TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE RE: SOUTH AFRICA SANCTIONS

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M00005R001400110008-2
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• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 6, 2013
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: July 1, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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OCA FILE
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Africa Division/DO
Chief, F,PS/DO
Chief, Africa & Latin America Division/DI
Associate General Counsel for the DO
FROM:
SUBJECT:
1 July 1988
OCA 2224-88
Office
Legislation Division
of Congressional Affairs
Testimony Before the Senate Re: South Africa
Sanctions
Attached for your information is a copy of the prepared
statement of the Deputy Secretary of State, John C. Whitehead,
before the Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations regarding
S. 2378, the South Africa sanctions bill.
Attachment
OCA/LE6
(1 July 19 88 )
Distribution:
Original - Addressees
1 - DDL/OCA
1 - DD/HA/OCA
OCA,Regi?s_tTy
OCA7Leg/Subject File:
1 - Signer
1 - OCA Read
South Africa
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S 8486 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE
from the Inter-American Development
Bank, ADMIC made approximately
2,300 microbustness loans averaging
$200 each. ADMIC estimates that one
job was created for every loan made.
During this same time period, ADMIC
also provided skills training and other
forms of technical assistance to about
4.800 microenterprises. In addition to
providing these services, ADMIC
played a leading role in establishing
eight affiliate organizations in seven
Mexican states and training their di-
rectors and staff. It also helped to es-
tablish an association of 150 microen-
trepreneurs and has assisted groups of
carpenters, seamstresses, and rug-
makers to organize small trade associa-
tions. Based upon its performance.
ADMIC negotiated a loan guarantee
from the U.S. Agency for Internation-
al Development which was used to es-
tablish a $450.000 line of credit for mi-
croentrepreneurs with the Banco Mer-
cantil del Norte. ADMIC's success has
also resulted in the creation of a simi-
lar state-run program in Monterrey.
Mr. President, each of these exam-
ples provides evidence that low coat
aid programs are successful in achiev-
ing lasting results. In this era of
budget restraint, we should realize?as
these examples demonstrate?that
helping others to help themselves
need not cost a great deal of money.
The experimental project approach of
the Inter-American Foundation has
worked well.
ASSOCIATION or A/sataktICAN
CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE BI-
CENTENNIAL OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION ESSAY CONTEST
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I am
pleased to join Senator STEVENS in
congratulating the winners of the Bi-
centennial Essay Contest held by the
Association of American Chambers of
Commerce in Latin America.
These students are talented individ-
uals. and I commend them for their
contributions to the bicentennial of
the Constitution.
Over the- 200 years of its existence.
the U.S. Constitution has demonstrat-
ed a formidable ability to respond to
challenges from any source?whether
from the militant rivalry of totalitar-
ian governments, or from the more
friendly competition of parliamentary
democracies, or from the political ex-
tremes in this country.
Again and again over the past two
centuries. the Constitution has proved
its capacity to protect and expand our
freedom, while safeguarding the en-
during values essential for liberty to
grow and flourish.
All of the winners of the bicenten-
nial essay contest should take pride in
their achievement. Their participation
has enriched their own lives and their
countries, by developing a greater un-
derstanding of the principle of the
separation of powers in the U.S. Con-
stitution that helps to make it the pre-
cious charter of liberty and democra-
cy. If the Pounding Fathers were here
today. I ani snare they -would he as
proud as we are of the achievements
of these students.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, a bi-
centennial essay contest was recently
held by the Association of American
Chambers of Commerce in Latin
America. High school and college stu-
dents from 13 countries in South
America, Central America, and the
Caribbean participated in the essay
contest. The essays analyzed the sepa-
ration of powers in the American
system of government and the avoid-
ance of political extremes.
Considering recent problems in the
Philippines, Panama, and Nicaragua. it
is enlightening to see that young
people from our southern neighboring
countries recognize the greatness of
our Nation's constitutional system.
Our attention is usually focused on
the problem areas in Central and
South America?and for good reason.
There are countries that are having
serious problems. But these are the ex-
ceptions. This contest should serve to
remind us that democracy is spreaditg
in Latin America.
The U.S. greatest contribution
this democratic movement has been
example. Our Constitution?the bac
bone of our Nation?has endured th
test of time. These students have rec-
ognized this.
