DRUG CZAR: PROVISION FOR DCI AUTHORITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M00005R001400010042-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 17, 2012
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: August 31, 1988
• Content Type: MISC

Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/17 :CIA-RDP90M00005R001400010042-5
. ~ OCR ~"~w~ _.~,M:~
OCA 2925-88
STAT
STAT
1~ CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
"'~~~:%/ Washingto
~A)ES~/ Telephone 1 AUG 1968
TO: ~' ? ~'~ Jones
Legislative Analyst
Office of Management and Budget
,Per our discussion, I'm including "talking
points" on the two sections we discussed, Alexander
and Broomfield amendments, as well as two other
sections of concern to us: R&D Centers and DCI
Authorities vis a ~~~ ~ ~~'~=r _
Legislation Division
Office of Congressional Affairs
STAT
I
Attachments (4)
FORM ~ 533 OBSOLETE
2-86 PREVIOUS
EDITIONS.
oCA/LEe
Distribution:
Original -Addressee
1-=~.OCA~Records_
1 - PS Signer
(31 August 1988)
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~ s ruu ~y6a
DRUG CZAR: PROVISION FOR DCI AUTHORITIES
Billsr
Byrd
Draft ??1001
- 1014
Dole
Draft ?1001
- 1015
Issue:
H.R.
5210/H.Rept.No. 100-861 - Brooks Amendment
Current law limits the authority of the Drug Policy
,Board/Chairman vis a vis the DCI:
Notwithstanding the authority granted in this
section, the Board and the Chairman shall not
interfere with routine law enforcement or
inteligence decisions of any agency and shall
undertake no activity inconsistent with the
authorities and responsibilities of the Director
of Central Intelligence under the provisions of
the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, or
Executive Order 12333. 21 U.S.C. ?1203 (d)
Protects DCI's authorities in areas of: information
protection, program management any buoget autonomy
Information protection: retains existing DCI
statutory authorities to protect sensitive
intelligence sources and methods while providing
intelligence information to anti-drug law enforcement
Program management: retains DCI's role as central
manager of all national intelligence programs
Budget_autonomY: retains DCI's authority to guide,
coordinate and administer national intelligence budget
in response to complex and continually changing
requirements for intelligence support from the
President and senior policy advisors
21 U.S.C. 1203(d) was in earlier drug czar bills: S. 789
(Biden bill) & H.R. 4868 (Hughes/NicC,ollum)
Neither Byrd, Dole, Hughes or Brcoks contain 21 U.S.C. ~1203(d)
Byrd & Dole have information protection provisions:
X1007 (a) (2) in both bills. Brooks and Hughes have none
None protect DCI program management or budget authority
Position:
Any drug czar legislation must contain 21 U.S.C. E1203(d)
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R&D CENTERS
Bills: Byrd Draft: ?4501
Not In Dole Draft or H.R. 5210/Amendments
?4501 would require drug czar to develop plan for President to
submit to Congress for use of DoD and Community R&D facilities
to support law enforcement efforts. GAG would be given
oversight
Currently, application of Intelligence Community technology to
law enforcement purposes is handled cooperatively between
Community and law enforcement agencies through various
administrative mechanisms.
Nc oversight role for the General Accounting Office.
Conference Report on FY '89 Intelligence authorization Bill
(House Report No. 100-879) requests DCI, SecDef and the various
law enforcement agencies to develop by 1 March 1989 a plan to
expand cooperation even further. House Report No. 100-879, p.
22.
Issue:
?4501 is unnecessary, in light of conference report
GAO role would be objectionable intrusion of GAO into
intelligence oversight.
Position:
?4501 should be deleted as unnecessary. Failing that,
references to Community facilities should be dropped and/or
provision giving GAO oversight. should be deleted.
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Increased Use of Anti-Drug Covert Actions
******************************************
Bill: H.R. 5210 - Broomfield Amendment
Alternate versions of Sense-of-Congress resolution that
Intelligence Community should be more actively involved in
combatting illicit international drug trafficking through the
use of covert operations.
Issue: Covert action, by definition,- is action not officially
acknowledged by the United States .Government.
Open, official reference/discussion discussion can' be
counterproductive to a particular use of covert action as well
as to the conduct of covert actions generally.
Z~here are a variety of channels between the Congress and the
Executive in which such discussions can take place.
Position:
Broomfield amendment is objectionable since it specifically
suggests that covert actions vis a vis international drug
trafficking be initiated/increased.
Of the two versions, the second is the most objectionable.
A provision in any final version of the drug bill which calls
upon. the Intelligence Community to increase intelligence
activities directed at combatting illicit international drug
trafficking would be unobjectionable.
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S t r- -
-~~ Alexander Amendment - "Anti-Stonewalling Act"
*********************************************
Bill: H.R. 5210 - Alexander Amendment
Requires an officer or employee in the Executive Branch to make
disclosure of "illegal foreign drug activities" information
through the agency head. Agency head, in turn, would disclose
to law enforcement agency and, upon request, to the Congress
and the General Accounting Cffice. Zhe President must be
notified of any determination of nondisclosure and must notify
Congress of this. GAO could sue Executive Branch to obtain
information.
Issue:
Amendment is objectionable for a variety cf reasons:
Congressional regortin~ revuirements:
Could compel disclosure of "raw intelligence reporting"
Allowing any committee to request information turns
all committees into "intelligence oversight"
committees for narcotics information purposes
Puts GAO into intelligence oversight business,
Duplicates existing duty of DCI/Community to keep
intelligence committees "fully & currently informed"
Withholding mechanism is cumbersome .&
institutionalizes Executive-Legislative Branch disputes
Term which "trips"obligation is vague, leading to
underreportingjoverreporting with resulting problems
Executive Branch_Reporting_Requirements:
Duplicates long-standing, carefully-crafted, flexible
administrative mechanisms for reporting intelligence
information to law enforcement authorities: E.G.
12333 and other liaison mechanisms
Subordinates Presidential foreign relations powers and
duties to Presidential law enforcement powers and
duties, "tying the hands" of .the President
Could be interpreted as requiring certain Community
units to turn over entire product to law enforcement
agencies
Position:
"Anti-Stonewalling Act" amendment is objectionable and should
not be passed in any form
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