeches and Articles." Moscow, 1985, p 313),
substantiated in the CPSU Central Committee Report to
the 27th party congress (Footnote 2) (Documents of the
27th CPSU Congress. Moscow, 1986, p 67), and was
then developed in a number of authoritative statements
and speeches by Soviet leaders. The idea of reasonable
sufficiency has also been reflected in the collective
documents of the socialist countries, specifically in the
Budapest (1986) statement by the Political Consultative
Council of Warsaw Pact member states, and in the
document entitled "On the Military Doctrine of Warsaw
Pact Member States" signed in May 1987 in Berlin. The
--..
article by USSR Minister of Defen e~ D.T.
for the establishment of the concept o reasonable sutu-
cL-? y in contem orary m ttar -po ~tt~an -n~
(Footnote A, 27 July 19
It is natural that promotion of the concept of reasonable
sufficiency presupposes attempts to give it a concrete
form and to provide answers to questions about the place
of reasonable sufficiency both in states' joint efforts to
consolidate international security and reduce arms, and
in each state's foreign political strategy; and also to
answer questions of the criteria for sufficiency and
rationality, and of effective methods of weaving them
into the fabric of international relations today and in the
future. This article is an attempt to come closer to an
understanding of certain concrete aspects of reasonable
sufficiency.
Has there been any historical experience of the applica-
tion of the principle of reasonable sufficiency to the
nuclear age in the period since World War II? It would
seem that there has been such experience, although it was
fragmentary, limited in its consequences, and inade-
quately thought out as a concept.
The first successful efforts in the attempt to set limits to
the buildup of nuclear arsenals were the well-known
Soviet-American SALT I and SALT II Treaties and
agreements on strategic arms limitations. The ABM
Treaty , which still remains a powerful obstacle in the
way of "Star Wars," has played an exceptionally impor-
tant role in preventing an arms race in space for over a
decade. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons and other international acts aimed at curbing
nuclear weapons are of intransient significance.
The history of the postwar period has also provided
ou
ra Ica num ers of the Soviet Armed Forces
at the end of the fifties under conditions in-w i , the
J
Unite -Slates-. er countries, too, ave provided
..~+ -rt,- thv PRC_ s
examples of unilateral measures.
unilaterally cutting its Armed Forces by Imi n o-
eral measures aimed at sufficiency.
Historical experience attests to the possibility of both
multilateral and unilateral measures. But it also speaks
of something else: The efforts made so far have not been
enough to halt the arms race. This gives rise toima need ed ator
a
a new, concentrated, large-scale approach
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UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 1
AIMFULL
SUBJECT:. f/akhromeyev artcle 1of6.
KEYWORDS:
akhromeyev,article,nov 87,ic.
COMMENTS:
Akhromeyev's article on doctrinal issues,part 1 of 6. Hard line.
CDS
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RTTUZYUW RUDKFVA0372 3651617 MTMS-UUUU--RUEBHAA RUEBHAA.
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FM FB.IS VIENNA AU
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RUEBHAA/STORAGE CENTER FBIS WASHINGTON DC
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(DUE TO COPYRIGHT OR OTHER RESTRICTIONS, THE FOLLOWING ITEM IS
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BODY
SUBJ
TAKE 1 OF 6--USSR JOURNAL ON WARSAW PACT MILITARY DOCTRINE
AU311607
MOSCOW PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA.IN RUSSIAN NO. 12, DEC
87 (SIGNED TO PRESS 6 NOV 87) PP 23-28
//((ARTICLE BY MARSHAL.OF,THE SOVIET UNION SERGEY FEDOROVICH
AKHROMEYEV, MEMBER OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE, CHIEF-OF
'GENERAL STAFF OF THE USSR ARMED FORCES,-AND USSR FIRST
DEPUTY MINISTER OFDEFENSE: "THE DOCTRINE OF PREVENTING WAR,
DEFENDING PEACE AND SOCIALISM"--PASSAGES WITHIN SLANTLINES
PUBLISHED IN BOLDFACE))
((TEXT)) THE DOCUMENT "ON THE MILITARY DOCTRINE OF THE
WARSAW PACT MEMBER STATES," ADOPTED AT THE BERLIN CONFERENCE
(FOOTNOTE 1) (HELD IN MAY 1987) OF THE POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE
COMMITTEE, HAS GENERATED A BROAD RESPONSE FROM THE INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC. AND THIS IS UNDERSTANDABLE. TODAY THE NUCLEAR DANGER
THREATENS EVERYONE. SURVIVAL.IN THE NUCLEAR-SPACE AGE HAS BECOME
THE MAIN TASK OF ALL MANKIND. THEREFORE, A DECISIVE SHIFT TO A
POSITION OF THE NEW POLITICAL THINKING IS NO LESS IMPORTANT IN THE
MILITARY SPHERE THAN IN POLITICS.. IT IS TIME TO COMPLETELY
RENOUNCE OUTDATED VIEWS ON THE PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY; TO OVERCOME THE.THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
"NUCLEAR DETERRENCE," ON WHICH THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES AND
THE NATO BLOC IS STILL BASED; TO REMOVE THE MUTUAL SUSPICION AND
MISTRUST-THAT HAS ACCUMULATED OVER MANY DECADES; AND TO ACHIEVE A
BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF EACH OTHER'S CONCERNS AND INTENTIONS.
IT IS PRECISELY THIS. THAT THE ALLIED SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAD IN
MIND IN DECIDING TO PROMULGATE THEIR MILITARY DOCTRINE, WHICH IS THE
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