Karen Conway. 17, first-place winner
from the Dominican Republic wrote:
The Constitution has survived cleavage
because of the separation of powers. As a
general guide for management, it has ad-
justed and expanded to the new conditions
Imposed upon it. The very fact that it is
able 'to adapt to change and isn't explicit
has made it workable. The Constitutional
Fathers must have certainly intended it this
way and must have trusted the American
people.
Ricardo Torres de Mello, 17, first-
place winner from Brazil, noted:
Some people have criticized the separa-
tion of powers arrangement. arguing that It
creates confusion. causes delays and contrib-
utes to a lack of direction in American gov-
ernment. But this is the prize (sir/ that
must be paid to safeguard against potential
abuses of the powers of the government.
Power tends to corrupt!
Robert Lustberg, 16, first-place
winner from Mexico said:
The Founding Fathers separated the gov-
ernment into three branches. Yet one must
say that the Constitution as well works due
to the people which play a role in the politi-
cal life of a country, for they try to hold the
pieces together, and when an anarchist or
havoc-wreaker finds his way in, he may
very well upset the system. The separation
of powers hence can be said to help make
*the Constitution work for it provides a
framework in which the precepts of the
Constitution car, be easily enforced, making
it easier for the Constitution to work.
The other winners of the essay con-
ten expressed similarly enthusiastic
perceptions of our constitutional
system.
As members of the International
Committee of the Commission on the
Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution,
June t 1988
would Wee to join Senator 1Cs2!wcox
In asking unanimous consent that the
list of 13 winners of the Latin Ameri-
can Bicentennial Essay Contest be
printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the winners
were ordered to be printed In the
REOORI), as follows:
Karina Mason. 17, Lincoln School
Buenos Aires. Argentina.
Ricardo Torres de Mello. 17. Graded
School of Sao Paulo, Sao Paulo, Brazil.
Martin Escobari, 15, Lscuela Cooperative
Santa Cruz. La Paz. Bolivia.
Paulina Bardor., 16, Santiago College,
Santiago. Chile.
Karen Conway, 17. Carol Morgan School.
Santo Domingo. Dominican Republic.
Michael Torres, 14, American School,
Guayaquil. Ecuador.
Tanta Brett. 16, American School. El Sal-
vador. El Salvador.
Juan Carlos Guiroia Palc-ncia, 18. English-
American School. Guatemala City. Guatf -
mala.
Danis Flores. 18. Maya School, Teguci-
galpa., Honduras.
Phillip Bailey. 22, University of West
Kingston, Jamatc.a_
Robert Lust-berg, 16, American School
Foundation. Mexico City. Mexico.
Sergio Luis Zanotti Cava=oni, 17, Amer--
an School. Asuncion. Paraguay.
Richard Kechichiarn. 18, Liceo Miranda.
ontevideo. Uruguay.
ADMINISTRATION SOUTH
AFRICA POLICY
Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, yes-
terday the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on which I serve began a
series of hearings on the issue of U.S.
economic sanctions against South
Africa.
At the hearing. the Honorable John
C. Whitehead, Deputy Secretary of
State, presented an explanation of the
Reagan administration's views on
pending legislation that would impose
further economic sanctions on South
Africa arid Namibia. I thought MT.
Whitehead's exposition of the issues
was excellent.
Mr. Whitehead's testimony was pro-
fessionally competent. He is one of the
State Department's most eloquent wit-
nesses. As a public service I ask unani-
mous consent that the full text of his
prepared statement be printed at this
point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the testi-
mony was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, ELS follows:
TESTFMONY OF DERDTY SECRFTARY OF STATE
Join,: C. WEIFFMEAR -
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this oppor-
tunity to present the Administration's views
on Senate Bill 2378, the Amendments to the
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986.
If enacted, this legislation could have im-
portant consequencea for the future ci
American dipicma,:y in South Africa and in
the Southern Africa region. For reasons I
hope to make clear in my testimony, the Ad-
ministration strongly opposes Senate bill
237E. American interests are not served by
legislation which requires that we experi-
ment in the economic destabilization of
South Africa without genuine prospects of
contributing to the solution of that coun-
try's problems.
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I Br.-:-21M77f,M7rOtlfr;t1jr4-t- _.Mr.-Makilr240"7,_';: 1;*?'
June 23, -1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE - S 8487
Despite our strong objections to this bill,
we are quick to recognize the feelings Which
motivated it. South Africa's apartheid
system is repugnant to all Americans. While
many governments tolerate or even surrep-
titiously encourage discrimination on the
basis of ethnicity, only in South Africa is
racial discrimination a civic duty arid the
failure to practice it a punishable offense.
Among nations which profess to identify
with Western, democratic values, only
South Africa classifies individuale, herds
them into groups, and strips them of their
Individual political rights according to racial
and ethnic criteria. This monstrous injustice
affronts us all and cries out for redress.
Our aversion deepens when we are con-
fronted by the stubborn resistance of the
South African government to appeals for
peaceful change. Successive generations of
black activists?during the defiance cam-
paigns of the early 1950s and early 1960s,
during the Soweto uprising of the 1970s.
and in the latest wave of township protest
from 1989 to 1936?have been shattered by
progressively harsher and more sophisticat-
ed forms of official repression. Despite re-
peated, worldwide censure and the imposi-
tion of severe sanctions?some of them
dating back more than twenty years?South
Africa's governing elite remains steadfast in
Its determination to retain its monopoly on
political power.
Injustice and inequality are entrenched in
South Africa, but net all the trends are neg-
ative. Over the past ten years, the nature of
apartheid has changed markedly. Numerous
petty apartheid provisions have fallen by
the wayside, the Pass Laws have been
scrapped, central business districts have
been opened to blacks, and black labor
unions have been legalized and have made
impressive organizational strides. These
changes testify to a growing awareness
among many South African whites that
apartheid in its purest sense is impractical
and uneconomic, if not actually immoral.
Consistent with this trend is the finding of
the Dutch Reformed Church two years ago
that no scriptural justification exists for the
practice of apartheid. Another institutional
pillar of the Afrikaner establishment, the
Broederbond, also broke with apartheid or-
thodoxy at that time. Regrettably, this will-
ingness to dispense with some forms of
racial discrimination has not yet developed
into a consensus in favor of addressing the
truly critical issue confronting South Africa,
which is the issue of permitting all South
Africans to participate in deciding how and
by whom they are governed.
A clear and dispassionate analysis of the
crisis gripping South Africa is required if
the United States hopes to play a construc-
tive role there. Our interests demand that
we avoid the pitfalls of desperate activism
on the one side and resignation and disen-
gagement on the other. We must accept
that the transition to a non-racial democra-
cy in South Africa will inevitably take
longer than all of us would like. We must
also understand that South Africans them-
selves?black and white?will be the agents
of their own liberation, with outsiders, in-
eluding the United States, playing only a
secondary role at best. Above all, we need to
acknowledge that such limited influence as
we currently possess derives from our con-
tinuing presence on the ground in South
Africa. A progressive U.S. business presence.
an official aid program reaching out to tens
of thousands of black South Africans. our
persistence in urging South Africans to con-
front the imperatives of dialogue and com-
promise and to consider u hat they are for
as well as what they are against?these are
the most important assets we have for chal-
lenging apartheid. We can condemn, cen-
sure and sanction?as this legislation re-
Quires?and 'hope against logic and experi-
ence that we can achieve some beneficial
result. Or we can take a longer view which
refuses to disengage, preserves our lines of
communication, our contacts and our limit.-
ed resources Within South Africa. and posi-
tions the United States to Intervene posi-
tively at the moment when our limited le-
verage can accomplish the most good.
THE FALLACY OF SANCTIONS
Three years ago, at the height of the vio-
lent unrest in black townships across South
Africa. it was fashionable to argue that
apartheid had entered its final crisis. Activ-
ists in South Africa, exiled black leaders and
many observers in Europe and the United
States predicted that only a final push was
needed to topple the system. Comprehen-
sive and mandatory international sanctions
were thought by some to be precisely the
push required.
These prognostications were obviously
wide of the mark. Few persons familiar with
existing power relationships in South Africa
seriously believe that a rapid resolution of
the crisis is possible?with or without sanc-
tions. pressure. Surely it was unrealistic to
expect the South African government to re-
spond tour pressure by ending the State of
Emergency, releasing political detainees or
meeting any of the other conditions for lift-
ing sanctions outlined in the Comprehensive
Anti-Apartheid Act. Not surprisingly, the
South African government refused categori-
cally to meet these demands.
Presumably in recognition of these fac-
tors. Congress has modified its expectations.
In reporting out HR 1580, the House For-
eign Affairs Committee describes sanctions
as spart of a medium-to-long-term approach
designed to maximize both internal and ex-
ternal pressure on the apartheid regime".
The House report further notes that to
ensure their effectiveness, sanctions must
be multilaterialized: that U.S. pressure
alone will be insufficient to accelerate the
pace of change in South Africa.
It should be clearly understood that the
Administration has consulted intensively
with South Africa's main trading partners,
all of whom are major allies of the United
States. For the most part, these govern-
ments are strongly disinclined to either
follow an American lead or act unilaterally
In adopting further punitive sanctions. Our
allies either reject or are highly skeptical of
the premise that by destabilizing the South
African economy, the West can somehow
engineer a relatively peaceful transition to
democractic rule in South Africa. Moreover,
these governments judge?as does the Ad-
ministration?that international sanctions
cannot be effectively enforced without re-
course to military measures.
As some of you may be aware, we have re-
ceived in the past two weeks separate, offi-
cial communications from the European
Community and the British government in-
forming us of their deep concerns over ex-
traterritorial provisions in this bill. Passage
of S2378. particularly the secondary boycott
features, could lead to GATT disputes with
our major trading partners and undermine
the U.S. negotiating position in the current
round of GATT talks.
We should not, therefore, delude our-
selves into thinking that it is possible to
internationalize sanctions under American
leadership. Our allies will resist this ap-
proach, at least until such time as we can
demonstrate convincingly that cutting trade
links, selling off assets, and relinquishing
contracts across the board in South Africa
will result in something other than a costly,
symbolic protest.
-The central Miley 01 the ilancticms ap-
proach Is .not limply that it Isn't feasible.
Rather, the problem lies with a fundamen-
tal *misreading of South African political
and economic realities, and with the accept-
ance of a false correlation between econom-
ic pain and positive social change. Simply
put, sanctions are the wrong tool brought to
the wrong job.
Sanctions are the wrong tool because
South Africa has the resources to resist an
economic siege and has been preparing for
such a contingency for many years. Al-
though heavily dependent on international
trade, South Africa has domestic deposits of
virtually every key raw material input
needed for an industrial economy, with the
major exceptions of crude oil and bausite.
The South African government and private
sector have spent millions of dollars stock-
piling strategic imports--ranging from crude
oil and bauxite to computer and aircraft
parts; these stockpiles would provide a cush-
ion against shortages until alternative
sources of supply could be found or import
substitution projects completed
Based on previous experiences with inter-
national embargoes against South Africa,
we believe that direct controls on shipments
to South Africa would probably not prevent
South African importers from obtaining the
foreign supplies that they need. One possi-
ble exception would be certain high-technol-
ogy goods, for which adequate enforcement
mechanisms already exist.
With regard to South African exports. 65
percent of export, earnings are made up of
low bulk/high value items such as gold. dia-
monds and strategic minerals. Most econo-
mists believe that an effective boycott of
these commodities would he difficult or im-
possible to enforce. The remaining 35 per-
cent, mainly steel and manufactured prod-
ucts, would be more vulnerable to a general
boycott. Even here, however, a boycott
aould not be airtight. For example. in the
past two years sanctions have closed 80 per-
cent of South Africa's traditional export
market for steel, yet South African steel ex-
ports were only down by about 2.9 percent
through October of last year. Given South
Africa's proven capacity for trade realign-
ment and diversion and its still untested ca-
pacity for full-scale sanctions-busting, we es-
timate that even reasonably well-enforcsd
comprehensive U.N. sanctions would cut
total export receipts by something less tlian
25 percent.
The net result of a total trade embargo on
South Africa would almost certainly be far
less dramatic than proponents of the sanc-
tions approach believe. The impact is likely
to be a moderate recession over the medium
term, comparable to the 1982-1986 period in
South Africa. Over the longer term, con-
traints on growth and s decline in competi-
tiveneas could push South Africa deeper
into recession.
But, whatever their economic conse-
quences, what counts is the political impact
of sanctions. As one leading South African
Marxist theoretician recently noted in a re-
versal of his previous position. the criterion
for sanctions should be the question of
whether they consolidate the position of
the black worker and black organizations.
He concludes that sanctions don't meet t1.-.at.
criterion. As I will point out, sanctions are
far more likely to produce perverse results:
mild discomfort, at most, for white elitcrs,
but a risk of severe economic dislocation for
the black work force.
THE ECONOMIC COSTS TO TEE UNITED STATES
Sanctions are not cost-free for the tini4ed
States. S. 2738 will require U.S. business to
find new markets, assuming they are at
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.7 .! 1.17:174510-.7777ftr-. -
8488 !CONGRESSIONAL 'MORD --SENATZ June 24 1986
able. for over i1.2 billion in annual exports
Of mostly manufactured and high-technolo-
gy goods. The forced ligtaidation of over 41
billion In direct US. investment will change
little in South Africa except to consolidate
the position of local business interests ac-
quiring these assets at well below market
value. It is reasonable to expect that at least
some U.S. companies will challenge the con-
stitutionality of this provision on the
grounds that it results in the confiscation of
assets without fair compensation.
While the precise impact of sanctions on
the U.S. economy is hard to measure, some
inclustrim will be more seriously affected
than others. Studies indicate that the U.S.
coal industry has already lost an estimated
f250 million over the past three years. A siz-
able portion of the loss is due to market dis-
tortions causeal by existing U.S. sanctions
against South Africa. Foreign customers of
the U.S. government enriching services who
use South African uranium provide approxi-
mately $350 million a year in revenues.
Some of these customers will take their en-
richment bieriess to Europe and the Soviet
Union lithe U.S. cannot process their mate-
rial.
These estimates do not include the poten-
tial cost of South African countersanctions.
Even a temporary disruption of strategic
mineral exports to the United States would
bete, serious. repercussions over -a broad
range of U.S. industries. ?
According to the U.S. Bureau of Mines,
the direct economic costs to this nation re-
sulting from a decision to embargo South
African strategic and critical minerals im-
ports are estimated at f1.85 billion per year.
Abut 94 percent of these- estimated costs
are for two platinum-group metals (PGM's),
platinum and rhodium.
Platinum is primarily used in the produc-
tion of automate. e catalytic converters, and
about P.vo-thirds of 1986 total domestic in-
dustrial consumption was used for this pur-
pose. In 1985, the United States imported 66
percent of its platinum supplies form South
Africa.
Outside the Soviet Bloc, there are insuffi-
ciere alternative supply sources to South
Africa to meet United States platinum
metal requirements. In 1986, the total pro-
duction of countries other than South
Africa and the Soviet Union, including do-
mestic primary and secondary production.
could only satisfy about 40 percent of
United States demand.
Rhodium is a very rare metal absolutely
essential for compliance with Clean Air Act
auto emissions standards for nitrous oxides.
Omitting the Soviet Union and other cen-
trally planned economies, U.S. consumption
of rhodium was almost one-half of the
Western world total. The primary applica-
tion of rhodium is in the production of auto-
motive catalytic converters. Over 70 percent
of U.S. consumption (93 thousand ounces in
1986; was used in this application in 1985.
Rhodium demand is increasing worldwide as
emission-control requirements are placed on
nitrous oxide emissions, and as the control
requirements are applied to a larger fleet of
vehicles. In 1936, South Africa provided
about 53 percent of Western world supply,
the Soviet Union 38 percent, and secondary
recovery 5 percent. There are insufficient
non-South African rhodium supplies to
meet U.S. demand.
It should he pointed out that while the
South African government has never threat-
ened the U.S. with a disruption or a cut-off
of strategic minerals supplies, it is certainly
has this option. Pretoria also has the option
of slapping countersanctions on neighboring
black states., all of whom are critically de-
pendent on South African trade or trans-
port router, or both. Passage of this bill
would put South Africa's intentions to the
test with regard to both the U.S. and our in-
terests in stable development Of the region.
T! POUTICAL COM Cif SAINCTIONS
If sanctions are the wrong tool, they are
also being used for the wrong fob. Ostensi-
bly alined at influencing South Africa's key
decislonmakers. sanctions mite this target
altogether while hitting everyone else, caus-
ing collateral damage in precisely those sec-
tors of South African society which are
pushing hardest for fundamental, peaceful
change.
If comprehensive, international sanctions
against South Africa are extended, we
should anticipate that the main losers will
be South African blacks. They will be the
first to suffer the effects of a prolonged re-
cession in terms of lost opportunities. lost
Jobs, and decreased government spending on
black housing, black education, and services
provided to black townships. This is unin-
tended and possibly tragic economic impli-
cation of the sanctions approach.
At the same time, the forced withdrawal
of U.S. corporations from South Africa will
end funding and logistical support for a
wide range of programs designed to promote
black economic empowerment. foster black
self-reliance, and build professional and
leadership skills U.S. and other Western
corporation play an important part in help-
ing to sustain an estimated 2.000 such pro-
grams which exist at the grassroots level. In
the face of mounting restrictions on most
forms of opposition political activity, these
programs provide a vital organizational net-
work and fall-back position for those blacks
working to build the power bases necessary
for challenging the government.
In less direct fashion, we stand to lose
other opportunities to deflect repressive
measures directed at blacks. If the threat of
a total economic embargo on South Africa
becomes reality. the South African govern-
ment have even fewer reasons to heed
outside advice on what it regards as its in-
ternal political affairs. Although our stand-
ing with the South African government will
have even fewer reasons to heed outside
advice on what it regards as its internal po-
litical affairs. Although our standing with
the South African government declined
sharply following passage of the ComPre-
bensive Anti-Apartheid Act in 1986. we re-
tained enough influence to argue persua-
sively in favor of a stay of execution for the
Sharpeville Six. We have also successfully
lobbied to postpone and. hopefully, side-
track pending legislation which could end
all foreign funding to groups whose activi-
ties the government broadly defines as "po-
litical." These are small but significant
achievements. We cannot realistically
expect to repeat them if we continue down
the road toward punitive trade embargoes
and a severance of ties with South African
officialdom.
I cannot accept the argument that by in-
flicting additional economic hardship politi-
cal frustration on South African blacks we
create the conditions necessary for a suc-
cessful challenge to apartheid system. Nor is
it reasonable to think that sanctions will
have a demoralizing effect on white elites.
thereby rendering them more vulnerable to
pressures for fundamental change. Under
any conceivable sanctions scenario the
South African government will assign top
priority to protecting white jobs and to en-
suring that the police and military are
funded .at levels sufficient to avoid any de-
cline in their capabilities. The suppression
of new outbreaks of black unrest is a fore-
gone conclusion. To suppose that outside
powers can rearrange government priorities
through economic quarantines and reduced
genteel with South Africa is to misread
tragically the slaying power of the Afrika-
ner minority and its determination _to put
its security ahead of all other interests. in-
cluding the Interests of South Africa as a
whole.
South African blacks sill be the primary.
but not the only, victims of an International
sanctions campaign against South Africa
Other victims will be those South African
Whites who most closely identify with Amer-
ican democratic ideals and who support
black aspirations for a more just society.
Leaders such as Frederik ran Zyl Slabbert.
Wynand Malan, Helen Sunman. and Denis
Worral staunchly oppose an economic and
diplomatic quarantine of South Africa. As
they struggle to build bridges across South
Africa's racial divide, they need the support
that a strong U.S. presence?both official
and unofficial?provides. They have seen
sanctions contribute to a siege mentality
among whites which the ruling National
Party has successfully fostered and exploit-
ed by converting to its ranks thousands of
relatively moderate. English-speaking voters
over the past two years. They have also wit-
nessed a steady erosion over the past year of
fundamental civil liberties even in the hith-
erto protected sphere of white politics. The
same noose which has been used to strangle
black dissent is now coiled expectantly
around the white, reformist opposition. By
dissociating ourselves from South Africa, we
simply make it easier and less costly for au-
thorities to pull that noose tighter.
By the same token. ultra-conservative fac-
tions in South Africa are Increasingly drawn
to the prospect of cutting trade links,
ending the U.S. business presence in South
Africa. and limiting contact with the West.
From their standpoint, a strong American
presence is an unwelcome restraint on
South Africa's internal and external policy
options. Conservatives resent what they
regard as American meddling in South Afri-
ca's internal affairs, including our financial
and moral support to anti-apartheid groups,
and our persistence seeking ways to dis-
mantle racial barriers arid promote dialogue.
They also resent American films and televi-
sion programs, our music, journalism and
popular culture because of their supposedly
subversive influence on a younger genera-
tion of Afrikaners. South Africa's 1J.N, rep-
resentative was speaking to this constituen-
cy when, in responding a few months ago to
harsh criticism of South Africa in the Gen-
eral Assembly, he invited the international
community to "do its damndest" to Preto-
ria. He could have as well added: "and close
the door behind you.- Neither hardliners in
the National Party, nor the growing con-
servative opposition. nor the more militant
organizations even further to the right will
mourn the absence of Americans from
South Africa.
SANCTIONS AND THE ELACE OPPOSITION
Claims that the overwhelming majority of
South African blacks support sanctions
cannot be substantiated. Certainly respect-
ed black leaders of community, labor.
church and student organizations, as well as
the ANC and PAC in exile, continue to call
publicly for further punitive measures
against Pretoria. Some. like Archbishop
Desmond Tutu, believe that sanctions are
the only alternative to uncontrollable vio-
lence. Leaders of the Front Line States have
also. in past years at least, been outspoken
in calling for U.S. and Western sanctions
against South Africa.
Yet there are signs that over tne past two
years a serious rethinking of the sanctions
stratega has taken place. Some mass organi-
zations. such as conservative black churches
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June 24 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE El 8489
and Chief Satiation's. Inkatha asovement
eartilch claims to repreesent more than six
malice Zulus. him away* been oPPeeed to
international sanctions. Other organisa-
tions, such as the National African Foie, &L-
ed Chamber of Commerce, which represents
most major black business interests, official-
ly subscribe to sanctions while /staving hxh-
vidual members ample rOODI to examen
doubts. Even within the staunchly pro-sanc-
tions COSATU? debate simmers over the
wisdom of promoting international embar-
goes.
While it would be wrong to infer that
black oPeosition leaders are simply out of
touch with their rank and file, debate over
the effectiveness of sanctions is unquestion-
ably IhnUer now than ever before. This new
mood is captured in Soweto Playwright
Gibson Mentes popular drama eSekunialo."
which depicts cornrades destroying a town-
ship by intimidating, burning and boycott-
ing. It ends vith a declaration of hatred for
Al rikaoter rule and a dance routine In which
the actors sing -Who's gonna plant that
cane? Who's gonna drive that train? Who's
gonna fly that planer Kentea actors re-
count the events of the 11150s when the
Xhosa nation killed its catOe and burned its
grain in the faith that the dead would rise
and the Russians would come to drive the
British into the sea. The actors compare
those times with the current calls for sanc-
tions and bemoan the self-destructive tradi-
tion of black South African resistance to
white rule.
The Marxist intellectual and leader of the
black-consciousness-based National Forum,
Neville Alexander?hardly an apologist for
apartheid?makes the same argument from
a different perspective. Re wrote recently
that "I believe . . . that the insistence on
total sanctions Is senseless?as senseless as
an unqualified academic boycott and unlim-
ited school boycotts?which amount to sui-
cide if you do not have real power, and U
the government is not yet so weak that such
pressure can bring it to its knees."
Across South Africa's borders, reassess-
ments of the effects of sanctions and possi-
ble South African countersanctions on the
economies of the Front Line States are also
underway. As a result, Front Line leaders
have modified their rhetoric, moved serious
discussions of sanctions to the margins of
international meetings and abandoned plans
to apply sanctions of their own. Trade be-
tween South Afriat and most neighboring
states has actually increased over the pent
year.
These observations are not meant to sug-
gest that black South Africans have come to
terms with white domination, or that South
Africa's black-ruled neighbors have accept-
ed the status of satellites to the region's
economic superpower. What has occurred, I
believe, is that sanctions have been re-evalu-
ated and strong znisgtrings have developed
about both their high costs and elective-
ness.
EKE:PING OPEN 0.6, OPTIONS
I alluded earlier to the combination of
outrage and impatience with which many
Americans react to the situation in South
Africa. But neither we nor South Africans
can afford U.S. policies motivated primarily
by passion. There exists a broad American
consensus on what is wrong in South Africa
and on the steps South Africa and its citi-
zens must take to correct these wrongs. This
consensus could provide the basis for a real-
istic, workable, and non-partisan approach
to the South African CASIS.
Any sound American policy toward South
Africa must take into account at least two
fundamental constraints. First, we must
accept that South Africa's crisis in an en-
during ene. There Ere Ds Valet alnotionre
Resorting to drastic tentedies. such as the
misuse Of American power to to destabilize
the South Airican econoiny, only Increases
chances of a catastrophic outcome lor. all
South Africane Second, we must also accept
that our leverage Is Wetted. South Africa
can survive?even thrtve?withont trade or
contact with Americans. Our mm should
be one of using all available means to maxi-
mize our influence and leverage. This can't
be achieved through a policy of economic
and diplomatic dissociation from the prob-
km.
Operating from these premises, the Ad-
ministration has constructed an approach
which emphasizes both the protection of en-
during US. interests in South Africa and
the promotion of rapid, fundamental
change in that society. This aPeresech has a
number of key elements..
The Administration has undertaken stren-
uous efforts to keep open all our lines of
communication, to expand contracts scram
the racial and political spectrum., and to
open up opportunities for the kinds of nego-
tiations which are South Africa's only alter-
native to a slow descent into civil war. Over
the past eight years, all groups in South
Including the full range of opposi-
tion movement leaders, have had access to.
the highest levels of our government. We \
continue to make. it clear to the South Afri-
can government that we believe It has a spe-
cial responsibility to create the necessary
conditions in which negotiations with credi-
ble opponents can take place.
Expanding our assistance to apartheid's
victims is a top priority. South Africa's
struggling black communities-need our 11-
nutria] support, our technics/ and profes-
sional training, and our help in developing
organizational and leadership skills. These
are the building blocks from which the dis-
advantaged majority will construct a more
just and more democratic future for South
Africa. To the extent that numbers of
blacks already possess the knowledge and
the skills, and hence the economic power,
that a modern industrial state requires,
they have greatly strengthened their bar-
gaining position vis-a-vis South Africa's gov-
erning elite. We must work to develop fur-
ther this leverage and to help turn it to po-
litia advantage. This is the central thrust
of our official aid program to South Africa.
Obviously, sanctions-induced unemploy-
ment, a turn by South Africa towards au-
tarky and tighter state control of the econo-
my. and a reduced American presence in
South Africa would all wort against this
effort.
In dealing with South Africa. we InUSt
continue to put a strong emphasis on the re-
gional context. Turmoil in South Africa con-
tinues to spread outwards In shock waves
which threaten the economic and political
stability of neighboring dates. OUT regional
din/rens-en is committed to reducing these
states' economic vulnerabilities and to
easing misunderstandings and tensions in
their dealings with South Africa.
in this regard, negotiations currently un-
derway to secure Namibian independence
and the withdrawal of all foreign troops
from both Namibia and Angola assume spe-
cial importance. A negotiated solution
'would be a signal achievement for American
diplomacy and would win widespread im-
prove) throughout Africa. Progress has been
made which even -sympathetic observers
would have said a short time ago was impos-
sible. We have laid down the conceptual
basis for a settlement and brought all par-
ties to the reseidaion that Namibian inde-
pendence, the removal of foreign armies
from Angola. and the resolution of Angola's
Internal conflict are interrelated problems.
Name of these breblesos ebb be soked to iso-
lation tic= the velem ;
-Our soetliatise continues. and It is Impor.
tant that Congress- not undercut this effort
by ordering drastic changes in our bilateral
relationship 'with one of the negotiating
parties. While It may be In South Africa's
best Interests to achieve a negotiated
settle-
znent In Angola and Namibia, Pretoria could
well decide that a harsh. Wok/matte rejoin-
des
As Wa finiq note. I e to hostility
point s
out
higher bzunecliate priority.
that in a few sionthie time a new U.S. ad-
ministration will enter office and will DO
doubt undertake a review of U.S. policy
toward South Africa mad the region. It
would be wrong for Congress to commit the
United States, in the final days of this ad-
ministration, to the extreme measures con-
templated in 82378. To do so will deny the
new Administration the option of continuity
In t policy while at the same, time seri-
ously restricting iLs el:faeces before it has
even entered office.
The South African dilemma sill be with
us for some time to come. The only reasona-
ble course Americans can adopt is one which
ensures that we retain as many diplomatic
loon and channels of influence as possible
In the search Mr ways to remain relevant
and involved in finding a solution. Regretta-
bly. 62378 takes US in precisely the opposite
direction.
-
APARTHEID AS IT AFFECTS
N OSIPHO
iteLE'TZENBAUM. Mr. President,
I rise today to talk about one of the
most poignant and painful aspects of
the strife that has engulfed South
Africa.
During the Senate's hours of debate
over the situation there, we have ad-
dressed many issues.
We have debated the effects of sanc-
tions on the black minority:
We have considered how Pretoria's
actions destabilise the region as a
whole;
And we have discussed the appropri-
ate role for international corporations
to play in ending apartheid.
In my view, the Senate has played a
constructive role In charting the
course of United States foreign policy
toward South Africa, Yet, Mr. Presi-
dent, I think that in our debate over
landing rights, 8.rugerands, and disin-
vestment we sometimes overlook the
day-to-day suffering meted out by Pre-
toria's apartheid regime.
Now is a particularly important time
to remember the painful consequences
of apartheid for the children of South
Africa.
Last year, I attended a symposium
on the plight of South African chil-
dren. Many have been caught in the
web of mass arrests under Pretoria's
martial law "justice system.- in fact,
nearly one-third of the total number
of blacks detained by the Police during
the 3-year-old "state of emergency"
were children.
Mr. President, the numbers are
shocking. The state of emergency was
recently extended, and the number of
children arbitrarily jailed remains un-
conscionably high.
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